Culture, Violence and Development
Dan Tschirgi on Upper Egypt and the Gama’a al-Islamiyya

The Ivory Coast
Michael Birmingham on the West African conflict

Sustainable Development
Deena Khalil on an alternative approach

US Foreign Policy
James Petretta on the Iraq wars
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As a teacher of Political Science at the American University in Cairo I have seen all sorts of written works, everything from handwritings, printed exam-papers to M.A. theses and presentations. A number of these have been outstanding. It was a pity that such valuable research remained confined to the bilateral student-professor relationship. Students outside our own classes have not been able to learn and benefit, not only from the research of past and present colleagues, but also from what we, their instructors, produce. Many of my peers share the same frustration. At the same time, I realize that I myself have been unaware of the research outputs of my colleagues next-door. All of us follow parallel, often overlapping research tracks, eventually publishing articles, chapters and books in distant places. But our Department, and the University at large, could only benefit from new forms of mutual exchange of research taken up within the community and of views on the topics these explore.

It is from this perspective that the idea for Khamasin matured and ultimately was endorsed by our Department. Without adequate logistical, financial and staff support, it was an uncertain start. We eventually managed to print five “preliminary” hard-copy issues of working papers in late Summer 2007. Yet, besides the primary contribution of the authors, these copies were essentially the products of only my own and James Petretta’s editorial efforts. In the context of this history, an online formula for the journal was eventually developed, and a new editorial team was inaugurated in Spring Semester, 2008.

It is my hope that the Khamasin project will live, develop and expand, attracting contributions not only from Political Science students and faculty, but also from other AUC departments, as well as Egyptian and foreign academic/research institutions. But the support of our Department, both from colleagues, students and the larger AUC community, will remain essential.
The American University in Cairo’s Political Science Department welcomes you to the inaugural edition of its new journal: “Khamasin.” Khamasin refers to the hot, dry southerly wind which emerges every March from the Sahara, blowing east across the southern Mediterranean. The term, derived from the Arabic word for the number fifty, recalls the nearly two month period of erratic daily temperatures when the people of the region collectively confront the desert grit. It is in this sense of a regional “predicament” that we have named our journal; not to conflate history with the ineluctable afflictions of climate, but rather as a reminder and recognition of a shared condition, interest and future.

The coming years will test our ability to attract and deliver worthwhile material on matters of social and political import. Yet, no journal becomes a home for writers until it has properly defined its boundaries. While the American University in Cairo presents a specialized academic environment with challenges and opportunities that can only be appreciated from the point of view of its Middle Eastern locale, the perspectives of social and political researchers in the region are tasked even more heavily. With so much scholarly emphasis and interest worldwide in the Middle East, it is often difficult to break out and explore the “exotic” issues which Canadian or Paraguayan politics and society, for example, must imply. With that said, this journal will not limit itself to a consideration of the heated issues which the Middle East has for some time signified. Rather, Khamasin positively welcomes writings which reflect the diversity of our global village, shedding light on issues of shared human concern. While previous editions were essentially limited and locally distributed productions, we are now going online solely as an “open access” e-journal. On the one hand, we hope that this will permit engagement with international readers and writers in a way which will not relegate Khamasin to a forum fixated on the “other.” On the other hand, we find ourselves situated in Egypt -a multi-millennial mosaic of social and political traditions- and we similarly commit ourselves to sidestepping a fixation with the cosmopolitan lest we neglect the rich scene within which we are immersed here at home. It is, as Tagore reminded us, between these two spheres -the home and the world- that we make of ourselves what it is we become.
We live in the most interesting of ages, a view which I presume social scientists generally share if for no other reason than this: globalization (here taken to mean the process through which the societies of our planet are progressively more interconnected and susceptible to similar experiences) not only underlies a revolutionary access to information but also necessarily implies that diverse societies, systems and cultures are increasingly exposed to similar stimuli. Together, these globalizing phenomena hold out unprecedented promise for the comparative efforts upon which progress in the social sciences depends.

To speak of the pursuit of “economic development” today immediately signals a dominant policy-making orientation—neo-liberalism—that has been all but universally adopted by governments around the world. While neo-liberalism is a broad enough categorization to allow for a great deal of variety in actual practice, it nonetheless bespeaks a clear direction. Self-sustained economic growth is sought through basic reliance on market forces, and linkages between national economies and the global economic system are fostered accordingly. The other side of the coin, of course, is the reduction of state control over national economies, and concurrently, the state’s retreat from social programs perceived as unduly hindering the flow of market forces.

Neo-liberalism, although rooted in economic theory and aiming at economic objectives, invariably has political as well as socio-cultural implications. The central issue is one of interactive influence: how do neo-liberal economic departures affect different types of political systems and socio-cultural settings and, in turn, how do different political and socio-cultural contexts affect the application and results of neo-liberal economic policies in practice?

It is therefore obvious that the interaction between culture and neo-liberal
economic policies cannot be ignored if the dynamics of economic development are to be understood. Yet, as frequently noted, “culture,” while one of the most frequently utilized concepts in social science, is also “one of the most elusive when it comes to precise definition.”

The definition of culture utilized by this paper deserves to be made explicit: culture is taken to be “the totality of various movements and elements which evolve social solidarity, independent of...national policies, among the peoples.” In this sense, our concern is with the interaction between economic development in practice and cultural elements that foster social solidarity at the grassroots level.

To my mind, there are two major related reasons to commend this focus. First, a concentration on the grassroots level is necessary if any credible analytical link is to be maintained between culture and economic development. The social sciences have a sad history of sweeping generalizations postulating the congruence, or lack of congruence, between certain national or ethnic cultures and types of economic systems. Grassroots investigation is a healthy antidote. Second, a grassroots focus does much to avoid the distorting impact of mythologies of monolithic “national” or “ethnic” cultures. That is, the more “grassroots” the focus, the more analysis must take into account sub-cultural variables whose influence may be seminal in the relationship between culture and economic development. In a word, the more “grassroots” the better.

In unfolding its analysis, this paper will also be informed by the concept of “economic culture,” as used by the German scholar Heiko Schuss. Schuss notes that “the transformation of many national economies toward market-economy does not only involve formal institutional changes,” and points out that “new constitutions and laws meet with resistance and are distorted in practice.” The question, he adds, is “whether this resistance also has cultural causes.”

Schuss defines “economic culture” in cognitive terms: “the mental factors concerning the allocation and distribution of scarce goods.” I believe the value of this approach to economic culture is twofold. First, by narrowing the conceptualization of culture to the cognitive, it reduces the range of potential interpretative difficulties. That is, artifacts and non-economic behavioral patterns need not be the focus of cultural study. Second, as the focus on “mental factors concerning the allocation of scarce goods” necessarily includes “opinions, attitudes, values and...
cognitive models of societies," the link between economic culture and “political behavior” (that is, behavior aimed at affecting the use and distribution of power within a given society) is patent. In short, Schuss’ definition offers a useful guide for exploring the roots of political behavior generated by steps toward economic development.

The global turn to neo-liberal development strategies has long been a source of concern to observers who foresaw the possibility that social upheaval and violence would be a by-product of neo-liberal efforts. Over a decade ago, David Apter worried that development in the modern age would find no place for certain groups, and warned us of the specter of the “superfluous man”—that is, those whose social existence is incapable of contributing positively to the demands of neo-liberal economies. He described the plight of the “marginalized” as follows:

Marginalization...is a condition resulting from prolonged functional superfluousness. [Marginals] are deprived of virtually all the roles of which functioning society is composed... Considered by the rest of the population as pariahs, morally and even perhaps biologically distinctive they... remain more or less permanently on the perimeters of society....”

The prospect, of course, was that the ‘marginals’ would not fade quietly into the dusk of history but rather burst forth in a discourse of violence.

Does neo-liberal economic development necessarily entail violent reactions in all contexts? Apter does not really imply this, but others do. Indeed, some would agree with Pierre Bourdieu’s characterization of neo-liberalism as an “infernal machine” whose tentacles invariably produce structural violence wherever they reach.8

This sweeping stand is unsatisfactory, begging the questions of how and why neo-liberal measures may generate conflicts, and ignoring the obvious fact that neo-liberal policies do not invariably lead to social violence. Nonetheless, substantial evidence indicates that neo-liberal initiatives have been associated with the eruption of major domestic violence in developing areas. The real problem is to identify the circumstances and dynamics that may lead to this outcome.

This paper examines the relationship between Egypt’s neo-liberal pursuit of economic development and the Gama’a al Islamiyya’sb violent struggle against the Egyptian government. The question is the extent to which the Gama’a’s campaign can be explained in terms of the relationship between identifiable features

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6 Schuss, 1.
9 Which translates to “The Islamic Group.”
of the drive to economic development and cultural elements prevalent in Upper Egypt that promoted insurrectionary grassroots solidarity. The link will be sought in the cognitive realm, which is partly defined by Schuss’ concept of economic culture. However, it will also be sought in the more decidedly political cognitive environment of values and attitudes pertaining to the distribution and use of societal power. No political action can be fully explained purely as a dependent variable of structural forces.\(^{10}\) Decision precedes action, which is particularly obvious when the action involves an organized challenge to the power of the state. Therein lies the necessity of relating economic and political cognitive frameworks.

The analysis that is presented below will first offer an overview of the Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s campaign against the Egyptian regime. This is followed by a look at Upper Egypt, the setting in which the Gama’a al-Islamiyya developed. Particular attention will be given to broad elements that help give the region a sub-cultural identity within the Egyptian polity. The discussion then focuses more directly on the rise and development of the Gama’a al-Islamiyya with a view to exploring the role played in this by the interaction of national neo-liberal economic policies and sub-cultural orientations. This then facilitated the growth of insurrectionary grassroots solidarity. The paper’s penultimate section highlights key findings. Finally, tentative conclusions will be offered as to the degree to which Egypt’s experience might be generalized to other settings.

The Gama’a al-Islamiyya developed as a movement in Upper Egypt during the early 1970s. Inspired by the early militancy of the Muslim Brotherhood, the group’s primary goal was to bring about the establishment of an Islamic state under Shari’a. The Gama’a charged Egypt’s existing political system and leaders with being religiously, morally and politically corrupt, and with violating true Islamic and Egyptian values. From its inception, the group had links to, and shared a degree of overlapping membership with, similarly inclined groups in other parts of Egypt. One of these, the Jihad, would assassinate Sadat in 1981.

In the early 1990s, the Gama’a embarked on a sustained campaign of violence that made it the most prominent of Egypt’s militant Islamic groups. Working through networks established over the years in poor neighborhoods of Cairo and other cities, the Gama’a was able to project its struggle, largely by terrorism, throughout much of the country. However, its focal point was Upper Egypt.

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\(^{10}\) Yvonne Grenier, “From Causes to Causers: The Etiology of Salvadoran Internal War Revisited,” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, (Fall, 1996), 1-16. As Grenier convincingly argues: “The eruption of internal war is contingent upon choices made by key actors.”
The Egyptian government adopted and maintained a hardline approach to the *Gama’a al-Islamiyya*, rejecting any possibility of negotiations. Instead, it relied on heavy security measures, including massive arrests, the death penalty, and—after October 1992—the use of military courts to try suspected militants. A sustained corollary to the government’s forceful response has been the use of the state-sanctioned “official” religious establishment, as well as the mass media to undermine the *Gama’a*’s claim to Islamic purity.\(^{11}\)

By 1996, Egypt’s government had clearly gained the upper hand. Militant attacks were in decline, though not ended, and this was paralleled by a resurgence of international tourism. Despite sporadic clashes in Upper Egypt, some *Gama’a* leaders suggested a cease-fire in the spring of 1996, a call that was repeated a year later when six major *Gama’a* figures (and the group’s spiritual advisor) proclaimed a “halt [to] military operations.”\(^{12}\) These initiatives, which were rejected by the government, seemed to reveal a growing division in *Gama’a* ranks. This was confirmed in November 1997, when members of the organization slaughtered fifty-eight foreign tourists in Luxor.

The ferocity of the Luxor massacre brought the *Gama’a* to its lowest ebb. All indications showed that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians were outraged both by the carnage and its perpetration in the name of Islam. The split in the *Gama’a* was glaring, with its main leadership apparently united in condemning the attack as a “violation” that proved “more damaging to the *Gama’a* than for the Egyptian government.”\(^{13}\) Although the government continued to arrest, try, and sometimes execute *Gama’a* members in 1998, by the following year only a few relatively minor armed clashes occurred.\(^{14}\) Egypt’s tourism, although not fully recovered from the blow of the Luxor attack, was solidly on the upswing.\(^{15}\) For the time being, at least, it appeared that the *Gama’a* was cowed. It remained an open question whether this heralded the organization’s final abandonment of its violent campaign or was simply a temporary lull.

Estimates of the numbers of militants who constituted the *Gama’a al Islamiyya* provide only the vaguest indications as to the group’s size. The United States government claims that at its height the *Gama’a* probably numbered “several thousand” hardcore members and enjoyed the sympathy of another “several thousand more” individuals.\(^{16}\) Some sources claim that the organization’s


\(^{14}\) Although no executions were carried out in 1999 by the time of this writing (October), several members of the *Gama’a* had been killed in confrontations with security forces. Simon Apiku, “State Steps Up Efforts to Root Out Militants,” *Middle East Times*, September 15, 1999.


hardcore membership may have reached as high as 10,000.17

Upper Egypt comprises the country’s eight southernmost governorates. The region’s history is isolated from the center of national life. The local relationships resulting from this centuries-old condition gave Upper Egypt an identity of its own, yet—it is important to note—this has not precluded Upper Egyptians from also identifying with the modern Egyptian state. Nonetheless, Southerners are aware that they are stereotyped negatively in the rest of the country, widely held to be crude, prone to violence, and lacking intelligence.

Alongside the even more ancient presence of Copts, tribal groupings dating from the Arab conquest combined to form a hierarchical order that placed two groups, the *ashraf* and the *arab*, in dominating positions. These were followed by lesser tribes, with the *fellah* at the bottom of the social scale.18 Personal loyalties are focused on the family and tribe.

The central government’s authority in Upper Egypt has traditionally been cemented through patron-client links with leading families of the *ashraf* and *arab* groups. Even the Nasserist regime did not substantially undermine this political-administrative arrangement. Although land reform benefited peasant farmers to a degree, members of the landed classes used a variety of means to retain much of their holdings. Cairo continued to staff the higher ranks of the local police and security apparatus with personnel from the *ashraf* and *arabs*.19 In Upper Egypt, as elsewhere in the country, the socio-economic status of the peasantry remained substantially the same. Land ownership was still heavily “unbalanced” and the peasant remained at the lower end of the social pecking order.20

Religion has been central to Egyptian society, and traditionally important as a socializing factor promoting acquiescence on the part of the country’s peasantry. As Kamal El-Menoufi notes, “the role of the Ulama in molding the peasant’s orientation toward government is undeniable. They have always been fatalistic and conservative-oriented.”21

In Upper Egypt, the *ashraf* claim direct descent from the Prophet, while the *arabs* trace their lineage to a group of tribes from Arabia. On the other hand, the status of the *fellahin* has rested on the general belief that they descended from members of Egypt’s pre-Islamic community who converted to Islam, a history that placed them inescapably beneath both the *ashraf* and *arabs*.22 Copts have occupied an ambivalent position in the social scale; as Christians they are considered inferior to Muslims but their individual status effectively depends on

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19 Ibid, 615.
21 Ibid, 86.
22 Fandy, “Regional Revenge,” 613.
more material criteria.

Religious practices in Upper Egyptian Muslim and Christian communities, particularly at the lower socio-economic levels, are strongly imbued with non-orthodox folk elements, some of pharaonic origin. Although orthodox Islam is well grounded in urban areas, the countryside is the domain of a rich folk-religion, replete with beliefs in the magical, miraculous and occult.23

Despite rich agricultural resources, Upper Egypt has long been the country’s poorest region, whether compared in terms of rural or urban areas. By the mid-1990s nearly seventy-two percent of Egypt’s poor remained concentrated in the south.24 Indicators related to health, population growth, social services and quality of life reveal similar disparities.25

The region has witnessed significant changes in the past four decades. The populist Nasserist years not only raised hopes for general improvement and a more equitable distribution of wealth but also produced concrete achievements. Land reform, though not as sweeping as promised, brought some benefits to the fellahin. Moreover, the opening of free universities in the 1960s seemed to promise an escape from poverty and the limitations of a rigidly traditional social hierarchy. With the government committed to employ all university graduates, the national bureaucracy provided a livelihood as well as a degree of prestige for sons of peasants who, under the pressure of increasing land scarcity, had no prospect of acquiring land of their own.

In broad terms, then, among the main elements comprising the modern Upper Egyptian sub-culture are the following:

- A sense of regional identity fostered by historical isolation from the centers of the Egyptian polity.
- A sense of identity with the Egyptian polity.
- A shared sense of being looked upon as inferior by the wider Egyptian society.
- A sense of social order marked by a rigid hierarchical regional social structure, sanctioned by historical mythologies and traditional practice, at the bottom of which are the fellahin.
- A strong sense of extended familial and tribal loyalty that includes strong adherence to the positive value of the blood-feud.

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• A sense of political order marked by the exertion of state power through patron-client relations between central authorities and the upper strata of local society.

• A strong religious orientation, predominantly Islamic, that is heavily imbued with folk-religion in which the miraculous (the supernatural manipulation of mundane reality) figures prominently.

As will be seen, the rise of the Gama’a was tightly linked to changes in some of these sub-cultural pillars that in large part were generated in the first instance by economic factors.

If we take Schuss’ cognitive approach to economic culture, it quickly becomes evident that the heavily traditional and historically-derived broader pillars of the Upper Egyptian sub-culture did not at all preclude economic ambitions from spurring Upper Egyptians to action. Neither religion nor the weight of traditional social hierarchy resulted in economic passivity. Upper Egyptians, decidedly including those at the lower end of the social spectrum, demonstrated through their actions, that mental factors concerning the allocation and distribution of scarce goods could, and did, cause changes in established patterns of behavior. Indeed, it is possible to go even further and claim that for politically significant numbers of Upper Egyptians the dynamic interplay between cognition and action helped change existing sub-cultural pillars. Such, for example, was essentially what occurred with the rise to prominence at the grassroots level of the Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s activist, militant, anti-status quo brand of Islamic fundamentalism.

Evidence for these assertions is found in the history of Upper Egypt after Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Free Officers overthrew the monarchy. The dominant Upper Egyptian reaction to the promise of land reform, the eagerness of Upper Egyptians’ response to the introduction of modern higher education at the regional level and to opportunities of employment in government service, and the massive participation of lower-class Upper Egyptians in labor migration all stand as refutations to any notion that the economic culture of Upper Egypt was mired in stagnant traditionalism. The evidence clearly indicates that change in prevailing patterns of access to scarce goods was highly valued and actively sought.

However, the 1970s and 1980s would see conditions in Upper Egypt begin to be affected more directly by world market forces as the Egyptian government initiated the country’s turn to neo-liberal development policies. For the lower strata of Upper Egyptian society, particularly the fellahin, the result was that expectations of economic and social betterment were increasingly threatened by the mutually reinforcing effects of official government policies and the self-interest of...
traditional regional elites.

The limitations of Nasser’s state-centric economic policies were soon reflected in Upper Egypt. By the early 1970s, for example, the country’s bloated bureaucracy was rapidly becoming incapable of providing employment to the burgeoning numbers of Upper Egyptians who poured into, and then out of, the regional universities. Even when placements were available, fellahin graduates discovered that university credentials were frequently unable to overcome Upper Egyptian class bias or the general prejudice against southerners in other parts of the country.26

Other developments in the 1970s placed Upper Egypt’s fellahin under increasing pressures. Anwar Sadat’s reorientation of Egypt’s economy through the liberalizing measures of the Infitah led him to seek the support of traditional rural elites. The renewed ascendancy of the landed notables—which sometimes resulted in officially sanctioned expulsions of peasant farmers from contested lands—not only menaced the fellahin’s gains but also their aspirations. In the same decade, large numbers of fellahin who benefited from the oil boom by finding temporary employment in Arab Gulf states returned home with relatively significant capital only to find the path to upward mobility still blocked by the traditional local power structure.27

Some, imbued by their experiences in Saudi Arabia with a more uncompromising and egalitarian vision of Islam, reacted to their mounting frustrations with greater religiosity—a phenomenon that helped produce a remarkable proliferation of private mosques in the 1970s. In Upper Egypt and among communities of southerners in urban centers throughout the country, returned fellahin workers funded mosques in which an activist and socially conscious interpretation of Islam challenged the status quo religious vision of the ashraf and arabs.28

The influx of villagers into Egyptian cities and towns, which by the 1970s led increasingly to the “ruralization” of these centers, provided fertile fields for fundamentalist, and militant, movements. Urban mosques often became centers for the recruitment of rural migrants into militant organizations.29

It was in this atmosphere that the Gama’a al-Islamiyya first developed as a movement among students at Assiut University in the early 1970s. Mamoun Fandy, “one of the first generation of peasant farmers’ sons to benefit from Nasser’s educational reforms” and an Assiut University classmate of many of the Gama’a’s founders, recounts that the Gama’a al-Islamiyya was marked from its inception by a distinctly Upper Egyptian fellah character which distinguished it from other militant Islamic groups. Most of its membership, he notes, “originally

27 Mamoun Fandy, “Regional Revenge?”, 616-18.
came from the fellahin."³⁰ While the Gama’a held the Cairo regime responsible for betraying Egypt’s Islamic values and saw the solution as an Islamic state under Shari’a, it was also determined to alter power structures in the south. In short, it fought “against southern tribal dominance, the Cairo government’s role in this conflict, and the impact of this conflict, as well as [local culture], on the group’s interpretation and use of Islam.”³¹

Some studies that focused on Egypt’s Islamic militants shortly before Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 concluded that the groups’ cadres came mainly from non-rural environments and lower-middle class backgrounds.³² While this may have been applicable to other militant groups, it does not seem to have been the case with regard to the Gama’a al-Islamiyya.³³

Fandy’s recollection of the Gama’a’s origins as rooted in a distinctly fellahin ethos is borne out by studies conducted after the organization gained prominence in the 1990s as Egypt’s main militant Islamic group. Commenting on what he termed “the changing face of Islamic militants,” Saad Eddin Ibrahim indicates that in comparison to militants studied in the early 1980s, those of the 1990s proved to be “younger and less educated, [many coming] from rural, small town and shantytown backgrounds.”³⁴ Ibrahim seems to have found a change that actually reflected only the Gama’a’s rise to preeminence among other Islamic militants rather than any change in the composition of the group itself.

