THE DIVINE NAMES

IN

IBN ‘ARABI’S THEORY OF

THE ONENESS OF EXISTENCE

A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Arab and Islamic Civilizations

For the Degree of Master of Arts

By
MAKOTO SAWAI

Under the Supervision of Dr. Saiyad Nizamuddin Ahmad

September/2014
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION

The English transliteration in this thesis is based mainly on the system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES).

The exception to this is that tāʾ marbūṭah (Cause) in *idāfah* is rendered as t, and the final tāʾ marbūṭah is represented as h (e.g. ḥaqīqah Muḥammadiyyah).

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this M.A. thesis is to elucidate the theory of the divine names in Islamic philosophy and mysticism (Sufism) according to Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of the Oneness of Existence. Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), commonly known as Ibn ʿArabī, is a great thinker in Islamic thought as well as the founder of the school of Wahdat al-wujūd (Oneness of Existence). His masterpieces are Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (The Bezels of Wisdom) and al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah (The Meccan Revelations) which are well known though he wrote many other works during his life.¹ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam is a magnum opus in the intellectual history of Islam that has influenced the thinkers of posterity, especially Sufis, philosophers, Shiʿa scholars, as well as intellectuals in the contemporary world, whether Sunnī, Shiʿī, or non-Muslim. There have been many commentaries written on Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam by scholars of the Oneness of Existence (i.e. Ibn ʿArabī’s school) and they continue to be written even to this day. This thesis will therefore look at this work mainly, because its influence on Islamic philosophy has been as significant as its secondary literature has been heterogeneous.

The divine names (asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnāʾ), the main topic of this thesis, function as one of the ways by which human beings, as limited beings, know God who is the Creator. These divine names are found in the Qurʾān: “The most beautiful names belong to God: so call on him by them” (Q7:180).² Since God has the most beautiful names, the gap between the Creator and the created comes to be seen more clearly. Based on Ḥadīth that God has ninety-nine divine names, the history and context of the adoption of the divine names has been discussed.³ These ninety-nine divine names selected from the Qurʾān represent divine

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² The English translation of the Qurʾān in this thesis is based on Yūsuf ʿAlī’s translation, but his version is not always appropriate, thus it is modified in this context and compared with other translations.
³ This Ḥadīth is the one transmitted by Abū Hurayrah. Abū Hurayrah reported the Messenger (May God peace be upon him) as saying: “There are ninety-nine names of God, that is (the number) subtracted one from hundred. And he who memorizes them will enter Paradise.” And Hammām adds (tradition reported) from Abū Hurayrah, and the Messenger (May God peace be upon him): “Verily, God is odd-number, and He loves odd-number.”
attributes. Though such names are based on the description of God in the Qurʾān, one should recognize that the divine names are not limited but rather unlimited. Thus, there are some differing opinions regarding the names of which Muslim scholars ought to choose.

Based on the above-mentioned background of the divine names in Islam, the present work will focus on the theory of the divine names in the school of the Oneness of Existence. I would like to focus especially on Fuṣūṣ al-hikam written by Ibn ʿArabī and commentaries on it such as Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-hikam (The Commentary of the Bezels of Wisdom) by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 730/1329), Dāwūd Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350), and Nūr al-Dīn al-Jāmī (d. 892/1492).

Overview of the Divine Names in Islamic Thought

In the intellectual history of Islam, the first school that speculatively argued for the divine names is the Muʿtazili theological group. They called themselves “the people of (divine) justice and oneness” (ahl al-ʿadl wa-l-tawhīd) and claimed orthodoxy for themselves. With regard to the well known discussion about the Muʿtazila, there is the theory of the createdness of the Qurʾān. Muʿtazili theologians denied the general thought prevailing in Islamic community by refuting the idea that the Qurʾān had been eternally with God from the everlasting past. This debate is closely related to the question of the nature of God, which follows the question of His attributes that are inherent to God such as word (kalām) and power (quwāwah), and the divine names which indicate the divine attributes.

Thereafter, the theme of the divine names came to be treated in a sophisticated way in Islamic theology (ʿilm al-kalām) related to divine attributes. In the theological group of the Ashʿariyyah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-6) discusses the divine names in order to clarify the divine attributes in al-Ibānah ʿan usūl al-diyānah (The Exposition of the Religious Principles). Later, Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan b. Hibat Allāh Thiqat al-Dīn b. ʿAsākir (d. 571/1176), commonly known as Ibn ʿAsākir, writes an apology of his theology in Tabyīn


Concerning the commentary of Fuṣūṣ al-hikam, some problems is pointed out about the commentary written by Muʿayyad al-Dīn Jandī (690/1291). The edition is published under the edition by Jalāl al-Dīn Āṣhtiyānī (2005), but he could not finish his editorial process. One of his students Ibrāhīmī Dinānī did it instead of him so problems are found in the edition. For this reason, we do not use it in our edition.
In this period, the theological view of the divine names was linked with Sufism by means of the intellectual combination of the divine names between Ashʿarī theology and Sufism. Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 418/1072) explains the divine names in *Sharḥ Asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā* (*The Commentary of the Most Beautiful Divine Names*). Moreover, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) studies them in *al-Maṣṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā* (*The Most Brilliant Contemplation concerning the Commentary of the Most Beautiful Divine Names*) and *al-Iqtiṣād fī-l-iʿtiqād* (*The Moderation in Belief*). Both are Sufis as well as theologians, and their theological speculation is based on their Sufism, and vice versa.

Historically, the divine names are the topic of Islamic theology developed in a speculative attempt to seek God. In this sense, they distinguish the concept of name in general from that of the divine name. Ghazālī’s argument is philosophical and speculative so that the sophisticated controversy about the names themselves reaches a peak in the period of Ghazālī. The discussion of the divine names in Ashʿarī theology has had a great influence on Ibn ʿArabī’s thought on the Oneness of Existence.

In the intellectual history of Islamic mysticism (Sufism) and philosophy, Ibn ʿArabī and scholars in his school developed a fusion between the idea of emanation (*fayḍ*) and the divine names. The former is ascribed to later Platonism, whereas the latter is ascribed to the original source of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, as well as the relationship between Islamic theology and Sufism. The fundamental idea which unites these various ideas together in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought is the Perfect Man (*al-insān al-kāmil*). In other words, it is possible to say that the theory of the divine names also one of the tools to discuss the aspect of human perfection. In the previous stage of this discussion, there is a philosophical interrogative “What is a name?” Ibn ʿArabī and the scholars of his school start from this question, and argue it by a synthesis of Greek philosophy and Islamic doctrine based on the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth. As we discuss in

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6 Concerning the later Platonism and its development in Islam, refer to the following works.

detail, for example, there is a verse which states that God taught Adam the names of all things (Q2:31). The organic fusion between later Platonism and Islamic ideas based on the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth leads to the idea in Oneness of Existence: “The Muḥammadan Reality” (al-ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadiyyah) and the “Perfect Man”. In this sense, their discussion is regarded as one of the development of Platonism, as well as the new interpretations of the Qurʾān.

Sources

The above-mentioned ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam⁷ and ʿal-Futūḥat al-makkiyyah⁸ are the primary sources upon which this research is based. I would like to analyze ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam in its entirety. At the same time, this analysis is made sequentially by using commentaries written by scholars on Ibn ʿArabī’s school of the Oneness of Existence. It is useful in the academic study of Ibn ʿArabī to refer to those texts in order to understand ambiguous words or phrases more clearly.⁹ In the case of Kāshānī’s Sharḥ ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam, for example, his commentary is regarded as the one which shows the most straightforward understanding of Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas. The characteristic feature of Kāshānī’s commentary is that he tends to provide the structure of the thought of Ibn ʿArabī. It is useful for the reader of his commentary to understand the ideas of Ibn ʿArabī, but it also has a potential problem: Kāshānī’s explanation may possibly over simplify the ideas of Ibn ʿArabī. This means that Kāshānī clarifies what Ibn ʿArabī often leaves ambiguous. Thus,

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⁷ There are some translations of ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam in English. They might be useful for reader to understand the general ideas of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, but it is hard to say that they are trustworthy translations of the Arabic text. Rather, my translation is based on the commentary by Kāshānī and Qayṣarī though I referred to such publications.

⁸ For the Arabic text we examine in our research, the main text of ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam is the forthcoming publication edited by Saiyad Nizamuddin Aḥmad. In general, ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam is published with notes based on commentators like Kāshānī, Qayṣarī, and so on. Each commentator divides Ibn ʿArabī’s original text into some portion, and states his comment after it. On the other hand, his edition of ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam collects only Ibn ʿArabī’s text, and adds footnotes in terms of ambiguous phrase based on Qayṣarī’s commentary. In this meaning, his edition overcomes the weak point of previous editions of ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam. Moreover, his edition is trustworthy for academic usage because it is based on the only known surviving copy dictated by the author himself to his disciple Šadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawi, Evkaf Mûzesi 1933. It is in Qūnawi’s handwriting and bears an authorization note in Ibn ʿArabī’s handwriting on the first page, which is dated 630/1232. However, I adopt different vocalization (tashkīl) and punctuation from his in accordance with some publications of Sharḥ ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam and their punctuation.

⁹ T. Izutsu mentions that he uses Kāshānī’s commentary of ʿFuṣūṣ al-hikam in his analysis of Ibn ʿArabī.

Concerning *al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyyah*, I have used the first edited work published in 1876 at Cairo as the main text,\(^\text{10}\) referring to the manuscript under the name *al-Fath al-makkī* in Evkaf Müzesi (No. 1845-1876, 4750 folios), and other previous publications. In the analysis of *al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyyah*, I would like to restrict my analysis to the divine names (the 558th chapter).\(^\text{11}\)

Moreover, there are some Arabic sources for comprehensive analysis in this thesis: glossaries of technical terms such as Kāshānī’s *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣāfiyyah* (*The Glossary of Sufism*). This work is a well known glossary for the novice of the Sufi path and Islamic philosophy. As Kāshānī is good at summarizing the essence of Ibn ʿArabi’s thought, he concisely defines the terminologies and ambiguous words in the Sufi tradition. Moreover, I use *Laṭāʿ if al-iʿlām fi ʾishārāt ahl al-ilhām* (*The Subtleties of Notification in the Signs of People of Inspiration*) as a complement to Kashānī’s work.\(^\text{12}\) This work has more technical terms and detailed explanation than *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣāfiyyah* so it can help in gaining a clearer understanding of the terminology. In spite of this advantage, previous scholars of Islamic studies have not used the latter work because of the unavailability of it. This MA thesis treats both works, which are useful for understanding the definition of “name” in the theory of the Oneness of Existence.

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\(^{10}\) Concerning the main text in the analysis, we should bear in mind that there are at least two versions published though the same printed matters are used. This is because the numbers of index before the main text are different in both versions.


\(^{12}\) Though this work is published under the name of Kāshānī, it is not sure that the work is his. This lexicon is attributed to Kāshānī in the critical edition by Majīd Hādīʿ Zādah. As Bakri Aladdin points out, however, there are some candidate authors of the book: Kāshānī, Qūnawī, and Saʿīd al-Farghānī (d. 700/1300). Brockelman attributes the authorship to Kāshānī and Qūnawī. In the critical edition of *Wujūd al-haqq* written by ʿAbd al-Ghānī al-Nābulṣī (d. 1143/1731), Aladdin claims that Farghānī is the author of *Laṭāʿ if al-iʿlām fi ʾishārāt ahl al-ilhām*. He reaches this idea based on the manuscript survey in the library of Istanbul. In addition to it, the description of *wujūd* in Farghānī’s commentary to *Muntahā al-madārik* (the commentary to *Taiyya al-kubra*) is the same as that about *wujūd* in *Laṭāʿ if al-iʿlām fi ʾishārāt ahl al-ilhām* though there are some minor differences.


