The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Internal Displacement Outside the Camp: Recognizing Displacement in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo

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By
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Abstract

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been facing a displacement crisis since 1994. This study focused on eastern DRC, as it has endured protracted conflict resulting in the forced displacement of millions of people. The majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are located in the eastern region of the country, finding refuge with host families and communities. Despite the vast number of IDPs living outside of displacement camps, scholars and practitioners generally focus their attention on camps. The purpose of this research was to examine the experiences of IDPs living in host communities, to shed light on this invisible population. Interviews were conducted with IDPs who had self-settled in the towns of Bukavu and Mudaka in the province of South Kivu. The research explored three aspects of displacement: cause of displacement, flight, and settlement. The thesis found that a high number of IDPs experienced direct violence related to the conflict that forced them to flee. Many brave risks of future attacks to stay near their homes and livelihoods but eventually decide to flee further from the violence, leaving behind their personal resources. Once in a host community, IDPs are faced with the dilemma of securing food and shelter despite having lost their livelihoods and resources during displacement. IDPs demonstrate resilience in developing new livelihoods but are confined by the informal job market in their host communities. The research found that IDPs in Mudaka were able to find employment in the local agriculture sector, similar to their traditional livelihoods; while IDPs in Bukavu were forced to find work in the over-saturated urban environment, most often as porters. In both cases livelihoods only provided enough income to live on a subsistence basis, where choices between food, shelter, and education had to be made. Finally, the research highlighted questions of integration into host communities as well as possibilities of return and reintegration. Participants from Bukavu overwhelmingly wished to return to their homes once their villages become secure enough, where as those in Mudaka had little desire to return to their homes.
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<td>AfCHPR</td>
<td>African Commission and Court on Human and People’s Rights</td>
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<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community based organization</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Rwanda</td>
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<td>FARDRC</td>
<td>Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Democratique du Liberation du Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Zaïre</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRIP</td>
<td>Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IRB</td>
<td>Institutional Review Board</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23rd Movement</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the D.R. Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NSAG</td>
<td>Non-state armed group</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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Chapter I: Introduction

Introduction: Context of Internal Displacement in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo\(^1\) (DRC) has a long history of unrest. The country was first colonized in 1885, as the personal property of Belgium’s King Leopold II. The country did not gain its independence until June 30, 1960, when Patrice Lumumba was elected prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu became president. Following independence instability was rife in the country. In 1965, commander-in-chief of the army, Mobutu Sese Seko seized control of the government and declared himself president. Mobutu ruled as the country’s dictator until 1997.

Since 1996 the Congo has faced almost continual conflict. The conflict, often referred to as Africa’s World War, is demarcated as the First Congo War (officially ending in 1997) and the Second Congo War (officially ending in 2003). Despite peace agreements signed in 2003, pockets of conflict remain in the eastern region of the country. A plethora of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operate within the country, sometimes with the support of neighboring governments\(^2\). Previous attempts to integrate NSAGs into the military have often failed, as some groups are allowed to maintain parallel military and administrative chains of command in the same territorial zones they controlled prior to integration\(^3\). The failure of the state to maintain its territorial control and address NSAGs operating in the eastern region has allowed for violence to continue plaguing the region.

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\(^1\) Formerly known as Zaire.
\(^3\) This was the case with Congres National Pour la Defense du People (CNDP) rebel group. For further information see: International Crisis Group, “No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda. (Africa Report 165, 2010).
The conflict has resulted in the deaths of over 5.4 million people, who died from conflict-related causes within the country between August 1998 and April 2007. Conflict-related deaths are often not at the hands of armed groups, but rather they reflect the correlation between conflict and quality of life, as deaths are indirectly caused by disease and malnutrition that arise from the displacement and disruption that conflict brings. The DRC’s almost 70 million inhabitants live in bleak conditions. As of 2006, 71.3% of the population lived below the poverty line. The country was ranked last on the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 2011 Human Development Index (HDI). The index paints a grim picture of the current state of the country, as illustrated by the following statistics. Life expectancy as of 2011 was 48.4 years. The mean years of schooling are 3.5. As of 2009 the under-five mortality rate in the Congo was 170 per 1000 live births. Stunting, when a child is too short for his or her age due to malnutrition, occurs in 45.8% of the population under five years of age within the country. These indicators demonstrate the grim health and social realities faced by the civilian population.

The conflict in the DRC directly and indirectly contributes to the grim quality of life in the country. The targeting of civilians is one of the most troublesome characteristics of the conflict. The majority, if not all, armed groups have been responsible for attacks on civilian populations, particularly in the eastern region of the country. The country’s military, Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), is also a known perpetrator of abuses against the civilian population. One of the most striking features of attacks on civilians is the use of rape and sexual violence, which serves as a mechanism for armed groups to tear apart the social fabric of these deeply conservative communities. International media and advocacy groups tend to focus on the prevalence of sexual violence, often overlooking the history, context, and causes of the conflict.

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Despite officially reaching peace in 2003, the same year the rate of internal displacement within the DRC reached 3.4 million people, the country’s highest rate\textsuperscript{10}. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) refer to:

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border\textsuperscript{11}.

Within Congo, displacement occurs in cycles, dependent on the conflict. If armed groups are carrying out campaigns in specific territories, civilians will likely flee due to violence or anticipated insecurity but return home as soon as they no longer perceive a threat. As of 2011 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 1.7 million IDPs in the DRC, primarily located in the eastern region of the country\textsuperscript{12}. Additionally, there are an estimated 491,481 Congolese refugees residing outside of the country\textsuperscript{13}. An estimated 78% of the IDP population is located in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu\textsuperscript{14}. The launch of a new rebellion in 2012, by mutineers in North Kivu called M23\textsuperscript{15} caused a spike in displacement. As of November 2012, 2.4 million people are internally displaced, of which 1.6 million are located in the Kivu provinces\textsuperscript{16}. This recent rebellion illustrates the cycles of insecurity and displacement in the eastern region of the country.


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Primarily comprised of ex-Congres National Pour la Defense du People (CNDP) defectors of the army, named after the 23 March 2009 agreement between the CNDP and Congolese government.

\textsuperscript{16} OCHA, “DRC: Aid Operation is Efficient but not Sufficient,” (November 2012).
International refugee law does not extend to IDPs as by definition they have fled within the country and not crossed an international border, thus IDPs fall under the responsibility and protection of the Congolese government17.

Former President Mobutu’s policy towards citizens of *debrouillez-vous* (fend for yourself) has largely carried over to the present government. Soldier’s salaries often go unpaid, causing many to finance their own salaries through extortion and illegal taxation of the civilian population. The FARDC have also been known to carry out attacks on civilians. A survey carried out by Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) found that civilians in South Kivu viewed the FARDC as the second most common source of insecurity18. With the Congolese government unable to control its own territory and unable (or unwilling) to control its own military forces, it remains incapable of providing protection and assistance to its displaced and vulnerable populations.

As the Congolese government cannot provide adequate assistance to vulnerable populations, a plethora of international organizations have stepped in. Eight humanitarian cluster groups operate in the DRC19:

- Health: led by the WHO;
- Nutrition: led by UNICEF;
- Food Security: led by FAO;
- Non-Food Items and Shelter: led by UNICEF
- Logistics: led by WFP;
- Protection: led by UNHCR;
- Education: led by UNICEF;
- Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene: led by UNICEF.

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19 http://www.unocha.org/drc/coordination/clusters
The provision of assistance to refugees in the DRC is considered a multi-sectoral response, which is currently led by UNHCR.

Cluster groups are designed so that international organizations and NGO’s working in similar sectors can coordinate programs and responsibilities.20 Also operating in the DRC is the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the D.R. Congo (MONUSCO) peacekeeping mission, which is mandated with protecting civilians. MONUSCO is an integrated mission, meaning humanitarian coordination and leadership occurs under the peacekeeping mission. United Nations (UN) integrated missions are designed to increase coordination between UN agencies operating in conflict or post-conflict situations. In the case of the DRC, all UN agencies regardless of political, military or humanitarian missions are led by MONUSO. However, this approach is controversial as UN humanitarian agencies can be easily associated with political and peacekeeping agencies. As NGOs coordinate with UN humanitarian agencies through mechanisms such as cluster meetings, NGOs are now concerned that they too are vulnerable to associations with UN political and peacekeeping agendas. Ultimately integrated missions face concerns over perceptions of humanitarian impartiality.23

The displaced in Congo seek refuge in a variety of sites. According to Steve McDowell, sites of refuge depend on the length of time displaced.24 Urban cities, rural villages, as well as spontaneous and formal camps are all host sites for IDPS. Some people may decide to hide in the bush (jungle) close to their villages for days or weeks, hoping for armed groups to leave.25 Each type of IDP site comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. In choosing a location,

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20 OCHA, http://www.unocha.org/drc/coordination/clusters
21 Previously known as the United Nations Organization Mission in the D.R. Congo (MONUC); Originally established in 1999 as MONUC, changed to MONUSCO in 2010 and authorized until June 2013; more information can be found here: http://monusco.unmissions.org/
25 Ibid.
McDowell found that a variety of factors influenced the decisions of those displaced, including: security, location, ethnicity, and expectations of aid\textsuperscript{26}.

The vast majority of IDPs in the DRC live outside of formal camps, either in spontaneous camps or in urban or rural host communities. Formal camps are registered with the UNHCR and receive humanitarian assistance. As of 2012 there were 31 formal camps in the DRC\textsuperscript{27}. Formal camps are problematic in terms of ‘institutional convenience’ as humanitarian actors focus on assisting IDPs in formal camps, giving less attention those living outside of camps\textsuperscript{28}. This is in part due to the difficulties of identifying IDPs in towns and urban cities. In towns, IDPs blend in with the local population, where as in camps they are registered and often hold identification cards. According to Refstie, Dolan, and Moses, the absence of humanitarian assistance for urban IDPs stems from conceptual debates on “voluntary versus forced migration, and when displacement ends.”\textsuperscript{29}

It was not until recently that urban refugees and IDPs began to receive attention from scholars and humanitarian organizations alike. While the field of knowledge on urban displacement is growing, the primary academic focus remains on refugees. Furthermore, the current debate of IDPs residing in urban areas should be considered, as finding a durable solution requires more research. The Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons was created in 2010, according to the document:

A durable solution can be achieved through:

- Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin;
- Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge;

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 14.
\textsuperscript{27} UNHCR, “DRC Fact Sheet,” (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4fab74189.html
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
• Sustainable integration in another part of the country\textsuperscript{30}.

The framework stipulates that a durable solution, other than return, can be met if displacement-specific needs are met and the person can enjoy their rights without facing displacement-specific discrimination\textsuperscript{31}. Differentiating between displacement-specific and non-displacement specific can be difficult, but the general rule from the framework is that non-displacement specific needs are those that the local non-displaced population also faces. A durable solution requires adequate and sustainable access to: essential food and water, basic shelter, sanitation, primary school education, and essential medical services\textsuperscript{32}. While IDPs should have access to livelihoods, it is in relative terms, meaning they should have the same access as locals.

**Significance of Study**

While rights-based approaches are ideal, evidence-based approaches are necessary to develop policies that can be implemented on the ground. IDPs remain largely invisible, in part due to the research gap on those living outside of formal camps. If IDPs living outside of camps, are being overlooked due to an academic debate on voluntary versus forced migration, then it becomes essential that any research conducted on self-settled IDPs includes an assessment of the cause of displacement. Additional understanding of the experiences and conditions of the displaced living outside of camps and the effects on the host communities is necessary for effective policy and humanitarian intervention.

Largely, the durable solutions framework for IDPs recommends integration, without taking into account to what capacity areas are able to absorb the displaced, potentially leaving both the host community and displaced population in vulnerable situations. Rapid urbanization contributes to and may even create humanitarian disasters, as urban populations are at high risk of food

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 31.
insecurity, disease, loss of livelihood, and marginalization. Robert Muggah informs that rapid movement of IDPs into low and middle-income cities causes negative shocks including: increased pressures on already weak water and sanitation, conflict over access to land, and competition for resources with hosts. Bukavu’s population has tripled since 1984, causing issues in infrastructure and ownership rights. As Bukavu continues to experience rapid urbanization we must take into account these factors and ask to what extent is integration sustainable if it places IDPs and their hosts in economically vulnerable environments.