During the decade that followed Sadat’s assassination, the Gama’a al-Islamiyya was relatively quiescent, though it ceaselessly endeavored to mobilize support. The same period was marked by the Mubarak regime’s pursuit of Sadat’s neo-liberal policies through steps that included reducing consumer and agricultural subsidies and decontrolling prices. The burden of poverty increased throughout the country.³⁵ However, Upper Egypt remained—as always—the poorest region. Ultra-poverty was particularly high in Assiut and rural Upper Egypt continued to be the country’s poorest agricultural area.³⁶

Additional regional misery was inflicted by circumstances that arose far beyond Egypt’s borders. The 1986 downturn of Middle East oil economies sharply reduced possibilities for migrant labor.³⁷ Then the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis produced

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³⁰ Fandy, “Egypt’s Islamic Group,” 613.
³¹ Ibid, 611.
³³ There is a widespread misconception that Islamic militancy is essentially alien to the rural, peasant culture of Egypt. The argument here is that Mamoun Fandy’s insistence that the Gama’a al-Islamiyya was distinguished from other Egyptian militant Islamic groups by its Upper Egyptian Fellah character must be taken seriously. The failure of many students to recognize this seems to have arisen from at least two sources: (1) A tendency to lump together different militant groups; (2) Implicitly defining such characterizations as “urban” and “lower-middle class” in limited geographic and economic terms that are void of cultural significance—thus discounting both the ruralization of Egyptian cities as well as the importance of sub-cultural factors in rural-urban migration.
a massive return of Egyptian workers as well as deep uncertainties regarding the future of the Gulf labor market.

However, the peasant’s worst fears came true in 1992 when, after a debate that had raged since 1985, the government enacted a measure that would, after a five-year grace period, effectively repeal statutes governing tenancy. Known by opponents as “the law for throwing out tenants from their land,” this step profoundly disturbed what the rural poor considered “an important basis of a moral and political order.”38 It was, however, fully in keeping with a neo-liberal strategy designed to rationalize agricultural production and liberate market forces.

The Gama’a’s major assault on the government developed in the early 1990s. No single event marked its beginning, but by mid-1992 there was no doubt that Egypt’s government was facing a sustained offensive. Press accounts of the developing struggle revealed the extent to which the group had won grassroots support in the rural countryside.

The following, events in “a tiny village in Upper Egypt,” is typical of such reports:

Since March, clashes between villagers and security forces have claimed two dozen lives. Farming is the only occupation...the district boasts few jobs and fewer public services...It is fertile soil in which to recruit ardent young men for the Islamic Leagues [Gama’a al-Islamiyya], with their aura of romance and their programs of spiritual betterment and practical activism.

In recent years the membership of such leagues has swollen into the thousands. In a dozen villages league enthusiasts have made themselves into enforcers of order and the providers of service.39

The next several years were tumultuous in Upper Egypt. Although the total number of Gama’a fighters almost certainly never exceeded a few thousand individuals, the government’s massive security operations long remained largely ineffective. Aware that family and tribal ties allowed Gama’a militants to count on the support of much of the population, government forces attempted to isolate the fighters through a variety of techniques. Large swaths of sugarcane fields were burned in the hope of denying militants concealed routes to and from villages; road blocks and identity checks were instituted throughout the region; and relatives of suspected militants were frequently arrested and—according to many

accounts—sometimes abused, terrorized or even killed. Given the prominence of the blood-feud in the Upper Egyptian sub-culture, such measures inevitably affected the nature of the violence that plagued the region. It was not long before many of the Gama’a’s terrorist attacks were perpetrated more for purposes of revenge than for political motives.

In the end, the government’s iron-fist approach proved effective. As noted above, by 1996 the Gama’a’s militant capabilities were clearly ebbing and its own leadership was torn over whether to sustain the violent campaign or abandon it. However, the challenge posed to the Gama’a by the government’s superior force does not fully explain the group’s retreat from terrorism. Equally, if not more important was the broader Egyptian public’s declining sympathy for the movement.

Reliable public opinion polls are not available to the researcher who focuses on Egypt. Nonetheless, available evidence indicates that in the early 1990s a significant portion of the Egyptian public sympathized with the goals of the Gama’a al-Islamiyya, though not so much with its reliance on violence to achieve them. This is not surprising when it is recalled that most informed observers believe that the Muslim Brotherhood, the Gama’a’s ideological father, would stand a good chance of coming to power through democratic means were free elections held in Egypt. By the mid-1990s, however, the group’s terrorist campaign had caused most public sympathy to evaporate. What little remained was swept away in the general outraged reaction to the 1997 Luxor Massacre.

From the start, and from deeply cultural roots, the Gama’a al-Islamiyya was characterized by both a regional and national ethos. Upper Egypt’s subculture incorporates both regional and national identities. Thus, the Gama’a perceived itself as fighting on behalf of Egypt’s true values. Definitive signs that its chosen path had alienated the bulk of Egyptian society lay at the heart of the Gama’a’s eclipse.

To refer to the society of Upper Egypt as “marginalized” is simply to encapsulate in a term a historical and socio-economic reality. On the one hand, distance and geography historically isolated the region from easy or quick contact with neighboring areas. On the other hand, endemic poverty and underdevelopment, as well as being perceived negatively by their compatriots, have long been the lot of most Upper Egyptians. At the bottom of the regional hierarchy are the fellahin, the most marginalized of the marginalized.

To refer to the society of Upper Egypt as “traditional,” however, is to enter
a realm where terminology must be used with extreme caution. If by “traditional”
is meant that certain historically derived customs, practices, and manners re-
main valued and followed, the label is accurate. If the term is intended to signify
a stagnant resistance to change, it is badly misused. This applies with particular
force to the lowest levels of Upper Egyptian society.

The above account has shown that from the days of the Nasserist Revo-
lution, the mass of Upper Egyptians actively hoped for and sought economic de-
velopment. The dominant economic culture of the marginalized fellahin valued
upward mobility that would alter their place in the prevailing “allocation and dis-
tribution of scarce goods.” The prospect of change, in this sense, was more than
welcomed.

However, it has also been shown that by the early 1970s rising expecta-
tions engendered by incipient economic opportunities were increasingly frustra-
ted. The negative impact of limitations inherent in Nasser’s command economy
was followed by Anwar Sadat’s turn to neo-liberalism. At the local level, the most
marginalized elements of society not only saw the promises of the revolution eva-
porate but also, as neo-liberalism increasingly promoted a market economy, the
rollback of gains already attained.

Conditions beyond Egypt’s borders were also a factor affecting Upper
Egypt. In the 1970s, the oil-rich Arab states provided an outlet for Upper Egyp-
tians’ search for upward mobility. However, revenues earned abroad often failed to
translate into the fulfillment of hopes at home. The rigid traditional social hierar-
chy of Upper Egypt frequently helped frustrate the ambitions of lower class mi-
grant workers. The downturn of the oil states’ economies in the mid-1980s, and
the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis curtailed the labor market and increased Upper Egypt’s
economic difficulties.

This catalogue of frustrated expectations explains the rise of the Gama’a
al-Islamiyya. It also explains why the Gama’a’s orientation was not “traditional”
or atavistic but rather revolutionary, in the sense of seeking basic change in the
dominant power structure. This is most clearly seen in the group’s interpretation
of Islam.

That religion played a central role in the Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s birth was
fully in keeping with Islam’s significance in the sub-culture of Upper Egypt. What
was not in keeping with the traditional was the Gama’a’s activist, socially-con-
scious, egalitarian interpretation of Islam. This change in a sub-cultural pillar can
be traced to the impact of economic development as it affected the lower strata of
Upper Egyptian society.

It is, perhaps, not difficult to see why this activist Islamic interpretation
appealed at a cognitive level to many. One need only reflect upon the rise and fall
of the Upper Egyptian fellah’s hopes over the past few decades. Under Nasser,
change was both welcomed and eagerly anticipated. Things were different in the ensuing years. Change, much of it emanating from sources far beyond the control, or in most cases, the understanding, of the marginalized appeared to have become not only threatening but almost overwhelming in its intensity, variety, and malignity.

The unfolding of this perspective provided fertile ground for activist who held state authorities responsible for the plight of the marginalized. Both in Upper Egypt and in Gama’a-dominated mosques throughout the country these activists injected a new emphasis on social justice into prevailing religious belief systems, and linked the new interpretation to “true” national values. The essential contribution and attraction of the message was that it offered, to those who accepted it, a credible promise of both change and resistance to change. This explains the emphasis the Gama’a gave to demands for socio-economic change for the better and the preservation of cultural integrity.

If this understanding of the allure of the Gama’a’s militant, activist interpretation of Islam is correct, it still only partly explains the movement’s ability to win widespread—and varied—support in Upper Egypt. Why did so many Upper Egyptians provide low-level, or tacit support to the Gama’a, while others, a more committed minority, throw themselves fully into the fray, often at the predictable cost of their lives? As to the former, in addition to the force of the Gama’a’s religious message, the answer appears to be found in non-religious sub-cultural elements. The sense of regional identity, the impact of familial and tribal loyalties, and the sense of being looked down on by both regional elites and the wider Egyptian public must all have contributed to the non-militant grassroots support enjoyed by the Gama’a al-Islamiyya.

But what of the fighters who spearheaded the Gama’a’s terrorist campaign? Put another way, what caused these relatively small numbers of mainly lower-stratum Upper Egyptians to believe they could force desired change despite the full military resources available to governing authorities? Here, with death being a starkly possible—if not probable—consequence, the answer may well largely hinge on the nature of the religious element in the Upper Egyptian sub-culture.

This is not to deny that the full answer is probably complex and may well include an intensity of frustration, anger and desperation that galvanized some to conclude that the effort had to be made, if only as a futile, but satisfying, expression of outrage. But this does not explain the actions of those who took up arms in the conviction that their cause would ultimately win.43 I suggest that any explanation of this phenomenon must take into account the deep impact of a cultural context permeated by a syncretistic brand of Islam in which the miraculous or

43 The responses of Gama’a members upon hearing sentences of death or long imprisonment substantiate this point.
magical is accepted as a normal part of life. The claim, in short, is that the folk-re-
ligion of Upper Egypt’s marginalized inhabitants fostered a cognitive framework 
that tended to be receptive to the notion that a just cause will ultimately triumph, 
regardless of objective power relationships.

The Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s armed challenge to the Egyptian state appears 
to have run its course. As argued above, the sub-cultural identification with broa-
der Egyptian society appears to have been instrumental in the group’s abandon-
ment of terrorism as its preferred political tool.

Did Egypt’s adoption of a neo-liberal economic development strategy 
“cause” the Gama’a’s violent upheaval? The foregoing analysis leads to the con-
clusion that no simple, direct causal relationship exists. Neo-liberal measures 
constituted one among several contributing factors that in conjunction explain 
the Gama’a’s insurrection. The particular context created by historical condi-
tions, the structure and nature of regional society and its links to national author-
ity, and, finally, the nature of the sub-culture of Upper Egypt provided the set-
ting in which neo-liberal measures helped spark the outbreak of violence.

This said, what must nonetheless be considered is whether the struggle 
waged by the Gama’a al-Islamiyya was unique or, on the other hand, represent-
tative of an identifiable type of conflict that is capable of arising in other cultural 
and national settings.

Objective historical and social circumstances define the context in which 
the Gama’a al-Islamiyya initiated and developed its conflict against the Egyp-
tian government. Among the more relevant of these were a historical legacy of 
regional isolation and marginalization from the center of national power; a rigid-
ly hierarchical local social structure; a tradition of national rule being extended 
through patron-client ties between regional elites and central authorities; an un-
derclass, long mired in poverty and neglect; the relatively recent development of 
opportunities for that underclass to develop ambitions for a better life; and the 
economically detrimental impact of neo-liberal measures designed to promote 
long-term national economic development.

With the exception of the last two factors, the others have sufficient histo-
ry behind them to have helped shape the cognitive frameworks that characterized 
the Upper Egyptian sub-culture. Religion, a sub-cultural pillar, was marked by 
large elements of folk-religion—a syncretic mixture of orthodox belief and reli-
ance on the magical and miraculous.

The combined impact of rising economic expectations and dashed hopes 
led, first, to an activist reinterpretation of religion among the most marginalized 
sectors of Upper Egyptian society and, second, to successful militant mobilization 
within those sectors. There erupted an outbreak of sustained violence against the
state, conducted by a minority of fighters but widely supported, at least tacitly, at
the grassroots level. However, the cause for which violence was waged was not,
in the eyes of the perpetrators, against the state. Instead, the struggle was waged
on behalf of the “true” values of the state and national society. In pursuing its
campaign against the national government, the \textit{Gama‘a al-Islamiyya} was clearly
aware of the imbalance of power between itself and its opponent, but nonetheless
long remained optimistic as to the final outcome.

Does such a series of conditions, circumstances and events describe a phe-
nomenon that can occur only in an Egyptian, Islamic, or Middle Eastern setting?
I do not think this is the case. I have elsewhere argued that half a world away
from the arid stretches of Upper Egypt—in the highlands of the Mexican state
of Chiapas—a generically similar struggle is waged by the Zapatistas against the
Mexican government.\footnote{Dan Tschirgi, “Marginalized Violent Internal Conflict in the Age of Globalization: Mexico and Egypt,” \textit{Arab Studies Quarterly}, Vol.21, no. 3, (Summer, 1999).} If this is so, it seems very possible that in identifiable con-
texts, neo-liberal strategies of development may spark a type of societal violence
which I term \textit{Marginalized Violent Internal Conflict}.

The ultimate effectiveness of neo-liberal economic development strategies
cannot yet be judged. However it is evident that neither the pace nor the extent
of benefits generated by these approaches will be all-inclusive of the populations
concerned. There will inevitably be groups who are not only bypassed but also
harmed by the distributive process. The coercive resources of the state do not
alone necessarily provide insurance against the eruption of costly, bloody uphea-
val. For it cannot be expected that the marginalized of the earth—wherever they
are found—will always be dissuaded from challenging the state, regardless of the
most overwhelming evidence of the hopelessness of armed struggle.


Introduction

Recently, many wars have been interpreted by observers as ethnic conflicts based on ancient hatreds and competitions. This conception, however, is rather facile. Ethnicity is a social construction whose importance has been magnified in modern times as Western nation-states mobilized ethnic identity to build legitimacy, unity, and nationalism.¹ Instead of being a source of conflict, ethnic identity is instead used as a tool by various groups for political mobilization, manipulation, and control.²

Viewing civil wars through only the simplistic lens of ethnic conflict is problematic at best. If magnified beyond specific conflicts, this conceptualization leads to ideas such as Samuel Huntington’s highly debatable belief in the clash of civilizations. The true problem in perceiving a conflict as having a solely ethnic base lies not in this conceptualization’s descriptive power, but rather with where it leads political scientists. Ethnic conflicts based on ancient hatreds and competition theoretically are almost insoluble. If they were truly the source of these wars, then the only viable solutions would involve segregation, ethnic cleansing, genocide, or military victory followed by oppression. Fortunately, for both political scientists and the world in general, today’s so-called ethnic conflicts are solvable. While ethnicity is salient in many of them, its true role is less causal than as a means of combatant mobilization. Taken to the extreme, focusing on ethnicity is akin to dividing war’s causality from its attendant propaganda. Taking a deeper look at the dynamics that create wars will assist political scientists and policymakers in both bringing today’s wars to an end and, hopefully, in heading off future wars.

There are many methods by which one can examine the dynamics of complex crises that gain the moniker ethnic conflict. Some, such as Binder’s frame-
work, are quite thorough and can conceive conflict as arising from up to five overlapping crises. For the sake of simplicity, this paper views ethnic conflict as arising from a combination of three intertwined processes: Economic, social, and political. The development in these three areas can often proceed in a distorted manner that leads to crisis. When all three fields move towards crisis together in a reinforcing manner, crisis can easily turn to conflict. Reinforcing economic constraint, internal social developments and political processes combine to ignite wars where ethno-nationalism can be a powerful tool. This can be seen in a more detailed manner in Ivan Ivecovic’s findings regarding ethnic conflict in the Balkans and Caucasus:

Economic stagnation and crisis created a social drama and provoked a crisis of individual and collective identities. This crisis set up the stage from ethnic confrontation, but real violence only erupted when politically manipulated ethnic communities were organized and set into motion.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Ivory Coast was viewed by many mainstream Western observers as a miracle of post-colonial economic development and a model for its African neighbors. However, its economic achievements on the national level veiled a systemic rot that would eventually yield disaster. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and into the new millennium, its citizens and government experienced an escalating series of complex crises. These events consisted of three intertwined and related crises; one economic, one social and one political. All three led first to a coup on 24 December, 1999, then a military rebellion on 19 September, 2002, and escalated into an on-going civil war. In many newspaper reports and in common perception, this conflict is considered yet another in a long line of ethnic conflicts that have broken out across the world since the end of the Cold War.

Thus, this paper will examine the recent history of the Ivory Coast in three broad areas. It will look at its economic, political, and social development to understand the dynamics that brought this once flourishing nation to a civil war of a highly ethnic nature. The role of distorted economic modernization in sparking a social drama and political crisis will be of particular focus and interest. This is, in part, due to many current thinkers’ belief that inappropriate modernization is the key element of causality in modern ethno-conflicts. Additional focus will also be given to the dynamics of ethno-mobilization in order to show it as a tool in a

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3 Ibid., 77.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 117-8.
8 Ibid., 20, 117.
political crisis rather than a cause of strife.

Following de-colonization, the Ivory Coast’s tremendous economy led Western capitalists to present it as a model for other newly independent states. Rich in diamonds, rubber, coffee, and cocoa, it had a great base to start from, and it took full advantage of these resources. Foreign investors flocked to the Ivory Coast and President Houphouet-Boigny threw open his country to foreign migrant workers to provide investors with essential and attractive cheap labor. Growth was remarkable and steady. In the decade from 1966-76, the economy grew between 8 and 10% every year.

The government grew overconfident with its performance, however, and structured its spending based on past performance rather than caution. Boigny used his agrarian sector profits to fund rapid speculative industrialization that focused on the Southeast corner of the country. This industrialization came with an attendant rapid and destabilizing urbanization. In the face of this, despite populist pretensions and rhetoric, Boigny only marginally made progress toward social and human development. Meanwhile, he used his nation’s economic success to fund a patrimonial and clientalist style of governance that cemented his leadership. He spent millions of dollars on transforming his hometown of Yamoussoukro from a small town into a modern city that now has one of the biggest basilicas in the world. With most industries controlled by the government, Boigny controlled the largesse. He distributed much of it through salaries to the large bureaucracy that was required to run his burgeoning state. At one point government salaries represented 80% of government non-debt related expenditures. The government’s biggest spending surge occurred from 1975-77, just before the Ivory Coast experienced a sudden reversal of fortunes.

Beginning in 1978 and continuing into the early 1980s, the Ivory Coast’s economy was confronted with massive exogenous shocks that exposed its weaknesses and almost tore it apart. During these years, the country was buffeted by the effects of the second oil shock, a world recession, and the collapse of cocoa prices (its primary export). The economy was devastated. Inflation and interest rates rose. Half of the industrial enterprises set up in the 1960s and 1970s failed, raising unemployment to around 45%. Exports dropped from $4 billion in 1980

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10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
13. “Joining the Instability Cycle,” CDD.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 131.
to $1 billion in 1983 and have just recently returned to 1970s levels.\textsuperscript{20} Along with this collapse, government revenues plummeted. This in turn led to a foreign debt crisis as the Ivory Coast could not repay loans taken on the assumption of continued good times. Foreign debt quintupled between 1981 and 1985.\textsuperscript{21} The budget deficit rose at one time to about 17\% of GDP and the trade deficit also reached the same percentage of GDP.\textsuperscript{22} Seeking to halt the collapse, the government introduced a series of reforms, austerity measures, and structural adjustments starting in 1984.\textsuperscript{23}

While each round of these adjustments seemed to ameliorate the problems, the economy never truly recovered. High population growth, coupled with the economic decline, led to steadily falling living standards until the outbreak of civil war at the end of 2002.\textsuperscript{24}

Economic problems also led to a crisis of fraud and public sector mismanagement. Widespread fraud had occurred during better times but was usually ignored by the general populace. By the 1980s, however, the government could no longer afford it. A major scandal in the public housing sector implicated a number of high government officials. Many were removed, but none were punished.\textsuperscript{25} With such light enforcement and heavy pressure on government salaries, fraud increased while performance dropped. Austerity was removing the will of the bureaucrats required to implement difficult reforms.