In the *Subject-Guide to the Arabic Manuscripts in the British Library*, however, this work is traced to Kāshānī and of anonymous author. Aladdin’s proof that the author of the work is Farhānī is not valid. However, there is no stable proof that the author is Kāshānī, so this thesis deals with *Laṭāʿ if al-iʿlām fi ʾishārāt ahl al-ilhām* in order to understand the meaning of the technical term more clearly.

addition to them, *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fi-l-taṣawwuf* (*The Book of Flashes in Sufism*) by Abū Naṣr ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAlī Sarrāj (d. 378/988), and *al-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah* by Qushayrī also have an important role as Sufi dictionaries. They also help us to understand how Sufi terminology is defined and how it changed gradually in a historical transition from classical Sufism to philosophical Sufism. Such dictionaries of Sufism will allow us to understand the historical transition of Sufi terminology such as *tajallī* (self-disclosure). At the same time, usage of such dictionaries will make the background of the Oneness of Existence better known, and will facilitate deeper analysis of the concept.
I. Genealogy of Studying Ibn ʿArabī: Scholarly Methodology

Ibn ʿArabī has almost always been the center of controversy in Sufism even during his lifetime in the thirteenth century. After his death, people who followed his ideas or admired him came to call him by the honorific titles of Muḥyī al-Dīn (the Revivifier of the Religion), or al-Shaykh al-Akbar (the Greatest Master). On the other hand, some who criticized him harshly came to call him the derogatory title of Mumīt al-Dīn (the Killer of the Religion). These two perspectives on Ibn ʿArabī show that there has been a big gap with regard to the evaluation of his thought.

1. Muslim Scholars

Islamic mysticism or Sufism called taṣawwuf has been controversial from the formative period to the present. This movement of seeking spiritual knowledge of Islam started in Baghdad in the Abbasid period in the 9th century, and rapidly spread in Muslim society together with saint (walī, pl. awliyā’) veneration. The reason for which Sufism was accepted by the masses is that it offers a “dynamic” understanding of Islam through physical practice and mystical experience. It is natural to contrast Sufi practice to Islamic law or speculative theology, which was limited to intellectuals. Sufism thus had a significant role in revitalizing the spiritual dimension of Islam.

At the same time, however, such spirituality was always likely to be persecuted and regarded as heretical. This is because the act of being a Sufi is not in accordance with Islamic law, or their “intoxicated” expressions are viewed as blasphemy against God. Abū al-Mughīth al-Ḥusayn b. Maṣʿūr b. Maḥammad al-Bayḍāwī al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) is a noted example of a persecuted Sufi as he was executed for his famous words “I am the Truth” (anā al-haqq). The opponent of Sufism thinks that this phrase is a blatant claim of divine status, which is strictly forbidden in Islamic doctrine. In the period after him, Sufi mystics were always in an awkward position because of the “aftereffect” of Ḥallāj. After him, some people who discussed Sufism classified Ibn ʿArabī as an heir of this disputed position in Sufism. Thus, the illustration of Ibn

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ʿArabī depends on how a speaker or writer describes him in terms of his or her own religious view.

Muḥammad b. Saʿīd b. Muḥammad b. al-Dubaythī (d. 637/1239) described Ibn ʿArabī in al-Mukhtaṣar al-muṭṭāj ilay-hi (The Short Excerpt which is Needed), which is his biographical dictionary (ṭabaqāt). This work is named like this because it is an excerpt from his History of Baghdad (Tārīkh Baghdād) for his own usage. Subsequently, Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348)14, an outstanding Iraqi historian, compiled his biographical dictionary under the title of al-Mukhtaṣar al-muṭṭāj ilay-hi min Tārīkh Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Saʿīd b. Muḥammad b. al-Dubaythī (The Short Excerpt which is Needed from the History of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Saʿīd b. Muḥammad b. al-Dubaythī). In spite of the fact that Dhahabī surely read the work written by Ibn Dubaythī, he depicted Ibn ʿArabī differently in Mizān al-iʿtīḍāl fī naqd al-rijāl, which is his own biographical dictionary. Thus, I would like to consider both contrasting descriptions related to the same specific person.

Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Ibn al-ʿArabī Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Maghribī:

He visited Baghdad in 608 A.H.15 The one who gives him victorious position is the way of people of the Reality (ahl al-ḥaqīqah)16, and he has involved in [spiritual] practice and dedication. He had companions and followers. I am acquainted with the group. Indeed, he had dreams, and I read about him in Baghdad: “He (Ibn ʿArabī) narrated you, that is, Muḥammad b. Qāsim b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Fāṣī, al-Salāfī, al-Qāsim b. al-Faḍl, and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sulāmī.17 Then, I heard Abū ʿAlī al-Shabawī says, “I (Ibn ʿArabī) met the apostle of God [Muḥammad] in a dream. I said [to the prophet Muḥammad]. “God quoted about you (in the Qurʾān),” but you

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14 Dhahabī was an Iraqi historian and biographer. His History of Baghdād called Dhayl or Mudhayyal is the historical biography which continues the work of Abū Saʿd ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1166).

15 cf. “Ibn al-Dubaythī” and “Samʿānī” in EF.

16 A. Knysh also translates the explanation of Ibn ʿArabī, but the edition he uses may be different version from this quotation. According to him, Ibn al-Dubaythī met Ibn ʿArabī during the short visit to Baghdad though he does not describe any information.


17 The phrase of “people of the Reality” is used in Sufism to show that Sufis are close to God.

Abū ʿAbd al-Rahmān Muḥammad al-Sulāmī (d. 412/1021) is a well known Sufi biographer who wrote the work of biographical dictionary of Sufism: Ṭabaqāt al-ṣūfiyyah (The Biographical Dictionary of Sufism).
said, “[Sūrat] Hūd turned my hair white, and what is that he turned your hair?”18 God said in His word, “So stand you firm [in the straight path] as you are commanded” (istaqīm kā-mā umīrtā, Q11:112). Ibn Ṭarājī said, “Because He orders in view of what there has never been [mysterious] knowledge through His occurrence (bi-wuqū‘-hi), so the Commissioner (al-ma‘ mūr) is on the fear.” (I [Ibn al-Dubaythī] said, Ibn Ṭarājī died in 638 A.H., and he has an explanation of complement and insult). 19

The narrative in his explanation is descriptive and sympathetic to Ibn Ṭarājī. According to Ibn al-Dubaythī, Ibn Ṭarājī had much influence even on people in Baghdad which is the birthplace, in the narrow sense, of Sufism. Those who follow his spiritual way are called “people of the Reality.” This phrase is mainly used in the context of Sufism, and users of the phrase intend to show its validity. In his understanding, Ibn Ṭarājī is the master of the spiritual path of Islam, as he created the group and was later followed by many people.

Furthermore, there is the explanation about the spiritual dream in which Ibn Ṭarājī meets the prophet Muḥammad. Ibn Ṭarājī asks Muḥammad about the interpretation of a verse of the Qurʾān and the tradition of the Ḥadīth. Concerning the steadfastness (istiqamah) of belief, God orders humans in the Qurʾān to stand firmly and straightly. That verse just mentions that God ordered “you.” However, Muḥammad understands that Hūd is the person to the divine order because the divine order is executed in Hūd’s story in the Qurʾān. Such Muḥammad’s understanding is recorded in a Ḥadīth transmitted by Ibn ʿAbbās, which describes the reason for the descent of divine revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl) in Ḥadīth. According to him, God gave this verse when Muḥammad said that the chapter of Hūd in the Qurʾān is so difficult that the difficulty makes his hair white. However, Ibn Ṭarājī questioned whether the person whom God orders to fix the belief isMuḥammad himself. His description requires the

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In the later period, Shīhāb al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl ʿAbd Allāh Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852/1449) quoted Ibn al-Dubaythī’s description, but that version is shorter and simplified. I also refer to his Arabic text for textual criticism.

background of the Qur’an and Ḥadīth. In fact, thus, Ibn Dubaythī read the article related to Ibn ‘Arabī.

In spite of this information which was provided by Ibn Dubaythī, Dhahabī and other later scholars did not refer to his attitude. Dhahabī (d. 748/1348 or 753/1352) was Syrian a historian as well as a theological scholar who belonged to the Shāfiʿī School.20 He wrote many works which influenced later scholars like Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373). In Mizān al-iʿtidāl, his biographical dictionary, his fundamental view of Ibn ‘Arabī is critical. In order to understand the perspective of Dhahabī, it is necessary to mention the name of Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328). He was a Muslim scholar belonging to the Ḥanbalī School and well known as the figure who criticized Sufism. He did not necessarily attack the idea of Sufism, but the thought of Ibn ‘Arabī. Ibn Taymiyyah regarded it not as Sufi, but as heretical, as summarized by the phrase “people of the heresy and freethinking” (ahl al-bidʿ wa-l-zandaqah).21 This is an opposite of Ibn Dubaythī’s “people of the Reality.” Dhahabī is categorized in the genealogy of Ibn Taymiyyah with such a negative attitude to Ibn ‘Arabī.22


He died in [6]38 A.H. […] He (Ibn Daqīq) says, “I heard from our master Abū Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Sulami.” He says, “We mentioned about Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. ‘Arabī (Ibn ‘Arabī).” Then, Sulamī said, “He (Ibn ‘Arabī) is the master of deceitful evil (shaykh sūʿ kadhdhāb).” So, I said to him, “[Is he] deceitful, too?” He said, “Yes, we studied together in Damascus about the marriage into jinn.” He said, “this is impossible because human is unclosing body (jism kashīf) and jinn is subtle spirit (rūḥ latīf). He cannot treat the unclosing body of subtle spirit (al-jīsm al-kashīf al-rūḥ al-latīf). Then, after short time, I saw him and he has cracking skull (shajjah).” He (Ibn ‘Arabī) said, “I married a female jinn and I was bestowed three children. One

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20 His name is known as Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān b. Qaymāẓ b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Dhababī al-Turkumānī al-Fārīqi al-Dimashqī al-Shāfiʿī; “al-Dhababī,” in ElT.
22 Knysh makes a chart of the genealogy of Ibn Taymiyyah.
Knysh, Ibn ʿArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition, p. 64.
day, it happens that I made her angry. So she hit me with bone, with which I got [my] cracking skull. I ran away, then I did not see her after this [accident].” […] [His] literary works are classified into philosophical Sufism (taṣawwuf al-falāsifah), and people of the Oneness (ahl al-wahdah). He said about forbidden things (ashyā’ munkarah): their thought is from the sect of deviation and freethinking (murūq wa-zandaqah). [In one hand, someone says that] their thought is from the sect of the subtle knowledge (ishārāt al-‘arifin) and symbols of the spiritual path (rumūz al-sālikīn). And [on the other hand, someone says that] their thought is from the sect of obscure word (mutashābih al-qawwal). Its surface meaning is unbelief (kufr) and error (dalāl), [whereas] its hidden meaning is Truth (haqq) and mysterious knowledge (‘irfān). His thought is right in himself in his big position.

Others say [differently] that Ibn ’Arabī said this kind of false and error. One who said that indeed he died in that situation. Appearance to them about what he is that he came back and turned repentantly to God. If he had been the knower of the words of successor [of the prophet Muḥammad] (al-āthār) and prophetic tradition (al-sunan), he would have been strong copartner of sciences. Concerning my utterance, it is conceivable that he belongs to the sainthood of God (awliyā’ Allāh), to which the Real gravitated him until their death besides him, and he died with the bless. As to his saying, one who understands and knows him on the basic methods of oneness (al-ittihādiyyah) and the knowledge reducing the value of such people [of Oneness].

Comparing Ibn Dubaythī’s explanation, Dhahabī’s one is a basically negative view of Ibn ’Arabī although he acknowledges that he is a talented thinker. Phrases like “master of deceitful evil” are other derogatory titles. However, his understanding of Ibn ’Arabī and Sufi tradition are accurate insomuch as he is a theologian. Moreover, he says that Ibn ’Arabī is “the one person of two men” (aḥad rajulayn) because he is the person who belongs to the “oneness in

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the hidden,” and who belongs to “believers of God who think that this faith is the most unfaithful of unfaith.”²⁴ In this meaning, he realises that Ibn Ṭarabī is a controversial thinker.