In the DRC food insecurity is directly related to the conflict. Much of the country’s economy is based on agricultural production. Conflict in rural areas causes displacement of the local farmers and herders, thus depleting food sources. This not only affects displaced persons whose livelihoods relied on agricultural production but also towns and cities, such as Bukavu. The depletion of agricultural production heightens poverty and can lead to food shortages. This loss of production needs to be closely examined, as does livelihood strategies used by IDPs, to understand the broader impact of protracted displacement on the country’s food security and economy.

Objectives

The objective of this research is to examine the displacement experience of Congolese IDPs living in host communities in order to gain insight on how individuals cope with the direct consequence of conflict (violence and displacement) but also with the indirect consequences (loss of resources and livelihoods). The research takes into account the following aspects of displacement: cause of displacement, fleeing/initial displacement experience, and settlement, to identify common experiences and themes within each. The study seeks to examine differences of

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IDPs living in urban and rural communities, in doing so it will examine livelihood strategies and durable solutions.

It is my hope that this research will build on the existing knowledge to provide greater perspective on an IDP population that has remained largely invisible. It is thought that by gaining a wider view of the displacement experience of IDPs in South Kivu, scholars and actors in the field will be able identify further gaps and create more dialogue on the sustainability of durable solution, invisibility of IDPs outside of camps, and what these things mean not only for the displaced but also the host communities.

**Organization of Thesis**

The next chapter details the history of the current conflict in the DRC dating back to the 1994 influx of Rwandan refugees. The chapter provides the context of the conflict to provide a foundation for understanding internal displacement within the country. Chapter III presents literature relevant to internal displacement in the DRC in terms of livelihoods, food security, and international frameworks. Chapter IV details the methods utilized to conduct this research. It also includes a discussion of ethical precautions taken, as well as challenges faced. The research findings are analyzed and discussed in Chapter V. Final thoughts and conclusions are then presented in Chapter VI.
Chapter II: Conflict in the DRC:
From Refugee Influx to Regional War

“War ends nothing” - Central African Proverb

In Chapter I, the significance and objectives of this research were identified. This chapter provides a background on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following the influx of Rwandan refugees in 1994 to present. This history provides the necessary foundation for understanding the causes and consequences of conflict-induced displacement in eastern DRC. One must understand the history of conflict in order to examine the nature of displacement within the country.

The 1994 Refugee Influx that Sparked ‘Africa’s World War’

In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, internal conflicts often have extraterritorial elements as borders are porous and group identities transcend those of nation-states. The conflict in Rwanda during the early 1990’s transformed into a regional war in what some have referred to as ‘Africa’s World War.’ The influx of over a million displaced persons of the Hutu ethnic group from Rwanda into the DRC following the 1994 genocide was unique in many ways and played a fundamental role in the ensuing regional war.

Following Rwanda’s decolonization from the Belgians in 1962, the Hutu ethnic majority was given control of the government. Since colonialization, tensions between Hutu and the Tutsi minority have led to violence, causing many Tutsi to flee to neighboring countries. Within the host countries of refuge, the exiled Rwandan-Tutsi would form armed groups that would launch cross-border attacks against Hutus in Rwanda. In response to the cross-border attacks, the Hutu in Rwanda would further repress the local Tutsi civilian population. On October 1st, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Ugandan-based Tutsi exiles launched an attack that

culminated into a civil war, which lasted until 1993. Ethnic tensions within Rwanda led to the 1994 genocide that began on April 6, 1994 and ended with the RPF gaining full control of the country on July 4th, 1994.\(^{38}\)

As the RPF gained control of Rwanda, a mass exodus of Hutus began seeking refuge in neighboring countries. According to Amnesty International, an estimated one million refugees fled to eastern DRC, including members of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR), Hutu political leadership, and Interhamwe\(^ {39} \) militias.\(^ {40} \) Many Hutu civilians were not forced out of Rwanda by the RPF but were instructed to leave by Hutu leaders in order to create a state in exile. Once settled into formal refugee camps, the Hutu genocide leaders were able to take full control, maintaining their political and military structures.\(^ {41} \) The camps were fully militarized as leaders publicly spoke of plans to destabilize the new government in Rwanda and utilized the refugee camps in the DRC as recruitment bases, sources of material support, and bases for cross border attacks.\(^ {42} \) The failure of international actors within the refugee camps to prevent the militarization of the camps and maintain there civilian nature has been highly criticized.\(^ {44} \) The exiles would frequently launch cross-border attacks against the Tutsi living in Rwanda. Congolese Tutsi faced attacks as well. Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of what was at the time Zaire (later renamed DRC), had been a close friend of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana whose death triggered the start of the 1994 genocide. Some alleged Mobutu was selling arms to the exiled Hutu political movement for their attacks, while that remains difficult to confirm at the very least he was turning a blind eye towards their actions within the country.

\(^{38}\) On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira were killed when their airplane was shot down over Rwanda. It remains unknown who was responsible for the assassination but the murder of Habyarimana, a Hutu, culminated the ethnic tensions that manifested into the 1994 Genocide during which 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed.

\(^{39}\) A Hutu paramilitary organization that was supported by the former Hutu government in Rwanda to perpetrate the 1994 genocide. Now the term is widely used within Congo for any armed Rwandan.


\(^{44}\) Ibid; The failure of the international actors to disarm combatants, humanitarian assistance to known combatants and political leaders is a highly contentious issue but was justified by actors who feared the combatants would prey on civilians if not provided with goods.
The First Congo War

Facing cross-border attacks, the new Rwandan government, led by Paul Kigame, entered into an alliance with Laurent Kabila, a Congolese political opponent of President Mobutu. Laurent Kabila’s opposition group, the Alliance des Forces pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) and Rwanda further aligned themselves with Uganda, Burundi, and Angola. In September 1996, the AFDL launched an offence in eastern Congo. By the end of October, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was openly carrying out military operations in Congo and providing military support to the AFDL.

Aligned with the AFDL, the RPA began military assaults on refugee camps in eastern DRC, in an effort to eliminate the Hutu militants who had been using the camps as support bases. The assaults on the refugee camps were brutal as the RPA failed to distinguish between civilian refugees and the armed ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-RAF) and Interhamwe, directly violating the rights of the refugees under the 1951 refugee convention and 1967 protocol. The RPA and AFDL utilized the presence of humanitarian aid to draw refugees out from hiding, and then they would proceed to block the aid workers access to the refugees, and kill the refugees once

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45 Ruled the DRC for thirty-two years, following the countries decolonization. The dictator quickly lost his popularity in the country as he dismantled the government institutions, failed to prevent the country’s economic downfall, and epitomized the kleptocracy of post-colonial African rulers.
46 Uganda, Burundi, and Angola had all been facing similar cross-border attacks from armed-groups based in the DRC, whom Mobutu allowed to operate out of the country.
48 UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html
humanitarian actors were out of sight\(^4^9\). At the Kirumbu refugee camp, AFDL forces supplied by Rwandan helicopters killed an estimated 500 refugees\(^5^0\). In addition to killing refugees, the armed forces used their assaults on the camps to push the displaced back into Rwanda, forcefully repatriating many refugees\(^5^1\).

Crimes against civilians were not limited to the RPA and AFDL, as the Armed Forces of Zaire (FAZ) mounted its defensive push against the invading forces, it too carried out crimes against the civilian population. Civilians were subjected to sexual violence, looting, and extra-judicial murder by all sides. During the AFDL offensive, both the refugee and the Congolese civilian population faced violent attacks by the various armed groups, with little acknowledgment from the international community. In April 1997, the AFDL forces took control of Kinshasa and on May 17\(^{th}\), Laurent Kabila was named president. Once in power Kabila renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997. While much of the Congolese population was suspicious of Kabila and the AFDL’s relations with Rwanda, he represented a welcomed end to Mobutu’s thirty-two year long dictatorship.

**The Second Congo War**

The peace did not last long. While Rwanda expected Kabila to remain its ally, the new president had other plans. Once Laurent Kabila consolidated his power, he turned his back on the allies that had brought him there. On July 26, 1998 Kabila ordered the removal of any foreign troops from the country. Following the removal of the RPA from the DRC, Kabila’s government turned a blind eye to the activities of the Interhamwe and ex-FAR when they resumed their cross-border attacks in Rwanda\(^5^2\). For Rwanda, Kabila’s actions were not only insulting but also viewed as a threat to the country’s security. Rwanda was still struggling to deal with the refugees that had

\(^{50}\) Ibid, 23.
\(^{51}\) Ibid.
been forcefully repatriated from the attacks on the refugee camps and was not prepared to for the resumption of attacks by ex-FAR and Interhamwe\textsuperscript{53}.

By August 1998 conflict re-emerged in eastern DRC with Rwandan and Ugandan troops taking offensive positions. Using similar tactics to their first military invasion, international alliances were made to back a new Congolese opposition group. Rwanda was able to piece together a new Congolese opposition group similar to what it had done with the AFDL. The new opposition group, the \textit{Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie} (Congolese Rally for Democracy; RCD)\textsuperscript{54}, was comprised of former Mobutusit, Congolese Tusti, and others who felt deceived by Kabila\textsuperscript{55}. Regionally, the alliances were split. Rwanda aligned with Burundi and Uganda but had failed to gain the support of Angola. Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe aligned themselves with Kabila. While Rwanda’s allied forces were able to quickly sweep through the eastern region of the Congo, upon reaching the west they were confronted by Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Congolese forces. The conflict in the west was played out in Kinshasa, with Kabila’s forces being the ultimate victor, pushing the Rwandan-led forces back into the eastern region of the Congo. On July 10, 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The ceasefire called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the installation of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers.

While the western region of the country experienced relative peace following the peace agreement, the east continued to be plagued by conflict. Instead of fully withdrawing their forces, Rwanda and Uganda moved their troops into the eastern region of the Congo. Local vigilante groups called Mai Mai formed to protect their villages from these foreign forces. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continued their operations. Rwanda continued to use the RCD forces to maintain control over the eastern provinces. However, the alliance between Rwanda and Uganda fell apart in 1999. In 1999 and 2000 the countries battled each other for control of

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} First led by Ernest WambadiaWamba. Later split with Wamba leading RCD-Wamba and the original RCD became RCD-Goma. However, now there are a plethora of RCD splinter groups.

the mineral rich town of Kisangani. At the time, Uganda was backing the *Mouvement de Liberation du Congo* (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo; MLC) rebel group led by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The Congolese government also used NSAGs as proxies supplying the ex-FAR, Interhamwe, Mai Mai, and various other armed groups to fight against the RCD and Rwandan forces in the east. According to the UNHCR there were over 2 million IDPs in the DRC in 1999, many of who were displaced due to government and NSAG activities in the eastern provinces. The UN found that from 1993 to 2003 at any given time, eight national armies and twenty-one non-state armed groups were taking part in the conflict in the DRC. The presence of so many ill trained, unstructured, armed groups wreaked havoc on the Congolese civilian population, killing over 5.4 million people between 1998 and 2007 according to the International Rescue Committee.

The motives behind the launch of the war appeared to shift after the Rwandan-led forces retreated back to the east. In 2001, Rwandan forces had control of a territory in eastern DRC 16 times larger than the country of Rwanda. According to reports by Amnesty International, many of the killings of Congolese civilians occurred in mineral rich areas of the east. The DRC has mineral deposits of coltan, gold, diamonds, tin, tantalum, and tungsten, adding a lucrative element to occupation. The RPA and RCD-Goma forces were alleged to have been forcefully displacing civilian populations to gain easier access to mine mineral rich areas. The east became a ‘gold mine’ of which everyone was vying for control.