By the 1990s, the Ivory Coast was in an economic “free fall.”\textsuperscript{26} Part of the difficulty was that cocoa prices remained low and the government seemed to be only “relying exclusively on internal adjustment” reforms recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.\textsuperscript{27} While reforms such as these often make good economic sense, they need to be accompanied by other reforms and initiatives (social, bureaucratic, etc.). Especially devastating were Boigny’s budget austerity measures. In an environment where government salaries equaled 11\% of GDP and there was significant government intervention in the market, budget austerity without effective bureaucratic and economic reform created a functional legitimacy crisis and became economically ineffective in the long run.\textsuperscript{28}

Houphouet-Boigny died in 1993, forcing the government to take more drastic action to ensure its survival. In 1994, the government took a risky step and allowed the CFA Franc to be devalued by over 100\% in return for the cancel-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Ibid. and 2005: Country by Country.} The Economist Intelligence Unit (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004), 223.
\bibitem{The World Guide 1997/98.} 204.
\bibitem{Trends in Developing Countries 1996.} 131.
\bibitem{Trends in Developing Countries 1996 and 2005: Country by Country.} 223.
\bibitem{“Economic and Political Issues of the Late 1970s and 1980s.”} Ivory Coast: A Country Study. 204.
\bibitem{“Joining the Instability Cycle.”} CDD.
\bibitem{Trends in Developing Countries 1996.} 131.
\bibitem{Ibid.} 132.
\end{thebibliography}
lation of half of its debt with the Paris Club. This action seriously harmed the government’s weak support and gained it few benefits. Even with a devalued CFA Franc, exports actually dropped between 1994 and 1995. While the debt reduction was significant, the Ivory Coast remained the world’s leader in per capita foreign debt.

Faced with elections and massive discontent among its citizens, the government went to extreme measures to win, utilizing xenophobic rhetoric and massive spending. Unfortunately, President Konan Bedie funded his party’s campaign, voter pay-offs, and repression of the opposition by diverting eighteen billion CFA franc in European Union development assistance. The discovery of this led to the suspension of all credit by the IMF and partner lenders. The government was near bankruptcy. Teachers, bureaucrats and sometimes the military went unpaid. At the time, the government did not even have the money to pay cocoa and coffee farmers (the government remained the sole consumer of these cash crops) for their nationally critical export crops.

Threats to the Bedie government multiplied as austerity measures began to affect the armed forces. Finally, in December of 1999, General Robert Guei led a military coup. While initially popular, the coup eventually lost public favor as Guei tried to legitimize his power. To this end, Guei allowed elections in 2000 but lost to long-time opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo. After a failed attempt to overturn the results, Guei was forced into exile by a popular uprising.

Despite Gbagbo’s initial popularity, he lacked any support in the country’s North and West and had used significant amounts of “Ivorite,” or xenophobic rhetoric, to maintain his popularity. The Ivory Coast’s economic problems continued unabated. In 2003, debt levels remained stratospheric. Real GDP growth was negative. The trade deficit remained large and unassailable. When the government tried to demobilize a large group of unpaid and disenfranchised soldiers near Bouake, a civil war ensued. The war, in a highly politically charged environment, quickly gained an ethnic character.

The economic crisis played a significant role in creating the current conflict in the Ivory Coast. It was not, however, the sole or even primary causal factor. The crisis was combined with other societal and political trends that together led the country to war. The economic problems in the Ivory Coast sharpened the competition for resources and power within the country. As the size of the metaphorical pie shrank, the fight for a piece of it became ever more desperate. Addi-

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30 Trends in Developing Countries 1996, 136.
33 “Cote D’Ivoire: The General’s New Clothes,” CDD.
34 Ibid.
36 Hara and Ero.
tionally, the economic crisis set the context for the social and political crises that followed. It did this by creating a crisis of legitimacy for the government and by bringing a competitive ethno-national discourse to the fore of Ivorian politics.

The Ivory Coast was set up for a legitimacy crisis, in part, by Houphouet-Boigny’s clientalist style of governance. His government gained legitimacy, success, and popularity based on its ability to provide access and patronage. When the economy collapsed, his basis of power was threatened. His government had been the major employer for the country and the major industrial developer. Its success gave it functional legitimacy. In the weak economy, its public industries failed and it often could not pay its workers. This seriously weakened government support among the average citizen and especially among the bureaucrats who actually ran the state’s institutions. As rewards shrank and competition increased, elites and low-level bureaucrats turned to corruption to make up their losses. This, in turn, worked to destroy the effectiveness and trustworthiness of the government and thus its functional legitimacy. The corruption scandals of the 80s were followed by aid embezzlement scandals in the 90s as locally available funds dried up. Finally, by the new millennium, the government was at the point of absconding with its soldiers’ U.N. pay allowances for peacekeeping missions and then had to bribe them to desist from mutinies and rioting. As the economy sank, so did the Ivory Coast’s state legitimacy.

As state legitimacy dwindled and the economic tools of patronage disappeared, politicians needed to find another way to mobilize support. They found it by defining and espousing a newfound Ivorian national identity which attempted, among other things, to direct public frustration towards immigrants. Depending on the season and the year, foreign workers make up anywhere from 27 to 50% of the Ivory Coast’s population. Additionally, a significant percentage of the country’s business is controlled by high profile Lebanese and French minorities. When times got tough, the foreigner, or “the other,” became a suitable scapegoat for local politicians. Pro-Ivorian discourse spread quickly. Politicians quickly moved from targeting actual foreigners to targeting each other’s Ivorianness in political battles. Ethnic/tribal political mobilization was both effective and one of the only remaining political tools left for elites to use. When civil war broke out after years of this identity-based discourse and political struggle, it was almost predetermined that the war would take on an ethnic character.

The concept of Ivorian nationalism is extremely new on the world stage. The name, Ivory Coast, is a European conception describing the predominant
trade with the region and had never implied any nationality save for the last thirty years.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, prior to 1975, the overwhelming majority of the Ivory Coast’s citizens identified primarily with a kin-based or tribal group.\textsuperscript{41} How then did a country with so little belief in a unique nationalism for itself fracture into a civil war driven by ethno-national rhetoric? The answer lies in the manner in which its politicians played on their citizens’ economic fears to define a scapegoat for their poor leadership and to help defeat their political rivals.

Historically, the concept of a nation-state with fixed borders is completely foreign to most of West Africa. During most of the colonial period, all of French West Africa was controlled as a single entity. Additionally, the Ivory Coast was considered to include Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso.\textsuperscript{42} Administrative borders were porous organizational tools that did not demarcate identity. Migrations of large groups were common across the region, both for economic and political reasons.\textsuperscript{43} Very often the historic patterns of these migrations moved across what would become national boundaries after independence. For example, The Mossi are one of the largest ethnic minorities in the Ivory Coast, with 1.2 million people.\textsuperscript{44} While mainly centered in Burkina Faso, a large percentage of them traditionally conducted a seasonal migration to coastal regions for work across tribal, then colonial, and finally national boundaries.\textsuperscript{45} Most importantly, throughout the 20th century the Ivory Coast was marked by “considerable and long-term interaction among the diverse ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{46}

Even for the first twenty years of its existence, the Ivory Coast had little true national identity. Some scholars felt it would never bind as a nation, as it had “no common myth” from which to foster unity.\textsuperscript{47} Interviews with its citizens revealed that “there seemed only a vague awareness of the existence of something called Cote D’Ivoire.”\textsuperscript{48} It was described as a “nation trying-to-be.”\textsuperscript{49}

This began to change in the 1980s as politicians began to utilize ethno-national mobilization to gain legitimacy in hard economic times. That their attempts to use nationalism turned eventually into ethnic conflict is partially due to Houphouet-Boigny’s skewed development plans and political style. Both fostered ethnic mobilization and competition.

Houphouet-Boigny initiated grand development plans for his country in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, these plans were developed at a natio-
nal level and were regionally skewed. They created uneven development which fostered regional jealousy and competition. The uneven nature of development started with the education system. As education served as the primary means of modern elite creation in the Ivory Coast, any bias was particularly damaging. The education system in the Ivory Coast heavily favored citizens from Southern ethnic groups; groups from the Center and North of the country were underrepresented by more than a third. This was compounded by a massive urban and Southeastern bias in industrial and social infrastructure development. The Southern sections of the country received a majority of the benefits of modernization; the North remained the poorest section of the state. The South, however, suffered the most social displacement, experiencing rapid urbanization and massive immigration. Thus, both sides felt slighted by the uneven development of the 60s and 70s.

As Houphouet-Boigny’s development schemes strengthened inter-regional rivalry, his style of leadership only further undermined the need to create a national consciousness that could supersede ethnic and tribal identities. To begin with, he developed loyalty through his personal charisma and patronage, thus building little legitimacy in state institutions. He made government appointments not by merit, but by balancing ethnic groups. Additionally, his party, the Parti Democratique de la Cote D’Ivoire (PDCI), was organized and mobilized purely along ethnic lines, and its ethnic networks were rife with nepotism and corruption. Thus, his leadership actually reinforced tribal and kinship identities instead of breaking them down.

As the economy started to collapse, the long-term effects of Boigny’s failure to create a unified national identity increasingly became evident. A critical part of the Ivory Coast’s rapid economic expansion had been the availability of abundant cheap labor. Boigny had opened his borders to economic migrants, many of whom came from Burkina Faso, to feed development. Additionally, urbanization and ethnic mixing had created an identity crisis that allowed Ivorian nationalism to find roots. When things turned sour, foreigners were the easiest targets for assigning blame. By the mid-1980s, “Ivorianization” had become a standard government policy proposal, even though this flew in the face of both traditional migration patterns and past governmental policy. The economic migrants, both foreign and Northern Ivorian, were the government’s scapegoats.

With seemingly no end in sight for the Ivory Coast’s economic woes, the

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51 Ibid., 353.
52 Trends in Developing Countries 1996, 132-3.
54 Ibid.
55 Tice, 214.
57 Ibid.
environment and discourse became one of “creeping extremism.” Rhetoric against true migrants eventually turned against internal migrants. Attempts at defining who or what was Ivorian, however, ran into trouble. Many people who migrated to the Ivory Coast in the French era and the early independence years had settled permanently and raised families. By the 1980s, many of those who were being labeled as migrants had lived their entire lives in the Ivory Coast; to say nothing of the economically critical French and Lebanese citizens who had been born in Africa. Additionally, many older Ivorian citizens in the North had mixed parentage. Defining who was Ivorian was either impossible or arbitrary.

This political environment was increasingly manipulated for political reasons after Houphouet-Boigny’s death in 1993. In the 1995 election to replace him, interim President Konan Bedie’s biggest rival was former Prime Minister and former IMF Deputy Secretary-General Alassan Ouattara. Ouattara was a powerful Northerner and a Muslim. Bedie, a Southerner, had little support in the North and had committed to the unpopular devaluation of the CFA Franc prior to the election in 1994. Bedie discovered that Ouattara had family links to ethnic groups in Burkina Faso and changed the citizenship laws to exclude his primary rival from holding office. In so doing, he also disenfranchised 25% of the Ivorian population who had lived there since at least the colonial era.

Throughout his rule, Bedie’s policies continued to marginalize Northern ethnic groups and favor Southern ones in order to maintain his support base. Ivorite nationalist discourse and the public scourging of foreigners became standard fair. Even after his overthrow, General Guei and then Laurent Gbagbo continued this style of rhetoric. As things got worse, Ivorian politicians increasingly came to rely on militias and “patriot groups” for support and control. Combined with harsh economic conditions and competition, this virulent discourse created, in a relatively short time, a violent ethnic polarization that had never existed before.

To make matters worse, government capacity and legitimacy were decreasing in an environment of ethnic extremism and ethnic competition. Rates of crime and violence began to skyrocket. After the coup of 1999, they became widespread. Trigger-happy, poorly paid soldiers armed with a massive amount of automatic weapons that were stolen from armories during the coup combined to create a public safety disaster. As conditions became more violent, other groups began to arm themselves. Civil defense groups based on kinship, villages, or tri-
bal groups mushroomed. The Brotherhoods of the Dozo, traditional collectives of hunters, transformed into local militias. By 2002, one-hundred of one hundred and sixty-five villages in the West and Central region of the country had armed, local self-defense forces.

It is surprising that ethnic conflict did not break out earlier. It took the combination of these conditions, a Northern-led Army rebellion, and widespread self-defense militias to finally transform a social crisis into a social collapse and generate widespread ethnic conflict.

The political crisis in the Ivory Coast followed basically the same trajectory as the social and economic crises; Houphouet-Boigny’s failures led to profound insecurity and instability. As the economy began to have severe difficulties in the 1980s, Boigny made moves to consolidate his power. He began by abolishing the position of the General-Secretary of the PDCI and making himself the head of the party. As both the head of the ruling party and President of the country, his power and influence were beyond challenge. He had his only serious rival and constitutional successor, Philippe Yace, removed as the Head of the National Assembly and replaced with the loyal technocrat, Konan Bedie. Despite such serious economic conditions, he maintained his popularity by exposing the corruption of fellow elites such as Yace and Emmanuel Dioulo, Abidjan’s mayor, who defrauded the National Agricultural Development Bank of thirty-two million US dollars.

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The impact of Boigny’s personalization of politics in the 1980s served to weaken the democratic institutions of the country. Party politics withered into nepotism and corruption. Government institutions remained subject to the PDCI, and thus Boigny’s control. Additionally, the corruption scandals and economic performance destroyed the public’s respect for most elite figures. By 1990, Boigny had been forced to allow contested presidential elections. Laurent Gbagbo was the only major figure willing to run against him and only managed to gain less than 20% of the vote.

The inevitable began in 1993 with Houphouet-Boigny’s death after thirty-three years of rule. Konan Bedie replaced him as President and party leader. In the elections scheduled for 1995, his greatest competitor and the man thought most likely to win was former Prime Minister Alassan Ouattara. Ouattara now headed a powerful, Northern-based opposition party called the Rally of Republicans (RDR). In order to win, Bedie embezzled large amounts of foreign aid and

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65 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 “Conflict History: Cote d’Ivoire,” ICG.
72 Ibid.
funneled it to the campaign and security apparatus. Under severe pressure, he resorted to xenophobic rhetoric and attacks. Bedie began to push the concept of “Ivoriteness” along with the anti-foreign rhetoric from the 1980s. He had the laws changed so that to vote or hold office in the Ivory Coast one had to be born there of “Ivorian” parents. This disenfranchised Ouattara, whose father was born in Upper Volta/Burkina Faso. It also disenfranchised much of his opposition, while solidifying his support in the South. Bedie’s pandering to xenophobic and ethno-national ideals worked well. He won the Presidency and then the PDCI won the 1995 local elections by a landslide. After conditions did not improve, however, strikes, protests, and unrest gradually spread among both his favored constituents and his disenfranchised opposition.

The end came for Bedie in 1999. A soldiers’ mutiny over unpaid United Nations allowances for peacekeeping transformed into a military coup headed by former Army Chief of Staff Robert Guei. Despite being primarily a military coup with no involvement of civil society, it was initially quite popular given the horrible conditions under the Bedie regime.

Guei’s promise of elections in 2000 was at first highly promising until it became obvious that he would try to use them to legitimize his rule. Guei started by continuing to exclude Ouattara and other RDR candidates from politics. He then went on to have the Supreme Court ban the PDCI candidate in hopes that, as a former PDCI leader, he would then receive the majority party’s support. Instead, he just convinced the RDR and PDCI, representing two-thirds of the electorate, to jointly sponsor a boycott of the process. Laurent Gbagbo, with an impeccable opposition resumé, was left as the last legitimate candidate. He garnered the support of his own party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), and the rather substantial protest vote. In the end he won an estimated 59.4% but counting was stopped in an attempt by Guei to steal the election. Civil unrest and riots forced Guei into exile, leaving Gbagbo as the protest President.

Gbagbo made some attempts at power sharing. The PDCI, however, was unused to being out of power and was problematic. The RDR enjoyed more popularity than the FPI and won a majority of the local elections in 2001. Still, however, there was no reconciling the Northern demand for an adjustment of enfranchisement rules and continued Southern xenophobic attempts to maintain

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73 “Joining the Instability Cycle,” CDD.
74 Hara and Ero.
76 Trends in Developing Countries 1996, 131.
77 “Cote D’Ivoire: The General’s New Clothes,” CDD.
78 “Cote D’Ivoire: The General’s New Clothes,” CDD. “Conflict History: Cote d’Ivoire,” ICG.
80 “Conflict History: Cote d’Ivoire,” ICG.
81 “Cote D’Ivoire: The General’s New Clothes,” CDD.
83 “Joining the Instability Cycle,” CDD. “Conflict History: Cote d’Ivoire,” ICG.
84 “Laurent Gbagbo.”
85 “Conflict History: Cote d’Ivoire,” ICG.
its false demographic and electoral advantage. Unrest, violence, and economic problems continued to spread after the election. Gbagbo’s Bete tribe, normally peaceful and generous, became a specific target of ethnic violence.\textsuperscript{86}

Finally, soldiers formerly loyal to Guei revolted in Bouake and Korhogo. This was followed by widespread violent repression of opposition politicians and expulsion of thousands of Northerners from Abidjan.\textsuperscript{87} The former military leader of Liberia, Charles Taylor, entered the conflict by supporting ethnic groups in the West with weapons and fighters.\textsuperscript{88} Only the armed intervention of French forces could save the Gbagbo regime and bring about a tenuous ceasefire.\textsuperscript{89} To the date of writing, both the violence (despite an on-again-off-again ceasefire) and the violent discourse of ethnic conflict continue unabated.

The tale of conflict in the Ivory Coast is quite tragic. Possessing great natural and human resources and a history of tolerance, it had the potential to become the hope and exemplar of a new Africa. Instead, like its neighbors, it has descended into war and madness. As shown in this exposition, this war stems from numerous intertwined causal pathways. It is not simply an ethnic conflict as it has often been described in the press. A severe, long-term economic crisis led to intense local competition and a de-legitimization of the political regime. As the continuing economic crisis undercut the legitimacy of politicians, they needed new techniques to mobilize support. They resorted to a virulent Ivorian-nationalist discourse. This discourse, combined with the impact of rapid urbanization and unbalanced development, led to a social crisis in the country. An inability to define the “other” in an environment of fierce political and economic strife caused the residents of the Ivory Coast to turn first against recent immigrants and then against each other. This was all exacerbated by the political crises. First Houphouet-Boigny’s rule weakened state institutions and reinforced ethnic or tribal identities. Then, both he and his successors stirred up animosity against “non-Ivorian residents” (whoever they may be) to deflect attention away from their poor governance. With his death, political competition became ever fiercer. In the fight to succeed Boigny, Bedie used ethno-national discourse to mobilize support and remove his opponents. Thus, three intertwined crises built up over the years until their synergistic effect sparked a conflagration of ethnically tinged killing and strife.

We have seen that while the war in the Ivory Coast is colored with the rhetoric of ethnic conflict, this is only a surface level analysis. The war was caused more by a combination of economic, social, and political crises than ancient ethnic hatreds and differences. Ethno-national rhetoric was simply a powerful tool

\textsuperscript{86} “Ethnic Clashes in ‘Wild West’ Displaces Civilians, 2002-2005,” IDMC.
\textsuperscript{87} “Conflict History: Cote d’Ivoire,” ICG.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Hara and Ero.
used by the contestants in their quest for power. A lack of security and despera-
te economic conditions were what finally triggered ethnic violence. Given these non-ethnic roots of the conflict, the prospects for peace in the region are better than one would think after listening to the pundits who do not look beyond the rhetoric of ethnicity. The way will be difficult but there is a solution.
Bibliography


“Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”¹ is the definition of sustainable development first espoused by the Brundtland report. Almost instantly after, the concept was hailed by those in the development field as the new “in vogue” development paradigm. When examining the reasons behind sustainable development being so readily adopted by those in the development field, one finds a sense of disillusionment with conventional economic development and all its various paradigms. The concept emerged as an attempt to rectify all that was flawed with conventional economic development, and in time, provide a complete replacement of it, and become the dominant development paradigm. What this paper will attempt to show is that the current interpretation of “sustainable development” is far too limited and must become more inclusive before this replacement can occur. The main idea underlying this paper is integrating development with society, which involves taking into account the economic, social, environmental, political, institutional, and cultural aspects of societies. The key implication that should be extracted from this paper is “sustainability over time” which differentiates between a theoretically sustainable project and the actual probability of the results from that project being sustained over time.

The paper is divided as follows: the first section will provide a history of the concept and why it emerged, followed by a review of the salient literature to show how the term was coined and how it has evolved over the years. The next section will delve into the alternative, more holistic approach to the concept and provide a detailed interpretation of it and practical ways to approach it. The following sections will look at how peace and security can be incorporated into development projects, and how culturally mainstreaming development is an important factor in its sustainability. Some comparative case-studies will then be provided to illustrate the theory more clearly.