Dhahabī quotes an anecdote which apparently shows the heretical character of Ibn Ṭarabī. Mysterious marriage with female jinn is popular in the tradition of Sufism in view of the spiritual connection between Sufis and jinn. However, the content picked up by Dhahabī is scandalous and slanderous.

Moreover, it is significant that the category of “philosophical Sufism” was already used in Dhahabī’s period. This category has had much influence in contemporary debates about classifying Sufism.²⁵ As he understands the contrast between the outer meaning (ẓāḥīr) and the hidden one (bāṭīn), Dhahabī does not accept the idea by referring to his opponents. In spite of such controversy, he says that Ibn Ṭarabī could be regarded as a saint of God.

In the later period, Shihāb al-Dīn Abu al-Fadl ʿAlī b. Nūr al-Dīn Ṭalāʿ al-Ḥadīth scholar, judge, and historian in Egypt, summarized the previous descriptions of Ibn Ṭarabī in his biographical dictionary. He stressed how the thought of Ibn Ṭarabī was distorted by historians; at the same time, it shows how the perspective which the historian has influenced the previous narratives. In the beginning of his explanation, Ibn Ḥajar quotes the whole description in Dhahabī’s Mīzān al-iʿtīdāl, and puts his comment just after it.


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²⁴ Dhahabī, Mīzān al-iʿtīdāl fī naqād al-rijāl, p. 270.

²⁵ Some separate “Sunni Sufism” from “philosophical Sufism.” According to them, the former is orthodox way of Islam following Sharīʿah, whereas the latter is apostasy based on Greek philosophy and Shiʿī tradition.

or as if his work, \textit{Fušṯūṣ al-ḥikam}, is not famous. Yes, Ibn Nuqtah said, “his poetry (\textit{shiʿr-u-hu}) does not amaze me.”\textsuperscript{26}

By collecting previous biographical dictionaries, Ibn Hajar refutes some negative descriptions related to Ibn ʿArabī that do not represent what he was like during his lifetime. In other words, their opinion is not valid because opponents criticize Ibn ʿArabī even though they were not his contemporaries. In contrast with this negative information, he provides other information, which is that there are positive explanations that “he is excellent in the knowledge of Sufism,”\textsuperscript{27} and “he is the greatest scholar of the [spiritual] way.”\textsuperscript{28} Thus, Ibn Hajar’s biographical explanation tries to balance between a positive perspective and a negative one. It can be said that it is a sort of apology by Ibn ʿArabī’s followers.

ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Shaʿrānī (d. 973/1565) was one of the most representative scholars who defended the thought of Ibn ʿArabī as a scholar in the school of the Oneness of Existence. He was an Egyptian scholar and a Sufi. Again, he was a prolific writer who discussed various topics from the history of Sufism to Islamic jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{29} He wrote \textit{The Red Sulfur (al-Kibrīt al-ahmar)} which discusses the truth of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, and \textit{al-Yawāqit wa-l-jawāhir} (The Rubies and the Gems). In these meanings, his explanation of Ibn ʿArabī gives him great respect. Shaʿrānī decorates his master with honorable words like “the expert,” “the perfect,” “the investigator,” “one of the greatest experts on God,” “the honorific title of “Sayyid”, “the revivifier of religion.”

[It is] with characterization just as [Ibn ʿArabī’s] opinion is through the sentences in \textit{The Lineage of the Patched Cloak (Kitāb Nasab al-khirqah)}\textsuperscript{30}. The investigators belonging to people of God (ahl Allāh) agree with his majesty in well known knowledge, just as his work testifies. What makes him reject is just his short word without doubt. So, they reject the one who gets his words without active way of [spiritual] exercise in real. One who is afraid of suspicious achievement in his doctrine

\textsuperscript{26} Ibn Hajar, \textit{Lisān al-mīzān}, p. 393.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibn Hajar, \textit{Lisān al-mīzān}, p. 394. 
\textsuperscript{28} Ibn Hajar, \textit{Lisān al-mīzān}, p. 396.  
\textsuperscript{29} “al-Shaʿrānī,” in \textit{EI²}.  
\textsuperscript{30} The name of the book is mentioned in the list of Ibn ʿArabī’s works, which was compiled by O. Yahyā.  
is dead there, and is not realizing the intention of the master [Ibn ‘Arabī] because of their own interpretation. Master Šafīy al-Dīn b. Abī al-Manṣūr wrote his biographical statement. [According to him], no one has the great friendship of God (al-walāyah al-kubrā), the honesty (al-salāḥ), the spiritual knowledge (al-ʿirfān), and the knowledge (al-ʿilm).31 Shaʿrānī notices that there are some who criticize Ibn ‘Arabī. According to Shaʿrānī, thus, it means that his teaching itself does not provide a cause of criticism. Rather, this is because critics can neither follow the spiritual way with practice, nor they do not comprehend the meaning of Ibn ‘Arabī’s words due to their individual interpretations. As Shaʿrānī explains, Ibn ‘Arabī has a brilliant role in spiritual Islam, and sits in the loftiest place in proximity to God. In this explanation, some flourishing words are used to decorate his position. Shaʿrānī appraises his great master without criticism. He adds an explanation of the objective evaluation of Ibn ‘Arabī.

Ibn ‘Arabī (may God bless him) first wrote treatises to some Arab kings. Then, they were refused [by some kings] and accepted [by the others]. Then he traveled and entered Egypt, Shām, Hijāz, and Anatolia. Whenever he entered each country, he wrote essays. Shaykh ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām32 and Shaykh al-Islām in Cairo33 made a stop with him for a long time. When Shaykh Abu al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī34 (may God praise him) became his companion and knew the conditions of people, he interprets him through friendship with God (walāyah), spiritual knowledge (ʿirfān), and polarity (qatabīyah). He (may God praise him) died in 638 A.H. The word on his sciences drew us. The position of it in our book [biographical dictionary by Shaʿrānī]

33 Shaykh al-Islām is an honorific title in Islam. “Shaykh al-Islām” in EI².
34 Abu al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (d. 656/1258) is the founder of Shādhilī Sufi ṭarīqah, but there is actually no evidence that he met IbnArabī.
moves it away from ignorance about a drop from sea of the sciences of divine friendship (‘ulūm al-awlīyā’). God, majesty, only knows.35

Ibn ‘Arabī traveled to many Arab countries in his lifetime. He sent his treatises which argue his ideas to kings in order to make them accept his thought. As Sha’rānī honestly states, not every authority welcomed his ideas. Though Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought has been always been controversial, he was an essential thinker in the history of Sufism. Amongst Muslim scholars, one’s opinion of him as a Muslim demonstrates one’s position to Sufism, whether it is positive or negative. Even representative opponents like Ibn Taymiyyah do not deny the whole of Sufism, and one of Ibn ‘Arabī’s famous defenders like Sha’rānī carefully puts on hold the evaluation of Ibn ‘Arabī.

2. Pioneers of Islamic Studies

In comparison with the number of books on other Sufis or Islamic intellectuals, there are more works available on Ibn ‘Arabī. The Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society was established in 1977 A.D., and the journal of the society, *The Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society*, has been published from 1982 A.D.. Academic study of this great thinker has been developing progressively. The establishment of Ibn ‘Arabī Society and publication contribute to prevail of his name. Eminent scholars of Ibn ‘Arabī were educated in western countries or in a western academic style, whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim. Their way of studying him is academic, so that they can treat him objectively without any prejudice. In other words, they delay their conclusion on his thought. This is different from the narration by Muslim scholars because the modern scholarly perspective tries to be as objective as possible. Rather, they positively try to find the meaning of his thought in the intellectual thought of Islam though they would regard his thought as the most outstanding of it. Thus, their academic efforts promote the study of Ibn ‘Arabī. Among the intellectuals like scholars and students of contemporary Islam, they learn Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought by importing the academic results into the western world.36

36 In this context, interests in spiritual thought or mysticism in the world flourished rapidly in the western world. In the Eranos conference founded by Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), famous scholars who were interested in mysticism like C. Jung, L. Massignon, H. Corbin, M. Eliade, G. Scholem, and T.
Most researchers of Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought have referred to *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* or *al-Futūḥat al-makkiyyah* as their academic sources. In addition to these books, there are later commentaries on *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* written by disciples or scholars in Ibn ‘Arabī’s school: Kāshānī, Qayṣarī, Jīlī, Jāmī, and so on. Technically speaking, studying Ibn ‘Arabī’s texts is qualitatively different from studying those of his adherents, or those who built on his ideas. Though the scholars of Ibn ‘Arabī’s school basically follow the idea of Ibn ‘Arabī, their detail discussion is diversified in each of them. In spite of this characteristic, the commentaries of the above-mentioned scholars explain the thought of Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought in their words so that their works are also useful for understanding the difficult idea of Ibn ‘Arabī. When studying his thought, researchers consider the thought of scholars in Ibn ‘Arabī’s school since they came to focus on later development, especially the concept of the Oneness of Existence.

One can speak of two methods of approaching the Oneness of Existence in Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought. One we might call the “metaphysical and downward” way, and the other we might call the “corporeal and upward” way. The former is related mainly to the emanations of Existence, whereas the latter is mostly concerned with sainthood, spiritual practice, and legitimation of authority. The divine name and the Perfect Man are located in the middle part of such two ways. Moreover, the discussion about both acts as a bridge between “metaphysical and downward” way and “corporeal and upward” way which are called as “isthmus” (*barzakh*). Thus, studying the divine names and the Perfect Man leads to comprehending all the arguments of the Oneness of Existence.

On Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of the divine names, Abū al-‘Alā ‘Afīfī’s *The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Dīn-Ībnul*[sic] ‘Arabī (1939) was a landmark study of the divine names. As Afīfī points out, the divine names are “the clue to our knowledge of the categories

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Izutsu gave lectures. With regard to Islam specifically, Massignon and his disciple, Corbin, were invited in the conference and gave lectures about Sufism. After publications on Ibn ‘Arabī by Corbin and Izutsu, moreover, Ibn ‘Arabī was used as an example of the evidence for “perennial philosophy” or “traditionalist” represented by René Guénon (1886-1951), Frithjof Schuon (1907-1998), and Martin Lings (1909-2005).

According to Webb, the “second-wave Sufism” in the United States originated in the 1960s. This phrase is used by him to make an overview of Sufism in the United States. This period was a time of discovering knowledge from the East like Yoga, Zen, and Sufism.

manifested in the spiritual and the physical worlds.” He mentions briefly the relationship between attributes and names that is the theological legacy of Ashʿarism. The unique point in Afifi’s discussion is that he points out that there are two aspects of the divine names: active and passive. The former aspect is called taḥaqquq: “each Name indicates one or other of the infinite lines of activity of the One,” and the latter one is called takhalluq, which shows multiplicity manifested in the phenomenal world. The relationship between the active aspect and the passive one is called taʿalluq.

In *L’imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d’Ibn ʿArabi* (1958), Henry Corbin who is the pioneer of Shīʿa as well as Iranian studies in the West centers his analysis on “the world of the idea-image” (ʿālam al-mithāl), which can be perceived only by way of imagination. This world is located between the purely spiritual world and the physical world which is perceived with senses. The divine name of Rabb is called “a special divine name” (“un Nom divin particulier (ism khāss)” because it shows the lordship of God and the subservience of humans. Furthermore, Corbin who was the student of Louis Massignon studied Hallāj and his claim “anā al-ḥaqq,” meaning “I am the Truth” or “I am secret of the Absolute,” in order to raise the example of the self-disclosure of God.