On January 17, 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. Kabila was succeeded by his son Joseph. In 2002, Rwanda and the DRC signed the Pretoria Agreement, leading to the withdrawal of Rwandan forces by mid-October 2002. The Congolese government

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59 Ibid; not all areas of the east are rich in minerals. Killings also take place in areas that do not have mineral deposits.
60 Ibid, 7.
61 The motivation for the assassination remains unclear.
also carried out negotiations with NSAGs, resulting in the Pretoria II Agreement. In 2003 the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the DRC; FARDC) was established as the new national military, comprised of a mix of the former regimes military and NSAGs. Additionally, a transitional power-sharing government led by Joseph Kabila was introduced under the Final Act agreement in 2003. In 2006, Joseph Kabila won the country’s first democratic elections. While these successes have often been viewed as an end to the war, in reality, conflict in the east remains

Post 2003 Conflict

Following the defeat of RCD-Goma’s political party in the 2006 national elections, Laurent Nakunda62 established the Congres National Pour la Defense du People (National Congress for the Defense of People; CNDP). Many former RCD-Goma fighters, along with recruits from Rwanda joined the group63. The group’s objectives focused on the defeat of the FDLR and for increased rights of Tutsi. Rwanda provided support to the CNDP, including the recruitment of soldiers and the provision of military equipment64. The CNDP quickly established control of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories in the province of North Kivu. After almost a year of fighting, the CNDP and DRC government reached an agreement in December 2006 entailing a limited military integration program, known as mixage. However, by mid-2007 the agreement failed and fighting resumed in August 2007. During this time the CNDP also carried out attacks against the FDLR in the Kivus65.

In August 2008, the FARDC launched an offense against the CNDP but were quickly overrun66. On October 29th the CNDP took control of the Rutshuru and Kiwanja territories in North Kivu. Following their territorial gains, the CNDP ordered the destruction of all IDP camps within the

62Nakunda is a Congolese Tutsi, who had been a commander in the RCD.
65Ibid, 23.
territories. It was estimated that at the time of closure there were 27,000 IDPs in formal and informal camps, in addition to over 25,000 IDPs living with local host communities. Satellite imagery taken on November 4th confirmed the complete destruction of camps in the CNDP held territories. While fleeing the CNDP advance, Congolese soldiers stole goods from the recently (re)displaced and forced some to act as porters carrying looted goods. These events illustrate the multiple security threats civilians face during military and NSAGs offensives in eastern Congo.

On December 5, 2008, Congo and Rwanda announced a joint military campaign against the FDLR. Following the announcement, on January 5, 2009 Nkunda, the leader of the CNDP, was ousted by the group’s military chief of staff, Bosco Ntaganda. After ousting Nkunda, Ntaganda signed a ceasefire with the Congolese military on January 16th that provided for the integration of the CNDP into the FARDC. On March 23, 2008 the CNDP signed a political agreement with the government of Congo, including provisions of amnesty, the release of political prisoners, and the inclusion into the government. The CNDP then underwent an accelerated integration process.

In January 2009, 4,000 Rwandan troops crossed into eastern Congo to begin the joint military offensive against the FDLR, called Umoja Wetu. On February 25th, Rwanda fully withdrew its troops as agreed upon with the Congolese government. Recognizing that further action against the FDLR was needed, MONUC then entered into an agreement with the Congolese government to launch another offensive against the FDLR, known as Kimia II. The military operations were successful in repatriating over 1,000 FDLR combatants to Rwanda. Despite these successes the operations failed to dismantle FDLR’s political and military structures. Additionally, the humanitarian consequences were devastating, with over 1,400 civilians killed by armed groups.

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67Ibid, 6.
68Ibid, 14.
69Ibid, 21.
70Ibid, 41.
71Ibid, 42.
72Ibid, 44.
between January and September 2009. During the same period over 7,500 rapes were reported and over 900,000 people were displaced in North and South Kivu.

The integration of the CNDP had been a contentious issue. According to the International Crisis Group, the CNDP was allowed to maintain parallel military and administrative chains of command, in addition to control of mines in North and South Kivu. The integration process has faced many problems, with many groups splintering off and others maintaining their own command structure acting as rogue military branches in the eastern provinces. The flaws of the integration were illustrated in March 2012, when ex-CNDP rebels mutinied against the FARDC, under the leadership of General Bosco Ntaganda. Research by a UN Group of Experts found that Col. Sultani Makenga and Gen. Ntaganda were jointly commanding a new rebel group, known as M23. The group took its named from the March 23, 2009 agreement between the CNDP and the Congolese government.

According to the 2012 UN Group of Experts report, the mutiny had been planned prior to the 2011 presidential election, as ex-CNDP commanders feared President Kabila would redeploy former CNDP units outside of the Kivus. The report also found evidence of Rwanda providing material and financial support for M23, including the provision of military equipment and recruits from Rwanda. In addition to M23, there are currently 21 NSAGs active in the DRC. The M23 advance forced the FARDC to withdrawal troops from other insecure areas to be deployed in North Kivu against M23 in the Spring of 2012. The re-location of FARDC troops created a security vacuum as other NSAGs were able to seize towns and villages that had previously been under the military’s control. This has further exacerbated ethnic tensions and

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73Ibid, 45.
74Ibid, 45.
76UN Group of Experts, S/2012/348.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.
sparked conflicts over land and resource control\textsuperscript{81}. The recent increase of NSAG and military activity has led to a sharp rise in emergency humanitarian aid needs. As of December 2012, only 56\% of the funding required for OCHA’s Humanitarian Action Plan for the DRC had been secured\textsuperscript{82}.


Chapter III: Literature Review

The previous chapter provided a brief summary of the recent conflict in the DRC. This chapter examines academic literature relevant to internal displacement in eastern Congo, with particular attention to livelihoods and food security. Additionally, existing frameworks on internal displacement are discussed and examined.

Internal Displacement in Eastern Congo

The continuous cycles of violence in eastern DRC has led to the displacement of civilians trying to escape the violence and find some level of security. Recent crises of internal displacement began with the influx of Hutu refugees and armed groups from Rwanda in 1994. By mid-1994 there were an estimated 500,000 IDPs in eastern DRC. The level of internal displacement has historically varied with the amount of conflict in the region. The highest rate of internal displacement in the DRC occurred in 2003 when there was an estimated 3.4 million IDPs. At the end of 2011 UNHCR estimated that there were 1.7 million IDPs within the country. However, due to the M23 rebellion and resulting security vacuum in North and South Kivu, as of November 2012, there were 2.4 million IDPs in the country, 1.6 million of which are currently located in the Kivu provinces. Additionally, there are 451,732 Congolese refugees living in host countries. The majority of the IDPs in the Congo live outside of formal refugee camps, in host communities. As of 2012, the UNHCR provides assistance to 70,000 IDPs living in 31 camps.

IDPs in eastern Congo generally try to stay as close to home as possible. Many take refuge in the bush or jungle at first, trying to stay close to their homes, livelihoods, and food sources.

Staying in the bush is dangerous as IDPs face daily hardships and risk running into armed groups. They choose the bush despite the risks as they know from previous experience or from others that they are unlikely to have access to food or assistance once displaced from their homes. IDPs hiding in the bush are often pushed further away from their homes as they try to avoid NSAGs and armed attacks.

Steve McDowell led a research project for UNICEF and CARE on the conditions of IDPs in North Kivu in 2008. The research was some of the most in-depth carried out on the IDP population in the country, despite its focus on the North Kivu province. The study found that IDPs generally sought refuge with host families, often with relatives or friends; however, some IDPs were hosted by strangers. The presence of IDPs creates serious economic and security burdens for hosts. IDPs would help tend fields or find work to supplement the host households’ income, however, after one-month resources would typically become strained leading both the hosts and IDPs to become economically vulnerable. Hosts also become physically vulnerable as the possessions IDPs brought with them make both targets of robberies.

Since the industrial revolution people have been moving into towns and cities, increasingly those displaced by natural disasters and conflict have been seeking refuge in urban settings, giving rise to the phenomena commonly referred to as ‘urban displacement.’ The phenomenon is not limited to the large metropolises of the world, as smaller cities in developing countries are also hosting large numbers of displaced persons. The presence of displaced populations in urban centers increases demands for resources, particularly land and food, often exacerbating pre-

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90 Ibid, 34.
91 Ibid, 36.
92 Ibid, 21.
93 Ibid.
existing deficits. Urban IDPs face unique vulnerabilities such as displacement within the city due to evictions or forced relocation.

Despite their needs, urban IDPs often remain invisible to humanitarian actors. The urban environment makes it more difficult for aid organizations to identify displaced populations for targeted assistance. Urban IDPs are often overlooked by aid agencies as they blend in with the urban poor making it difficult to distinguish the groups. In countries such as the DRC, IDPs seek refuge in cities like Bukavu but also in villages, where they blend with the rural population and also remain invisible to the aid agencies. While the UNHCR has reviewed and adapted its policies on urban refugees, no actions have been taken to address urban IDPs. One factor limiting humanitarian assistance to IDPs is donor fatigue. Since 2009 funding for humanitarian relief in the DRC has steadily dropped. Only 61% of the funding appeal for humanitarian assistance in the DRC was met in 2012.

Formal camps offer the most secure assistance to IDPs as they offer target sites for humanitarian assistance. McDowell’s research found that IDPs viewed formal camps as providing aid, security, and employment. A gap exists between the perception of security in camps and its actual presence. It the DRC, soldiers have been known to rape women and kidnap children from the camps. The government is also a cause of insecurity for IDPs, as they seek to demonstrate regional security by closing IDP camps. After a military offensive against the FDLR in 2009, known as Kima II, the government sought to illustrate the success of the mission by closing five official refugee camps, forcing 60,000 IDPs out over night. Forcible closure causes many

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101 Ibid.
problems, as humanitarian agencies are not always able to track where the IDPs relocated to, delaying and in some cases preventing aid from reaching the relocated IDPs.

While the closing of the camp was somewhat unique, it is common for IDPs to be displaced multiple times. As security improves many IDPs return to their homes, but as conflict returns they are forced to flee again weeks, months, or even years after they were first displaced. Despite continued insecurity, IDPs often travel back and forth from their site of refuge to their homes to check on their property. Such traveling is extremely dangerous for IDPs as they risk running into armed groups. In 2009, Human Rights Watch reports indicated that FARDC troops were stopping IDPs during their flight, forcing them into labor, robbing, and raping them. These are very serious crimes being committed by Congolese troops, the very forces who are responsible for providing protection for the people they are abusing. Such incidences highlight the need for further examination of attacks against IDPs during flight.

Livelihoods and Food Security

Agriculture is a central pillar in the DRC. Within South Kivu 83.3% of rural households rely on farming and agricultural related activities as their livelihood. The country still has vast potential for further agricultural development, as only 10% of the country’s arable land is currently used. Despite the Congo’s potential, it remains widely food insecure. According to the World Food Program, six of the eleven provinces in the country have general acute malnutrition (GAM) rates over 10%. For 2009, 2010, and 2011 the Congo was ranked last on

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104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
the Global Hunger Index (GHI)\textsuperscript{109}. Additionally, the country has the highest rate of undernourished persons in Africa and the highest prevalence of malnutrition world-wide\textsuperscript{110}.

There are direct links between conflict and loss of food production. Research by Slobodanka Teodosijevic found that both per-capita agriculture and food production significantly decline during conflicts in relations to prior to the onset of conflict\textsuperscript{111}. In Congo food production between 1998 and 2008 declined by an estimated 30\% to 40\%\textsuperscript{112}. This time period falls within the time of conflict in the eastern region of the country. Research found that between 2006 and 2008 over 60\% of rural households lost crops due to armed groups\textsuperscript{113}. Armed groups will intentionally destroy or hinder means of producing and accessing food these tactics include: destruction of wild food sources, disruption of markets, restrictions on mobility, and forced displacement\textsuperscript{114}. As farmers flee the violence and control of armed groups, food shortages occur that extend into the economy and last years\textsuperscript{115}. Additionally, the use of landmines poses challenges to farmers and hinders transportation in parts of the country\textsuperscript{116}

Those who lose their livelihoods must adapt new strategies. International organizations and NGO’s alike do carry out livelihood programs with certain vulnerable communities. With or without assistance IDPs develop coping strategies that differ between urban and rural areas. In rural areas, people continue to have access to land so farmers diversify crop varieties\textsuperscript{117}. IDPs

\textsuperscript{109} International Food Policy Research Institute, “Global Hunger Index,” (see years 2009, 2010, and 2011); DRC was not included in the 2012 GHI due to insufficient data.
\textsuperscript{111} Slobodanka Teodosijevic, “Armed Conflicts and Food Security,” (the Food and Agricultural Organization, 2003), 1.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{114} Slobodanka Teodosijevic, “Armed Conflicts and Food Security,” (the Food and Agricultural Organization, 2003), 18.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 20.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, 21.
living with rural communities are often hired to help work as a cheap source of labor\textsuperscript{118}. In urban cities petty trade, labor, and prostitution become common livelihood strategies\textsuperscript{119}.