Deena Khalil

Deena Khalil is a graduate student in Development Studies, at the American University in Cairo. She received her B.A. in Computer Science from the American University in Cairo. Though she discovered the field of development at a late stage, she is completely immersed in the field. This paper in many ways has helped her accept the realities of the field of development work, and she is committed to working and pursuing a career in this field.
Developing communities face a range of issues such as marginalization, overcrowding, poverty, and pollution. Due to the self-propagating nature of underdevelopment, governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often have no idea how to approach such tasks, and thus development practice, historically, has ranged from random successes to planned failures. This sheds light on the reason why it is only recently that development theory and practice has begun to take into account environmental concerns and their relation to economic growth and development. However, typically the nature of development practice has been to visit impoverished areas, assess their needs, develop a plan to fill those needs, implement the plan, and then move on to the next project without really tackling the issue of who will maintain, or sustain, these results. Therefore, a sustainable project’s results may not actually be “sustained” further than a few years, and developers have begun to realize that while their projects may yield economically and ecologically “sustainable” results in the short run, maintenance of those results in a broader context only persist for so long before old attitudes and practices override them. Thus, while the problem of sustainability initially stemmed from a concern for the environment, actual experiences are pushing those in the development field to look at issues of societal and cultural sustainability.

There is a need to examine how results of sustainable development projects can be constant across generations. This same line of thinking is what led to the emergence and popularity of bottom-up/participatory development. Ideally, “sustainable development” refers to the discovery of a certain allocation of resources such that sufficient capital (natural and otherwise) is guaranteed to be transferred to the next generation. Traditional top-down development models have proven to be lacking in this aspect. To overcome this problem, bottom-up/participatory approaches emerged, where the local residents are themselves the key players in the development process. By following this approach, when the NGO or government agency finishes the project, the residents can take on the role of maintaining and improving the results, and the residents often undergo training and capacity-building to fully understand the mechanisms of what they are doing.

Initially the above approach seems to provide an efficient solution to the problem of result-sustainability, and thereby achieves long term development. However, this is a misleading interpretation for the simple reason that one “successful” project is in the overall scope, for all practical purposes, of negligible importance. For example, if one community has learned to recycle water as a water-conservation tactic, but the overall national attitudes and government policies have not changed, only so many generations will go by before that same community stops recycling water and returns to following the dominant national
trend. Thus, in the long run, the seemingly “sustainable” development is not really sustainable at all. Furthermore, accomplishing success on one project on the micro-level is clearly not synonymous with achieving “sustainable development” on the macro-level, and this is an important distinction to be made if sustainability is to be looked at as an ongoing process rather than a fixed goal. In order to fully ensure the sustainability of project results, and in order to correctly target development plans towards sustainability, development agents (be they NGOs, governments or anyone else) should look towards finding ways of causing a large-scale change in attitudes and policies. Therefore, those in the development field, rather than acting in a vacuum, or even perceiving themselves that way, should actually be acting as intermediaries, essentially between poor communities and the rest of society. An important issue to address is how development agents, once they have adopted this alternative role, can undertake the difficult process of changing cultures and dominant behaviour patterns. The advocated approach is one based on the importance of “stakeholders” and “development mainstreaming” which will be explained more below.

Tansey describes “sustainable development” as “a rallying point for those who were becoming disillusioned with the traditional development paradigm.”

The concept gained its popularity after the Brundtland Commission defined the term in 1987 as mentioned above. This definition, with its obvious vagueness, caused several interpretations of the term to emerge which initially all revolved around environmental desirability.

Daly attempts to develop a set of operational principles by which one can achieve “sustainable development.” He first explains the concept through distinguishing between the current economic thought which looks at achieving optimal allocation of resources, and what he believes should be added: optimal scale. Whereas the former takes into account only distribution of resources from an ethical perspective, the latter, he states, involves the addition of environmental criteria. He argues the need for a mechanism that keeps “the economic scale within the ecological carrying capacity.” Daly clearly defines “sustainable development” only in terms of the world’s environmental capacity to sustain development. Jickling also defines the term solely through the environmental consequences of development. He acknowledges the ambiguity of the term but only within the scope of environmental sustainability. More clearly, he discusses the need to eradicate the ambiguity of how people can be educated about environmental sustainability.

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in order to ensure sustainable development. However, once again, sustainability has been given a very limited definition in terms of solely environmental concerns. This limited interpretation is reiterated in many of the early literature on development. Clarke’s essay interprets the concept in terms of the effect growing populations have had on environmental degradation and “the need to examine the link between population dynamics and global environmental change.” Meadowcroft deals with the relation of government planning and intervention with achieving “sustainable development.” Although he does acknowledge the role institutions play in development, he nevertheless interprets sustainability as “an ambitious attempt to reconcile environmental and development objectives.” These environment-centred interpretations remained dominant for many years before the definition began to evolve to a more inclusive form.

Because “sustainable development” emerged as a theory – a re-conceptualization of economic development— it has proven difficult to articulate the concept in the form of steps and goals. However, significant progress has been made with regards to defining “sustainable development,” and it is no longer limited to environmental concerns but rather has grown to encompass economic, social, and cultural as well. The World Summit Outcome Document referred to sustainable development as incorporating “interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars [which are] economic development, social development, and environmental protection.” Other United Nations (UN) documents such as Agenda 21 use similar definitions and many scholars are now using broader interpretations of the term, as evinced in the following literature.

Custance and Hillier put forth an alternative definition that takes into account social progress alongside economic and environmental aspects. Thus, the set of indicators they proposed included economic, environmental, and other issues such as crime rates, equity, and poverty levels. This definition is much more encompassing, and what is more important is that the authors stress the importance of involving other parties in the generation of these indicators. The authors mention that the process was inclusive of many actors from within and outside the government such as “scientists, ecologists, economists, and green activists.” Although this involvement was undertaken merely to get different expert opinions on the proper economic, environmental, and social measures of

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7 Ibid, 57.
sustainability, and although the process was not as inclusive as the one proposed in this paper, it does showcase the benefits that may be accrued from cooperation.

Wikan argues that because of the concept’s focus on environmental factors, it has subconsciously inferred a rural undertone. She contrasts this with the fact that “nearly half of humanity lives in cities.” She moves on to argue that preserving natural resources should be merely one of the foci of “sustainable development” and that the focus should be shared with preserving social and cultural resources as well, which are facing degradation in the city. She also argues that assessing sustainability can only be performed over the long-run and thus development must involve a long-term perspective. While this interpretation is more inclusive of non-environmental factors, and does involve the issue of sustainability across time, she does not provide us with a conceptual framework.

Mamman and Rees have argued that one of the reasons that there has not been great success in implementing policy change has been because of the emphasis on institutional change. Instead, they argued, one might expect more success if greater attention were paid towards organizational and management theories, which take into account the human element in implementing policy. In their article, the authors argue that a gap exists between policy formulation and implementation, and is due to the failure to take into account the role that organizations play in implementing policy. What they are advocating in this article is related to the importance of cultural change argued for in this paper. Policy change cannot be implemented effectively without simultaneous cultural change. However, the article does not provide the theoretical underpinnings for this, nor does it provide practical mechanisms for achieving this.

These interpretations of sustainability are much closer to the interpretation proposed in this paper, but still lack a detailed description of how this can actually be implemented and fail to set clear targets for the sustainable development process as a whole. Although documents such as Agenda 21 advocate (non-bindingly) for governments to adopt more “sustainable” policies, little work has been done on how policy change can be a main target of development, and not just remain as advocacy work. Also, the issue of culture is a sensitive and controversial one, often leading to never-ending debates on the universality (versus relativism) of development. This problem is somewhat curtailed in Dalal-Clayton and Bass. They provide an alternative strategy of targeting sustainable develop-

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15 Ibid, 635.
ment, which will serve as the core of the approach presented here. This strategy is centred on creating a link between the long, medium, and short-term goals and objectives, and creating both horizontal and vertical networks, which stresses the importance of establishing “linkages across sectors ...and vertical spatial linkages” among the government, business and local communities. The authors further call for a need for a “strategic response to sustainable development.” This strategic response can be summarized in the following quote:

Achieving sustainable development requires deep structural and governance changes on many fronts. A strategic framework can help to organize this by coordinating plans and activities at different spatial levels and by uniting the required mechanisms – of participation, communications, information, investment and monitoring into an adaptive system for continuous improvement.

They further describe how the strategy yields results by coordinating and synthesizing information between different sectors of society and, so, an initial task of great importance is to identify stakeholders and understand their “views on sustainable development priorities.” The authors clearly place great importance on getting as many actors in society as possible involved in the development process. This kind of societal engagement in the development process takes the results of development projects and effectively mainstreams them into the local culture. Also, by making “development mainstreaming” a target of development projects, the above-mentioned cultural debate is effectively rendered obsolete because developers are not trying to change cultures, they are mainly trying to integrate best practices into the existing culture.

The above-described publication provides an excellent strategy for targeting sustainable development, from which this paper borrows freely, but it lacks the theoretical underpinnings that can provide the much needed rationale to following this approach. This paper hopes to provide both. Furthermore, this paper does not disagree with the other interpretations provided above; it merely postulates that the very nature of development theory is that it is always evolving and being refined according to what new knowledge we have. “Sustainable development” has made great progress since its inception, however now a time has come when more revision and refining of the concept is needed. This evolution should see development workers aiming for national, long-term change. Those in the field should not be satisfied when only one slum manages to overcome its

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20 Ibid, 27.
21 Ibid, 29.
22 Ibid, 77.
adequate housing problem, but should immediately take their methods to the government or private sector and integrate them into the existing government housing policies. When the slum solves its housing problem, that is a sustainable project, and when the developers spread their method on a national scale so that every slum is aware of this method and has access to assistance in implementing it, that is sustainable development. While the former is encompassed by the latter, it is not synonymous with it. Development has never been gauged on the micro-level, and having pockets of development in the midst of an underdeveloped country does not mean that the country has become developed. Sustainable development shouldn’t be any different: a sustainable project should be regarded as such and nothing more.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

As shown by the above literature, “sustainable development” emerged as a concept initially limited to environmental friendliness but later moved on to encompass both social and economic development as well. However, this paper is putting forward a new interpretation—one that adopts the belief that, in order for development to be sustainable, it must take into account institutions, policy, peace and security, and culture. How all these factors relate to each other is illustrated by the above diagram.

Behind the alternative interpretation lies the concept of intergenerational equity as the basis of sustainable development. The only way development results, regardless of their sustainability from an environmental perspective, can be
transferred to following generations is if they are mainstreamed into society. This can only occur through changes in policies and culture, and an acknowledgement of “institutions” when development policy is formulated. This is not the same as a modernization theory approach where developing societies are judged to be culturally backward and in need of help in becoming more “modern.” This approach does not address why development hasn’t occurred, but rather how development, once it occurs on a small scale, can be sustained over a large scale and over the long-run. In other words, it does not look at a problem such as water scarcity and declare cultural backwardness to be its cause, but rather looks at how ways of combating water scarcity (e.g. water recycling) can be integrated into the local culture and become a widespread tactic employed by governments, NGOs and communities nation-wide, i.e. how effective mechanisms can become a part of the local policy and culture. Furthermore, development is not equal to the sum of its parts, meaning that one cannot tackle economic development separately from social development and hope to generate the same results as had they been tackled simultaneously. This is the reason behind the inclusion of peace and security as a main pillar of sustainable development in the above diagram. Just as it would seem unreasonable to design an environmental project (for example) without looking at the economic context, so too is it necessary to look at the context of peace and security.

Whenever issues of peace and security are mentioned there is always an inevitable association with democracy. Democracy has been hailed for decades as the ultimate panacea for all political instability and repression around the world. International donor agencies, as well as powerful governments have pushed democracy onto developing nations, usually as a condition for foreign aid. The way the West has attempted to institute democracy within developing nations can be said to follow a “big bang” approach. The dominant mentality involves a “put-the-democratic-structures-in-place-and-the-people-will-follow” mentality. The ineffectiveness of a big-bang approach to democracy was advocated by scholars as early as Tocqueville, Huntington, and Almond. Tocqueville proposed the necessity of organization before democracy, and equality in conjunction with participation.24 Huntington supported this argument strongly:

Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations. In many, if not most, modernizing countries, elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority...The primary problem is not

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liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order.  

Tocqueville further advocated that civil society should play a large role in making democracy sustainable. Tocqueville, Democracy in America. This idea was developed even further by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who argued that a vibrant civil society is vital to the existence of a democratic one. They based this argument on the fact that many of these organizations have political undertones that can facilitate the transfer of information regarding political issues. This in turn leads to better-informed citizens who have the ability to make informed choices and hold governments accountable. Participation in these organizations also immerses participants in the decision-making process, thus creating a culture of democracy. The idea of a culture of democracy was pushed even further by Putnam, who argued that even non-political organizations play a role in facilitating democracy. Social organizations in general build social capital and shared values and create a space where opinions can be voiced and discussion becomes a norm, creating a culture of democracy.

The task of creating a culture of democracy is usually tackled by organizations or projects whose primary goal is to increase participation and accountability. However, the holistic interpretation of sustainable development advocated in this paper suggests that empowerment should not limit itself to only being a primary goal, but should also be targeted as a secondary goal of any type of development project. Of course, development projects should focus on a particular goal and an environmental project should not be expected to also advocate for freedom of the press. But the idea is for project designers to ask themselves how they can contribute to peace and security as an externality of the project. In this respect, empowerment as an externality of any development project becomes an important goal in its own right. With the increasing popularity of participatory development, previously marginalized peoples have increasingly been able to voice their opinions, and hence they are becoming more empowered. However, this empowerment is generally a subconscious means to alleviate cultural biases and ensure the sustainability of results over a longer period of time. To bring empowerment to the consciousness of project designers, even if as only a secondary goal of the project, could potentially have drastically different effects. An example of this is presented in an Austrian case-study of feminist resistance to a mega-dam project. One of the leaders at the forefront of the resistance, who later went on to run for Federal Presidency, credited her foray into political life to this environ-
mental experience. This is clearly depicted in the following quote:

Against this nightmare we went out to protect trees and democracy...experienced the power of our own non-violence, the joy and relentlessness of community. We developed a taste for more democracy.29

This example shows how taking culture into consideration when looking at democracy can affect societies’ “readiness” for democracy by giving people a space to articulate their demands. This relates back to Huntington’s30 call for order before liberty, because without providing marginalized peoples with a space or mechanism through which to have a voice, liberty is merely a word.

Order before liberty is a crucial concept and any discussion about order inevitably leads to a discussion of one of the primary sources of disorder worldwide, which is corruption. The idea that democracy will automatically alleviate corruption is also a common one. However, Warren31 argues that the causal link between democracy and corruption alleviation is “ambiguous at best.” Furthermore, a recent cross-national study in Treisman32 finds no correlation between electoral democracy and low corruption. Hence, the idea of tackling corruption separately from democracy is becoming a more well-established concept in the field. However, the way corruption-alleviation is approached is a point of contention. Although democracy is commonly approached using a big-bang concept, corruption is usually tackled in an opposite manner, using a highly gradual method. Looking at the literature, it is impossible to miss a trend of advocating “small initial steps” when tackling corruption. An example of this is a World Bank report on combating corruption in transition economies where it states that “small gains can provide essential levers to sway public and official opinion.”33 Johnston34 also advocates a gradual approach to corruption-alleviation stating that it “is the work of generations.” A United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit declared that when trying to combat corruption “a long-term process begins during which corrupt...practices are gradually...eliminated [and]...reforms to individual institutions take place in stages.”35

However, looking at the reality of corruption, one realizes that it is not an overnight phenomenon, but rather part of complex historical processes that

30 Huntington, Political Order, 4.
create a legacy which cannot be reversed without first being acknowledged. Once this legacy is acknowledged, it becomes clear that corruption becomes embedded in the local culture and part of everyday life, creating a culture of corruption. This is not to pass judgement on societies as being corrupt, but rather to understand that certain elements of corruption cease to be moral questions, but rather become the norm. For example, when one lives in a society where it is impossible to get a driver’s license through legal means because traffic officials fail people until they receive the expected “tip” (read: bribe), tipping them right off the bat becomes the norm. Furthermore, imagine that if you fail the test once, you must wait another six months before taking the test again, which will increase inefficiency and time wasted. Now, knowing this as a cultural fact, it becomes the norm to pre-emptively “tip” the official, and this act is not preceded by deep questioning of the ethical legitimacy of this practice, because it is understood that there is no other choice. This is further corroborated by the fact that even conservative Islamic scholars have issued fatwas (religious decrees) allowing bribery under certain conditions. In his well-known book, the prominent Islamic scholar Al-Qaradawi\(^\text{36}\) says the following:

> If someone finds himself in a situation in which all avenues of redressing a wrong done him, or recovering a right which has been forfeited, are blocked except through the payment of a bribe, it is preferable for that person to wait patiently till Allah guides him to a better way of redressing the wrong or recovering his rights. Still, should he resort to bribery, the sin will not be on him as long as he has tried all other lawful avenues to no avail and as long as he just regains his own rights without infringing upon the rights of others. In such a case the burden of the sin will fall entirely on the recipient of the bribe.\(^\text{37}\)

This fatwa is a clear indication of the degree to which corruption has pervaded society, to the extent that viewing it as a moral choice will be at the expense of one’s own rights. This concept is explained clearly by Rothstein:

> This is a system where the need to offer bribes and the need to demand bribes in order to maintain what is deemed as the necessary services and/or economic standard is ingrained in most agents’ “mental maps.” When you go to the doctor, when you see your children’s schoolteacher, when you put in a bid for a public contract, when you need a license for your restaurant, when you want to take an exam at the university, when you ap-
ply for a job in the public sector, when you are stopped by the police, then paying bribes or carrying out similar illegal actions is simply the “standard operating procedure.” You have done so all your life, as has everyone you know, and this way of doing things is “common knowledge.”

Once the existence of a “culture of corruption” is acknowledged, the question of corruption-alleviation becomes much more complex, and the link between democracy and corruption becomes much more ambiguous. This ties into an interesting hypothesis presented in Rothstein that connects the permeation of corruption into culture with game theory. Game theory postulates that when agents decide how to play a certain game, not only do they take into account their own experiences and preferred strategy, but also the most likely strategy to be adopted by other players. When looking at corruption in light of this theory, one can see that it is a “mutually reinforcing phenomenon” in the sense that one’s individual decision to take part in a corrupt practice (e.g. pay a bribe) is no longer based solely on one’s own moral preferences, but what one expects to be the “way the game is played,” i.e. the way corruption shapes mutual expectations. In such a situation, the only way each individual player will have any incentive to change the way they play the game, is if they believe that other players will also change, and that the game is now played in a different way. The effectiveness of a step-by-step approach to corruption in such a situation is questionable, because changing a few institutions here and there does not send a message that the game is being played differently. Mungiu-Pippidi, in her study of “systemic corruption” in Romania, says the following:

At the root of systemic corruption is a particularistic political culture, which is defined as a system in which the government’s treatment of citizens depends on their status or position in society, and people do not even expect to be treated fairly by the state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status. Thus, within such a particularistic political culture...the establishment of a few new “western style” institutions will not help against corruption because they will become impregnated by the dominating particularistic political culture.

This shows the importance of taking cultural context into consideration when tackling corruption, which provides another strong argument for the game theory approach. Rothstein further explains that

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39 Ibid, 12.
In a thoroughly corrupt setting, even people that think corruption is morally wrong are likely to take part because they see no point in doing otherwise . . .

What is important is their beliefs about the other agents’ beliefs, or in other words, their beliefs about how the world works. From a policy perspective, this has some important implications...if you only reform one set of institutions, corruption is likely to creep over to the other. Rather, agents in, for instance, a powerful corrupt network must realize that everywhere they turn, “there is a new game in town.” [Thus] . . . everything (almost) has to change and this should be conducted as simultaneously as possible. If the anti-corruption policy measures are limited to the introduction of small measures, they will not convince enough agents that continuing their corrupt practices are no longer a viable option.42

What this really implies is that before institutional changes can yield their potential benefits, attitudes and behaviours must change as well. This further emphasizes the importance of taking all the above issues into account when designing development projects. For example, by including within pre-implementation questionnaires questions about bribery and other similar signs of corruption, development agents can get an idea of the way things are done, i.e. the way “the game is played.” This can alleviate cultural biases or external factors that may have affected the project outcomes. This is further evinced in the following section which attempts to provide a detailed analytical framework with which to approach “culturally sustainable” projects based on the above diagram by “mainstreaming” development into the local culture and society.

The key to this approach is dynamic negotiations between multiple stakeholders. It is based on the idea that in order to mainstream an idea into society, development agents should target as many different actors in society as possible and convert those actors from bystanders into stakeholders. These stakeholders should then engage in a process of dynamic negotiations to decide on the development strategy employed and the expected outcome. Upon completing the design of the project, implementation should begin with a scoping exercise. This exercise generally involves an analysis of the different actors in society and an assessment of which bystanders could potentially be converted to stakeholders in the project. This could involve a wide range of actors. For example, if the government is beginning an irrigation project, it could approach a pipe company. Alternatively, if an NGO is beginning a desert reclamation project, it could approach the government and try to integrate its project with the existing desert

reclamation policy. Also, the point of this exercise is for development workers to engage as many stakeholders as possible at all levels, ranging from the communities themselves (by making the project participatory) to approaching the NGOs operating in the area of the project and engaging them in the process, to academics and government officials on the local and national levels.

The development field has been subject to much criticism, the most common of which has been the accusation of ethnocentricity. Because of this it is important to address this issue with regards to sustainable development. Escobar argues that development discourse is inherently Eurocentric and thus inevitably detrimental to the development process. Escobar is not alone in this assertion as many of the post-modernists have adopted a “rejectionist” position towards the development field. Some have even adopted this position with regards to “sustainable development” which is evinced by the following passage by Hove:

Upon analysis of the assumptions and underpinnings of the approach, it becomes apparent that sustainable development simply embodies a new form of the old discourse; it fails to emerge from its ethnocentric vices.