Among previous research, Toshihiko Izutsu’s *Sufism and Taoism* (1983) compares Sufism with the idea of the Way (Dào) in Daoism. This work is one of the unique works for understanding Ibn ʿArabi’s *Fuṣūṣ al-hikam*. He was the first scholar to pose the question of the relationship between signifier and signified, or the “question whether a Name (ism) is or is not the same as the ‘object named’ (musammā),” which is an important topic in Islamic theology.

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38 Ibid., p. 46
40 Massignon created two types of classification of Sufism; one is “monisme existentiel” which is the Oneness of Existence (wahdat al-wujūd), and the other is “monisme testimonial” meaning the Oneness of Testimony (wahdat al-shuhūd). According to him, Ibn ʿArabī is categorized into the former, but Hallāj is put into the latter.
Though he does not contribute a definite solution to the problem, he proceeds to explain some of important points in the area of the divine names such as “the names of the world” (asmāʾ al-ʿālam) and “the divine names” (al-asmāʾ al-ilāhiyyah). By using a clear framework for his discussion of the divine names, Izutsu explains the role of the divine names in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. Furthermore, he attempts to realize the “meta-historical dialogue,” comparing the thought of Ibn ʿArabī in Islam with the thought of Lao-tsū in Taoism.

Concerning the theory of the Perfect Man, it could legitimize one’s religious authority once one becomes the Perfect Man. This is because his perfection reaches the level of apotheosis, and his perfect position is as the heir to the prophets, especially Muḥammad. It is possible to regard the theory of the Perfect Man as the result of Ibn ʿArabī’s ideology or legitimization.

Michael Chodkiewicz’s Le sceau des saints: prophétie et sainteté dans la doctrine d’ Ibn Arabi (1986) is a masterpiece which offers a systematic study of sainthood (walāyah). Though apostleship (nubuwah) has been sealed, sainthood has not been sealed and will continue until the end of the world. Chodkiewicz deals with the issue of how the apostleship originally traced to Muḥammad is inherited by later Sufis by changing its name to sainthood.

In “Ibn ʿArabī’s Theory of the Perfect Man and Its Place in the History of Islamic Thought” (1987), Masataka Takeshita analyzes the idea of the Imago Dei in Ḥadīth which states that God created Adam in His image, and how this motif elucidates the theory of the Perfect Man in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. His analysis focuses on how the term “the Perfect Man” (al-insān al-kāmil) in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam is used and how the idea of sainthood in the history of Sufi thought is treated. His discussion is highly significant because he traces the process of becoming the Perfect man and having sainthood in the Sufi context, like Abū Ṭabd Allāh al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 318/936 or 320/938).

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43 In spite of this, this neither means that the present work focuses on political thought in Islam, nor regards Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as what Hamid Enayat mistakenly says:

The modernists reiterate the meaning of tawhīd to denounce devotion to anything other than God, and this includes not only the apotheosis of ‘perfect man’ as suggested by Sūfī teachings, but also servile obedience to the tyrants and tağhūts (‘satans’ or illegitimate rulers).


William C. Chittick was among the first to focus on *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah*, which, owing to its length, is a difficult source to use. His *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (1989) focuses on *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah*. He categorizes Ibn ʿArabī’s work into several parts: Theology, Ontology, Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Soteriology. Though the important idea of the Perfect Man is central to *Fuṣūṣ al-hikam*, Chittick’s work can have an important role in supplementing Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. He analyzes his thought in the category of Islamic sciences as well as in the downward and upward methods with regard to the Oneness of Existence. Thus, there is analysis of spiritual practice required to be the Perfect Man as well as a metaphysical argument of the self-disclosure of Existence.

Tonaga Yasushi clarifies the relationship between the emanations of Existence as the downward way and the Perfect man as the upward way in Jīlī’s argument. He explains that there are forty stages of Existence beginning from pure Existence, and tries to show how the higher stages of it corresponds to Jīlī’s arguing six stages of self-disclosure from the Essence of Divinity (*al-dhāt al-ilāhiyyah*): (1) Absolute Oneness (*aḥadiyyah*), (2) integrated Unitedness (*wāḥidiyyah*), (3) Mercifulness (*raḥmāniyyah*), (4) Divineness (*ulūhiyyah*), (5) Lordship (*rubūbiyyah*), and (6) Kingship (*mālikīyyah*). As Tonaga considers, Jīlī seeks to make the way that he maintains the sublimity of God compatible with the way that man as the creature becomes the Perfect Man.

Looking over the extant scholarship, it is possible to say that the arguments about the divine names and the Perfect Man are still not adequate inasmuch as more analysis is needed with regard to what a name is and how such notions were important for Ibn ʿArabī to construct his idea of the Perfect Man. The present M.A. thesis deals with this hitherto relatively neglected issue.

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II. The Divine Names in the Oneness of Existence

In general, Islamic doctrine and sciences like Islamic theology do not admit any level of existence more intense than God, whereas Ibn ʿArabī suggests a higher level of existence that cannot be called the divine persona of God. This pure Existence which is just called the Real (al-haqq) does not have any limitation. From this point, called “the hidden of the hidden” (ghayb al-ghayb), Existence discloses Itself as shown in the Ḥadīth Qudsi:

“I was like a hidden treasure, and I loved to be known; so I created the world that I might be known.”

Scholars of the Oneness of Existence understand that Existence lets the lower existences know about Itself through self-disclosure. This process is explained in the structure of emanation (fayḍ) from one to many. Sufism in the period prior to Ibn ʿArabī was not used to adopt such kinds of explanation. In this point, consideration of the term tajallī (self-disclosure) in the historical context of Sufism will bring more profound understanding the divine names in the theory of Oneness of Existence.

1. The Historical Development of the Concept of tajallī (self-disclosure) in Sufism

The concept of tajallī (self-disclosure) in Sufism has not hitherto been an important word in the discussion of early Sufism. Sufis describe their testimonial experience mainly by using other key terms like annihilation (fanāʾ) and subsistence (baqāʾ). Their way of narrating has a high point through purification of the self, represented by spiritual stations (maqāmāt) and subtleties (laṭāʿif). It is possible to say that analyzing the historical development of tajallī in Sufism helps us to understand how the Oneness of Existence introduced a new ontological idea.

46 Arabic uses huwa to indicate the pure Existence because it does not have any neuter gender like it in English and es in German. On the level of pure Existence, it is not appropriate to call such a Being qua Being any gender. Though the term It instead of He is better for indicating this level of Existence, how to translate the word, whether to say It or He, depends on the context. Again, in this thesis, I will use capitalized “He” or “It” in translating the transcendent.

47 Ḥadīth Qudsi is the prophetic tradition in which the subject of the tradition is God.

In *Kitāb al-Luma‘ fi-l-taṣawwuf* (*The Book of Flashes in Sufism*), Sarrāj (d. 378/988) explains that self-disclosure is the advent of the Truth in the heart of humans is work is one of the earliest glossaries of Sufism. Thus, it demonstrates the meaning of *tajallī* in the early period of Sufism, and its usage in 9th century Baghdad.

Self-disclosure (*al-tajallī*) is the brilliance of the light of the advent of the Truth (*ishrāq anwār iqbāl al-ḥaqq*) on the hearts of those who move toward (*qulūb al-muqbilīn*) it.

[Abū al-Ḥasan] al-Nūrī (May God bless him) said that He discloses Himself to His creatures (*khalq*) through His creatures, and He conceals (*istatar*) Himself from His creatures through His creatures.

Wāsiṭī (May God bless him) said that in His Almighty word: “That is the Day of the True Disclosure” (*yawm al-tagḥābun*, Q64:9). He said that the True Disclosure of people of the Truth (*ahl al-Ḥaqq*) will be the extent of [their] annihilation [of the self] (*maqādīr al-fanā‘*), [their] vision [of God] (*al-ru‘yah*), and His self-disclosure (*al-tajallī* [to them]).

Nūrī (May God bless on him) said that it is through His self-disclosure that all that is beautiful is embellished and made handsome, and it is through His self-concealment that the beautiful is made to seem ugly… It thus was said:

He revealed Himself to his heart, by projecting therein from Himself a light;

Thus, it was that the gloom sought the light.

The points in his argument can be summarized in the following three points in accordance with the beliefs of previous Sufis: (1) the nature of disclosure, (2) disclosure in the Last day, and (3) disclosure as light. First, divine disclosure is through God’s creatures, so is divine concealment. There are some implications here. Like the “intoxicated” expression by Ḥallāj, for example, God reveals Himself through the words of His creature. The timing of the self-disclosure of God depends on Him, so human attempts alone cannot manage it at all. Second, “the Day of True Disclosure” (*yawm al-tagḥābun*) which is derived from the Qur’ān illustrates true disclosure of the elected people by God. At that time, their human selves will be annihilated by

their vision of God, and His self-disclosure to them. This narrative describes the situation of the end of the world as well as unity with God. Third, the self-disclosure of God shows in its effects the beauty of light, whereas self-concealment shows ugliness with gloom. It implies the work and power of God by contrast with light and gloom.

Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī gives an explanation of two types of self-disclosure in his treatise about Sufism: (1) tajallī for ordinary people and (2) that for the elected Sufis. The section is edited as a pair with the description “self-concealment and self-disclosure” (al-satr wa al-tajallī).

The ordinary people (al-ʿawāmm) are in the cover of the self-concealment [of God], and [on the other hand] the elected ones (khawāṣṣ) are in the permanence of self-disclosure. In a report [of the prophet Muḥammad], “Verily when God manifests Himself to something, it submits to Him.” A person of concealment is characterized by his own perception, while a person of disclosure is always characterized by submission. Concealment is a punishment for the ordinary people and a blessing for the elect. If He did not protect from them what He unveils to them, they would have [completely] disappeared by the power of the Reality (al-ḥaqīqah). However, just as He manifests Himself to them, so He conceals Himself from them […]

The ordinary people of this group [who can enjoy the divine self-disclosure] enjoy happiness by [divine] self-disclosure and they deteriorate by [divine] self-concealment. [On the other hand,] as for the elected ones, they are between heedlessness and liveliness. This is because when God appears to them, they become heedless, whereas when He conceals Himself from them, they are thrown back to pleasure and feel happy […]

It reports that he seeks covering his heart against the onslaughts of the True Realities, because creatures cannot survive with finding the Real. In the [prophetic] report, “If

50 In the analogy of Sufism, the word heedlessness (jaysh) corresponds to drunkenness (sukr), and the word liveliness (ʿaysh) does to recovering from intoxication (ṣahw). In other words, they are heedless because of the drunkenness of the divine ecstasy, whereas they are lively because of they are sober after drunkenness.
[someone] was unveiled from His face, the majesty of His face would burn what reaches His sight."⁵¹

Ordinary people are kept a distance from self-disclosure. When God conceals Himself, this brings them punishment. On the other hand, His self-disclosure brings them happiness. Sufis as the elect can be near self-disclosure because they are the elects who are close to God. In spite of their experience of the self-disclosure of His grace, their feelings are ambivalent. Self-disclosure itself is a blessing so that it makes them content. Likewise, they realize that self-disclosure gives them intoxication since the extent of the true Reality is so strong that they cannot continue to gaze at His brilliant face.

The explanations by Sarrāj and Qushayrī are given totally in the context of Sufism. It proves that they describe tajallī with satr as its pair. In other words, the concept of self-disclosure does not go without the opposite meaning of self-concealment in early Sufism. In contrast with the argument about tajallī by Sarrāj and Qushayrī, the word satr merely appears in the context of the Oneness of Existence. This shows that the meaning of tajallī changed after its usage by Ibn ʿArabī and his school.

2. The Concept of tajallī in the Oneness of Existence

In Iṣṭilāḥat al-ṣūfiyyah, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī explains four aspects of tajallī: (1) “self-disclosure” (tajallī), (2) the “first self-disclosure” (al-tajallī al-awwal), (3) the “second self-disclosure” (al-tajallī al-thānīyy), and (4) the “self-closure of visibility” (al-tajallī al-shuhūdīyy). According to him, the general meaning of self-disclosure is that which manifests to hearts among the divine lights of the hidden.⁵² It shows that (1) the “self-disclosure” is the divine manifestation to the hearts of creatures through the divine lights. This explanation is given in the context of Sufism, but it is different from the previous explanation. This is because there is no word for self-concealment as the paired forms of self-disclosure.