**International Frameworks for Internal Displacement**

It was not until the 1990’s that internal displacement was recognized as not only a humanitarian issue but also a human rights one\textsuperscript{120}. IDPs are not afforded any special rights as they have not crossed an international border; however, their rights are protected under international human rights law and humanitarian law. It is the responsibility of the nation state to ensure these rights under the norms of sovereignty; however, nation states inability or lack of willingness to protect and provide for vulnerable populations, such as IDPs, often causes NGOs and humanitarian organizations to step in to meet their needs\textsuperscript{121}.

The primary guideline for IDP rights and protection is the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (1998), the guidelines are based on international human rights and humanitarian law and were unanimously approved by the UN Commission and General Assembly. The document is non-binding, as nations were not consulted in the creation of the document. The *Guiding Principles* cover: rights against displacement, the rights of the displaced, obligations of States and humanitarian organizations, and durable solutions to displacement. Principle 3 of the *Guiding Principles* stipulates that it is the State who has “the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction\textsuperscript{122}.” Principle 25 reiterates the obligations of the State to provide for IDPs also stating that humanitarian organizations can also supply assistance, which the State should

\textsuperscript{118} Ib\textsuperscript{i}d.


\textsuperscript{120} Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul, “Protect or Neglect: Toward a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” (Brookings and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2004), 19.


allow\textsuperscript{123}. This is problematic in countries that are unable or unwilling to provide for and protect their IDP populations. The Congolese military forces have violated many of the principles, while it remains difficult to say if they did so on government orders or simply acting on their own accord it is clear that at the very least the Congolese government remains unable to protect the country’s IDPs.

Within the \textit{Guiding Principles} framework, protection not only encompasses physical security but also social, economic and political rights. Under the cluster system, the UNHCR leads the global protection cluster and is the co-lead of the emergency shelter and camp coordination/management cluster\textsuperscript{124}. Even when international actors, such as the UNHCR step in, the ability to provide adequate protection is often limited. Research by Bagshaw and Paul found that despite the UN’s rights-based approach to the protection of IDPs, in practice it “is still largely ad hoc and driven more by the personalities and convictions of individuals on the ground than by an institutional, system wide agenda\textsuperscript{125}.” The research also found that senior UN officials remained reluctant to adequately advocate for the rights of IDPs\textsuperscript{126}.

Regional legislation on human rights provides legal norms that extend to IDPs. The African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Right’s (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons provides IDPs within African nations with legal rights relating to displacement\textsuperscript{127}. The Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons was established by the ACHPR in 2004 with the mandate of conducting research and fact-finding missions on refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers in order to assist in the development

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid, Principle 25: 1-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} UNHCR, “Working with the Internally Displaced,” (2008), 1; the global clusters are inter-agency groups that are in charge of developing capacity, standards, policies, and tools necessary for field operations.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul, “Protect or Neglect: Toward a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” (Brookings and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2004), 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid, 4.
\end{itemize}
of effective strategies and policies\textsuperscript{128}. The DRC is party to the ACHPR and while a observation mission by the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and IDPs has not been conducted\textsuperscript{129}, the DRC does report to the ACHPR on it’s human rights developments.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed the “Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced Persons,” in 2008 to provide a standard methodology for humanitarian actors to identify IDPs and collect data on displacement, humanitarian and protections needs, and potential solutions\textsuperscript{130}. The IASC also developed the “Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons in 2010. According to the framework, a durable solution is:

Achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement\textsuperscript{131}.

The framework identifies return, local integration, and resettlement in another part of the country as possible durable solutions for IDPs. According to the framework, it is the responsibility of the government to provide durable solutions for IDPs, at minimum authorities must ensure minimum legal and policy frameworks for IDP rights and government mechanisms are able to facilitate humanitarian assistance\textsuperscript{132}. IDPs have the right to voluntarily choose what solution they would like under the framework.

The IASC framework promotes a community-based approach that mitigates tensions between the displaced and host communities\textsuperscript{133}. The IASC notes that factors including the ability of the local community to absorb IDPs, availability of natural resources, livelihood opportunities, and infrastructure, and environmental sustainability may affect durable solutions\textsuperscript{134}. A durable


\textsuperscript{129} As of 2012, the Special Rapporteur has not conducted any research or observation missions in any country.


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 11.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 13.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 18.
solution requires adequate and sustainable access to: essential food and water, basic shelter, sanitation, primary school education, and essential medical services. According to the framework durable solutions have been achieved when IDPs can access public services on an equal level as locals with comparable needs. Likewise, while IDPs have the right to meet their core economic needs, livelihoods are relative, in that IDPs should have the same access to employment as local residents.

In order to determine durable solutions for IDPs in eastern DRC, their current conditions within host communities must be assessed to determine the communities’ capacity to absorb the population for the possibility of integration. Land rights must also be examined, as the displaced return and try to reclaim their homes. The land laws in the DRC are outdated and ill equipped for the current crisis. In practice land is generally owned and transferred according to customary law; however, the state only recognizes ownership and land certificates issued by the states property administration office. Large-scale land sales in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories have already sparked outcry by IDPs and the local population. Within Bukavu, the issue of land is pitting the local government against residents of a slum on the road between the Bukavu and Panzi. While initially allowed to build and live on the land, the government has now reclaimed it to widen the road, demolishing the homes and shops on the route. Inevitably, land will be a contentious issue in the future. If the government fails to resolve the disconnect between traditional land ownership and government Ministry of Land Affairs policies durable solutions will be difficult to achieved.

136 Ibid, 33.
137 Ibid, 34.
139 Ibid.
140 Field Research 2011.
Chapter IV: Methods

The purpose of this research is to explore the displacement experience of those living in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) based on primary research. This section describes the research methods utilized, ethical and practical challenges, and types of data analysis employed. This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the American University in Cairo.

Figure 3.1: Map of South Kivu

DATA COLLECTION

For this research, interviews were carried out in the urban setting of the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and in the rural town of Mudaka, located 35 km north of Bukavu (Figure 3.1). An urban city and rural town were chosen to identify the differences in experiences between IDP’s living in different host communities. Mudaka was selected as the location for the rural interviews as it was easily accessible from Bukavu, is relatively safe, and I had access to the IDP community within the town. The interviews occurred in December 2011 and January 2012. A leader of a local community based organization (CBO) facilitated my access to the IDP communities in both Bukavu and Mudaka. The facilitation of the interviews by a local CBO leader, who was trusted within the communities, was key to identifying willing participants. Non-probability, snowball sampling was utilized as IDPs are not easily identifiable and maybe hesitant to participate in research conducted by an unknown foreigner. Furthermore, insecurity prohibited the possibility of accessing a probability sample. Due to time restrictions, interviews were unable to be carried out with humanitarian actors.
Semi-structured interviews were utilized based on an interview guide consisting of 20 open-ended questions (see appendix). Using the back translation method, a professional outside translator was hired to translate the English guide into Mashi, Kiswahili, and French. The three translated versions were then presented to the three translators that would be carrying out the interviews to translate the interview guide back to English to ensure the translation was as close as possible to the original translation. The Mashi\textsuperscript{141} version particularly benefited from this process, as the language is less common than Kiswahili and French. Having a translator whose primary language is Mashi was beneficial, particularly while conducting interviews in Mudaka.

All participants voluntarily agreed to participate in the interview. Before the interviews, all participants were provided with an informed consent form in the language of their preference. An oral consent form was also read aloud for any illiterate participants. All interviews were conducted in private rooms, to avoid the third-party-present effect. The third-party-present effect occurs when interviews occur in the presence of a third-party is present in the room\textsuperscript{142}. This can be particularly problematic when interviewing conflict-affected persons.

Interpreters were utilized to conduct interviews in French, Kiswahili, and Mashi. All of the interpreters possessed previous experience working with vulnerable populations. Additionally, they were required to sign a confidentially agreement. About one-fourth of all the interviews were carried out by the author of the article with the aid of an interpreter.

In Bukavu, 31 interviews were conducted and 19 were conducted in Mudaka, for a total sample size of 50 interviews. The size difference between Bukavu and Mudaka can be attributed to the number of participants that were available for the interview session and met necessary criteria, namely being displaced and above 18 years old. Of the 31 participants in Bukavu, 13 were male and 18 were female. At Mudaka only five participants were male and the remaining 14 were

\textsuperscript{141}An indigenous language in eastern DRC.
\textsuperscript{142}Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Blue Ridge Summit: AltaMira, 2011), 181.
female. The total sample consisted of 34 females and 18 males. The age range of participants was 18 to 81 years old.

DATA ANALYSIS

Semi-structured interviews were chosen to provide descriptive statistics, in addition to qualitative analysis. The research does not provide a fully representative sample, but highlights individual experiences while employing descriptive statistics to note patterns and trends within the research sample. As the research was exploratory, grounded theory was utilized to find trends and patterns that emerged in the data. According to Glen Bowen, grounded theory method is inductive as “the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis come from the data” gathered. After reviewing the data three themes of the displacement experience of research participants that clearly emerged during interviews. The identified aspects of displacement that will be analyzed are:

- The reason for fleeing (generalized violence or personally targeted);
- The experience during flight (cycles of displacement, other locations of refuge, and mode of travel);
- The self-settlement experience (reason for refuge in current community, livelihood strategy, relations with host community, and desire to return home).

CHALLENGES AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Carrying out research of conflict-affected persons within insecure regions requires the highest levels of ethics, as well as provisions of protection and security. Many witnesses and actors in

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the conflict in the DRC refuse to share their experiences. This is in part due to the potential reprisal one may face for testifying, making silence a form of self-protection. In eastern DRC, conflict-affected civilians are more likely to identify foreign rebel groups as perpetrators of violence than Congolese military forces or local rebel groups. Additionally, impunity is widespread so many civilians do not believe there is a point to testifying or reporting violent crime.

Fear of reprisal for speaking out, as well as stigma likely decreased the likelihood of respondents reporting acts of sexual violence. Similarly, as all of the interpreters were male, female participants may have been less likely to report sexual violence during the interviews. All of the interpreters have past experience working with survivors of sexual violence but as interviews were conducted over one day it is unlikely that they could gain the full trust of the participants. As the research focused on displacement, not sexual violence, under reporting of sexual violence is unlikely to change the accuracy findings of the research. Anonymity and security are of the utmost importance for any research, but particularly so in such an environment. Anonymity was ensured to protect all participants.

Conducting research in impoverished communities also presents challenges; particularly where one’s skin color may associate them with Western nations creates situations where the researcher is constantly managing economic inequality. In eastern DRC, foreigners are easily identified by external features and are referred to as muzungu, meaning one who wonders aimlessly. Westerners are commonly perceived to be wealthy and it is not unusual to receive requests for goods and money. This is particularly problematic when conducting research for a few reasons. First, research participants may expect compensation for their time which may increase the likelihood that the participants respond by saying what they believe the researcher would like to

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145 Ibid.
hear, known as the deference effect. Secondly, the interaction of the participant with a Westerner may lead others in the community to suspect the participant of receiving money, potentially increasing the possibility of the participant being robbed.

Aware these challenges, I conferred with Congolese experienced in conducting research in the region for advice in developing a strategy to minimize such risks. A local NGO employee warned against visiting any participants’ homes. According to the source, a local Congolese who allowed for a researcher to interview them within their home was robbed afterwards as the robbers suspected they must have received money from the researcher. For this reason I choose to conduct my interviews at community centers, a church in Bukavu and a school in Mudaka. This choice created its own problem, as participants required transportation. To address the issue of transportation I reimbursed each participant. As public transportation has fixed rates, round-trip costs were estimated to be USD 1 per person. While I did provide financial reimbursement for transportation I was hesitant to provide more financial compensation. However, I did feel it was absolutely necessary to consider the needs of the participants as well as the time they were taking out of their day to participate. For this reason I provided participants with snacks during the interview and a portion of grains to take home with them. Providing remuneration, rather in goods or money, is debated among scholars. My approach was based on the needs of the participants.