Parfitt argues that while ethnocentricity is a point of contention for top-down development, it does not apply to bottom-up/participatory development. In conventional top-down development, there is an unequal balance of power between the development worker and the community being developed. When participatory methods emerged, a more preferable balance of power was created because the community now has the right to negotiate with the developer and modify the project. This same logic applies to any form of dynamic negotiation and thus applies to the stakeholder approach advocated here. Adopting a stakeholder approach not only allows community residents to participate in their own development, but to get involved with society on a much larger scale, and potentially see themselves affecting government policy and neighbouring communities’ practices. Thus the stakeholder approach ensures a more preferable balance of power and empowers previously marginalized people to a much larger degree than a solely participatory approach. This approach also ameliorates the issue of sustainability over time by mainstreaming development practices into the local culture and by spreading the beneficial effects of a sustainable project on a national scale. This can be illustrated more clearly by contrasting different development projects, all seemingly designed on the basis of sustainability.

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Sekem and Basaisa are both community development projects that emerged in Egypt in the Sharqeya governorate near the Nile Delta in the 1970s. The Sekem community is an isolated community of people who work within the highly-successful Sekem commercial enterprise. With over one-thousand employees, every employee is provided with free housing, free healthcare and free education for him/herself and all dependents. Abouleish\textsuperscript{46} states that the community revolves around certain well-established principles of sustainability based on integrating eco-friendliness with social and economic development. When looking at this inspirational case in a vacuum it seems to be the epitome of sustainable development, however, once our scope is broadened to encompass the Egyptian society, our perspective may change. The founders of this community development project had a certain vision of a sustainable community, and they achieved that, but they have not attempted to promote their model beyond the scope of the Sekem community. With a simple glance at the communities neighbouring Sekem, which I have visited myself, one can see that they still suffer the same problems of poverty, illiteracy, and environmental degradation among others. The effect that Sekem has had on its neighbouring communities is negligible, so one can only imagine how negligible its effect has been on Egyptian society. Sekem’s only significance to Egyptian development is as a community development model that could be replicated in other communities. However, the Sekem founders have not attempted to promote the model or influence the way the government currently approaches community development.

This development experience can be easily contrasted with Basaisa, also a community development project. The founder of this model, Dr. Salah Arafa, began the first development project in an attempt to ameliorate certain issues such as high illiteracy rates, high unemployment and non-efficient energy sources.\textsuperscript{47} Capitalizing largely on the local social capital, he engaged in weekly dialogues with the local residents and came up with several plans to develop the community. He then moved on to replicate the model in South Sinai by purchasing a plot of land and moving youth out of the over-populated Basaisa community and into what they aptly called New Basaisa or “El Basaisa El Gedeeda.”\textsuperscript{48} Today both Basaisa communities are complete with multiple Community Development Associations (CDA’s), several cooperatives, solar panels, biogas generators, and other environmentally-sustainable mechanisms.\textsuperscript{49}

In 2000, Dr. Arafa established an NGO by the name of Internal Migration and Development Association (IMADA) which was to deal with the coordination of further implementations of the Basaisa model.\textsuperscript{50} The first attempt after New

\textsuperscript{47} Salah Arafa, interview by author, American University in Cairo, Egypt, 4 May, 2007.
Basaisa is to be a community in the Egyptian White Desert called “Ashoka Village Basaisa.” The NGO is currently in the planning stage of the project and conducting several dialogues with the neighbouring communities and government officials. Through these dialogues, Dr. Arafa is garnering support from all those who may possibly see him as an intruder, and thus pre-emptively avoiding potential obstacles. The nascent IMADA organization has proven useful in spreading the word by setting up branches all over Egypt and targeting populations in different cities.\(^{51}\) Clearly, the core principle of the Basaisa model has been sustainability through economic, social, and environmental aspects of the targeted communities. But while the model has proved successful at this and these efforts have managed to produce seemingly sustained results, the development cannot be truly sustainable over the very long run unless national attitudes are changed, and this model becomes integrated into national community development and desert reclamation efforts. As an example, Dr. Arafa could approach the government with the success of his previous Basaisa implementations and try to engage it in subsidizing solar panels for poor communities elsewhere. A community across from Ashoka Village Basaisa called Abu Munqar, which was created on public land following the government’s land reclamation policies also has solar panels, however they are unutilized and covered with dust.\(^{52}\) Perhaps, had the Basaisa model been incorporated by the government, this might not be the state of Abu Munqar. However, in contrasting the Basaisa experience with Sekem, one can see that the overall scope of its effect has been much larger. The mention of the Abu Munqar community presents another opportunity for comparison. The dusty solar panels are not the only problem facing the community. During my recent visit to the community, one resident pointed out the inapplicability of the mode of housing used by the government to the type of soil on which the houses were to be placed. This failure by the government to make sure the housing technology used was appropriate to the local circumstances caused a crack to form on one side of a house, running down the extent of the wall.\(^{53}\)

This project can be easily contrasted with another government project that focuses on environmental sustainability, titled National Water Quality and Availability Management (NAWQAM). NAWQAM began as a joint project between the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), but today is coordinated by a steering committee comprised of over nineteen different stakeholders including ministries, research centres, and farmers.\(^{54}\) One component of the project involves designing and testing an environmentally-friendly water-recycling mechanism to be implemented in rural villages. Because the government acknowledged the

\(^{51}\) Salah Arafa, interview by author, American University in Cairo, Egypt, 7 March, 2007.
\(^{52}\) Khalil, “Social Capital.”
\(^{53}\) Abu Munqar, resident, interview by author, Farafra, El-Wadi El-Gedid, Egypt, 7 March, 2007.
\(^{54}\) Hamza El-Desukki, interview by author, Drainage Water Institute, Egypt, 28 November, 2007.
fact that the potential effects of this mechanism on the livelihoods of the farmers are unknown, they have gone to great lengths to ensure the participation of the farmers in the design, implementation, and more importantly, assessment of the project.\textsuperscript{55} Through the farmers’ assessments, other poverty-related phenomena unrelated to the project were also pointed out by the farmers. Upon seeing this, the project coordinators immediately got other ministries involved to tackle these issues.\textsuperscript{56} The project also involved local NGOs from the villages that aid in certain aspects of the project, such as helping women establish micro-enterprises. Because of NAWQAM’s engagement with different actors in society at the highest and lowest levels, it has become easier to ensure that this project will not succumb to cultural biases. More importantly it managed to avoid the pitfall of the Abu Munqar project which enforced seemingly “sustainable” practices onto a community that ended up having negative effects. Furthermore, the extent to which empowerment has been a positive externality of project is much larger than that of the Abu Munqar project. When farmers are sitting at a table with Ministry officials and CIDA representatives assessing the project, and realizing that their assessments have actually altered the project in the past, the sense of empowerment generated has increased exponentially.

In order for “sustainable development” to become the dominant development paradigm, and fully replace traditional paradigms, it must become more inclusive than it currently is. It must involve a holistic view of development factors while simultaneously avoiding the many pitfalls of the traditional paradigms. One such pitfall, and perhaps the most crucial, is development theory’s ignorance or disregard of cultural factors. A development mechanism that may be sustainable in theory indicates nothing regarding its cultural sustainability. Hence, in order for results of development projects to truly become sustainable, they must become fully mainstreamed into society. This applies to environmental, social, economic or political practices. Furthermore, in order for sustainable development to be truly holistic, it must incorporate all of the above forms of development into every project, if even as a secondary goal. The conceptual framework with which to approach this relies on the notion of scale and the scope of developmental results. It is based on the understanding that one sustainable project does not affect society, and does not guarantee that future generations will not regress. Moreover, sustainable development calls for structural, behavioural, and institutional changes, i.e. the need to affect policy and culture. The only way this can be achieved is by creating a broad strategy for development that targets different actors in a society and converts them into stakeholders, thereby engaging the society in the development process.
By engaging in a dialogue with different sectors in society, and converting them into stakeholders through dynamic negotiations that ultimately lead to a symbiotic relationship, the singular sustained project is converted into a development *movement*, and this is how sustainable development is generated. A key reason why the bottom-up approach has garnered so much popularity and success is because it converts the local residents from objects to subjects; it converts them from bystanders into stakeholders, which means they are accountable to themselves and each other. Following the same logic, accountability is drastically increased whenever a bystander becomes a stakeholder, because every stakeholder, by definition, has some stake invested in the success and *sustainability* of the project. In short, development agents aiming for “sustainable development” need to see themselves through a different lens and change their self-perception in order to fully understand how to ensure long-run cultural sustainability.
Bibliography


The Rise to Dominance of Neoconservativism in U.S. Foreign Policy:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US-IRAQ WARS

Introduction

On March 19, 2003, the United States went to war with Iraq. The deliberate, stated objective of the war was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The decision to use massive military force to obtain regime change was the culmination of a dramatic shift in US foreign policy and of the worldview driving that policy. This new foreign policy had a moral, logical and strategic foundation in the neoconservative worldview. This worldview is not monolithic, but it has found consensus and indeed has come to dominate US foreign policy under President George W. Bush. The trajectory followed by the neoconservative view over the 1990s—a crucial formative period for a worldview which had its roots in earlier decades—grew in large part as a reaction to the policy decisions of the US-led war to oust Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1991. Indeed, neoconservatism came to dominate US foreign policy after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and led to the war against Iraq; it was able to do so after its development in the 1990s, as a reaction to the outcome of the Gulf War.

Comparing the case studies of the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003, there appears a clear and distinct divergence of US foreign policy in general, and regional Middle East policy in particular. While the foreign policy view held by the George H.W. Bush administration in 1990 was one of pragmatic realism, the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein and affect a new greater Middle East under the George W. Bush Presidency was the manifestation of a new perception of interests, threats, and realities both global and regional. While Operation Desert Storm was carried out within the confines of a foreign policy and worldview which depended in part on international institutions, balance of power and a fundamental concern for state sovereignty, the war against Iraq in 2003 was the formal and forceful initiation of a new understanding of America’s role in the world: No less than a changed understanding of US interests, as well as the means to
achieve those interests, had occurred.

This paper will trace the decision making towards war, and the perceptions guiding policy in the case studies of the Gulf War and the war against Iraq in 2003. By a comparative analysis of these two US-led wars, it will be demonstrated that US foreign policy under George W. Bush has been dramatically different, indeed in ways significantly opposed to that of his father’s foreign policy. The foreign policy of George W. Bush has been constructed by key thinkers among the neoconservative movement of the 1990s, many of whom have since played vital roles in the administration of George W. Bush. In addition, there has been a convergence of ideas between the assertive nationalists of the George W. Bush administration with those of the neoconservatives, forming a powerful locus of ideas and an engine for forceful foreign policy. It will also be shown that while the former Bush Presidency held to a foreign policy paradigm based on a realistic and pragmatic perception of US interests and interests of its allies, the neoconservative movement of the 1990s resulted in a foreign policy marked by ideology, presumption and academic theories over historical precedents and of moral ideals over traditional understandings of vital interests and balance of power politics.

Regionally, the policy guided by neoconservativism lies in sharp contrast to its predecessor in its lack of understanding of important realities in the Middle East. The Gulf War, understood by those who led it as a defining moment for a new post-Cold War world, had its exemplary status challenge by proponents of a new world order and a new century for America. A sea-change took place in US foreign policy, from one founded on principles of order, stability, balance of power— all on the foundation of vital interests— utilizing multilateralism and alliances, to one of moral and unilateral leadership, the spread of “universal” American values as a foreign policy objective, an emphasis on military strength, and the relegation of alliances to ad hoc and short-term crisis-specific coalitions.

In order to compare the decision-making process of the foreign policy makers in the case of the Gulf War to the case of war against Iraq in 2003, this paper will present a historical review of the circumstances leading up to the use of military force in each case. In this way, the context of the decision-making in which each president and foreign policy team worked will elucidate the perceived interests, threats to those interests, and means to achieve US interests in each respective case. Additionally, the understanding of realities in the Middle East held by each administration, and the understanding of appropriate ways in which to deal with those realities, in respect to achieving US policy interests, can also be better understood. To this end, part one will deal with the Gulf Crisis of 1990/1991 and the decision-making process which led to the Gulf War; part two will deal with the development of neoconservative thought, in particular in regards to the out-
Part one: The Gulf
War of 1991

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s army rolled across the border of its tiny neighbor, Kuwait. Iraq’s buildup of forces had taken place over several weeks but it was only in the last day or two before the invasion that top members of the Bush administration realized that the Iraqi president was actually intending to do the unthinkable: initiate aggression and invade a sovereign state. The reason that such an act came as a surprise to US officials was not because of an intelligence failure. On the contrary, the amount of intelligence on Iraq’s movements regularly being gathered and discussed over the previous two months was abundant. The Bush administration, relying on traditional assumptions of rationality and power politics, suspected that Iraq’s military buildup was mere posturing; this was further supported by the strong and repeated advice coming from virtually all the leaders of the Arab world. Thus it was a defiance of many deeply held assumptions, not only by the United States, but of the Arab world, when Saddam Hussein brazenly invaded the tiny, oil rich emirate of Kuwait.

Just months before, Saddam Hussein had personally presented a gold plated Kalashnikov rifle and Iraq’s highest honor to the king of Kuwait. The honor was in thanks for Kuwait’s support of Iraq with billions of dollars of aid throughout Iraq’s bloody eight-year war with Iran. By July of 1990, Saddam Hussein requested that his debts be canceled, and demanded that Kuwait stop exceeding its oil production quota, which had caused prices to drop. Saddam also demanded that Kuwait pay 2.4 billion dollars which, he claimed, Kuwait had stolen by taking oil from the Rumailya oil field, an area of oil straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border. And while Kuwait never officially acknowledged such theft of Iraqi resources, they did seem to concede to the fact with counter offers. At any rate, Iraq was not satisfied with the amount of money offered, or with the principles of the loan repayment. Rhetoric from Iraq grew, with Saddam declaring that Kuwait’s actions regarding the money were in fact aggressive acts of war.

It was under this apparent hard-ball diplomacy that Saddam began his military buildup along his country’s border with Kuwait. But within the Arab world his actions were seen as a bluff. The universal consensus on this was based primarily on the understanding that no Arab state would attack another Arab state and secondarily, that Saddam’s nature was such that bullying tactics were normal and therefore did not mean that he would actually resort to force. The

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nation states of the modern Middle East had existed, for the most part, only during the global reality of the Cold War. The two overarching rule sets for those decades were the dynamics of a contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the concept of pan-Arabism. From these two frameworks there had been the assumption that certain types of behavior among Middle Eastern states were simply not possible. The demise of the Cold War and the weakening of the Soviet Union were still new and developing realities, and Arab leaders and Western leaders alike did not anticipate Saddam’s eventual invasion and annexation of his neighbor.

The significance of Saddam’s “surprise” lies in its demonstration of lingering Cold War beliefs in status-quo international relations. Surprise was achieved, at least in part, because observers were limited in what they could imagine. Additionally, the surprise of the invasion meant that decision-making by President George Bush and his key advisors would be condensed in a short amount of time, and as a reaction to a crisis event which had already taken place. This itself would prove to be a heuristic event for the US administration in terms of contingency planning and global force deployment. But for the hours and days immediately following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the President was forced to quickly evaluate the event and its importance to the United States.

Before August 2, the United States lacked regional preparedness for an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Central Command (CENTCOM) was working on a contingency for an invasion of Kuwait, but was still in the process when the invasion took place. The US had no forces positioned in the region to launch against Hussein’s forces if he were to send his army across the border. Contingencies were hurriedly discussed just before August 2: What if Saddam did invade Kuwait? What if he went into Saudi Arabia? What if he only took the Rumailya oil field?

The change in the US-Iraq relationship can best be understood in terms of the pragmatic realism of the Bush administration. According to Robert Gates, who was serving as President Bush’s Deputy National Security Adviser, there never was “some great relationship” or “love feast” between the United States and Saddam Hussein, as some had claimed. According to Gates and other members of Bush’s security council, the administration was attempting to bring Saddam into the “tent” of moderate nations through the use of various carrots, “mutually beneficial to both sides.” But there were never any illusions as to what type of person Saddam Hussein was. This claim, supported through statements by several in the administration, supports the basic balance of power principle which
was held by the Bush presidency. The US’s support of Iraq during its war with Iran was crucial for minimizing Iran’s power in the region. With the end of that war, the United States continued to engage Iraq diplomatically and with the carrots of trade and so on. There was also the hope that American businesses could be involved with Iraq’s reconstruction efforts. But the administration’s view of Saddam began to change in the Spring of 1990. Saddam’s threatening rhetoric about “eating half of Israel with fire” meant a change in US policy. By March it was clear to the administration that its policy—that of bringing Saddam into the tent of responsible nations—was not working.

The declassified National Security Directive (NSD) 26 of 1989 shows the administration’s perception of vital interests and the means to achieve them. US vital interests would be secured through the use of force when necessary, not with unilateralism being the preferred route, but rather through the support of allies in the region so that they could better protect themselves:

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral U.S. military intervention.

Western allies and Japan would also be encouraged to be effective in promoting mutual interests in the region. The NSD also called for a reduction in US force levels in the region, and setting a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or Battleship Battle Group (BBG) to respond on short notice when needed. The NSD called for a continued effort to “nurture the mutually beneficial cooperative security relationship” between the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Regarding US relations with Iraq, the NSC document states that US longer-term interests would benefit from normal relations with the country. Stability in the Gulf and the Middle East would be promoted through such a relationship, the document asserts, and economic and political incentives should be advanced in order to bring about a moderation in Iraq’s behavior. Additionally, American business involvement in Iraq’s economic and energy reconstruction should be pursued. The US should make clear, however, that any use by Iraq of chemical or biologi-

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5 Ibid.
6 Pbs.org, Oral Histories, James Baker.
8 Ibid.
cal weapons, or violation of IAEA safeguards on Iraq’s nuclear program, would bring about political and economic sanctions, enforced with the cooperation of the “broadest possible support” of US allies.

On the morning of August 2, President George H. W. Bush held a National Security Council (NSC) meeting to discuss the invasion. It was a general meeting and did not amount to much. Brent Scowcroft, the President’s National Security Advisor, left the meeting unhappy with what he saw as resignation, that the invasion was a fait accompli.9 There had been some focus on Hussein’s possible intentions and impact on the oil market: Would he try to flood the oil market to hurt the economies of the other Gulf countries? There was also concern over Iraq’s potential control of 40% of the world’s oil reserves if he were to move into Saudi Arabia. Even without a move into Saudi Arabia, by making Kuwait Iraq’s “19th Province,” 30% of the Middle East’s oil and 19% of then known world-reserves would be under Saddam Hussein’s control.10 This was something the Bush administration felt was unacceptable. The idea of imposing sanctions was discussed, but overall little came from the meeting. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was worried by “their inability to come up with a clear definition of the problem.”11 President Bush was scheduled to attend a meeting that day with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Aspen, Colorado.

It seems evident that while that first meeting—in its general and exploratory nature—did not expound a clear and direct course of action or description of the problem, the President and his key advisors agreed that the invasion was a serious crisis and was unacceptable in regards to US interests. This perception of the event and its consequences was reinforced in the President’s meeting with Margaret Thatcher. The popular misconception surrounding this meeting is that President Bush went into the meeting without his own solid stand on the issue. The significance, and perhaps true meaning, of the Prime Minister’s “don’t go wobbly” comment seem to have been overstated.12 While the precise degree to which Thatcher’s role in the decisions of that day is not entirely clear, there was agreement that Saddam Hussein’s action was unacceptable and that troops should be sent to the region. Significantly, “the two leaders also agreed that the future of Kuwait was not the only thing at stake.”13

President Bush immediately sought the support of the United Nations, which unanimously agreed on UN Resolution 660 on the morning of August 2. At the emergency UN Security Council meeting—convened through the efforts of Kuwait and United States Ambassador to the UN Tom Pickering—the Resoluti-
on, acting under articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter, condemned the invasion of Kuwait and demanded immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi forces to their positions of August 1, 1990. Only Yemen, which was at that time a member of the Security Council, did not participate in the vote. The agreement between Bush and Thatcher on the deployment of troops to the Middle East would be supported to some degree by the UN Resolution. As will be shown, President Bush consistently factored in the United Nations as a source of legal and public support (domestic and international) for his own policy objectives in the months leading up to the war.

By the second NSC meeting held on August 3, President Bush and his advisors were able to articulate a new strength and understanding. Interests were clearly stated and direction was given for US policy concerns. According to Brent Scowcroft, the second NSC meeting stressed the importance of the invasion and “how it affected vital US interests.” At the meeting, the possibility of Saddam Hussein invading Saudi Arabia was addressed; the potentiality of this meaning a much larger task than liberating Kuwait. This meeting was significant in that it marked a new phase in problem identification and in the decision-making process. At that second meeting, the debate was “no longer about what the United States had to do.” And according to Richard Haass, NSC Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, the President was “at least as far, if not farther than any of his advisors” in his assessment of the situation and how it pertained to US interests. “I think that the President understood what he was potentially going to have to do,” said Haass, “but he still hoped he could avoid having to do it...he had no doubts whatsoever that Saddam had to be denied what he had done.” And it was Bush, according to then-Secretary of State James Baker, who decided to pursue a multilateral track towards the ousting of Saddam’s forces.