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In the metaphysics of the Oneness of Existence, the starting point, the *terminus a quo*, is the level of Essence of Existence (*dhāt al-wujūd*), or Being *qua* Being (*al-wujūd min ḥaythu huwa huwa*). Existence at this stage is beyond any word or contemplation, so this is a preceding level at which God becomes available to human language or contemplation. In other words, divine existence is the later self-disclosure of Existence. In this stage of pure Existence, the Real *per se* does not have any limitation, so It is just called the Real (*al-ḥaqiq*). Based on this previous undescribed situation of Existence, the Absolute One (*al-aḥad*) discloses Itself in the first self-disclosure. Thus, the word *Allāh* is not placed on the highest rank in accordance with the Oneness of Existence. This word is something unveiled from the viewpoint of the persona of the Real. In this meaning, self-disclosure (*tajallī*) is an ontological divergence of Existence from the ineffable level of Existence to the occurrence of the many.

In (2) the “first self-disclosure”, the Absolute One discloses Itself, following that some appear as Its entity in the stage of the Absolute Oneness (*al-aḥadiyyah*). Kāshānī explains the first self-disclosure with the word the Essence (*al-dhāt*),⁵³ but It is as same as the Absolute One (*al-aḥad*) in that both are a departure. Moreover, the Essence at this level is described with some equivalent terms like “pure Existence of Reality,” “unlimited Non-Existence,” “pure Nothing,” and “the hidden in the hidden.”

The first self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-awwal*): it is the essential self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-dhātī*). That is, it is the self-disclosure of the Essence, that is, the One of It to the Essence of It (*tajallī al-dhātī waḥdu-hā li-dhātī-hā*). The Essence is the stage of the Absolute Oneness (*al-hadrah al-aḥadiyyah*), which is not property (*naʿ*) and not illustration (*rasm*), i.e. the Essence. It is the pure Existence of Reality (*wujūd al-ḥaqiq al-maḥḍ*), its One is its Entity. This is because what is other than Existence inasmuch as It is Existence (*mā siwā al-wujūdu min ḥaythu huwa wujūdu*), is only the unlimited Non-existence (*al-ʿadam al-nuṭlaq*), and It is the pure nothing (*al-lāshayʾ al-maḥḍ*), thus It does not need the One and the determination in [the stage of] the

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⁵³ In the context of the Oneness of Existence, there are some words which show absolute Existence. The Absolute Unity (*al-aḥad*) is one of them. According to the section in *Iṣṭilāḥat al-ṣūfiyyah*, it is described as “the name of the Essence (*al-dhāt*) in respect to the absence of multitudes of attributes, names, relationships (*nisbahr*), and divergences (*taʿayyunāh*) from them.” In this meaning, it is possible to understand that Kāshānī’s use of dhāt (the Essence) is as same as *al-aḥad* (the Absolute Unity). Kāshānī, *Iṣṭilāḥat al-ṣūfiyyah*, p. 5.
Absolute Oneness (fi aḥadiyyati-hi ilā wahdatin wa-taʿayynin). They distinguish through It from thing, therefore, nothing without it (al-lāshayʾ ghayr-hu).

Then, Its One is the Entity of Its Essence (wahdatu-hu ʿaynu dhāt-hi). This One is the springhead of [the stage of] the Absolute Oneness (al-aḥadiyyah) and [that of] Integrated Oneness (al-wāḥidiyyah). Because it (wahdah) is the Entity of Existence insomuch as it means [what is] non-conditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ), that is, the unlimited which contains its Being (kawn-hu), provided that nothing is with It (bi-sharṭ anna lā-shayʾ) - it is the Absolute Oneness (al-aḥadiyyah), and its being is, provided that It is with it (bi-sharṭ an yakuūna maʾa-hu shayʾ), thing - It is the Integrated Oneness (al-wāḥidiyyah). The Realities (al-haqāʾiq) in the united Essence is such as the tree in the seed (nawā), that is, it is the hidden of hidden (ghayb al-ghuyūb).54

Though Existence discloses Itsself to Itsself in the stage of the Absolute Oneness, there is still no available word to describe this purest level of Existence. So Existence keeps Its pureness without property or illustration. Philosophically speaking, Existence at this level is called unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ). As Kāshānī explains, moreover, the highest level of Existence is that Existence inasmuch as It is Existence.

In the appearance of Existence, negative adjectives of Existence like “Non-existence” or “pure nothing in this stage.” are used to describe It. It is so pure that It does not accompany the One and the determination. In spite of this property, such Non-existence cannot appear until the first self-disclosure. The Non-existence is explained with the philosophical term of “negatively conditioned” (al-lāshāyʾ ghayr-hu or bi-sharṭ lā-shayʾ), which is described with a negative adjective. Moreover, the entity of the Essence is the One (wahdah). Due to the Oneness of the entity, the One as the entity of the Essence is called non-conditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ).

In (3) the “second self-disclosure” (al-tajallī al-thānī), it is the stage of the emanation of the possible fixed Entities (aʿyān al-mumkināt al-thābitah) which is the spring of all imaginable existences in the universe. In this stage of self-disclosure called “Integrated Oneness” (al-wāḥidiyyah), existential entity appears. Then the divine essence appears as the

54 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
result of the “first determination” (*al-taʿayyun al-awwal*). Thus, in the stage of Integrated Oneness, the entity is disclosed from existential essence to divine essence. From this divine entity which is the spring of all existences in the universe, the divine name *Allāh* appears. Moreover, every knowledge is fixed through the divine names. This stage reaches the “conditioned by something” (*bi-sharṭ shay*’), which is the stage of Integrated Oneness (*al-wāḥidiyyah*). Such conditional existence is perceptible by methods like language and imagination, so it is called the “visible self-disclosure” (*al-tajallī al-shuhūdiyy*).

The second self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-thānī*): it is that which discloses possible fixed Entities (*aʿyān al-mumkināt al-thābitah*). It is matters of the [existential] Essence to [divine] Essence, and it is the first determination (*al-taʿayyun al-awwal*) with the attribute of universeness and faculty. This is because the Entities are their first knowledge. And the essential (*al-dhātīyyah*) is the next [knowledge] for the visible self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-shuhūdiyy*), and for the Reality through this self-disclosure. [The visible self-disclosure] descends from the plane of the Absolute Oneness (*al-ḥadīrah al-ḥadiyyah*) to the plane of the Integrated Oneness (*al-ḥadīrah al-wāḥidiyyah*) in regards to the nameness (*al-asmāʾiyyah*).

Following the second self-disclosure, “the visible self-disclosure” is the revelation of “named existence” (*al-wujūd al-musammā*) and that of “Reality in the form of His names.” Thus name is the clearest appearance of visible self-disclosure. This visibility is followed by the emanation to the world of many.

In addition to Kāshānī’s simple explanation, the description in *Laṭāʾif al-iʿlām fī ishārāt ahl al-ilhām*, which influenced scholars of the Oneness of Existence, explains the same term differently. As also explained in *Iṣṭilāḥat al-ṣāfiyyah*, the first self-disclosure is the appearance of the Essence. Kāshānī thinks that the first determination arose in the second

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self-disclosure, whereas the description in *Laṭāʾif al-ʾilām fī ishārāt ahl al-ilhām* says that the first determination happens in the first self-disclosure.

The first self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-awwal*): it is the appearance of Essence (*ẓuhūr al-dhāt*), Essence Itself to Itself in the spring of the first determination (*al-taʿayyun al-awwal*) and the first power (*al-qābiliyyah al-ʿūlā*). [The appearance of Essence] is the One (*al-waḥdah*) as known that the first determination of the Essence and its degree, and as the high degree of self-determination [of existence] will come because of this. Thus, the first self-disclosure is equivalent to the appearance of Essence (*ẓuhūr al-dhāt*), Itself to Itself in the spring of the first determination and the first power (*al-qābiliyyah al-ʿūlā*), in terms that the Essence appears for the first time to Its Essence (*tajaddu al-dhātu dhāta*), with what It contains. […] The first disclosure is only the determination with the first determination, which is the One as known.

Through this, it is known that the Reality of the first self-disclosure is only equivalent to the visibility of Essence (*shuhūd al-dhāt*) Itself and grasping It in terms as such Its Integrated Oneness (*wāḥidiyyatu-hā*) through the entirety of Its reflection and rank.58

As is clearly shown in *Laṭāʾif al-ʾilām fī ishārāt ahl al-ilhām*, the Essence is the spring of the first self-disclosure, and is known as the One. Moreover, the second self-disclosure accompanies the second determination, in which names and intellect appear. Due to the “plane of intellect” and the “plane of meaning,” it is clear that the second self-disclosure is the appearance of the archetype of name, intellect, and meaning.

The second self-disclosure (*al-tajallī al-thāniyy*): it is the appearance of [divine] Essence to Essence Itself in the second degree. [It is] through the second determination (*al-taʿayyun al-thāniyy*) in which names, distinguishing appearance, and intellect as distinction appear. Hence, it is named as the second determination through the plane of the intellect (*al-hadrah al-ʿilmīyyah*) and the plane of the meaning (*ḥadrah al-maʿānī*),59 that is, the world of the meaning (ʿālam al-maʿānī). 60

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59 The word *maʿānī* is used here as the opposite meaning to form (*ṣūrah*). That is the level of abstractness which is distinguished from the concreteness.
The explanations in Ḩaṣṣīyāt al-aḥādīyyah and Laṭāʿif al-ʾālam fī ʾishārāt ahl al-ʾilām are different, but we cannot prove that the author of the latter book is not Kāshānī. As Tonaga points out, the explanation given by Kāshānī himself is neither fixed, nor is it different from Qayṣarī’s. Furthermore, the explanation of the process of self-disclosure differs among the scholars of the Oneness of Existence. This means that the big framework of self-disclosure is shared among the scholars, but its detailed description is different.

Even in the introduction to Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, Kāshānī does not explain the process of self-disclosure of Existence. Instead, he summarizes the idea of the Oneness of Existence. Differing from the normal prayer phrase in the beginning of the Qurʾān or books written by Muslim, his first sentence is “praise be to One God through Its Essence and Nobility” (al-hamd li-llāh al-aḥad bi-dhāti-hi wa-kubriyāʾi-hi), which depicts the cosmology starting from the Real (al-ḥaqq). The Reality of the Real, the named as the “Absolute Essence” (al-dhāt al-aḥādīyyah), is neither conditioned by non-determination nor by determination. Here, the Real is also shown with the word of the One (al-wāḥid) and the Supreme Being (al-mutaʿālī). Self-disclosure is “through Its Essence to Its Essence, then the Realities and the Entities appear -It made them through veiling Its countenance (wajhu-hu) through Its Existence.” The Real does not have any name, description, or mental construction (iʿtibār) such that It is “the Existence in terms that it is Existence.” From this point, the Existence which is over any word is the spring of the Essence from which non-Existence (ʾadam) occurs. The word ʾadam is explained with “sheer non-Existence” (ʾadam ʿirf) and “pure nothing (lā shayʿ maḥḍ). This means that non-Existence emerges from the Real as non-Existence so Existence is the zero-point in the Oneness of Existence.