In the DRC compensation is common and can be expected, this can be problematic for researchers as deference is common. Word spread around Mudaka that a Western researcher was coming causing many non-IDPs to come to the school claiming to be displaced and requesting participation in the research. This was addressed in two ways. The local contact that had identified local IDPs for participation had a list of those he whose participation he had requested. Additionally, noting that some individuals who had shown up but were not on the lists were IDPs, a translator from the region vetted those who were not on the lists to identify IDPs. Those not on the list were asked where they were from and using the local language of the region they identified questioned on key landmarks of their village or town. The process was messy and
certainly not ideal but given the unexpected circumstances it allowed for the participation of more interviewees while removing deference from those falsely claiming to fit the participation criteria.
Chapter V: Analysis and Discussion:
Identifying Displacement in South Kivu

Chapter IV explained the methods utilized to conduct this research; this chapter examines the research findings. In this chapter I will utilize descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis to examine the research findings. As discussed in the methods sections, three phases of the displacement experience were identified using grounded theory. The phases that will be analyzed in this section are:

- Conflict-induced displacement
- Flight and search for refuge
- Self-settlement

The aim of the section is to shed light on patterns and trends that were identified during these phases of displacement. The themes will be examined in terms of the overall findings, differences and similarities between respondents in Bukavu and Mudaka, as well as individual experiences in order to provide a multi-dimensional analysis. In highlighting trends we attain a glimpse of the experiences of the current 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the DRC. It is important to note that since this research was carried out in December 2011 and January 2012, the number of IDPs in Congo has increased by almost 25% from the estimated 1.8 that were displaced during the time of research. This increase means further strains on every level of society in the eastern region. It will become evident in this chapter that displacement creates burdens not only on the displaced but on host families and communities, as well as the economy. The examination of these phases provides a research-based perspective on the plight of IDPs living outside of displacement camps in the South Kivu province of DRC.

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Profile of Participants

Thirty-one interviews were conducted in Bukavu and 19 interviews were conducted in Mudaka, creating a total of 50 participants. Of the 50 interviews carried out 18 of the participants were male and 32 were female. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 81 years of age. Using the villages which respondents were from, the territory that the village is located within was also identified (Table 5.1). Participants came from the Kabare, Kalehe, Mwenga, and Walungu territories of South Kivu. Forty-two percent of the participants were from the village of Nindja in the Kabare territory and 16% were from the village of Kalonge in the Kalehe territory. The rest of the participants came from various other villages. The identification of participants’ villages of origin is important in identifying wider military and rebel operations in those territories, as well as identifying trends in population movements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village, Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bideka, Walungu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunyakiri, Kalehe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chocholo, Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikoma, Kabare</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabare, Kabare</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahuzi, Kabare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalonge, Kalehe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanyola, Walungu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasika, Mwenga</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogo, Kabare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngweshe, Walungu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nindja, Kabare</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamubanda, Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the participants, 48% self-identified as belonging to the Mushi ethnic group, 42% identified as belonging to the Bashi ethnic group, while the remaining participants self-identified with other groups (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Respondents Ethnic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakunaushi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashbesha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashi</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batembo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murengeronge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

The majority (68%) of participants were married and only 4% reported being single. Nine respondents (18%) reported being widowed, two female respondents reported being abandoned and one female reported being divorced (Table 5.3). All of the nine respondents who reported being widows were females. Six of the widows reported that their husbands were killed during attacks on their village. One widow stated that her husband was abducted by the Interhamwe to carry goods for them and later killed.
Table 5.3: Marital Status of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012

The number of children each participant had ranged from none to 10, the figures included deceased children. The mean number of children per participant was 5.24 with a median of 5. Of the participants, 20% (10) reported the death of one or more of their children. Nine of the 10 respondents that reported the death of a child stated that their child or children were killed during attacks on their homes and villages. The remaining respondent did not specify the cause of death of their children. Three of the interview participants had adopted a relative’s orphan(s).

Cause of Displacement

This section examines the cause and year of displacement to determine if displaced are fleeing due to generalized violence or targeted attacks. It will assess the types of violence experienced to understand the reason that respondents chose to flee. Additionally, it will examine insecurity in the region during periods that experienced increased conflict.

Time Frame of Displacement

Displacement of respondents occurred over a 16 year period between 1994 and 2010 (Figure 5.1). The highest rates of displacement of participants occurred in 2004, 2006, and 2010. Each of
these years corresponds with surges in violence related to military and/or NSAGs offensives. In 2004 South Kivu plunged into chaos as the military battled against Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie- Goma (RCD-Goma)\textsuperscript{148}, led by Laurent Nakunda for control of Bukavu. The city fell to Nakunda’s forces on June 2, 2004. It is estimated that there were 2.3 million IDPs in the DRC in 2004\textsuperscript{149}. In 2006 government forces, with the support of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) carried out offensives against rebel groups, including RCD-Goma, in the Kivus. At this time there were 1.1 million IDPs\textsuperscript{150}. Displacement during 2010 corresponds with anti-Forces Democratiques du Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)\textsuperscript{151} military campaigns carried out by the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC)\textsuperscript{152} with MONUC support. These operations were highly criticized due to the enormous civilian toll and limited success against the FDLR. Amani Leo, meaning peace today in Kiswahili, the third anti-FDLR campaign was launched in the Kivus in January 2010. During government campaigns against them, the FDLR are known to retaliate by increasing their attacks on civilian populations\textsuperscript{153}. The same year saw a rate of 1.7 million internally displaced\textsuperscript{154}.

This research indicates that displacement increases during military campaigns. This creates a humanitarian dilemma, if agencies are uninformed of military operations they will be unable to predict humanitarian needs and rapidly deploy; however, if they are perceived as coordinating with the military they will no longer be viewed as impartial\textsuperscript{155}. The case of Amani Leo operations resulting in retaliation indicates a need for increased protection efforts during military campaigns. As the current United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the D.R. Congo (MONUSCO) already coordinates with the FARDC and includes a mandate on civilian

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{148} Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma
  \item\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{151} Democratic Forced for the Liberation of Rwanda
  \item\textsuperscript{152} Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
  \item\textsuperscript{154} UNCHR, “UNHCR Global Report 20120,” http://www.unhcr.org/4dfdbf4516.html
  \item\textsuperscript{155} Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,” in Civil Wars, (2007), 143.
\end{itemize}
protection, the mission should review the 2009 and 2010 military campaigns to identify failures in coordinating protection with the FARDC. While humanitarian agencies are paralyzed by the dilemma of coordinating with military campaigns, the damage of impartiality has already been done to MONUSCO due to previous support during FDLR campaigns. In spite of this mistrust, the organization should examine the protection failures during the 2009 and 2010 military campaigns and use their relationship with the military to develop mechanisms for coordinating protection and humanitarian responses during military campaigns.

**Figure 5.1: Year Displaced from Home**

![Year Displaced from Home](image)

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

**Reason for Flight**

Within the dataset two reasons for fleeing were identified:

- Those who fled because they and/or a member of their nuclear or extended family were targeted by an armed group, I refer to this as experiencing a direct attack;
Those who fled because their village was being targeted by an armed group but they did not report being directly targeted, I will refer to this as generalized violence.

Sixty-six percent of participants reported fleeing their village due to an armed group targeting themselves or a member of their nuclear or extended family, while 34% fled due to generalized violence within their village (Table 5.4)\textsuperscript{156}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.4: Reason for Fleeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly Attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

The types of attacks reported by respondents included: abductions, looting, sexual violence, beatings and torture, murders and massacres, and the burning of houses. Many of these tactics would be used together during attacks, resulting in forced displacement of the targeted civilian population. The types of attacks reported include those reported by participants who directly experienced attacks, as well as those who did not personally experience attacks but reported generalized violence.

*Looting*

Thirteen of the respondents mentioned looting and pillaging of their villages by armed groups. According to Human Rights Watch, looting and pillaging are common aspects of attacks on

\textsuperscript{156} Participants in this study were not asked why they or their village was attacked, while perceptions of NSAGs motivations are important, as are the actual motivations of the armed actors this study attempted to focus on the displacement experience.
villages\textsuperscript{157}. During the RCD-Goma 2004 offense in South Kivu, the rebel group was nicknamed “operation TDF,” standing for operation telephones, dollars and daughters, as these were the demands of the rebels when they would break into the homes of civilians\textsuperscript{158}. Looting and pillaging appears to be one way that armed groups sustain themselves, as one man explained:

\begin{quote}
During the war Hutu soldiers were killing, raping and taking everything including our cows and goats.
\end{quote}

Looting was sometimes used in combination with sexual violence and/or killings. According to one participant from Nindja (Kabare territory):

\begin{quote}
I left my village because of different rebel groups were oppressing the people there. Kidnapping, looting, and sexual abuse were all orders of the day.
\end{quote}

Another respondent from Nindja (Kabare territory) explained:

\begin{quote}
Every day the Interhamwe came and demanded things which we didn’t have. When you didn’t have what they asked for they would kill you.
\end{quote}

Looting and pillaging pose a double threat to civilian populations. As one woman from Kabare told:

\begin{quote}
Mai-Mai and Interhamwe were looting and pillaging every day in our village and took everything we needed to live. When we ran out of things for them they began killing people. We did not wait to be killed, so we ran away.
\end{quote}

For armed groups looting is a tactic for directly improving a group’s immediate economic situation\textsuperscript{159}. The affect of frequent and repeated looting depletes civilian resources creating a daily struggle to survive. Looting alone can cause economic vulnerability but when coupled with threats of violence and murder becomes a source of economic and physical insecurity.

Abductions

Two types of abductions were identified within the dataset. The first is a common tactic of armed groups in eastern Congo, abduction for labor. One of the most common forms of this is armed groups kidnapping civilians to port goods, weapons, and equipment for them. This often occurs following large-scale looting when the perpetrators cannot carry all of the looted goods. Men who are abducted for this reason are often killed after or are never heard from again. As one respondent explained:

*The Interhamwe came and attacked my village. Then they took my husband with them and forced him to carry things for them, after they killed him.*

Another respondent described the different uses for males and females who were abducted:

*I left Kalonge in 2002, it was very dangerous at this time. Rebels would come to the village and kidnap boys who they would make carry their supplies. They also would take girls that they used for sex. During this time my girlfriend was taken by the rebels. She was held for two weeks before escaping.*

I choose to include the abduction of girls and women into this category as well, as opposed to in the sexual violence category which this could also fit under. While they are often labeled as ‘sex slaves’ because in a large part that is what they are used for, the term fails to account for the other forms of exploitation they face. Meredith Turshen asserts that during conflict “systemic rape and sexual violence are among the strategies men use to wrest personal assets from women.” BUILDING FROM TURSHEN’S ARGUMENT THAT WOMEN HOLD PRODUCTIVE VALUE TO ARMED GROUPS, WE MUST MAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT FEMALES WHO ARE ABducted AND SUBJECTED TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE ARE ALSO FORCED TO COOK, CLEAN, ACTS AS PORTERS, FETCH WATER AND FIREWOOD, ETC. ARMED GROUPS VIOLENTLY TAKE AND USE FEMALES BOTH SEXUALLY AS WELL AS A SOURCE OF FORCED LABOR. One respondent accounted how she escaped her abductors after being sent to fetch water for them:

161 This is not in all cases; some are only used for sex.
I was kidnapped by the rebels and became theirs [sex slave] for three years. One day I went to fetch water alone. When I arrived at the river, I took the advantage of running away from them through the way of the river. I was so scared they would catch me and kept wondering what would happen if they did.

The second form of abduction that appeared in the dataset was kidnapping for ransom. Both the FARDC\textsuperscript{162} and NSAG’s are known to carry out extortion and taxation of the local populations under their control. I was unfamiliar with the practice of kidnapping for ransom by armed groups in South Kivu, expect in cases targeting foreigners. Oxfam identified kidnapping for ransom as a threat to civilians in the Orientale Province in 2011\textsuperscript{163}. This research suggests that it was also occurring in South Kivu, as one respondent reported being abducted from Chocholo in 2000 and being held for two weeks until family members paid a ransom. Another respondent from Nindja explained how his son was abducted in 2007:

My son was taken by the Interhamwe who demanded I give them $200 within 24 hours for his release. I managed to get the money and pay them but they came back again to try to rape my wife. Fortunately, she was in the field when they came.