In the first days following the invasion, President Bush and his advisers in the Security Council evaluated the implications of the invasion on what they perceived as US interests. These interests can be generalized broadly as: 1) primarily economic, to the US specifically and also to its allies; and 2) the precedent of an aggressive state take-over for the post-Cold War era. Both of these general categories contained aspects which were assumed to have far reaching, long lasting, and potentially catastrophic effects on the United States, its allies, and potentially any state in the new era.

The oil concern was not just regarding Kuwait’s oil; it was also that “no other country could be independent again.” OPEC member states would not be able to “cross” Saddam Hussein, and there was also the fear that Iraq would have the power necessary to make moderate OPEC states comply with “Iraqi po-
licies on issues ranging from the production levels and pricing of oil to the settle-
ment of the Arab-Israeli dispute.” Israel, it was understood, would not be free to
“even contemplate a trade of territory for peace with anybody.” Haass saw the
situation as “one of those training points in history”:

...beyond the region it would set in motion the worst conceivable trends
that this was going to be the nature of the post-Cold War world, where
there’s essentially going to become a free-for-all...(with) consequences
beyond this crisis. Even though the crisis itself had enormous stakes.

And then there was the long term concern that, with Saddam’s increased wealth
through his acquisition of such immense quantities of oil, he would acquire more
weapons and be a serious risk to Saudi Arabia’s oil wells, which lay vulnerable
just 40 kilometers across the border (if he did not do so even sooner). Saddam
was seen as being able then to obtain significant forms of coercive control over
OPEC and therefore the entire world. The precedent set by OPEC’s price-hike as
a political weapon in the 1970s gave the administration an historical example of
what could happen again.

On August 5, President Bush met with his key security council and mili-
tary advisors at Camp David. This meeting, and the surprise remarks made by
the President to reporters later that day, would prove crucial to the momentum
and direction of the White House as it sought the exit of Saddam Hussein’s forces
from Kuwait. A critical concern addressed at the Camp David meeting was the se-
curity of Saudi Arabia. And while there was some tough talk about the US hand-
ling the situation without the Saudis, it was eventually agreed that they had to be
involved. It was at this meeting where perceived US interests, and the necessity
of multilateralism as a means to achieve those interests, were turned into policy.
The focus at the meeting was on the defense of Saudi Arabia. At this stage, mi-
litary advisors saw a military operation requiring seventeen weeks for a defense
phase, and between eight to twelve months for an offensive phase. Saudi Ambas-
assador Prince Bandar bin Sultan was present for parts of this meeting, and the
Saudi King was contacted about a US military presence in the Kingdom to defend
against the Iraqi threat. This was initially rejected, but King Fahd’s agreement
soon came, after he was informed that upwards of 70,000 Iraqi troops were near
or moving toward the Saudi Arabian border. General Schwarzkopf informed
the President that he would need around 100,000 troops to be able to adequately
defend the Saudi Border. The President’s response was “You’ll have it.”

\[19\] Michael Hudson, in Ibrahim, ed., 65.
\[20\] Pbs.org, Haass.
\[21\] Ibid.
\[22\] Hybel and Kaufman, 67-69.
\[23\] Pbs.org, Scowcroft.
cally the agreement came after a mission to Saudi Arabia which included Secretary of Defense Cheney, General Schwarzkopf, Deputy National Security Advisor Gates, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz. However, it was understood already that the King had agreed to the US military presence in the Kingdom prior to the group’s trip. For the US Secretary of Defense to visit the King and then return with a “no” would be the “worst of all possible outcomes.” It was the White House’s requirement that no public mission of such a nature could be allowed to end in failure. Concerns by the Saudis included the public presence of US forces on its soil, the possibility that the US would remain after the conflict was finished, and that the US would back out. Between the intelligence presentation of the Iraqi threat, and President Bush’s strongly worded personal commitment to the Saudis, the stage was set for a massive military buildup. Thus the dramatic step of an Arab leader allowing US forces to be based in his territory can be seen as occurring within the time-frame of the Camp David meetings.

The Camp David meeting was a turning point in the way the administration looked at the problem and understood the course for action. To Brent Scowcroft, the meeting brought “the first clear military step in the conflict.” That the President himself internalized this can be seen in his remarks upon his return that day to the White House. Without discussing his remarks first with any of his advisors, Bush dramatically stepped up the White House’s commitment to ousting Saddam from Kuwait. When asked by reporters about the Cheney mission to Saudi Arabia and possible military intervention, the President would not offer any details. He did, however, deliver his now famous words, which Powell saw as a “defining moment”:

...I view it very seriously, not just that but any threat to any other countries, as well as I view seriously our determination to reverse out this aggression. And please believe me, there are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I’ve just said, and I salute them. They are staunch friends and allies, and we will be working with them all for collective action. This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.

The remarks by the President show his personal view on the unacceptability of Iraq’s aggression, and also his multilateral, collective security perspective that would remain throughout the buildup to war.

That the crisis was occurring at an historical period was especially evident

24 Pbs.org, Haass.
25 Pbs.org, Scowcroft.
26 Hybel and Kaufman, 71.
in the joint statement made by James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze. Throughout the Cold War, the default route to veto by the United States and the Soviet Union had a paralyzing effect in the Security Council’s ability to do its job. The cooperation and communication taking place between the two powers was indeed something radically new. Rather than reduce the Security Council to a place of US-Soviet bickering, if the US and Soviet Union could cooperate, there could be a new world order. Aggression could be dealt with “in a way that it had never been known before.” Instead of every conflict becoming a US-Soviet conflict, it was now possible for the two powers to cooperate to deal with conflicts. President Bush’s handling of the Gulf Crisis demonstrates his belief that such a relationship constituted an important interest to the United States.

On August 8, the President declared that Iraq must withdraw all of its forces from Kuwait. Such momentum, which would only increase in the coming days, was cause for concern by some top officials, including Paul Wolfowitz and James Baker, that Bush was rushing toward war with Iraq without first obtaining public support. Wolfowitz was surprised at the “absence of a process of writing alternatives and implications so that the principle foreign policy makers could evaluate them.” The President took “a firm stand without an open discussion of alternatives.” Sanctions were also seen by some as needing more time to have an effect.

The declassified National Security Directive 45, of August 20, 1990, presents a concise articulation of US interests and threats to those interests, as perceived by the Bush foreign policy team. The Directive, entitled U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, emphasized economic interests, state sovereignty, collective action, stability, state legitimacy and regional balance of power. These interests, moreover, would be defended with military force if necessary:

U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to the national security. These interests include access to oil and the security and stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also will support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense. The United States will encourage the effective expressions of support and the participation of our allies and other friendly states to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region.

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28 PBS.org, Scowcroft.
29 Hybel and Kaufman, 73.
The document stated that the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait put “vital U.S. interests at risk.” In response, U.S. policy would be guided by four principles: 1) the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; 2) restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government; 3) security and stability in the Gulf; and 4) the protection of American citizens abroad. Diplomatic, economic and military measures were outlined in the document. Support for the measures was referenced to UNSC resolutions 660 and 662, as well as article 51 of the UN Charter. Economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait came with UNSC Resolution 661; the U.S. would “emphasize individual and collective compliance” with the sanctions, but would be prepared to enforce them based on the “inherent right of individual and collective self-defense” within Article 51 of the UN Charter. This individual and collective self-defense was based on the idea that “a major threat” could face the United States, which imported almost half its oil, and that “Much of the world is even more dependent on imported oil and more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.”

NSD 45 also established two multinational forces: the Multinational Force for Saudi Arabia (MNFSA) and the Multinational Group for the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait (MNFES). Throughout the document, US policy objectives are discussed along with reference to pertinent UN resolutions, articles and so on. The MNFES was designed to enforce sanctions, though the President apparently did not expect this tactic to result in Saddam’s withdrawal from Kuwait. The blockading of imports (other than medicine and food for humanitarian purposes) was considered legal under Article 51 and Resolutions 660 and 661, and therefore no further UN endorsement was deemed necessary.

President Bush’s view against the viability of sanctions was based on a historical understanding which played an important role in his overall assessment of the crisis and range of policy options. The President, who held a deep hatred for Saddam Hussein, equated the Iraqi dictator with Adolph Hitler and other historical tyrants. It is apparent that the President’s view strongly directed his initial reaction to the invasion of Kuwait, and continued to limit the policy alternatives along the path toward the use of military force. The use of sanctions, on the other hand, while seen as a necessary political mechanism for “trying all the options,” was never considered likely to succeed. Indeed, the idea of appeasement was considered dangerous by the President, who was at that time reading a book on the history of World War Two. By placing the Gulf Crisis in a historical role, President Bush looked to history, specifically the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. The logic of this is straightforward: Saddam Hussein was considered a dictator and tyrant; history has shown that dictators cannot be appeased, and therefore force

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31 Ibid.
32 Hybel and Kaufman, 109; also Pbs.org, Scowcroft.
will ultimately be required. The longer sanctions were given priority, the longer Saddam Hussein would have to carry out his persecution of Kuwaiti citizens, the seizure of property, money, and so on, and solidify his control over Kuwaiti oil. Emboldened by this, Saddam would be more likely to set his sights on Saudi Arabia. In Bush’s advisory circle, the argument in favor of sanctions came strongest from Colin Powell. Bush, however, continued to see sanctions as not only ineffectual, but also counterproductive and harmful in the long-term. Sanctions, thought Bush, could actually “strengthen” Saddam Hussein and benefit him. By waiting too long, the alliance could “unravel.” Also in terms of long-range planning, Bush did not want Saddam Hussein to “withdraw with impunity,” and with his military force and weapons of mass destruction still in his possession.

As weeks and months passed, and with Saddam Hussein’s forces still occupying Kuwait, President Bush concluded that, “if his administration failed to take a resolute stand against Iraq, the U.S. drive to create a new world order would stall.” Again, the historical example of pre-World War Two appeasement for Bush was that appeasement of Saddam Hussein “would shape a new status quo in the Middle East, one that would ultimately end in chaos.” Bush was afraid of leaving an aggressor for future generations, one who would take over Saudi Arabia and be a “paramount power in the Middle East.”

On January 15, 1991, diplomatic maneuverings came to an end, and Operation Desert Shield was replaced with Operation Desert Storm—the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. National Security Directive 54 laid out the war’s rationale and objectives. The terminology and articulation of interests in NSD 54 are congruent with those in NSD 45 of August 20, and carries on the interests detailed in the 1989 NSD on US policy in the Persian Gulf. First and foremost in the directive is the “access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly sates in the area” as being “vital to U.S. national security.” Additionally, “prolonging the current situation would be detrimental to the United States” by increasing “the costs of eventual military action.” A continuation of sanctions and diplomacy was seen then to “threaten the political cohesion of the coalition,” which would “allow for the continued brutalization of the Kuwaiti people and destruction of their country, and cause added damage to the U.S. and world economies.” The directive’s wording cites a basis in long-standing policy and vital US interests. Again citing Article 51’s inherent “right of collective self-defense,” President Bush authorized military operations “designed to bring about Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.” Four objectives were outlined for the ope-
ration: 1) to cause the “immediate, complete and unconditional” withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; 2) to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; 3) to protect American citizens abroad; and 4) “to promote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.”

Consistent with President Bush’s support of multilateralism, “maximum participation of (US) coalition partners in all aspects of operations conducted either in Kuwait or Iraq” would be utilized. A significant clause regarding Iraqi sovereignty was included in the Directive: “The United States recognizes the territorial integrity of Iraq and will not support efforts to change current boundaries.”

The withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait was the operation’s objective, though regime change was not ruled out if certain conditions were met:

Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorist acts against U.S. or coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait’s oil fields, it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq.

The inclusion of this potential recourse to regime change is significant, for it sheds light on the perspective of the Bush Administration on Saddam Hussein. Having been a sovereign leader worth being “brought into the tent” of responsible nations, Saddam was now a potential target himself for regime change. However, based on the wording of the National Security Directive, as well as speeches, post-war interviews and accounts and security directives, regime change was not a primary objective of the war. Indeed the viability of a post-war Iraqi government as a counter balance to Iranian hegemonic aims precluded an outright desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein (or the outright support of indigenous groups to overthrow him).

The consistency of George Bush’s policy persisted throughout the months before Iraq’s invasion, through the buildup to war, and at the war’s conclusion. This policy was one of concentration on perceived vital US interests, grounded on a historical perspective, and with strong consideration to the future of the region and to the post-Cold War order. There was also pragmatism in the decision-making conditional to the realities in the Middle East. The coalition force exemplifies the conversion of George Bush’s multilateralism and his understanding of key aspects to regional political dynamics. The large number of Arab states directly involved with the military operation was part of a multilateralism in general, but was specifically seen as important to lend legitimacy to the US-led operation to use force in the Middle East against an Arab country.

The outcome of the war has been a contentious issue for many, and indeed
served as a type of catalyst for neoconservative thinking throughout the 1990s. For many influential political observers at the time—many of whom would later take active roles in Washington think tanks, foreign policy journals and eventually in the George W. Bush White House—the terms of the Gulf War’s conclusion were fundamental to their world view and dissatisfaction with US foreign policy. Before taking a close look at these foreign policy perspectives of the neoconservatives, it is beneficial first to briefly examine the outcome of the Gulf War, and the opinions of the war’s key policymakers. Later, their understanding of interests and risks can be evaluated with the perception of those who would lead the US to war with Iraq in March of 2003.

The first two points of NSD 54 were empirically met. The US-led coalition brought about the “complete and unconditional” withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Secondly, the legitimate Kuwaiti government of the Al-Sabah family returned to power. The promotion of peace and stability of the Gulf Region was arguably achieved. For the short term this would be hard to argue. Saddam Hussein’s military was devastated but not destroyed outright. Keeping with the administration’s concern for state sovereignty and balance of power, the Iraqi president remained in power. Public rhetoric by President Bush appeared, to many, to support an Iraqi rebellion against Hussein. That such a rebellion did take form in March of 1991, but was not supported militarily by the US, is seen by many as a critical failure of President Bush and his foreign policy team. To such critics, it was a wasted opportunity to change the face of the Middle East for the better. Two assumptions of the Bush policy team are important to understand here. The first involves what they anticipated for the fate of the Iraqi leader. The second involves the understanding of success, which was dependent on a perception of realities in Iraq and the greater Middle East.

The publicly stated objectives of the war seem to match the authentic objectives of the administration. If this is indeed the case, then militarily the war was a success. The regular supply of oil was no longer under threat; Saddam Hussein would not be able to control OPEC or OPEC. The flagrant aggression by a powerful country over a small country was shown to be unacceptable in the new post-Cold War world. An example was made that threats to US interests would not be tolerated. At the same time, the US showed that its war efforts would be limited. In terms of the “new world order,” the US could not be seen as surpassing its own stated limitations. The primacy of state sovereignty was therefore a priority to be given even to an aggressor nation. President Bush was required by his own doctrine to forego his “personal loathing” for Saddam Hussein, and show the world that it had not been a “war of vengeance” or a war against Arabs or
Islam. Goals were met, and objectives were achieved; to go beyond those goals would be counterproductive. Iraq’s destruction was not a desired outcome, but rather its territorial integrity should be maintained. This was largely because the US did not want Syria or Iran taking portions of Iraqi territory. From this view, the remaining Iraqi army was needed and had to be strong enough to defend the country against attack from a neighbor while at the same time not strong enough to intimidate others.

Such limits notwithstanding, it is also clear that the Bush team would have welcomed the fall of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, they expected such an outcome to follow the dictator’s military loss. The defeat to the US-led coalition, coming as it did just after the long and costly war with Iran, was wrongly judged to be too much for the dictator’s military to tolerate. His demise was therefore anticipated, but it was desired only if it came from the Iraqi people, not the United States. Specifically, the Bush foreign policy team expected Saddam’s overthrow to come from Saddam’s lieutenants. From the US perspective, Saddam Hussein had twice led his country to defeat—the Iraqi army and civilians would be “fed up” with their brutal dictator who was also an unsuccessful leader of the armed forces. Before the March uprising by the Shia and Kurds, the assessments of the White House and intelligence agencies were all in agreement on this assumption. Ironically, it may have been the uprising that prevented the military from organizing itself to get rid of Saddam. The uprising was not anticipated by the United States. Coming from the Shia and the Kurds, it was a threat not only to Saddam but to his Ba’ath party military leaders. Because of this, it gave Saddam a “pretty solid basis to argue to his army, ‘stick with me or we’ll all be out’.” And so in fact the military did not turn against Saddam, and he was able to use them to crush the spontaneous uprising and secure his position of power following his military defeat and replace the image of a “failed leader” with the image of a hero.

Broad consensus apparently existed that a US-led overthrow of the regime would not be in US interests. In the context of US objectives and interpretation of realities in the region, the valuable successes of the Gulf War would be negated in many ways if the US were to continue on into Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein by force. This would set the wrong post-Cold War precedent, away from the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity towards an example of the most extreme form of infringement upon sovereignty. It would also set the wrong example to Arab states regarding US intentions in the region, and would erode the positive effects of the broad-based coalition, which included important Arab states. The purpose of the war, according to Richard Haass, was not only to li-

41 Obs.org, Haass; Hybel and Kaufman, 120,121.
42 Pbs.org, Robert Gates.
43 Pbs.org, Haass and Baker.
44 Hybel and Kaufman, 120.
45 Pbs.org, Baker.
46 Pbs.org, Haass.
berate Kuwait, but also to make a new political situation in the Middle East that would “promote security and promote our interests.” When considering a future Iraq with Saddam removed by the US, Richard Haass again clarifies the Bush team’s perspective:

I don’t know how to...tell you to ‘replace this government with something better’. I don’t know how to do that sort of thing without years of occupation and even then I can’t guarantee it. But unless you’re willing to do the sort of thing the United States and the world did after World War Two with Germany and Japan and spend years and years on the ground in a retail occupation, door to door, street to street, I don’t know any way to use military force to engineer the societies of other peoples. The fact in this case it was the 1990s, it was an Islamic society, it was an Arab society, it was half the world away where there were no common traditions. I just thought that was beyond the do-able.47

Haass’ statement illustrates a critical view underlying the Bush team’s foreign policy parameters, in terms of policy leading to the war and policy ending it. Regarding the accusation that the US should have removed Saddam when it “had the chance,” Brent Scowcroft’s answer supports Haass’ view, and that of the Bush foreign policy doctrine in general: “It was never our objective to get Saddam Hussein,” Scowcroft explains. “Indeed, had we tried we still might be occupying Baghdad. That would have turned a great success into a very messy, probable defeat.”48

The defeat of George Bush to Bill Clinton in 1992 was a wake-up call for Washington: Foreign policy was not the major concern of the American people. The success of Clinton’s campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” demonstrated that domestic concerns trumped the grand foreign policy schemes of George Bush, Ronald Reagan and their Cold War warriors in the Departments of Defense and State. The Cold War was over and the United States had won. It was once again time to look inward.

Thus a process began to regroup, define and refine a foreign policy that encompassed a grand strategic vision on a global scale. The moral component was already present in the Republican Party, but much of the hard-line foreign policy aspects seemed to have been lost with the “victory” over the Soviet Union. Even George Bush’s popular success against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm was not enough to keep him in office. It appeared to be the death of hard-line, global thinkers who had helped shape Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy, and who played a

47   Pbs.org, Haass.
48   Ibid.
role, though with less influence, in the administration of George Bush. Those who would become most influential in the development of a foreign policy philosophy loosely known as neoconservativism would make use of the next decade to put in place a doctrine of world leadership and dominance. Far from accepting defeat to Clinton’s multiculturalism and embrace of globalization, this collection of foreign policy advisors and writers would, over the coming years, seek no less than a redefinition of America’s role in the world and a reshaping of interests. The conditions under which the Gulf War was concluded served as a reaction point for much of what the neoconservatives saw as being wrong with American foreign policy, and would also factor in greatly for a perception of threats, a specific agenda, and an achievable goal upon which to focus intellectual attention and, eventually, policy. But the development of neoconservativism in the 1990s, as an idea or worldview, was not just a reaction to any one issue. Indeed, it is a sometimes diverse worldview, but one which is also unified in its moral understanding of American hegemony, leadership, and on the essentialness of peace through strength in foreign policy. Another defining characteristic of the neoconservatives might be said to be their ability, or even their tendency, to grow stronger from apparent defeat. A brief look at the history of the neoconservative movement is in order.

In 1988, with the end of Reaganism, Jay Winik wrote that it was a watersheded time for the neoconservatives. “Fundamental choices must be made about policy and about identity,” he wrote, “but most of all about the future. Are the neoconservatives going to be a lasting part of American politics, or will history record them as a once potent phenomenon in U.S. foreign policy that reached its height in the opposition party of the 1980s and then faded?” This would be answered, he wrote, by whether or not a “successor generation is left behind.” In the same question could have been asked with the election of Bill Clinton, and it would seem to have an answer by the time George W. Bush was promoting a new, neoconservative foreign policy, and moving to overthrow Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.

The neoconservative agenda was not monolithic; it did not abide by one all-encompassing platform. Its origination can be traced to the administration of Lyndon Johnson and the Henry “Scoop” Jackson Democrats. A crucial moment came for them when the Soviet Union, in a gesture of support of the Arab cause in the Middle East, restricted Jewish emigration to Israel following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Senator Jackson led a drive to punish Russia resulting in a changed policy. Senator Jackson’s tough stand against the Soviets emboldened the neoconservative “orientation.” Another key moment came in 1972 with the Democratic nomination of Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. McGovern’s
position for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam was seen by neoconservatives as a dangerous return to isolationism and a weak stance against the threat of international communism. That year the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) was formed, giving the neoconservatives a “voice in the party” against the nomination of McGovern.51 Coupled with Nixon’s détente with the USSR and opening to China, conservative Democrats who wanted a strong, morally founded foreign policy sought an approach identified with former President Truman and Senator Jackson. The soft foreign policy of President Carter and the election of Ronald Reagan brought many conservative Democrats away from their party.