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61 Tonaga, İslām and Sūfism, p. 129.
62 He divides his introduction into three parts: 1) investigation of the Reality of the Absolute Essence (ḥaqīqat al-dhāt al-ahādīyyah), 2) clarification of the Reality of names and their infinities, and 3) clarification of the divine affairs. These are intended by him to explain “the principles of The Bezels of Wisdom.”
64 This word is based on the following verse in the Qurʾān: “To Allah belong the East and the West; whithersoever you turn, there is the Face of Allah (wajh Allāh). For Allah is All-Pervading, All-Knowing” (Q2:115).
65 Kāshānī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 77.
3. Kāshānī’s Introduction to the Divine Names

Through the second self-disclosure, the Integrated One (al-wāḥid) emanates Itself in the stage of Integrated Oneness (wāḥidiyyah). The fixed entities (al-a’yan al-rhābitah) which are the identity or archetype of the universe are shown in this stage. These fixed entities proceed from existential essence to divine essence. Following the second self-disclosure, the visible self-disclosure (al-tajallī al-shuhūdiyy) brings the essence of “name”, that is, nameness (asmāʾiyyah). In this point, the name with divine essence comes into existence: allāh. This name shows the appearance of the divine essence, and its personal name of Allāh is called “the greatest name” (al-ism al-aʿzam). Thus, the name with capital letter Allāh is the first name of all names, as well as the divine essences related to the later development of God’s faculties. As the name Allāh is the comprehensive name encompassing all names, Allāh unites other divine names, and “plane of divinity” (ḥaḍrat al-ilāhiyyah) is located on the top of the whole names and essences in the lower name.

Before examining the divine names, the philosophical question of “what is a name” arises. However, it is possible to say that this question is inappropriate in the context of Oneness of Existence. In Islamic theology, three derivative words -- name (ism), naming (tasmiyah), and the named (musammā) -- are a main key to contemplating God and His attributes. This is related to the way by which human beings are given the various faculties from God.

In theological arguments by Ashʿari theologians like Ghazālī and Qushayrī, they think that the proposition “name is the named” is valid. Every name (ism) is the named (musammā) in accordance with naming (tasmiyah) by God so the creation is attributed to God in terms of its name. The Muʿtazili theologians claim that the faculty of naming is assigned to humans, whereas Ashʿari theologians insist that naming itself is an inherently divine function, and that the name is equal to the named. Otherwise, they would need to say that the action of naming is a kind of creating by humans. Thus, their theological argument is intended to refute the validity of the Muʿtazili argument.

Scholars belonging to the Oneness of Existence also argue that “name is the named,” which is the same idea as Ash‘ari theologians. However, their discussion is based on the ontological process of self-disclosure (tajallī) and the appearance of the divine names. This means that all names come into existence from the self-disclosure of the Existence through the determined process: the name Allāh is emanated first, and the divine names and whole creature determined by name emerge gradually.

Concerning the appearance of name from the divine names, Ibn `Arabī himself clearly says that the name Allāh following which are other divine names is the Essence of all existences. The divine names are the source and the archetype so properties of “name” in general are required to be understood through the divine names.

The name of Allāh denotes the Essence through the wisdom of correspondence, like (1) the proper [divine] name (al-asmā‘ al-`ālām) is on the named things. Therefore, (2) a [divine] name denotes the absolute incompatibility (tanzīh). And, (3) [divine] names denote affirmation (i.e. establishment, ithbāt) of the entities of the attributes, though the Essence of the Real does not allow the subsistence of numbers (qiyyām al-`ādād) [because the Essence is always One]. (4) [Divine] names are given the entities of the essential and affirmative attributes, like the Knower (al-`Ālim), the Powerful (al-Qādir), the Willing (al-Murīd), the Hearing (al-Samī‘), the Seeing (al-`Abīr), the Living (al-Hayy), the Responder (al-Mujīb), the Thankful (al-Shukr), and so on. (5) Names are given descriptions (nuʿūt). Therefore, nothing is understood from ascriptions except relations (nisab) and correlations (idāfāh), like the First (al-`Awwal) and the Last (al-`Akhir), the Manifest (al-`Akhir) and the Hidden (al-Bāṭin), and so on. Furthermore, (6) [divine] names are given action (al-af`āl), like the Creator (al-Khāliq), the Provider (al-Rāziq), the Author (al-Bārī), the Shaper (al-Muṣawwir), and others among names.

There are five characteristics of the conceptual divine name derived from the name Allāh: (1) a proper name as the named thing, (2) absolutely free from imperfection, (3) affirmation of the...
entities of the attributes, (4) the entities of the essential and affirmative attributes, (5) descriptions with relations and correlations, and (6) action of things.

According to the properties of the divine names, even the divine names are the named, and do not exist without any cause. These divine names are totally free from imperfection. In the context of Ibn `Arabī, the word tanzīh is God’s essential and absolute incompatibility with His creatures. A “name” of God establishes the entities of the attributes, whereas the Essence of the Real just indicates the only thing. This is because the Essence of the Real is always one, and His essence does not have any number other than one. Moreover, a “name” has its entities which show the affirmative and essential attributes. As Ibn `Arabī suggests, the Knower and the Powerful are the names which shows such entities, which also reflect on the creature. Moreover, a name based on the divine names illustrates the situation which is made up of relation and correlations with others. In other words, some names explain how they are located in comparison with other things. An example is the divine name of the First and the Manifest, which indicates the relationship with others. As well, some divine names show their actions, like the Creator and the Provider.

These characteristics of the divine names are important to understand what is a “name.” As far as a “name” is derived from the divine name, it shares the same properties in spite of the big gap between a divine name and general meaning of “name”. According to Kāshānī, a name has three layers: essential (dhātiyyah), descriptive (wasfiyyah), and active (fiʿliyyah, or faʿliyyah). These three layers are important insomuch as this framework is the base of a divine name, too. Furthermore, a name is not a mere phonetic complex (lafz), since it is the embodiment of the essence of the named (dhāt al-musammā). The layer of names are:

(a) essential (dhātiyyah)
(b) descriptive (wasfiyyah)
(c) active (fiʿliyyah, or faʿliyyah)

[This is] because name has validity (yuṭlaqu) only for essence in respect to relationship (nisbah) and nomination (taʿayyun). That respect is either

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70 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, p. 49.
71 Kāshānī, Iṣṭilāḥat al-ṣūfiyyah, p. 120.
72 Ibid., p. 9.
[1] non-existent matter (*amr ʿadamiyy*):

[A] pure relationship (*nisbiyy maḥd*) – like the Self-Sufficient (*al-Ghaniyy*), the First (*al-Awwal*), and the Last (*al-Ākhīr*), or

[B] no relationship (*ghayr nisbiyy*) – like the Holy (*al-Quddās*) and the Source of Peace (*al-Salām*). This part is named “the names of essence” (*asmāʾ al-dhāt*).

[2] Or in meaning, the existential [matter] is considered as the intellect (*al-ʿaqīl*) without adding to the essence which is outside of the intellect, though it is unconceivable (*muhāl*). It is:

[A] either that does not consist in understanding the other -like the Alive (*al-Ḥayy*) and the Necessary (*al-Wājib*) [asmāʾ al-dhār].

[B] or that consists in understanding the others without its existence -like the Knowing (*al-ʿĀlim*) and the Able (*al-Qādir*)- this is named “the names of attribute” (asmāʾ al-ṣifāt).

[C] or that consists in the understanding existence of the others -like the Creator (*al-Khāliq*) and the Provider (*al-Rāziq*)- this is named “the names of actions” (asmāʾ al-ṣifāl) because those are the origin of action.73

There are the general characteristics of a name. “Name” is categorized into three layers: essence, attributes, and action. As the inherent nature of “name”, some names indicate the essence of the named thing, and some show the relationship with other names. Based on this idea, “name” is divided into two categories: non-existent and existent.

Concerning the former “non-existent” matter, it is divided into [A] pure relationship and [B] no relationship with other who has a name. As the example of each divine name shows, pure relationship is a simple relationship shown a pair, or an opposite concept (ex. the First and the Last), and no relationship shows a name which stands by itself (ex. the Holy). On the latter “existential” matter shown as the intellect, it is explained as the way of perception: how we conceive an intellect of the name. Each of the names is regarded as “the names of essence,” “the names of attribute,” and “the names of action.” Significantly, these three parts of the intellect correspond to the three aforementioned conditions of existence: non-conditioned” (*lā bi-sharṭ shay*), “provided that nothing is with It” (*bi-sharṭ anna lā-shay*) and “provided that

73 Ibid., p. 120.
It is with it” (\textit{bi-shar\'t an yak\=una ma\'a-hu Shay}). Thus, it is possible to say that the name of an essence like the Necessary is non-conditioned, that the name of an attribute like the Able is provided that nothing is with it, and that name of an action like Creator is provided that it is with it. As considered in the next chapter, these three layers of “name” are in the essential idea of Ibn `Arabi’s theory of the divine names in terms of the divine presence (Chapter III-1).
III. The Self-disclosure of Existence in Ibn ‘Arabī’s Theory of the Divine Names

Ibn ‘Arabī explains that Fuṣūṣ al-hikam was written at Damascus in 627 A.H./1229 A.D., seeing the prophet Muḥammad and receiving it from him. The content is restricted to what he memorized in his spiritual meeting with the prophet. This means that he just narrates what he was taught from the prophet; in this point, this can be regarded as a kind of “revelatory” work. Sometimes in the work, Ibn ‘Arabī mentions al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah in the context of the divine names.

In the name of Fuṣūṣ al-hikam, the term faṣṣ, singular of the term fuṣūṣ, means the bezel or groove holding the crystal or stone of a gem in its setting. Otherwise, fuṣūṣ are the gems themselves with rings, whose tops are engraved with decorative words or designs. Since there is no clear explanation by Ibn ‘Arabī, it is impossible to determine exactly what he intends in the title of his work. However, this is the setting of Ḥikam, which is the wisdom of divine existence, including the wisdom of existence itself in the theory of the Oneness of Existence.

In Fuṣūṣ al-hikam, this wisdom is gradually disclosed in all twenty-seven chapters named by the title for a divine personage, and the names of apostle of God. For example, the first chapter starts from the messenger Adam, “The Chapter of Wisdom of Divinity in the

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75 The type of wisdom and its correspondent messenger is following:


The translation of each prophet is referred to in Austin’s work.

Word of Adam” (faṣṣ ḥikmah ilāhiyyah fī kalimah Ādamiyyah). This means it shows the wisdom of the divinity disclosed in the form of Adam’s word or the theme of Adam derived from the Qurʿān. Thus, the different type of wisdom in each chapter is provided with the words of each apostle. The divine principles are represented by apostles in the Qurʿān, so that an association is established. Ibn ʿArabi would intertwine two types of name, the divine names and those of the apostles, to show what and how the Perfect Man is.

In the 558th chapter of *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah*, moreover, Ibn ʿArabi argues the divine names under the title of “On the [spiritual] knowledge of the Most Beautiful Names possessed by the Lord of Might, and on those possible to be literally ascribed to Him and not possible [to be literally ascribed to Him].” It is one of the longest chapters in the rear part of the work. In this chapter, he argues one hundred planes (*ḥadrāḥ*, pl. *ḥadrāt*) of the divine name, starting from the name *Allāh*. Differing from previous scholars, he explains the divine names with the presence on each of them.77

1. The Divine Mercy and Its Presence

In Sufism, the word *al-ḥadrāḥ* is used as the counterpart of the word *al-ghayb* (the absence). In this meaning, the term includes the meaning that something unknown or hidden appears gradually. The name *Allāh* is located at the first appearance of the divine existence in the Oneness of Existence. The structure of Ibn ʿArabi’s theory that *Allāh* is the highest among all the names is common with that of Islamic theology. However, the discussion of the divine names in Ibn ʿArabi is more ontological than the discussion in Islamic theology.