All forms of abduction found in the dataset provide the perpetrators with economic gains, rather in the case of cash ransoms or through forced labor. While it is impossible to know the intent of the perpetrators, abductions and looting are providing them with economic resources. Further research would need to be conducted to determine the extent of these economic benefits for NSAGs. For the civilian population the threat of abduction is a threat to one’s life and livelihood and thus a cause of fleeing.

Sexual Violence

Sexual violence was one of the most common types of attacks respondents mentioned; however, few reported being directly affected by sexual violence. Sexual violence in endemic in the DRC,

\textsuperscript{162} Soldiers’ salaries often go unpaid leading to extortion and corruption.
according to a study by the American Journal of Public Health, an estimated 1,100 women were raped every day between 2006 and 2007. Twenty-two participants cited sexual violence as part of their reason for leaving their village, two told of personal experiences, and one spoke of his wife’s experience. Congolese are deeply conservative and despite the prevalence and normalization of sexual violence, a very strong stigma is still attached to survivors. It is possible that more participants had personal experiences with sexual violence but choose not to discuss it during interviews. Sexual violence in the DRC destroys social ties of families and communities as husbands leave their wives, families abandon their children, and babies conceived by rape are rejected.

*Beatings and Torture*

Beatings and torture are both utilized by armed groups in eastern DRC. In some cases they occur when a civilian refuses to give the armed group goods or act as a porter for them, in other cases they occur with no apparent reason. One research participant told of how soldiers beat his wife, breaking both of her hands. Another respondent recounted the types of horrors rebels carried out in Nindja:

> At night you would hear a knock at the door and it would be rebels there to loot and rape. I witnessed beheadings, breast being cut off, rapes. They killed my husband and two of my children.

*Murders and Massacres*

Nineteen of the research participants had at least one relative that was killed by an armed group. Some lost one or two family members, while others lost their entire family. One respondent fled

164 Relief Web, “More than 1,100 Rapes Daily in DR Congo: Study,” (2011) [http://reliefweb.int/node/401070](http://reliefweb.int/node/401070).
after the May 2005 massacre in Nindja where he was residing. Another respondent described the killings of multiple members of her family:

*Interhamwe came and killed my mother and father. Then they slit the throats of two of my children and burned our house down.*

In two cases, the respondents were young children when their village was attacked and families killed. One was only two years old when his parents were killed. The other, who was 13 when his family was murdered, described how he managed to escape the same fate:

*Rebels came to my house and killed my parents and 11 siblings. I pretended to be asleep and the rebels thought that I was dead as well.*

**Burning of Houses**

Eleven participants reported that armed groups had burned down their homes. The burning of houses is particularly relevant when looking at displacement, as it is one of the clearest forms of forced displacement. Human Rights Watch has documented the burning of over 9,000 homes, schools, churches, and other buildings in North and South Kivu. In many cases it is nearly impossible to identify the reason of armed groups attacking a particular village. In some cases land control appears to be a critical factor. This motive was evident by the forced displacement of one particular ethnic group in 2006 by the CNDP who then repopulated the village with CNDP constituents. The burning of houses also appeared to be a tactic utilized by the FDLR as reprisal attacks on the civilian population for the military’s anti-FDLR campaigns. Rather respondents were directly targeted or not, these types of attacks on villages amount to intentional forced displacement.

Based on the type of violence experienced, regardless if respondents were directly targeted, all of the respondents meet the definition of an internally displaced person by the UN’s criteria as the

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violence occurring was wide-spread and posed a threat to the loss of life. According to Sarah Kenyon Lischer, when dealing with conflict-induced displacement, it is important to take into consideration both the violence that caused displacement, as well as characteristics of the displacement in order to understand how conflict affects displacement and visa-a-versa\textsuperscript{170}. Failing to examine both the violence that caused displacement and the displacement crisis prevents full understanding of what causes the crises as well as the ability to predict future events\textsuperscript{171}. This research indicates that carrying out wide-spread violence against the civilian population is a common tactic of armed actors in eastern Congo.

**Perpetrators of Attacks**

While this research focused on the displacement experience of the civilians, the identification and labeling is relevant to exploring the violence that caused displacement. Adapting Lischer’s argument on the need to consider both the violence that induced displacement as well as the displacement, I believe it is also important to include the identified perpetrators of violence. Understanding the perceptions and identities of perpetrators is also necessary for understanding the conflict itself. Additionally, the identities of perpetrators are not only relevant for any future justice and/or reconciliation efforts but also to the success of durable solutions.

Of the participants, 50% identified Interhamwe as carrying out attacks on their village and 20% said that “rebels groups” were responsible for attacks (Table 5.5). Interhamwe has become a catch-all term in eastern Congo. The term originates back to the paramilitary group involved in the Rwandan genocide but is now often used for NSAGs that include remnants of the original Interhamwe, such as the FDLR. It is important to note that those labeled at Interhamwe in eastern Congo are not always the same Interhamwe that carried out the Rwandan genocide. It is notable, that the most commonly identified groups are often viewed as foreigners: Interhamwe, Hutu, and the FDLR. The local Mai Mai militias were less commonly identified and no one identified the military as perpetrators, despite widespread documentation of military abuses of civilian

\textsuperscript{170} Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,” in *Civil Wars*, (2007), 143; The case of the influx of Rwandan refugees into the DRC following the 1994 Genocide is a prime example of how displacement can affect and cause conflict.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
populations in the Kivus. This is not surprising as widespread impunity and fear of retaliation discourages civilians from speaking out against crimes committed by the military.

Each armed group presumably has their own agenda and motives but the targeting of civilians is a tactic employed by most, if not all of the armed groups in the Kivus, including the military. According to Jeremy Weinstein, armed groups that operate in resource rich environments or that receive support from an external patron are more likely to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilian populations\textsuperscript{172}. Weinstein argues that armed groups in resource poor areas are less abusive towards the civilian population and use violence more “selectively and strategically”\textsuperscript{173}. As discussed in Chapter II, Rwanda, Uganda, and the government of Congo have all supported and aligned with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) at various times to fight a proxy war\textsuperscript{174}. Not only do many armed groups in eastern Congo have outside patrons but some are based in territories with profitable mineral resources. Both of these factors allow armed groups to brutalize the civilian population as the groups do not require civilian support to operate. Expanding on Weinstein’s argument based on this research, NSAGs who receive external support from patrons and/or operate in resource rich areas of the eastern Congo employ high-levels of violence against the civilian populations, particularly in times of military campaigns and NSAG offensives. The high-levels of violence in turn spark massive displacement of civilians.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
         & Frequency & Percent \\
\hline
FDLR     & 1          & 2          \\
Hutu     & 2          & 4          \\
Interhamwe & 25       & 50         \\
Mai Mai and Hutu & 3        & 6          \\
Rebel Groups & 10        & 20         \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Identified Perpetrators of Attacks}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{173}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174}Rwanda has backed the Rally for Democracy (RDC), the National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP), and M23. Congo has supported various Mai Mai militias and under Mobutu supported the Interhamwe and ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR). Uganda backed the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC) and reportedly M23.
This section explored the conflict and causes of displacement at the micro-level. In analyzing the research participants’ experiences with violence, we found that the majority personally experienced violence related to the conflict that caused their displacement. As the research sample represented four territories within the South Kivu province, we can conclude that the insecurity is relatively wide-spread. Additionally, as the displacement of participants increased during times of military campaigns and NSAG offenses we can deduce that these operations lead to intensifications of direct targeting of civilian populations that in turn results in increases of displacement.

**Flight: the Search for Refuge**

In the previous section we found violence by NSAGs is responsible for the displacement of respondents. This section focuses on the participants experience during flight, as they sought refuge. It examines where refuge was initially sought. The section also identifies the modes of transport used to reach sites of refugee, as well as the reasoning behind choosing certain sites of refuge. Finally, it examines where respondents stayed upon first arrival at their current location of refuge. In light of Lischer’s two-pronged approach to examining conflict-induced displacement, this section focuses on the displacement crisis caused by NSAGs violence described in section 5.2.

**Locations of Refuge**

For many respondents their current location of refuge was not the first place they went to after fleeing their village. Forty-six percent of the respondents went directly to their current location, while the remaining 64% went to one or more locations prior to their current location (Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.
5.6). Examining the 64% is important as it exposes the diversity in sites of refuge, as well as cycles of displacement. Fifteen respondents (30%) went to one village prior to relocating to their current location. Many times the village they first sought refuge at was also experiencing insecurity. As one respondent from Ngweshe explained:

*First, my family and I went to Kabare but once we were there we heard that the Interhamwe were kidnapping children and forcing them to work for them, so we then decided to flee to Mudaka.*

Not all who left their first site of refuge did so because of insecurity, as one woman described:

*We first travelled to Bukavu but once we were there we found that life was too difficult so we decided to move to Mudaka.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.6: First Location of Refuge</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Location</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bush</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Another Village</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bush &amp; Other Village</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bush &amp; 2 Or More Villages</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Another Village, Home, Another Village</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

Some respondents reported staying in another village for months or even years during which time they would return home to check on security. One man from Kalonge described his experience:
I left my village in Kalonge in 2002 and went to a village nearby. In 2007 I returned to check on my home and security in the village and found that it was even less secure. I also learned that rebels kidnapped by girlfriend but she managed to escape and was receiving treatment at Panzi hospital in Bukavu. After seeing all of this I fled with my family to Bukavu in 2007. In 2009 I returned to Kalonge to check on security but found more insecurity. There were dead bodies on the ground and my home had been burned. Those who were still staying at the village were living in the bush nearby.

This is not an uncommon experience, as other respondents similarly described trying to wait out the insecurity at a village nearby so they could check on their homes and fields. Once they decided that security was unlikely to return they would then choose to flee to another site of refuge, presumably one further from the violence and insecurity.

Another commonly identified site of refuge was the bush (the jungle). From the dataset refuge in the bush was used by some only for sleeping during the night, while others lived there for months and even years. As attacks often occurred at night, sleeping in the bush nearby allowed civilians to hide from armed groups while maintaining access to their fields. These findings are supported by previous investigations by Human Rights Watch that found that many civilians choose refuge in the forest because it allows access to food sources and land. As man from Nindja informed:

For one year before leaving the village we would stay at home and work our fields during the day but at night we would go into the bush to sleep. After one year of this we fled to Ngweshe. We spent six months there then decided to return home and see if it was secure. When we got home we found that it was even more insecure so we decided to go to Bukavu.

---

While the bush provided a chance of hiding from armed groups, it was not guaranteed. NSAGs movements and attacks often push IDPs further into the bush\textsuperscript{176}. One 71-year-old man from Nindja explained:

\begin{quote}
We lived in the bush for two years, from 2003 until 2005. While we were in the bush we ran into Interhamwe. They raped women and children, beat men, many died. At this time there were many people living in the bush. We constantly kept moving to try to avoid the Interhamwe. We returned to Nindja and found that 28 people had been killed, others had their legs chopped off, so we decided to flee to Bukavu.
\end{quote}

Armed groups are not the only challenges civilians face while living in the bush. A male from Nindja described the difficulties:

\begin{quote}
It was extremely hard in the bush. There is no food, no house to sleep in, diseases, and many other problems.
\end{quote}

One respondent caught Typhoid while living in the bush and another suffered a serious shoulder injury that now prevents movement of her right arm. Despite the dangers of life in the bush, the decision to leave is not easy. As one participant who spent three years in the bush explained:

\begin{quote}
We decided to come into town [Bukavu] because at least here we will die near people, rather than in the bush where there is no one. Here we can tell people about the situation.
\end{quote}

The least common site of refuge among respondents was camps. One respondent reported staying at a “military camp” and another stayed at a sporadic camp in Walungu. She said:

\begin{quote}
We first went to Walungu, the displaced had made a camp there that we stayed at for four months. Church groups gave us materials to make shelters out of but the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{176}Ibid, 36.
conditions there were very bad. They were not sanitary. There were no latrines and lots of illness.