Today, many observers rightly think of neoconservatism as being a Republican Party worldview. But its origin in the Democratic Party is an important fact in understanding its complicated and often heterogeneous behavior. As Winik wrote of the Neoconservatives in the late 1980s, many were not registered Republicans, they were not homogeneous, and generalization was impossible. But it was the neoconservatives who “most ably led and articulated the Reagan foreign policy crusade.”52 Reagan’s foreign policy, which would later be exalted as a rallying call for a neoconservative renaissance by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, among others, was characterized by massive defense spending, a belief in American moral superiority and exceptionalism, peace through strength, support for Israel and a consistent, morally guided leadership.

With the end of George Bush’s single term in office, those members of his administration who were of the neoconservative worldview did not sit idly by. Instead, they wrote, and taught, ran political departments at prestigious American universities, formed think-tanks, and wrote some more. The Weekly Standard, a weekly publication started by the influential neoconservative William Kristol provided a regular forum and a place to make policy recommendations. Academic journals, especially Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs, were important venues for the propagation and refinement of the emerging, more cohesive neoconservative worldview which would come to dominate the foreign policy of George W. Bush. Many of the key players served in the administrations of Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and George Bush; they would grow less disparate, more organized, and more determined over these intervening years.

In their 1996 landmark article in Foreign Affairs, Robert Kagan and William Kristol recalled the values of Reagan’s foreign policy—values which had been abandoned after Bill Clinton’s victory over George Bush. In “Toward a Neoreaganite Foreign Policy,” Robert Kagan and William Kristol’s argument is important because its fundamental premises can be recognized in many of the views of key players in George W. Bush’s administration and, importantly, among those...
who were pivotal in pushing for war against Iraq. While Jay Winik may have spoken accurately about the neoconservative’s lack of homogeneity in the late 1980s, this characteristic changed dramatically in the late 1990s, and Kagan and Kristol’s article was a watershed in its own right. In it, the authors outlined what they saw as the declining role of conservatism and the inevitable consequences of that decline. They saw a lack of a conservative view of the world—and America’s role in it—in American foreign policy, politics and public opinion. This view saw the end of the Cold War as a direct result of Reagan’s strong leadership, moral clarity and emphasis on a massive defense buildup, but then witnessed that success lead many Americans, even policy thinkers, Democrat and Republican alike, to unburden themselves from the responsibility of global leadership. The 1990s, these people thought, was a time to “return to normalcy,” with “The adoption of a more limited definition of national interest,” and an equal withdrawal from actions abroad and spending on defense.53 Conservatives limited their foreign and defense policies due to the apparent reluctance and even hostility of Americans to a foreign policy that advocated strong leadership and involvement abroad. Americans, Kristol and Kagan wrote, were “more intent on cashing in the ‘peace dividend’ than on spending to deter and fight future wars.”54

The recurrence of ideas and the ever-growing importance of certain actors shows the continuity and progression of neoconservative thought towards a coherent and relatively heterogeneous worldview by the time of the 2003 war with Iraq. Prominent themes are seen to overlap in the neoconservative discourse of the late 1990s, a period in which two particular objects of discussion strengthened neoconservative ideas into a framework for policy. Among other issues, both would serve as guidance for the new Bush administration. These two issues were the “unfinished business” of the Gulf War, and the general lessens learned—or not learned—from Clinton’s approach to foreign policy which seemed to undermine US interests by giving priority to international treaties and organizations. For neoconservatives, the disastrous consequences of Clinton’s foreign policy were seen especially clear in the case of Bosnia, but in no way was it limited to that case. In both of these areas, neoconservatives like Kristol and Kagan were angry at what they saw as the separation of core American values in domestic versus foreign policy. The traditional realist view of international relations allowed for an intellectual separation between vital interests abroad and American values and liberal democratic tradition. This rejection of the “realist,” Kissengeri-an school of foreign policy is crucial to the development of an adjusted perception of “vital interests” under the neoconservative paradigm and, of great importance, of the way in which to achieve US interests. Old and new understandings of US interests would all be achieved through strong, determined leadership, guided by

54 Ibid.
a solid understanding of American values. Furthermore, such leadership would be implemented unilaterally, and only multilaterally when instrumentally useful. In his 1998 article in Foreign Policy, Robert Kagan explained the lessons which then-President Bill Clinton “was supposed to have learned” from Bosnia:

...to be effective, multilateralism must be preceded by unilateralism. In the toughest situations, the most effective multilateral response comes when the strongest power decides to act, with or without the others, and then asks its partners whether they will join. Giving equal say over international decisions to nations with vastly unequal power often means that the full measure of power that can be deployed in defense of the international community’s interests will, in fact, not be deployed.55

Later, this logic was seen in use by George W. Bush’ foreign policy team, as they prepared for war against Iraq. The role of the US, in this perspective, is as a moral leader, and a leader because of its hegemonic power. Neither role should be shunned or deemed offensive, according to neoconservativism. Rather than shirk the tiresome burden of global responsibility, the US role should be one of “benevolent global hegemony.” Indeed, “the first objective of US foreign policy,” wrote Kristol and Kagan, “should be to preserve and enhance (US) predominance by strengthening America’s security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world.”56 From this view, the US should take control of the position it already has, and further its position unilaterally whenever necessary. Criticism of hegemony from other nations, such as China and Russia, should be taken as compliments and as “a guide to action.”57

From the above perspective, one of the biggest risks to American security and position in the world lay in the view of Americans—among the public at large as well as policy-makers—that adversarial ambitions were no longer present in the world, and that America’s defeat of international communism meant there were no longer existential threats to the American, liberal democratic way of life and values at home and abroad. But it was the Reagan administration’s foreign policy, led by its neoconservative foreign policy makers, that brought this success. By the 1990s, complacency had set in, and liberals “began to deny they (adversarial nations) had any ambitions, or even that (the US) had any adversaries.”58 This was considered a security threat to the US for two reasons: 1) there were very real existential threats present at that time; 2) such a posture by the US would only encourage other nations and non-state actors to pursue ways in which to erode

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid, 22.
and attack US interests. Again, the lessons of the Gulf War are important: While the most vocal neoconservative writers such as Kagan, Kristol and Paul Wolfowitz spoke highly of George Bush’s liberation of Kuwait, the outcome of the war was seen as deeply flawed and dangerous to US interests and security. America’s role of benevolent hegemon, and its credibility backed by military power, were both susceptible to erosion from humiliation and disregard for US values. Lesser powers than the US could afford a degree of humiliation, but for the US “humiliation exacts too high a price,” compared to what other countries can safely endure.59 With Saddam left to control Iraq with blatant tyranny over his people, and apparent disregard for international monitors, and ordering American and United Nations officials to leave Iraq, Saddam Hussein was humiliating the United States. “International credibility,” The Weekly Standard explained, “starts to take a dive,” and “adversaries start whetting their appetites.”60 According to this line of thinking, Clinton’s response to Saddam’s stubbornness only made the risk greater. America limited itself by working along with the UN and worrying about world opinion; meanwhile, the American people did not recognize the growing threat to their own security and way of life. Due to “the lack of a visible threat to US vital interests, or to world peace,” Americans were tempted to “dismantle the material and spiritual foundation on which their national well-being has been based.” Furthermore, America’s global position was not obtained through a foreign policy of “live and let live, nor by passively waiting for threats to arise, but by actively promoting American principles of governance abroad—democracy, free markets, respect for liberty.”61 The persistent existence of Saddam’s regime, his defiance to American-backed inspectors, and the US subordination of its interests to an ineffective United Nations were all signs that US interests were being eroded and America’s position was in fact being undermined. What was necessary, and achievable, according to the neoconservatives, was a reversal of such trends through strong, demonstrative leadership. In their clarion call of 1996, Kagan and Kristol’s words would seem entirely at place in the post-September 11 foreign policy of George W. Bush’s administration, his War on Terror and, most importantly, in his charge for war to overthrow Saddam Hussein:

History also shows, however, that the American people can be summoned to meet the challenges of global leadership if statesmen make the case loudly, cogently, and persistently. As troubles arise and the need to act becomes clear, those who have laid the foundation for a necessary shift in policy have a chance to lead Americans onto a new course.62
That new course would be founded on a clear understanding and emphasis on American values, and the shouldering of an historical responsibility. The peace and stability of the world is on America’s shoulders in this view, and thus a foreign policy of “sitting atop a hill and leading by example becomes in practice a policy of cowardice and dishonor.” But more than dishonor is at stake, according to this view: “A true ‘conservativism of the heart’ ought to emphasize both personal responsibility, relish the opportunity for national engagement, embrace the possibility of national greatness, and restore a sense of the heroic.” Referring to George Kennan’s “open letter,” the authors call upon the “responsible of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended (Americans) to bear,” and that the case is as true today as it was at the onset of the Cold War. Without the “support of an elevated patriotism, bereft of the ability to appeal to national honor, conservatives will ultimately fail in their effort to govern America. And Americans will fail in their responsibility to lead the world.”

In February of 1998, President Clinton received an open letter from the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf. In their letter, they argued against containment of Saddam who, they wrote, was continuing to develop chemical and biological weapons. “Sanctions and exhortations” were the only tools being used by the US, they wrote, and America’s policies toward the dictator were “static and bound to erode, opening the way to Saddam’s eventual return to a position of power and influence in the region. Only a determined program to change the regime in Baghdad will bring the Iraqi crisis to a satisfactory conclusion.” The letter called for a comprehensive political and military strategy to overthrow Saddam’s regime, a call which would be intensified over the coming months and years, culminating in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Justification for a policy of regime change was founded on Saddam Hussein’s “long record of treaty violations, deception, and violence” which were not abated by diplomacy and arms control. Keeping in line with the neoconservative position, the letter went on to say that in Washington, “some may misunderstand and misinterpret strong American action against Iraq as having ulterior motives. We believe, on the contrary, that strong American action against Saddam is overwhelmingly in the national interest, that it must be supported, and that it must succeed.” Based on the arguments in other publications, speeches, and so on, from the composers of the latter, the sincerity of this statement should be seen as real. The argument was also made in the Weekly Standard series, which cited The New York Times’ claim that, according to UN inspectors, Iraq possibly had the makings of an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and the “rudiments of a missile system” for deployment.

63 Ibid, 31-32.
66 Ibid, 2.
of WMD. The Standard argument was that UN inspectors could “no longer verify that Iraq is not making weapons of mass destruction,” and were unable to monitor “equipment that could grow seed stocks of biological agents in a matter of hours.” Zalmay Khalilzad, (a former adviser to George Bush who would eventually work for George W. Bush) and Paul Wolfowitz, argued with an assumption that Saddam already possessed WMD. Saddam’s tactics with the UN inspectors showed that he “concluded that he can allow U.N. inspectors back in at very little risk.” And, having learned from the conclusion of the Gulf War, Saddam felt that while he could not try to achieve all of his goals at once, he could “take the loaf one slice at a time.”

In the same year of the “open letter” to President Clinton, Paul Wolfowitz, as Dean of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, wrote a strongly worded argument for the absolute necessity of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. In his December 7 article in the New Republic, Wolfowitz’s argument reiterated the claims made by William Kristol, Robert Kagan and Zalmay Khalilzad, in their articles from the previous years, as well as the persistent message set forth by the Peace and Security in the Gulf group. When evaluating the consistency over time and across members of the various think tanks and, later, membership in George W. Bush’s foreign policy team, Wolfowitz’s strongly worded article is useful for understanding the linkage between neoconservative discourse and the eventual foreign policy under George W. Bush. In Wolfowitz’s article, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense claimed that “Toppling Saddam is the only outcome that can satisfy the vital U.S. interests in a stable and secure Gulf region.” This was due in large part, he wrote, because Saddam and the Iraqi regime were one and the same and that there were “critical moral, political, and even strategic implications” in this. He continued with the charge that leaving Saddam in power at the end of the Gulf War was a serious mistake. His argument in this particular article focuses on the need to support an Iraqi resistance, and says that in the month following the Gulf War a “golden opportunity was lost.” This was, of course, the time of the Kurdish and Shia uprising, and at that point, Wolfowitz says, it was obvious that the war was no longer a conflict over Kuwait, but had become a direct conflict with Saddam. Because of this, Saddam would be dangerous unless he was removed from power. According to Wolfowitz, due to the changed nature of the conflict, and especially due to the nature of Saddam himself, his threat to his neighbors and to the US would always remain and would increase with time. Arab regimes who were part of the Gulf War coalition would be threatened by Saddam, a gangster who “uses revenge to intimidate, and hence accumulate power.” Citing the alleged Iraqi attempt to
assassinate former President George Bush on his visit to Kuwait in 1993, the message to members of the coalition was clear: “Saddam Hussein gets even.” While Wolfowitz criticized the end of the Gulf War, he placed special criticism on President Bill Clinton who, he said, further eroded US credibility in the region by using insufficient force against Saddam. Even the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 was not backed up by genuine support of the Administration. This trend of “pin prick” attacks, along with tough talk contradicted by a clear reluctance to undertake a genuine policy of regime change, served to embolden Saddam Hussein and sent a message that the US was too risk averse and dependent upon multilateralism and UN-endorsement. The failure to support the uprisings in 1991 and 1996 showed that the US abandoned the resistance twice. Wolfowitz wrote that Saddam was a “war criminal without a shred of democratic legitimacy,” whose “continued rule is incompatible with peace in the Gulf.” Wolfowitz’s argument, as with the others in this period, was concerned with Saddam’s view of American weakness.

Wolfowitz’s 1998 article was somewhat different from other arguments in that period, in that he gave special attention to pursuing a charge of war crimes against Saddam, and also because he emphasized US support for the Iraqi resistance. In a four point proposal, Wolfowitz outlined what he thought were the most important steps for the US to take: First, the United States should stop sending mixed signals to the opposition. Secondly, the US should pursue an indictment of Saddam for war crimes, and also prevent him from earning money from Iraqi assets and oil. Additionally, the US must provide the Iraqi opposition with weapons, as authorized by the Iraqi Liberation Act, but “seemingly opposed by Clinton’s administration. Lastly, the effort to support the opposition would require a protected area, secured by US forces, in which opposition forces could organize and to which Saddam’s military could defect. These steps, Wolfowitz wrote, would be “risky,” but “not as risky as the present course, which is leading us to the day that we are obliged to face Saddam ourselves, when he is armed with weapons of unparalleled destructiveness.”

To better appreciate the consistency and determination of this charge, it is helpful to review a report written under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz a few years prior to his articles in the New Republic and Weekly Standard. The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), supervised by Wolfowitz while he was under-Secretary of Defense for Policy under George H.W. Bush, presented a new foreign policy vision and strategy for the United States. The original draft document was leaked to the New York Times and Washington Post. The new strategy called for

71 It should be remembered that the actuality of this alleged assassination attempt was at that time, and remains to be, highly in doubt.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
the US to prevent the rise of a rival power and the ensuing controversy caused then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to order a rewrite of the Guidance. The subsequent document sounded much less hegemonic and unilateral than its leaked draft. If the leaked document is considered along with the ever-more refined foreign policy view of the neoconservatives, it shows a strategy ready and waiting for George W. Bush’s foreign policy team. For the neoconservative agenda, it provided a strong platform from which to promote neoconservative values in foreign policy. By September 20, 2002, the controversial elements of the leaked DPG would be formalized in the White House’s National Security Strategy. In the leaked, original draft of the DPG, prepared under the guidance of Paul Wolfowitz, a dramatic shift in US foreign policy was presented:

Our objective is to prevent the emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.

The document went on to say:

...the U.S. must show leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.75

In the leaked draft, there was no mention of collective action through the United Nations; it should be anticipated that future coalitions would be ad hoc assemblies, organized to face a specific crisis but not lasting beyond the resolution of the crisis.76 Although the guidance was written by President George Bush’s foreign policy officials, it was a marked divergence from the approach taken by the President in the Gulf Crisis. The controversy which came with the leaked draft led to a watered-down version, complete with references to coalitions and multilateralism. But taken as part of a collective of statements and policy recommendations over the course of the decade, and as exemplified with the foreign policy team of George W. Bush (especially after the attacks of September 11), the policy objectives and perception of interests and means to achieving those interests, as worded in the original, leaked 1992 DPG, are quite instructive. Indeed, eight years after the 1992 DPG, Condoleezza Rice would repeat many of the same ideas as Foreign Policy Advisor to then-candidate George W. Bush.

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76   Ibid.
The DPG and the neoconservative agenda which was refined over the 1990s would be a stark rebuke of many key components of the foreign policy of the first President Bush and those of the Kissinger school. Balance of power and coalition building, strengthening of the United Nations and the serious investment of resources in coalition building, as seen in the Gulf Crisis, were to give way to a policy built on unilateral strength and leadership, emphasis on American values, a belief in the moral superiority of the United States, and the prevention of new rising international powers.

The Project for the New American Century and the Convergence of Ideas: Global Dominance and Neoconservative Interests

Throughout the 1990s, Saddam Hussein would remain a thorn in the side of the neoconservative worldview. Indeed he would take on a role of importance that seemingly contradicted the argument of Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad that “Saddam is not ten feet tall.” The views of neoconservatism and the strategy postulated in the 1992 leaked DPG would converge most regarding the issue of Saddam Hussein. Key neoconservatives and proponents of unrivaled American global dominance joined together in June of 1997, under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century, a Washington think-tank founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. The strategic vision of the PNAC shares the most controversial elements of the leaked 1992 Defense Planning Guidance: “At present the United States faces no rival,” they stated in their report of America’s defenses in 2000, and “America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.” The PNAC’s Statement of Principles calls the foreign and defense policy of the 1990s “adrift.” Conservatives, the Statement explains, have criticized Clinton’s policies as being “incoherent” and stood against isolationist tendencies within the Republican party, but have not established clear and “guiding principles for American foreign policy.” Overcoming these weaknesses and lack of cohesion within the party is an important aspect to the think-tank’s Principles, but even more important when considering the organization’s influence on US foreign policy, is its vision of America in the 21st century. The group is highly critical of the cuts in defense spending which characterized the 1990s, and calls for a renewed attention to statecraft and leadership. It harkens back to the days of Ronald Reagan and the lessons of that administration’s success: Military strength and readiness for present and future challenges and bold foreign policy that “purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United

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77 This was a common refrain from Wolfowitz and Khalilzad, used in various writings, testimony, and so on.
78 The group’s membership and advisory board provides the major link between ideas and policy after George W. Bush put together his foreign policy team.
The PNAC sees the United States’ responsibilities to the world as being essential for global peace and security. If the United States “shirks” its responsibilities, the result will be challenges to its “fundamental interests.” The historical lessons of the 20th century, they say, demonstrate that the US must shape circumstances before they are manifested, and address threats before they become too serious. “The history of this century,” their statement explains, “should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.” The group’s four “consequences” consist of significantly increased defense spending; strengthening of relationships with democratic allies, “and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values”; the need to promote political and economic freedom around the world, and to “accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.” This “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today,” they explain, “but it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.”

The list of names following the Statement of Principles is telling: Dick Cheney, I. Lewis Libby, William Bennett, Donald Rumsfeld, Jeb Bush, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Paul Wolfowitz, among others, were the proponents of this vision of America’s new century of greatness and global leadership.

The George W. Bush Campaign and Foreign Policy: The Vulcans and Assertive Nationalism

George W. Bush placed foreign policy as a secondary matter of interest as he campaigned for president in 2000. His own description of the role of president was as a Chief Executive Officer. With this view in mind, he assembled a foreign policy team that would play an exceptionally strong role in formulating his foreign policy. Because of this, it is possible to understand his agenda, motives, priorities and assumptions of foreign policy realities, in this case especially in the Middle East, by examining the progression and development of the views of those who would form his foreign policy team.

Leading Bush’s campaign foreign policy team was Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz. Their group, known as the Vulcans, were mostly “hawkish” conservative Republicans—“assertive nationalists.” The Vulcans were assembled in 1999 by Rice and Wolfowitz, and included Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Stephen Hadley, Robert Blackwill, Robert Zoellick, and Dove Zackerheim. Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were also very influential during Bush’s campaign.
Wolfowitz and Perle were the two neoconservatives, while the others were assertive nationalists. But the convergence of ideas and ideals outweighed the divergence between the worldviews. An indicator of this fact is that Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were essential in the selection of such neoconservatives as Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby once Bush was in office. At the onset there was a commonality in their ideals and worldview, whatever the intellectual terminology or name that was used. Cheney and Rumsfeld differed from the neoconservative view in that they did not have the “ideological zeal to aggressively export US values, particularly democracy,” as the “hard-line Wilsonian(s)” like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. But where they did agree should not be underestimated. The concept of American exceptionalism and the necessity of unilateralism and military strength linked the assertive nationalism of Rumsfeld and Cheney with the neoconservatives. They also shared important formative experiences in the Pentagon, and believed that American power was “a force for good in the world.” They opposed the liberal internationalist view which asserted the importance of international treaties and institutions, which they saw as “tying down” American power.