In his usage of *ḥadrāḥ*, there are two main meanings: the first is “plane” and the second is “presence.” Of course, these both meanings are closely connected to each other. First, the meaning of “plane” is the stage of divinity which comes to disclose the divine existence from one to another. Second, “presence” means the ontological reality shown by the divine

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76 Ibn ʿArabi, *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah* (vol. 4), p. 316. See the list of divine names raised by Ibn ʿArabi: “Appendix II The Divine Names in Islamic Thought.”
77 Appendix II “The List of the Divine Names in Islamic Thought” in the end of this thesis shows the list of the divine names by representative scholars who discuss the divine names.
names. Importantly, the structure of the divine name is equal to that of the divine presence. Concerning the divine presence, Ibn ʿArabī clearly states:

The prophet [Muḥammad] said about the creation of Adam who is the blueprint (barnāmij) which is the synthesis (jāmiʿ) for descriptions of the divine presence (nuʿūt al-haḍrah al-ilāhiyyah), that is, they [consist of] the Essence, the Attributes, and the Actions (al-afʿāl).

The divine presence is divided into three parts: the Essence, the Attributes, and the Actions. As discussed above in Kāshānī’s discussion of the divine names in the last chapter (Chapter II-3), the three parts of the divine name (the names of essence, the names of attribute, and the names of action) are equivalent to the divine presence. In Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of the divine names, then, the divine name demonstrates the divine presence which demonstrates in turn its Essence, Attribute, and Actions.

Each plane in the one hundred divine names in al-Futūḥat al-makkiyyah is the ontological reality of the divine names and presence. Whole names are derived from the name of Allāh, which is the divinity of the Real. Divinity shows Its existential presence in the name of Allāh. In terms of this point, Ibn ʿArabī explains that the name of Allāh is the Presence that comprehends all divine presences. These divine names standing as reality are infinite. Though every divine name is from the single source of God and is existent after the same process of self-disclosure, each has its own essence, attribute, and action. Ibn ʿArabī regards haḍrah as the degree of existence which informs the metaphysical thing with the visible.

The names derived from Allah are endless (tatanāḥ) because they are known through what comes from them, and what comes from them which are infinite. They derive from unlimited elements (uṣūl mutanāhiyyah), and they (such elements) are the matrices of the names or the presences of the names (haḍrāt al-asmāʾ). Certainly, there is but one Reality. It embraces all of these relations and additions (al-idāfāh), which are designated through the names of divinity (al-asmāʾ al-ilāhiyyah). In the same

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79 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 348.
81 The main text edited by Saiyad Aḥmad makes tashkil as yukannā, but I read tukannā in accordance with Kāshānī’s commentary. Kāshānī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 133.
way, [each divine] gift is distinguished from any other gift because of its individuality. Though they are from a single source, [it is] evident that this is another [thing]. The reason is [mutual] distinction of the names.

In the plane of divinity (ḥaḍrat al-ilāhiyyah), to extend [to lower names] is that a thing is repeating as source. This [source] is the Real (al-ḥaqq) who depends [only] on Itself.\(^82\)

As well as the names themselves being different from each other, the essence of each name is different. This is the reason that a “name” can hold its nameness (asmāʾ iyyah). In the emerging plane of the divine name, there is the acquisition process of “name.” In this formation of “name”, significantly, Ibn ʿArabī regards the divine name as a thing (shayʾ) stemming from the One essence of God. In the plane of the divine name, the name of Allāh unifies all other names.

Though Ibn ʿArabī proposes one hundred planes of the divine names in al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah, the name Lord (al-Rabb), based on the plane of Lordness (al-rabbāniyyah), is considered as a special name, that is another plane other than this plane of divinity.\(^83\) In other words, the name al-Rabb (Lord) is another aspect of the name Allāh (God). Lord is the outside name of divinity, whereas God is the more unified and inside name of it. They are two names, but each aspect of the name Allāh. In the next self-disclosure of the divine names, there is the divine name Mercy (al-Raḥmah)\(^84\) which is the source of compassionate (raḥmān) and merciful (raḥīm) in the plane of divinity. “Thing” as a divine name comes into existence by extension of Mercy.

According to Ibn ʿArabī, every name has its own “thingness” (shayʾiyyah), and this situation is shared among names in general. This thingness is closely related to an appearance of the divine names. In the divine presence, thingness comes into existence as a result of God’s Mercy being through Mercy Itself as Its first object. From this determination of existence, he discusses as follows:

\(^82\) Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 46.
\(^84\) These important names - Allāh, al-Rabb, and al-Raḥmān illustrating the Reality - occur in the first chapter (sūrat al-fātiḥah) of the Qurʾān.
The first thing which the Mercy embraces is [the Mercy] itself. Then, the thingness aforementioned [comes into existence]. Moreover, thingness of every existent which is found [develops] to what is infinite in this world or the next, contingent or substantial, complex or simple.  

This quotation means that every name - whether it is a divine name or name in general - appears in this endless process of acquiring thingness. It seems to be equal to the essence or entity of each thing. However, there are some interpretations by commentators of what thingness shows. Concerning the above quotation of Ibn ʿArabī, Kāshānī adds this comment about it.

(Ibn ʿArabī’s words) “Thingness of every existent”: that is, the one Entity (ʾayn) which is the first gathering entities and their principle. Then, the Mercy related to this Entity embraces the gathering of the fixed entities (al-ʿayn al-thābitah).  

In his commentary, Kāshānī regards thingness as that which comprises of entity of thing or principle. Thus, thingness in his understanding is as same as the conceptual idea in Greek philosophy or the perpetual archetype. On the other hand, Qayṣarī makes this comment about thingness.

(Ibn ʿArabī’s original text) “the thingness aforementioned [comes into existence]”: that is, the Entity of the Merciful […] “Moreover, thingness of every existent which is found [develops] to what is infinite”: that is, the entity of every existent.

Qayṣarī shares the same understanding of thingness as Kāshānī. Thus, the Essence of the Existence manifests Itself through the name as “thing” in self-disclosure. In this process, the name can settle itself by acquiring thingness. This thingness is the archetype of a hing, which is the essence of “name.” Because of the inherent property of Mercy, all the divine names include the component of Mercy. Thus, the later development caused by Mercy represents some effects. The most important effect of Mercy is “preparedness” (istiʿdād). This is the primal effect of Mercy, appearing as a particular form in standing as existence. It is possible to say that preparedness is thingness shifting to a thing through obtaining its entity. This process  

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85 Ibn ʿArabī, Fusūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 304.
86 Kāshānī, Sharḥ Fusūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 450.
is also rephrased that a name comes into existence just by getting its entity, that is, nameness. So preparedness is the process of acquiring nameness or thingness.

Moreover, Ibn ʿArabī argues two effects of Mercy: (1) effect by the Essence (āthār bi-l-dhāt), and (2) the effect by asking (āthār bi-l-suʿāl). The first one is the effect as a result of the self-disclosure of Mercy by revealing Its Essence. All the created and existent is things fixed its essence inherently, in accordance with compassion of Mercy. On the other hand, the second one is the effect of the Mercy by petition on the part of creatures, especially by human beings. In other words, God gives His Mercy to them as a result of their efforts. They ask God by saying that “Oh, God, show mercy on us” (Q23:109). These people who try to reach God and know the Merciful are called “the people of (divine) presence” (ahl al-hadrah).

In this way, Ibn ʿArabī argues a different aspect of divine Mercy. The two types of Mercy, the Compassionate and the Merciful, is well known aspect of the word.

Two kinds of Mercy, (1) the “mercy of grace” (raḥmat al-imtinān) and (2) the “mercy of obligation” (raḥmat al-wajūb), corresponding both to the Compassionate (al-raḥmān) and the Merciful (al-rahīm). God [exercises] gracious through the name al-raḥmān and obligation through the name al-rahīm. This obligation is from the grace, so the Compassionate (al-rahīm) is included in the Merciful (al-raḥmān) interiorly. “God writes on Himself the Mercy (al-raḥmah)” (Q6:12). This is for his servant because the Truth remembers the action which this servant brings. Truly, to God, the servant is in duty to Him in himself, so that the servant deserves this Mercy -that is, the mercy of obligation.88

The mercy of grace is wider than the mercy of obligation. The former is the essential mercy to all creatures, whereas the latter is the mercy to the servant who does his duty as obligation. This structure is parallel to the two diverse words of Mercy (raḥmah): the Compassionate (al-raḥmān) and the Merciful (al-rahīm). Namely, all creatures can enjoy the Compassion of God, but not all can see His Mercy.

This relationship is mentioned clearly in al-Futūḥat al-makkiyyah. The Compassionate (raḥmān) and the Merciful (raḥīm) are names like the “vehicle” (al-markabah)

88 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 244.
to prevail Mercy. The mercy of grace is Mercy by the way of a gratuitous gift. It is based on the verses of the Qur’an: “It is part of the Mercy of Allāh that you deal gently with them” (Q3:159), and “We sent you not but as a mercy for all creatures” (Q21:107). Significantly, the role which is played by the mercy of grace is equal to thingness, in the meaning that Mercy is prevailed to every creature. This is shown in the verse of the Qur’ān, “My Mercy covers everything” (Q7:156).

Moreover, these essential facets of Mercy occur in different ways, the pure mercy (raḥmah khāliṣah) and the mixed mercy (raḥmah mutazijah).

Concerning the bestowal of nameness (al-ʾasmāʾ iyyah): know that the bestowal of God is His creation of the Mercy (al-rahmah) which is from Him. That bestowal is on [the presences of] the names. (1) On the “pure mercy,” [it is] such as goodness from pleasant blessing in this world, and pureness on the Day of Resurrection. That name “the Compassionate” (al-raḥmān) is given [to the pure mercy]. It is the compassionate gift (al-ʿaṭāʿ al-raḥmāniyy). (2) On the “mixed mercy,” [it is] such as drinking of distaste medicine whose drinking follows relief. It is the divine gift (al-ʿaṭāʿ al-ilāhiyy).

In spite of the divine gift, it is not possible except that the bestowal of His gift is through mediate of holder of the names. The pure mercy in the quotation is given in this world and the next world. It is the essential Mercy, and seems to be bestowed directly. Therefore, it is possible to say that the pure mercy is a compassionate gift is equal to “the mercy of grace.” On the other hand, the mixed mercy requires mediation to show the gift. This kind of mercy is an indirect one, so that the gift of mercy is always through a mediator. Concerning Ibn ʿArabi’s quotation, Qayṣarī states in his commentary:

What emanates first is the “mercy of existence” (wujūd) and (2) the “mercy of life” (al-hayāh): then what follows both of them? It is divided into three: (a) the pure mercy is in accordance with the visible and the invisible. [Concerning] the mixed mercy, (b) the Mercy is in the visible, and (c) the Avenge (al-Niqmah) is in the invisible. This is as what the Commander of believers [’Umar] (praise on him) says, “God is one who

90 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 45.
extends His Mercy to His friends in high degree of His Avenge, and one who strengthens His Avenge on His enemies in extent of His Mercy.”

First, [it is] such as pleasant and good blessing—that is, permitted (al-ḥalāl)—in this world, and [it is] such as useful sciences and knowledge in the next world.

Second, [it is] like an appropriate things to nature, forbidden food, drinking of wine, outrage wayfarer, and agreement the deported self (al-nafs al-mub’adah) for the mind (qalb) from the Real.

Third, [it is] like drinking of distaste medicine, whose drinking follows the relief and health.\(^91\)

According to Qaysarī, the “mercy of existence” and the “mercy of life” come into existence by means of emanation. Both mercies consist of the nameness of creation. The words existence and life have important roles in Islamic thought. As known the “seven leaders” (al-aimmah al-sab’ah)\(^92\), they are words which show the first knowledgeable relationship of the Essence, as a result of determined fixed entities. Such an intellectual relationship is imaginable without being through life (al-ḥayāh). It, thus, is regarded as “the top of leaders” (imām al-aimmah) and through such a relationship it necessitates other words.\(^93\) After both, three mercies follow. First, the pure mercy works in this world (visible) as well as in the next world (invisible).

Concerning second and third, the visible appears in the form of Mercy, whereas the invisible does in the form of the Avenger. As in the narrative by ʿUmar b. Ḥaṭṭāb (d. 24/644), God bestows Mercy to His friend in the situation of Vengeance, but bestows Mercy to enemies in that of Mercy. Thus, Vengeance is the opposite counterpart of Mercy. So, some can say that they ask the Avenger to give them Mercy.