One possible reason for displaced avoiding camps is perception of their insecurity due to memory of the 1996 attacks on Rwandan refugee camps outside of North Kivu.  

Flight by Foot

Forty-one participants reported walking to their current site of refuge. For many this was a very difficult and dangerous journey that lasted days and in some cases weeks. Some would sleep in the bush as night and others would stay in villages along the way. One woman described the hardships her family faced during the journey:

I came by foot with my family. I was pregnant at the time and we faced many difficulties on the way, such as thirst, hunger, and fatigue.

The journey by foot is very insecure, due to the risk of running into armed groups. Many respondents told of hiding from armed groups along the way. One woman from Kalonge explained:

The journey was really insecure because many people on the way were being arrested by the rebels for no reason. It is by the grace of God that I got here safely.

Another respondent reported:

The journey was really bad because of our lack of food and water. In addition to that, there were criminals’ terrorizing people, taking their money.

One woman and her husband ran into a group armed men while fleeing Kabare. She described it:

My husband and I were traveling by foot after we left our village. We ran into soldiers on the way who took everything we had. Then they beat my husband and I.

Reasons for Sites of Refuge

In examining why participants choose to flee to their current site of refuge, we are provided with insight into the reasoning and decision making that occurs during flight. The common reasons for choosing their current location of refuge included: security, having a friend or relative living in the town, or following others who were fleeing to the town (Table 5.7). The majority reported choosing their current location due to relative security. Common words used to describe the reason for respondents current locations included: peace, safe, and security. As a woman from Nindja explained:

*We came here [Bukavu] because it is safer than home. In Bukavu people still sleep safely in their homes. I was also pregnant at the time and Bukavu was the only safe place for me to have my baby.*

Many reported choosing Bukavu because they had heard it was safe. Others choose Bukavu as they required medical treatment, including one woman who suffered from typhoid and another who had been abducted by Interhamwe. Two respondents currently residing in Mudaka explained how they first sought refuge in Bukavu but found that life was too difficult there and decided to move to Mudaka, these cases illustrate the multiple factors that influence the choice of sites for refuge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/Friends</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.
Seven respondents chose their current location as they knew a friend or relative there. Similarly, McDowell’s research in North Kivu also found that second to security, having friends or family of the same ethnic group in a location of refuge was a primary factor in choosing a site of refuge\textsuperscript{178}. Family, friends, and members of the same ethnic group are preferred hosts as they are seen as being able to provide compassion to displaced, as well as spiritual and emotional security\textsuperscript{179}. The reasoning for others varied, a few followed others who were fleeing. This was the case for a respondent who was 13 years old when he was forced to flee after his entire family was killed. Unaccompanied minors are especially vulnerable during displacement, as armed groups forcibly recruit boys and girls are at risk to sexual violence. Upon arriving in Bukavu he was taken in by a man who lets him live in the kitchen of his house in exchange for the young man (now 18 years old) doing the washing in cleaning. This respondent never got to finish his education and is essentially locked into a cycle of servitude in exchange for shelter.

Hosts

Upon first arrival at their current town of refuge, respondents stayed with a variety of hosts (Table 5.8). Eighteen respondents stayed with a relative and six stayed with friends, some of the time the hosts were neighbors and relatives from the same village who had fled prior to the respondents. Ten participants reported staying with strangers upon their initial arrival. As one man from Kasika stated:

\begin{quote}
When I arrived here [Bukavu] a man of good will felt mercy upon me and welcomed me and my family into his house. He let us stay there until I was able to rent a small house.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, 14.
Table 5.8: Host upon First Arrival at Current Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Center</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stranger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

Two respondents were hosted by the chief of Mudaka upon their initial arrival at the village. Eight respondents stayed at community centers upon their arrival, churches were the most common type community centers. The remaining two respondents stayed at hospitals for medical treatment upon their arrival. The length of stay with hosts varied from weeks to years. Hosting displaced families depletes the host family’s resources; this can result in the vulnerability of not only the displaced by the host as well. As a man who stayed with a host family explained:

A relative allowed me to stay at his house when I arrived but then his resources ran low and I had to find somewhere else. Since then I try to rent my own house but sometimes I cannot pay rent and am kicked out.

In this section we found that IDPs seek refuge in a variety of locations. Many seek refuge in the bush risking hardship and the threat of armed groups in order to remain close to their resources and land. Others seek refuge in village close to their homes where they can also check on their homes. The persistence of insecurity eventually pushed respondents who sought refuge in these locations to move further away from their homes to locations with greater security. Economic factors greatly contribute to choices of refuge, as evident by the reluctance to move away from ones home and resources, as well as in cases where respondents moved from Bukavu to Mudaka.

---

because of economic hardships. While security was the primary reason for seeking refuge in Mudaka and Bukavu, networks of family and friends also drew respondents to the locations. Family and friends of the displaced served as hosts upon their initial arrival. IDPs who did not know anyone in the site of refuge relied on strangers and community centers to host them.

**Settlement Experience**
This section examines the current experience of participants. As the latest date of displacement for any participant was 2010, all of the research participants had been displaced for over one year. The term settlement is used loosely here, as this section will demonstrate the respondents continue to face daily struggles in their current location. A variety of aspects relating to the displaced current situation are analyzed including: access to humanitarian assistance, current residence, and livelihood strategies. Additionally, the section examines perceptions of relations with host community and life in current location. It concludes by analyzing the respondents desire to return to their home and discusses the dilemma of durable solutions.

**Access to Assistance**
As interviews were not conducted with aid organizations, this section is based on the information provided by IDP interview participants. Of the participants only three respondents (6%) reported ever receiving any humanitarian assistance, either in the form of medical treatment or a food ration. None of the respondents were currently receiving support from NGO’s, further research would need to be conducted to determine if IDP’s are reaching out for assistance and being denied or if IDPs are not attempting to contact organizations for support. Some participants reported occasionally receiving support from local churches. NGO’s often report their lack of access to displaced populations in eastern Congo, citing: insecurity, restricted access by armed groups, and lack of infrastructure. This research indicates that humanitarian aid is also limited in the urban setting of Bukavu, as well as the town of Mudaka. Bukavu is the base for many NGO’s and UN agencies so the lack of physical access does not account for the absence of assistance. Additionally, Bukavu is relatively secure, debunking any security related reasons for inability to access displaced within the city. Similarly, Mudaka is easily accessed via road from Bukavu and is also relatively secure. Further investigations need to be carried out to find out why
communities like these that are home to IDPs are overlooked by humanitarian and government actors. Lack of funding and difficulties of targeting of likely contribute to lack of assistance; however, these difficulties do not negate the needs of IDPs living in Bukavu and Mudaka.

**Residence**

Eighty-six percent of respondents lived with their families at the time of research, while 6% live in a friend’s home (Table 5.9). Often extended families, consisting of grandparents, aunts, uncles, etc., would live together; this was particularly common in cases where the respondent was widowed. These types of arrangements allow for the pooling of resources. The remaining participants either live with strangers or at a community center. In all of these cases the respondent was still residing with the same host from their initial arrival.

Being able to secure personal residence is a challenge for most displaced and many face possible eviction due to finances. As one man residing in Bukavu explained:

\[
I \text{ am currently living with my family in a small rented house but in a few days we will be kicked out because I have no money for rent.}
\]

While most of the respondents have been able to secure their own residence, it is certainly a challenge. Generally, IDPs own their own homes and land in their villages but upon settling in Mudaka or Bukavu they must have the financial resources in order to rent a home. This is a dilemma given that IDPs often lose their primary resources and livelihoods during displacement. As IDPs do not receive humanitarian assistance they are left to their own devices to secure both shelter and food.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friends</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strangers</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Centers</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The perception of relations with the host community varied based on personal experiences, with most reporting good relations. Others commented that relations were “not as needed” or had “some problems.” As one widow residing in Mudaka explained:

*I don’t have a house so my children live with different relatives. It is really not good though; they [the relatives] blame and mistreat us.*

Problems with hosts likely stem from the draining of household resources during extended periods of hosting.

**Livelihood Strategies**

Agriculture plays a central pillar in the DRC. Within South Kivu, 83.3% of rural households rely on farming and agricultural related activities as their primary livelihood. For many displaced leaving their homes results in a loss of livelihood strategy as most rely on agricultural production. Following displacement many IDPs are forced to adapt new livelihood strategies. According to the research dataset, working as a porter or as a cultivator for other people are the two most common livelihood strategies (Table 5.10). Other livelihood strategies reported were coded as formal, informal, relying on charity, or those without a livelihood strategy. For these purposes formal was classified as those working for a large business that would likely be registered with the government, such as working as a security guard at a school. Informal was classified as those working for others who are unlikely to be registered with the government or working independently. Both porting and cultivating others land would be considered as informal. Other examples of participants’ informal livelihood strategies include: cooking, cleaning, selling goods at the market, and providing religious services to others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

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182 Given the nature of government bureaucracy in the DRC it is entirely possible that these employers were technically informal; however, I went with the assumption that they were businesses that should be registered with the government.
Table 5.10: Livelihood Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator – Other Peoples Land</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other - Formal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other - Informal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

Notable differences in livelihood strategies in Bukavu and Mudaka were identified in the dataset. In Bukavu, the majority of respondents worked as porters and two respondents worked in the formal sector (Table 5.11), this contrasts with Mudaka, where none of the participants worked in the formal sector (Table 5.12). Porters in Bukavu do the work that pack animals are used for in most other developing countries; the load can vary from carrying one large bag of Cassava to the market for someone or pulling a cart with hundreds of pounds of wood on it. This type of work contrasts Mudaka where the majority of participants worked as cultivators on other people’s land. No one from Bukavu reported working as a cultivator or any livelihood strategy related to agriculture. Similarly, no one from Mudaka reported working as a porter.

The differences between Bukavu and Mudaka likely stem from the different economies of the towns. Compared to Bukavu, Mudaka is rural. Much of Mudaka’s local economy is based on agricultural production. Bukavu on the other hand is the largest urban center in South Kivu. It is a center for trade, as well as the provincial hub of government, UN, and NGO offices. During the 1990’s, Bukavu experienced a significant expansion in population size, growing from 100,000 people to over one million\(^{183}\). Insecurity in the province since the mid-1990’s likely

\(^{183}\)Ibid, 18.
contributed to this urbanization, as people sought refuge in the city. The continued growth of Bukavu has led to the over-saturation of the job market, making even informal work irregular. For the urban IDPs, access to land within the city and surrounding slums is impossible due to the lack of available land as well as financial resources to purchase or rent land. The lack of access to agricultural livelihoods leads many to adopt informal livelihood strategies. Another problem with informal livelihood strategies, such as porting, in urban areas is that they are often limited to subsistence survival, meaning they only provide enough income to cover the minimal needs for survival. Organizations are implementing livelihood training programs, as well as micro-finance programs to address the needs. However, livelihood problems persist due to the inability to provide assistance to all of those in need.

Table 5.11: Livelihood Strategies in Bukavu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other – Informal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other – Formal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

Table 5.12: Livelihood Strategies in Mudaka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator – Other Peoples Land</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other – Informal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.
Elderly and those with health problems are often unable to work, leaving them dependent on family members and charity. As one 71-year-old man residing in Bukavu explained:

\[
I \text{ am old and my leg is bad so I cannot work. My children work as laborers [porters] and they help support me.}
\]

A 70-year-old woman had been residing in a church in Mudaka since her arrival there almost two years prior. Unable to work, she relied on charity and “the grace of God” to survive.

Life in Host Communities: Physical Security at What Cost?