The neoconservatives strongly believed that the spread of American values around the globe should be a central component of US foreign policy, and that all means available should be used to achieve this. The worldview held by Cheney and Rumsfeld differed in this regard, but shared with the neoconservatives the “primacy of the state, military power and national security in international affairs,” profound distrust of international commitments and institutions, and the notion that America should prevent the rise of any new powers. Furthermore, they shared the belief that only American hegemony and “an unchallengeable military” could ensure world peace.

It is useful to return to the ideas held by the PNAC and the leaked 1992 DPG, while considering the formulation of foreign policy during the administration of George W. Bush. A consistent trajectory of ideas is seen in the linkage between the PNAC’s 2000 report on America’s defense, and the 1992 leaked Defense Planning Guidance: US foreign policy should be a policy of global leadership and in the prevention of a rival to that leadership. The timing of the PNAC report should not be overlooked, coming as it did in a presidential election year, and while George W. Bush was the Republican Party’s candidate. The fundamental objective of US global dominance and the means to achieving that dominance and position of unrivaled leadership was echoed in the writings of then-Foreign Policy Advisor to candidate George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice. In the same year Rice, in

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82 Ritchie and Rogers, 149, 154.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, 152.
her article in the influential foreign policy journal Foreign Affairs, entitled “The National Interest”, wrote that “Power matters,” and that US policy should not be dependent in any way upon institutions such as the United Nations. US policy, she argued, should not seek to legitimate its use of power through international treaties, law or norms. When George W. Bush was about to take office, a non-partisan report was prepared to help with his transition to the White House. The report was written in part by neoconservative Zalmay Khalilzad, the former NSC adviser and signer of the PNAC’s statement of principles. The report reiterated the group’s view on American global leadership and influence:

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the United States finds itself with military, economic, political, and even cultural power that is unrivaled. But we are still struggling to understand what we must do abroad in support of our interests and values, how we can help shape the kind of world in which we want to live, and what the limits of our power are.

The report does not rule out the need for alliances or call for the US to entirely “go it alone.” The report does declare that, “despite the responsibilities of leadership that necessarily now fall on U.S. shoulders, American power and will cannot on their own suffice to meet and master the array of global demands that challenge U.S. interests, those of our friends and allies, and the welfare of the planet as a whole.” Yet the centrality of US global leadership is the overriding message, even with the allowance of “democratic alliances”:

American power and position, while today unrivaled, will not automatically be sustained, but will be deeply affected both by what the United States does and by how others respond...we must learn how to translate our great power into lasting influence. . . . America should seek to preclude the rise of a global rival or a hostile global alliance.

This report presents ideas which by now should not seem new. Indeed, the notion of American predominance and the preclusion of any rival powers was central to the PNAC report of 2000 on US military strategy and was the controversial objective of the leaked 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. This strategic vision for America’s foreign policy future should not, therefore, be seen as limited to the writers of the leaked 1992 DPG, or as being separate from the neoconservative worldview as promulgated in the reports and statements of the PNAC. Additionally, the revised and final version of the 1992 DPG should not then be

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87 Ibid.
considered to have seriously taken the place of the controversial leaked draft. Quite significantly, the ideas of that report, and the foreign policy vision propounded by various neoconservative thinkers of the 1990s, were seen manifested in numerous forms from members of George W. Bush’s campaign team and his transition team.

The influence of these thinkers on the new president’s actual foreign policy course would not necessarily be decided so easily. As discussed above, US foreign policy under George W. Bush’s father was very much a policy directed by the President. By all accounts he drove the policy, and his worldview was the result of his personal reading of history, and his own, personal vision of America’s place in the world. The US foreign policy of George H. W. Bush was very much his own vision. The question then must be asked, What was George W. Bush’s own strategic vision for America’s foreign policy? And, Was he susceptible to the ideas presented to him from his foreign policy advisers, both during the campaign and after he took office? Finally, why should it be accepted that George W. Bush did not override such thinking with his own strategic vision of American foreign policy?

It is apparent that the neoconservative influence on the foreign policy of George W. Bush’s presidency was indeed significant, and in fact drove the administration’s policy for nearly all of his two terms in office. But this was not the case until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Indeed there were indications in his campaign, and further evidence in his first eight months in office, that George W. Bush would follow a relatively “realist” or “neo-realist” approach to foreign policy, however loosely this was defined. The more important facet of his campaign regarding foreign policy lay not in what his own views were, but where he would go for the answers. During his campaign, George W. Bush described his view of his own role as American President as that of a CEO-president. His foreign policy team would be made up of strong, experienced advisers on defense and foreign policy; descent and debate would be encouraged, he said, but he would be the one to make the final decisions. His position then would be one of strong leadership and moral strength guiding the implementation of policies which originated from the intellectuals and experienced policymakers comprising his administration. When confronted during his campaign by his own lack of knowledge regarding world politics, political leaders, and so forth, Bush declared that, when it came to the issue of facts and knowledge, the important thing was not who or what he knew about current world events, but that “I know what I believe in.” With his position on believing in something, and his emphasis on a business-like role of strong leadership, Bush made it clear that he would surround himself with the most competent people who knew about foreign policy.

88 Ritchie and Rogers, 152.
89 Daulder and Lindsay, 32-35 (Emphasis added).
And beneath this was also a foreign policy ideal held by Bush which centered on American leadership through unilateral means, as opposed to seeking support from multilateral institutions.90

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought about the beginning of a new foreign policy for George W. Bush. The direction of US foreign policy would, from then on, have a decidedly neoconservative identity, and would culminate in the invasion of Iraq less than two years later. The pragmatic realism of the President’s campaign speeches, which declared that the US was not in the business of state-building, and the focus on domestic matters which characterized his first eight months in office, would be replaced with unprecedented internationalism, unilateralism, and a determination to affect change within regions and within sovereign states. Importantly, a key component to the neoconservative agenda of the previous decade would now become the primary US objective: the removal, through military force, of Saddam Hussein.

The buildup to war with Iraq began immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. And it is here that the convergence of neoconservativism with assertive nationalism in fact gave way to the dominance of neoconservatism in George W. Bush’s foreign policy team:

After the attacks, Cheney and Rumsfeld came to accept much of the neo-conservative perspective and the actions it advocated as the appropriate long term response to the attacks and strove to put it into practice over Iraq, even if they did not accept this worldview in its entirety. Without their support the relatively small group of neoconservatives in the Pentagon and White House would have had far less influence on the President’s post-9/11 views and actions.91

Just nine days after the attacks, the Project for the New American Century published an open letter to George W. Bush regarding the best way to ensure US security and interests. In the letter “Lead the World to Victory,” PNAC issued a joint statement asserting that: “We agree with the Secretary of State that U.S. policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for this incident, but must also target those ‘other groups out there that mean us no good’ and that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies.” The PNAC argued that in order to “whip terrorism,” going after Al Qaeda was a “key goal,” but that “any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps
decisive surrender in the war on terrorism.”92 The immediate focus on Saddam Hussein and Iraq, driven especially by Paul Wolfowitz inside the administration, and by influential neoconservatives outside, brought the neoconservative agenda to a preponderant position in post-9/11 policy formation. Keeping in mind that Bush, who admittedly did not have his own foreign policy strategy, relied on the strength and experience of his advisers, it is not difficult to understand how such a marked shift in foreign policy—a shift clearly toward neoconservativism—could quickly characterize his presidency.

In January of 2002, Robert Kagan and William Kristol were publicly advocating for war against Iraq—and for the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein—in the pages of their neoconservative publication, The Weekly Standard. They argued against the claim that the US had too much to deal with already, with the new War on Terror, and declared that the US “can walk and chew gum at the same time.” Decision makers who had avoided the “hard decision to confront Saddam Hussein” now had to face up to that difficult task, they argued. “The Iraqi threat is enormous,” they wrote in their January 21 article entitled “What to do About Iraq,” and “it gets bigger with every day that passes...and it cannot wait until we finish tying up all the ‘lose ends’.”93 As George H.W. Bush saw the end of the Cold War as an especially critical moment in history for setting precedent and establishing a new order, so too did the neoconservatives view the attacks of September 11. The similarity in wording and the perception of the historical moment for US foreign policy decision-making can be seen in the words of these two influential neoconservative writers. The urgency and absolute necessity of ridding the world of Saddam Hussein was the defining theme of neoconservative discourse following September 11. If the US did not act on Saddam Hussein soon, Kagan and Kristol wrote just four months after the attacks, the risks to the US “may increase exponentially”:

And after September 11, those risks are no longer abstract. Ultimately, what we do or do not do in the coming months about Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq will decisively affect our future security. And it will do more than that...it will shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come. It will be a world conducive to our liberal democratic principles and our security, or it will be one where brutal, well-armed tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international security hostage.94

94 Ibid.
The ideas put forth in the article mirror those propounded by Kagan, Kristol, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad in the late 1990s. From September 2001 onward, the terrorist attacks served as the major justification to overthrow Saddam, and to pursue a foreign policy predicated on American hegemony and the continuation of that position. The claims and links made by major writers of the post-9/11 neoconservative school often made unsubstantiated and even contradictory claims, yet they were essentially consistent with each other, and consistent with the charges made over the previous several years. The new component was the September 11 attacks. The strong role of the neoconservative worldview in targeting Iraq after September 11 is especially clear in light of the lack of evidence connecting Iraq in any way to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Though the link was alleged, notably in the claim that one of the members of the terrorist team which destroyed the World Trade Center, Muhammed Atta, met with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague of 2001. But this claim, which was later shown to be untrue, was less important than the way in which Iraq, and the continued existence of Saddam’s regime, years after the Gulf War and in spite of American–led sanctions and “pin-prick strikes,” represented a humiliation and weakening of American global hegemony. This, as seen from the neoconservative view, was a major threat to US security. Later in the year, Fouad Ajami wrote in the Wall Street Journal that “it was the sparing of Saddam in 1991 that nourished Al Qaeda, and gave its masterminds and foot-soldiers ammunition, and an ideological pretext, for targeting America.” Because Saddam had been “left off the hook” after the Gulf War, Ajami claimed, “the new purveyors of terrorism” had been emboldened to carry out attacks against the United States.

In contrast to the Gulf War, the steps leading up to war with Iraq in 2003 should not be seen as steps taken within a period of sharp “crisis,” but instead should be seen as a culmination period, and as the latter part of a process which in fact began several years prior. The period that began with the September 11 attacks can then be seen as the critical phase in which the neoconservative worldview came to dominate US foreign policy, and in which the push to overthrow Saddam Hussein became the pivotal step in achieving the neoconservative strategic vision for the United States. Surely the September 11 attacks were a crisis moment for the United States; but the drive toward war against Saddam Hussein was initiated virtually from the minute George W. Bush’s foreign policy advisers gathered to discuss the shocking surprise attacks. Further illustrating the convergence between the neoconservatives and the assertive nationalists in Bush’s foreign policy team, the immediate response of Paul Wolfowitz was to focus on

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95 Robert Novak: “No Meeting in Prague,” May 13, 2002 (national columnist), Iraq War Reader, 266. According to Robert Novak, no evidence exists for the claim that the alleged leader of the Sept. 11 attacks ever met Iraqi intelligence official Ahmed Al-Ani, even though the claim was “the solitary piece of evidence that could link Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime to the carnage at the World Trade Center.”

going after Saddam. Meanwhile, Rice asked how the event could be utilized to promote US interests. In light of the preponderance of evidence already pointing directly at Al Qaeda for carrying out the attacks, this immediate reaction shows the shift of attention to Iraq. In their January article, Kagan and Kristol wrote that Iraq was the “supreme test of whether we as a nation have learned the lesson of September 11.” Recalling Kagan and Kristol’s charge that “the American people can be summoned to meet the challenges of global leadership if statesmen make the case loudly, cogently, and persistently” and that “those who have laid the foundation for a necessary shift in policy have a chance to lead Americans onto a new course,”97 the tone of the Bush administration as it shifted focus onto Iraq makes sense within the neoconservative framework for US policy and the sense of moral mission in rallying public support for internationalist policy and global, military leadership.

In the spring 2002 issue of the political science journal Foreign Policy, Mark Strauss wrote on the arguments against regime change in Iraq. While he was not endorsing unilateral action at that time, his points, written mostly as a response to the most common counterarguments to regime change, are indicative of the major assumptions leading the administration to war against Saddam just a year later. Strauss’s points can also be recognized as a reaction to the claims made by former president George Bush, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker and Richard Haass. Strauss began his argument by making an assumption held by many neoconservative writers at that time: that proponents and opponents alike of a new war against Iraq agreed that the first Bush administration should have “solved the problem of Saddam when it had the chance,” and that the world would be better off had the United States “marched into Baghdad.”98 The decision to stop before taking such action made perfect sense at the time, he said, but in hindsight was in fact the wrong decision, and policy should be made to correct that crucial mistake.

The real mistake, he wrote in 2002, was in the outcome of the Gulf War: the terms of the ceasefire, and the failure to support the uprising, because the administration was afraid that Iraq would fragment. To support his argument that such assumptions were flawed, Strauss wrote, “Iraq had proved remarkably durable, holding together despite decades of revolution, coups d’état, international sanctions, economic devastation, and war.” He added that Iraq “existed decades before the rise of Saddam, and the country would likely survive his downfall. That’s good news, since the only thing worse than a unified Iraq with an arsenal of mass destruction would be a Lebanonized Iraq where rival factions would fight one another, possibly with chemical or biological weapons.”99

98  Ibid.
What Strauss failed to recognize, however, was that Iraq’s decades of revolution and coups d’etat were only truly ended with the ascendancy of Saddam’s harsh dictatorial regime. Then, the wars and political isolation and economic sanctions which followed all took place under his tyrannical control. Indeed, it was because of Saddam’s rule, and not in spite of it, that Iraq had not fallen apart already. This crucial fact was apparently not understood by influential neoconservatives, and by Mr. Strauss, who claimed that a post-Saddam Iraq would not be a scene of chaos, or a quagmire for US forces. It is a stark example of an ignorance of realities in the Middle East, and is in bold contrast with that of the Bush foreign policy team at the time of the Gulf War.

Though Condoleezza Rice’s 2000 article on the American national interest may not have been in line with the worldview of neoconservatives, beginning with September 11 her perception of interests would change in a way that very much supported the neoconservatives’ goals—especially that of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. In her 2000 article she had said that the US was finding it hard to define its national interest “in the absence of Soviet power.” With the attacks of September 11, however, she believed that the role for the United States had been “clarified and sharpened,” and that “opposing terrorism and preventing the accumulation of WMD ‘in the hands of irresponsible states’ now define the national interest.” This view by the then-National Security Advisor, while close to the “one-power” plan of the leaked 1992 DPG, would bring the view of the once-realists in line with the perception of interests of the neoconservatives. President Bush himself had initially rejected Wolfowitz’s idea of immediate action against Iraq, only to change his mind. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 and the President’s speech of that year to the graduating class at West Point each contain a worldview that is congruent with the assertive nationalists as well as the neoconservatives. Importantly, it is a foreign policy based on neoconservative interests and values, including, but not limited to, US global dominance, moral superiority of the United States and the universality of its values, and the exportation of those values as being a key foreign policy objective. This last aspect shows most clearly that the biggest difference between the worldview of Cheney and Rumsfeld had been replaced by the neoconservative worldview. That this important characteristic of the neoconservative worldview had become doctrine of George W. Bush’s foreign policy is evident in the text of the National Security Strategy of 2002. Indeed, the Strategy’s opening paragraph expounds the universality of American liberal values, and is followed in the second paragraph by stating that US foreign policy will be directed to support and extend those values:

\[\text{100} \quad \text{101} \quad \text{102} \quad \text{103}\]
People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. . . . Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence...We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants...We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.104

In his speech to West Point, President Bush spoke in terms both unilateral and moral, with the combination being a powerful example of the Reaganite exceptionalism and neoconservative moral purpose. In his speech, as in the NSS, the President referred to Saddam Hussein, though he did not say the Iraqi leader’s name. Instead, he used the word “tyrant” and made other references to “lawless regimes”105. In an important contrast to the foreign policy of the Bush Sr., administration, the new foreign policy left no room for leaving American values to the domain of domestic policy only; the new foreign policy would match and promote domestic values in its policies abroad. As discussed above, this is precisely the position of the neoconservative worldview, and is a fundamental element of the “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy promoted by William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996. The President’s words to the graduating class of June, 2002, spoke for a foreign policy founded on moral clarity, American exceptionalism, leadership through an overpowering military, and the importance of acting unilaterally in order to ensure American security:

. . . Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. . . . Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree...Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place...There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it.106

To better appreciate the transformation of US foreign policy, especially the perception of interests and means to achieve them, it is useful to contrast key elements of both the 2002 NSS and the President’s address to West Point, with the National Security Strategy of August 1991. While the NSS of 1991 certainly contains references to American values, influence and leadership, it was more as a leader of alliances. Moreover, the need to make alliances stronger and more able to share the burden with the United States was spelled out as a key component of the US security strategy in 1991:

(The United States will seek to) strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights; (and) establish a balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities. . .107

To achieve this, the US would “strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress.”108 In 2002, George W. Bush declared that the “containment” which characterized much of the pragmatic realists’ policy (including that of his father) was no longer possible “when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.” It was a clear reference to Saddam Hussein, and was a congruent argument to the arguments of Kristol, Kagan, Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives in their charge to take direct action to overthrow Saddam. If the United States waits for threats, Bush said, in another apparent reference to Iraq, “we will have waited too long.”109

The deep distrust of international regimes and institutions, so central to the neoconservative view, had become central to the view of George W. Bush following the September 11 attacks. And nowhere was this new policy approach so essential than in regards to Iraq; and with no one was it so vital, than with Saddam Hussein. Again, the argument of Kagan and Kristol shows the motivation and direction of the new neoconservative Bush foreign policy, a policy which would result in the invasion of Iraq the following Spring: “The problem today,” they wrote in January, 2002, “is not just that failure to remove Saddam could someday come back to haunt us. At a more fundamental level, the failure to remove Saddam would mean that, despite September 11, we as a nation are still unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of global leadership, even to protect ourselves.”

No doubt referring to the arguments of foreign policy officials like Haass and Scowcroft, Kagan and Kristol disregarded the worry about using ground troops

108 Ibid.
109 West Point speech, June 2002.
in a “messy part of the world,” or the fear of having to put Iraq back together. To avoid the decision to take action against Saddam for such concerns would be to make a “momentous and fateful decision.” And no other action but the forceful removal of Saddam’s regime, they charged, “would contribute more toward shaping a world order in which our people and our liberal civilization can survive and flourish.”

Nearly a year before the invasion of Iraq, the White House had already decided on using military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Due to the secretive nature of much of the decision-making process towards war, the exact moments and specific reasoning of each key player is not knowable at this point. But what is knowable is that the US decision to use force in order to achieve regime change in Iraq did not begin with the official, public declarations from the administration. Unlike the Gulf Crisis and ensuing Gulf War, the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003 was not a crisis-driven decision-making process. Instead, it was the policy outcome of a years-long drive by neoconservatives to assert a new worldview on America’s foreign policy. The neoconservatives saw the outcome of the Gulf War, with the endurance of Saddam’s tyrannical regime, as inimical to US interests, much as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had seemed to the first President Bush. In both cases, US foreign policy aimed at establishing a new order, in the region of the Middle East as well as in the world generally. In the case of the first war against Iraq, President George Bush spoke openly and publicly about vital US interests, such as access to oil for the United States and its allies, and of the precedent that would be set in the first moments of a new post-Cold War era. This public justification of war seems to match the rationale for war held by the president and his key foreign policy team.

This is in sharp contrast to the case of war in 2003. Public justifications for war changed over time—before, during, and after the major military phase of war. From this it can safely be concluded that such justifications as Saddam’s alleged possession of WMD, involvement with Al Qaeda, or part in the 9/11 attacks were, at best, possible secondary justifications to those in support of war. The leaked “Downing Street memo” shows just how important the drive to overthrow Saddam Hussein was to George Bush and his foreign policy team regardless of any factual evidence of Saddam’s possession of WMD. As the leaked memo reveals, as early as July of 2002 US policy was shaping intelligence on WMD in order to justify regime change in Iraq. In the minutes of that memo to Prime Minister Tony Blair, it was recorded that: “Military action was now seen as inevitable” against Saddam Hussein. “Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route...There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.”111 Not only then was intelligence coming out of policy, rather than the other way around, but post-war planning was not given serious consideration. Recalling the claims made by neoconservatives that Iraq would be better off without Saddam, and that the country would withstand the difficulties brought about by war, it is not hard to derive the source of the administration’s overly-positive expectations. Understanding of realities on the ground were clearly lacking, and especially so when contrasted with the understanding of the policy-makers of the 1991 Gulf War.

It would not be accurate to say that neoconservatives should receive sole blame, or credit, for the war against Saddam Hussein. Clearly there were differing worldviews maintained by key decision-makers such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. However, their respective convergence with the ideas of the neoconservatives made it so that their own ideas, whether called assertive nationalism or otherwise, came together with the worldview of neoconservatism that has dominated in US foreign policy under the George W. Bush administration. The values, interests and means to achieve those interests which developed profoundly following the Gulf War came to dominate and transform US foreign policy under President George W. Bush. It is a watershed period, more than a moment, for the neoconservatives. The future role of neoconservativism in US foreign policy now greatly depends on the outcome of the war in Iraq, and how neoconservativism’s global test will be judged by policy-makers and the American people.

111 Downing Street Memo, July 23, 2002; leaked secret memo, containing the minutes of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s meeting on Iraq. Npr.org.
Bibliography