When participants were asked about life in their current location, the answers varied but were overwhelming negative. The biggest commonality of all the responses was hardships related to finances including: school fees, rent, and food insecurity. As one woman residing in Bukavu explained:

\[
Life \text{ here is very difficult. My children don’t study because there is no money to pay school. There is no joy in my heart because I am suffering, we even miss food.}
\]

Participants in Mudaka reported similar problems. One woman informed:

\[
Life \text{ here is difficult, we cannot afford school, doctors, or clothes; and we often do not have food.}
\]

Participant responses on the security of their current location of residence also varied greatly and depended upon the respondents’ personal definition of security. For some it was considered secure because attacks by armed groups are unlikely, for others with a wider definition of security, insecurity remained. Many spoke of not only of safety but also economic insecurity, as one woman residing in Mudaka stated:

\[
I \text{ do feel safe here but part of the problem is that I have no job so I cannot provide for my family sufficiently. We do not have enough food for my family.}
\]

Similar sentiments were expressed by participants in Bukavu. One man explained:

\[
It \text{ is not safe here at all, there is no stability in poverty.}
\]

One woman residing in Bukavu aptly put it:

\[
\text{Bukavu is safer [than Nindja] but here hunger is insecurity.}
\]

One man explained the differences between security in Bukavu and Nindja, where he was from:
There is peace in Bukavu but no resources to live; Nindja has resources but no peace.

School Fees
School fees are a problem throughout DRC, while the constitution stipulates that primary education is supposed to be free for all children; most families must still pay school fees. Like many other government institutions, schools suffer from the same lack of funding, particularly for teacher salaries, so families must pay school fees. As most of displaced families are struggling to feed and shelter their children, relying on informal work that barely covers subsistence survival, school is not an option. The lack of schooling for these children will likely force them into the same informal subsistence livelihoods as their parents, creating a cycle of poverty.

Interestingly, a few respondents placed their children’s education as a marker of security. One woman residing in Mudaka stated:

\[ I \text{ do not feel safe as long as my children are not in school. } \]

A male in Bukavu shared similar sentiments explaining:

\[ I \text{ do not feel safe as long as my children are not studying. } \]

These responses are very important, as they highlight the participants belief that education can bring the next generation security, be it economic or political stability.

Rental Economy
It is important to remember that prior to displacement the respondents owned homes and land but upon displacement have lost most of their resources and in the case of Bukavu were forced to adapt to a very different economy. One man residing in Bukavu stated:

\[ \text{Life is more difficult in Bukavu compared to the village because here you have to pay for everything while you only make a very small income.} \]

Similarly a woman also residing in Bukavu explained:
It [life] is very hard here. I really do not like the way I live here, life was better at home. When I was home, I could cultivate my field and have enough to feed my family and make an income.

Many respondents spoke of the difficulties and inabilities of paying rent, something uncommon in villages. One man living in Bukavu reported:

*Life here is very hard. Here you have to pay rent on houses but you do not have enough income to pay the bills.*

Another participant similarly described the predicament:

*In Bukavu you have to rent a house but you have no land and need money for food. That is much more difficult than the agricultural way of life. It is very difficult to go from life in Nindja to always struggling here.*

A few respondents reported being evicted at times when they were unable to pay rent.

**Food Insecurity**

Another common theme was food insecurity. For many IDPs food insecurity is a constant struggle following displacement. As one woman living in Bukavu said:

*Here [Bukavu] we die from hunger, there [Nindja] we die by the knife. It is better to die from hunger than die by the knife.*

Participants both in Bukavu and Mudaka spoke of food insecurity and inability to feed their families. As the vast majority of rural households are engaged in some form of agriculture, even if it was only subsistence, it was enough not to face chronic food insecurity at the household level. A few respondents weighed the difficulty of daily life against the relative security. As one participant residing in Mudaka explained:

*Life here is really hard, but at least I sleep safely in my house at night.*

**Future Hopes: Return or Integration**

There was a significant contrast between participants in Bukavu and Mudaka over their desire to return home, if it was safe enough. Ninety percent of respondents in Bukavu wished to return (Table 5.13), compared to only 36% in Mudaka who wished to return (Table 5.14). Respondents from both locations lost their homes and experienced trauma. The dataset was analyzed to
determine if those who personally experienced traumas were less likely to wish to return to their homes. Eleven of the 28 participants in Bukavu that wished to one day return to their village had directly experienced violence in their village. Exposure to violence at home did not appear to affect respondents’ desires to return home. Some respondents spoke of their desire to return home to their resources, as one man from Ikoma stated:

*Yes, of course I wish to return. All of my goods are there, especially my farm land.*

Similarly a woman from Nyamunbanda explained:

*I wish to go back to my village because then I will be able to cultivate and gain money to support my family. I pray for peace so that I may return.*

Of the two respondents in Bukavu who did not wish to return home one had personally experienced violence in her village. In comparison, eight of the twelve participants residing in Mudaka who said they did not want to return to their village had personally experienced violence in their village. One of the common reasons given by respondents in Mudaka for not wanting to return was bad memories, as one woman explained:

*I do not wish to return [to Nindja] because I will be remembering my children that were killed there.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.13: Bukavu Participants Desire to Return Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.
Table 5.14: Mudaka Participants Desire to Return Home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.

The difference may in part be due to the differences of daily life in the two towns. Respondents residing in Mudaka are able to continue livelihoods in the agricultural sector, similar to their lives prior to displacement. The smaller size of Mudaka also means less competition for employment in the informal sector. In comparison, IDPs in Bukavu must adapt new livelihood strategies, outside of the agricultural sector. The over-saturation of the informal job market creates competition even at the lowest levels. Additionally, the urban environment is very different from the villages that displaced come from.

These findings suggest that differences between Mudaka and Bukavu have more of an impact on the desire to return to ones village than past traumatic experiences. The current struggles that respondents described of poverty, food insecurity, and lack of material resources are examples of daily stressors. Currently psychosocial advocates are one of the primary groups paying attention to the affects that daily stressors have on the mental health, as well as overall quality of life of conflict-affected persons\(^{184}\). While limited in scope this dataset suggests that these daily stressors may have more bearing on respondents than past traumatic exposure.

In considering durable solutions this research indicates that quality of life will affect IDPs preference of return or integration. Additionally, the situation in Bukavu raises questions of the capacity of urban centers to be considered as locations of integration. To what extent does the integration of IDPs contribute to rapid urbanization and what are the affects of hosting displaced

\(^{184}\) Kenneth Miller and Andrew Rasmussen, “War Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings: Bridging the Divide between Trauma-Focused and Psychosocial Frameworks,” in *Social Science and Medicine, 70* (2010), 7.
populations on the urban population? McDowell found that at the household level displaced can only be hosted for so long before their presence depletes the household resources, eventually making both the host and displaced vulnerable. There is a need to examine this at the macro-level as well. Additionally, assuming that the majority of IDPs were involved in the agricultural sector prior to displacement, their protracted displacement is at a loss to the regions food production. Given that the region is food insecure, the loss of IDPs traditional livelihoods not only affects the displaced but also urban centers like Bukavu that rely on rural agricultural production.

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Chapter VI: Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to explore and identify common experiences of internally displaced persons (IDPs) living outside of displacement camps in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Existing literature on the topic was explored, highlighting the lack of attention given to IDPs who do not seek refuge in formal camps. Despite the fact that the vast majority of IDPs live outside of camps, humanitarian actors, policy makers, and scholars have been slow to recognize this population. The lack of research on self-settled IDPs means that policies, including durable solutions, are being developed in a top-down approach, without research-based knowledge. Durable solutions for IDPs include: return, integration, and resettlement within the country. However, lack of research on the experiences of IDPs living with host communities, as well as the affects that hosting IDPs has on local communities, results in a disconnect between policy and reality on the ground.

By documenting the displacement experience of IDPs living in the host communities of Mudaka and Bukavu, the author found that all participants were in fact displaced due to the conflict. The majority of participants had directly experienced violence related to the conflict. Despite high-levels of insecurity many participants choose to remain in the nearby bush or a close-by village in order to maintain access to their resources and livelihood strategies. The persistence of violence eventually pushed the displaced to move further away from their homes to comparatively secure areas. The reason behind choices for current sites of refuge was primarily due to security, but networks of family and friends also attracted participants to their current locations.

For displaced who did not have family or friends to host them, they were forced to rely on strangers and community centers. By the time of research, many of the displaced had secured their own housing, however, some remained dependent on hosts. IDPs living outside of camps have the dilemma of needing to secure housing and food despite having lost their traditional
livelihood strategy. As it is extremely unlikely that they receive any humanitarian assistance, self-settled IDPs must adapt new livelihood strategies. These new survival livelihoods often are not enough to cover all the financial demands displaced are faced with. These subsistence livelihoods leave IDPs vulnerable to eviction and food insecurity. Faced with the costs of food and shelter, parents are unable to pay school fee for their children, creating a cycle of poverty.

IDPs in Mudaka were able to secure informal work in the agricultural sector. While IDPs in Mudaka were working on other peoples land instead of their own, their new livelihoods were similar to those they had prior to displacement. In contrast, IDPs in Bukavu often worked as porters, competing for in the over-saturated informal job market with the local urban poor. The urban environment in Bukavu leaves IDPs in a sustained position of economic vulnerability. While organizations have initiated programs in vocational training, disconnects persists on the ground level. Vocational training in leatherworks or wood carvings is relatively useless as there is no local market for these goods. Organizations are beginning to recognize the need for local market research to identify what goods and skills are actually in demand\textsuperscript{186}. There is also a need to recognize the potential of over-saturation of a particular good or service. Additionally, many of these programs are tailored to victims of sexual violence and former child soldiers, targeting needs to be expanded to include IDPs as well, as they are also an economically vulnerable population.

The loss of livelihoods must also be considered in relation to the Congo’s persistent food insecurity. The majority of rural households in South Kivu are involved in agricultural production and as the majority of IDPs in the province were displaced from rural areas we can assume that the majority of IDPs in the province were involved in the agriculture sector. Thus, the loss of these IDPs livelihood strategies likely impacts the regions food insecurity. Even if the IDPs were only involved in subsistence agriculture, after displacement they become another

\textsuperscript{186} The Women’s Refugee Commission developed a helpful toolkit for this based on IDP research in Northern Uganda.
household dependent on a diminishing sector. Further research is necessary to determine the extent of the loss of agricultural production due to conflict-induced displacement.

When considering the possibilities of durable solutions, the realities on the ground are necessary to determine implementation. As long as IDPs living outside of camps are not recognized by policy makers or humanitarian agencies, any framework will be over-looking a large proportion of the displaced population. In order to understand a displacement crisis one cannot choose to over-look the majority of IDPs because they are not easily accessible or identifiable. Without research on the consequences of hosting IDPs on local communities, the sustainability of integration and resettlement remains unknown. Failing to acknowledge the consequences on hosts at the micro-and macro-levels will hinder the implementation of sustainable durable solutions. This is not meant to argue in favor of encampment or one durable solution over another. The point of this research was to highlight the experiences of IDPs who remain invisible to actors and researchers.

Attention must be given to self-settled IDPs in order to develop policies and practices that are representative of the reality on the ground. Failure to do so will result in a continued knowledge gap on integration and will hinder the development of implementable solutions. This case-study brought up questions on the relationships between the conflict and displacement, invisibility, rapid urbanization, food insecurity, and livelihoods. Further research is needed on every one of these topics and their relationship to internal displacement. Researchers need to conduct more case-studies on conflict-induced IDPs, particularly self-settled, so that policy makers can develop research-based frameworks and practitioners can design interventions that adequately meet the needs of the entire population instead of limiting themselves to those most visible. This means all parties must face and admit past failures and inadequacies of current approaches. If actors remain unwilling to do so then they are ultimately undermining the very purpose of their work.
Bibliography


Miller, Kenneth and Andrew Rasmussen. “War Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings: Bridging the Divide between Trauma-Focused and Psychosocial Frameworks” in Social Science and Medicine 70. 2010.


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Appendix: Interview Guide

How old are you/ What year were you born?

What ethnic group/tribe do you belong to?

Are you married or single?

Do you have any children? How many?

What village are you from?

When did you first leave your village?

How old were you when left your village?

Can you tell me why you left your village?

Where did you first go to when you left your village?

Tell me about your journey to get here?

Why did you choose here?

When you first arrived here where did you stay?

Who lives with you?

Have you/Do you receive any assistance from any NGO’s? If so when and what type of assistance?
How do you support yourself and your family?

Tell me about life here?

Do you get along with the local community?

Do you feel safe here?

Do you plan to return to your village?

Would you like to return to your village?

_Date:_ ________________________________

_Interviewer:_ 

___________________________________________________________________________

_Translator:_ 

___________________________________________________________________________

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