Mercy shows Its mercifulness essentially in this world and the next world. In general, the presence of Mercy is ubiquitous in every name and creature. However, there are other fortunes which develop in other topics. The seeker tries to reach Mercy by purifying himself, so that he feels its presence more vividly. Divinity shows concretely Its presence in the divine

\(^{91}\) Qaysarī, Sharh Fusūṣ al-hikam li-l-Qaysarī (vol.1), p. 368.
\(^{93}\) There are seven names in imām al-aimmah: the life (al-ḥayāh), the knowledge (al-ʿilm), the wish (al-irādah), the power (al-qadrāh), the hearing (al-samʿ), the sight (al-başar), and the speech (al-kalām).
name of Mercy. Though Mercy comes to the fore as the divine presence in Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought, it is not possible to understand the divine presence except understanding the presence of Lordship.

2. The Lord as a Divine Name and Its Divine Presence

The name Lord (al-rabb) is another aspect of Allāh. As Ibn ‘Arabī clarifies that every existent belongs to God other than the particular aspect of Lord (rabbu-hu khāṣṣah).\(^94\) For this reason, the name of the Lord keeps a privileged position in the divine names. The divine presence which evokes imagination from the name al-rabb is the presence of Lordship. In elevating from Mercy analyzed in the last section, Ibn ‘Arabi’s discussion of the Lord is always with its pair of servant (‘abd).

In order to understand Lord-servant relationship, the etymology of the word wujūd must be explained. The word which is usually translated as Existence or Being is derived from the consonants wāw-jīm-dāl (و-ج-د). The verb wajada has two important meanings: one is “to find” and the other is “to exist”. In this reason, its nominal form wujūd contains the meanings being, existence, and finding. At the same time, wujūd is equal to the word ‘ayn which means spring from which everything is emanated and created God makes the existent or creature exist by His finding them, so the Existence is the cause of other existences. Here the derivative words of wujūd indicate a similar dimension: wājid and mawjūd. The former is an active noun meaning “finder” and “one who makes a thing exist.” On the other hand, the latter is a passive noun meaning “the found” and “one who is existed or created.” The creatures as the found are existent through the Existence of the Finder. The ontological relationship between Existence and the existed can be adapted to the Lord-servant relationship. In considering the presence of Lordship, Ibn ‘Arabī writes the following poem.

The Lord is our King (Māliku-nā), and the Lord is our Conciliator (Muṣlihu-nā). The Lord fixed us (thabbata-nā) because He is the One who fixes.

If not for my existence [I am not existed]. And Being of the Real made me exist (found them, awjadā-nī). What I was knowing better that passing existent (al-kā’īn al-fā’īt).

\(^{94}\) Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 110.
Then the Real made me exist (found them) from Him and supported me through Him.
Thus I was required as the silent speaker.  
This poem also explains the relationship between God and human beings with the derived term *wujūd*. Humans cannot exist without the Existence and God’s finding them. In this meaning, God is the One who fixes their existence.

In *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah*, Ibn ἴʿArabī discusses five properties derived from the presence of Lordship: (1) fixity by coloring [the existence] (*thubūt ʿalā al-talwīn*), (2) reign on the contested people (*ahl al-nizāʾ*) in the Real, (3) appearance of the matter of possibilities, (4) servanthood which does not accept the liberty (*ʾitq*) of servant, (5) commitment of life through accustomed reason. Because these five wisdoms do not always connect with the argument about Lordship, we will restrict the theme to a minimum and focus on his direct argument about Lordship.

The first two wisdoms are mainly about the speculation of his cosmology. First, God as the cause of existence makes the existent in every moment. This is based on the verses of the Qurʿān: “Everyday He is involved with some matter” (Q55:29), and “It is God who alternates the Nighttime and the Daytime” (Q  :  ). This means that God fixes the world by managing night and day as well as all other things related to the universe. The word “Lord” is not present in this explanation, but Ibn ἴʿArabī brings out hidden wisdom without stopping such basic understanding. Rather, his argument itself is related to his cosmology, as with some aspects in *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah* and other works.

Among the self (*nafs*) in the universe, no one is except His completion the changing wisdom. [It is] so as not to denote the sun which is the cause of nighttime and daytime self-disclosing not settled nighttime and not [settled] daytime. And [It is] so as not to denote the stars: “all [the celestial bodies] swim along, each in its rounded course” (Q21:33). What He said that stars are settled in the 360 degree which is every degree, rather every minute, rather every second, rather every portion which does not divide from orbit of star (*falak*). When God reveals any star which is among stars, God on His revelation relates about the every single monad (*jawhar fard*) of the universe of basic element -nobody knows what it is except God who makes it exist. And He also relates

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about the middle group (al-malaʾ al-awsāṭ) among the celestial hearts, under which the deep signs of the zodiac (falak al-burūj)⁹⁶ are among knowledge […] Those who are in this [middle] group and in the universe of basic element are the people of the garden. Those who are in some of this [middle] group are the people of fire who are the people of it. God relates about the higher group. What is over the signs of the zodiac is to the essence of souls and intelligence (ʿuqūl), [following] the heavy clouds (al-ʿamāʾ)⁹⁷ of knowledge which give the names of divinity (al-asmāʾ al-ilāhiyyah).⁹⁸ His words can be summarized in the following stages of universe. These are the explanatory illustration from the self-disclosure of the divine names to the world of creation.

[Higher group]
1. The Names of the divinity in heavenly clouds.
2. The essence of souls and intelligence.
3. The signs of zodiac.

[Middle group]
4. People of the garden in the universe of basic elements.
5. People of the fire in some of the universe of basic elements.

[Lower group]
6. Single monad of the universe of basic elements.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ According to *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (8th edition), the zodiac means “the imaginary area in the sky in which the sun, moon and planets appear to lie, and which has been divided into twelve equal parts each with a special name and symbol.”

⁹⁷ In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, ‘amāʾ is the abstract place in which creations appear. This idea is based on the Ḥadīth: “Where was our Lord before He created the creatures?” “He (Muḥammad) answered: “He was in a cloud (ʿamāʾ).” This Ḥadīth is often used in al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah. Mohamed Haj Yousef considers the issues related to Ibn ʿArabī cosmology. Cf. Mohamed Haj Yousef, *Ibn ʿArabī-Time and Cosmology*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 8 and pp. 193-194.


⁹⁹ Refer to Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
Related to the stages of the universe, the second wisdom picks up the light (nūr) in brightness and shadow (ẓill) in darkness. The Real is light and essence, whereas creation is Its shadow and form. The Lord breathes the spiritual and sensory energy into the creature as servant: “I breathed into him of My spirit” (Q15:29).

The third wisdom is the appearance into matter of possibilities, which is in the process of the self-disclosure of the Essence. In the appearance of the Existence, various possibilities come into existence because of the presence of Lordship. As the fortune of Lordship, It creates the possibility of a relationship with time, place, and condition.

Some possibilities (mumkināt) precede some, and [some possibilities] are behind [some], [some possibilities] are higher [than some], [some possibilities] are lower [than some], and [some possibilities] are coloring [to some]. [Those are] in different conditions and stages, closeness and isolation, produce and commerce, movement and halting, gathering and scattering, and whatever resembles that. He (the Lord) is reshaping (taqlīb) possibilities in possibilities of other variable things.  

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100 This figure is copied from the following work.

101 Ibid., p. 131.

The Lord Himself is the Essence which leads to the reality and qualification. Importantly, it is clear that Ibn Ḥaʾim regards the possibilities as existence as well as the relationship arising between two opposite things. The relationship (nisbah) develops infinitely, this potentiality is called possibilities (mumkināt) organized in the presence of Lordship. Here, possibility can be called “preparedness” (istiʿdād) which is regarded as the possible essence or idea of existence. The possibilities appear from the fixed entity, which grants their identities.

The Lord-servant relationship is the most important in the presence of Lordship. Lordship necessitates servanthood, and vice versa. It means that each concept cannot exist without the other.

Every existent under his Lord is pleasing [to Him]. [But] it does not keep because every existent is pleasing to his Lord, on what clarifies that they are pleasing on the Lord of other servant. Since he is what takes Lordship except from every [existent], not from only one. Thus, what determinates every [existent] except what suits to it is his Lord.

The fourth wisdom of Lordship is about the liberty of the servant. There are three parts of servanthood (ʿubūdah): “servanthood to God,” “servanthood to creation,” and “servanthood to the situation” which is the servanthood of divine veneration (ʿubūdat al-ʿubūdiyyah).

Concerning the first and third servanthood, they are servitude to God. Thus, it is inevitable for any creature to escape from such servanthood.

Only the second one, “servanthood to creature,” does not allow human to be in free from the servanthood. The free condition is divided into two situations: “servanthood in freedom” (ʿubūdat fī hurriyyah) and “servitude of reign” (ʿubūdiyyat al-mulk). Both conditions arise just because of the result of “causes” (asbāb, sing. sabab). In other words, one belongs originally to himself or herself, so they are free. In spite of the natural situation, some of them in creation come to be placed in the Lord-servant relationship, which leads to sale and purchase of servants. Depending on the situation, they can be free from servanthood.

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103 Ibn Ḥaʾim, Fusūṣ al-hikam, P. 175.
104 Ibid., P. 112.
106 cf. “sabab” in EI².
The fifth wisdom is discussed mainly in the context of the relationship with the Lord. Creatures are bestowed nutrition (ghidhāʾ) in their life. The allusions expressed by the word nutrition, “semantic nutrition” (al-ghidhāʾ al-maʾnawī) and “perceptible nutrition” (al-ghidhāʾ al-mahsūs), demonstrate intelligence fed through Him. These kinds of nutrition make creatures exist, and understand what is existent and in which way it exists, and so on.

Considering the fourth wisdom, it is possible to classify the concept of “Lord.”

This name of “Lord” has much relativeness (iḍāfah), gathering in the relations and dividing in accordance with what relates to it. Therefore, [such] relativeness is to the worlds and to [the letter starting from] “kāf” (ك) of address like single “by your Lord” (fa-wa-rabbi-ka, Q19:68), and dual “Who is the Lord of you two, O Moses?” (fa-man rabbu-kumā (ربكما) yā Mūsā, Q20:49), and plural “your Lord” (rabb-kum, ربيكم).

And, [the plural form of “your” refers] to ancestors, to the hidden personal pronoun like his lord (rabb-hu) and their lord (rabb-hum), to heaven and heavens, to earth, to the East and the West, to eastern places and western places, to people, to daybreak, and the personal pronoun of the speaker. [the Lord] does not renew lord (tajaddu-hu) forever except as relativeness. So, your knowledge is through Him, as such he relates to Him.

“Relative” (iḍāfah) in the quotation means what happens relative to others. In this meaning, lordship is the product emerged in the crossing of each thing. However, the Lordship of God is the most intensified, so that Lordship is Essence for other creatures.

Borrowing Izutsu’s analysis, Lordship has two different levels: absolute (muṭlaq) and relative (iḍāfiyy). The former is the absolute lordship of God over human beings, whereas the latter is changeable lordship in each situation. It is nothing but a relative relationship brought in various situations. Therefore, lordship of creatures is modifiable at any time. As shown by the two kinds of lordship, everything in this universe is but shadow, whose archetype certainly exists. However, existence in the lower stage surely connects with the Real

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107 In regards to enclitic forms of personal pronoun (al-damāʾ ir al-muttasilah) in Arabic, there are three types which denotes "you." The Singular form is ka (masculine, ك) and ki (feminine, ك), the dual form is kumā (same word is used in both masculine and femine, كما), and plural form is kum (masculine, ك) and kunna (feminine, كن).

108 Ibn ʿArabī, Fūṣūṣ al-hikam, p. 149.

109 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, p. 113.
in the higher stage. As Ibn Ḥarabī prefers to quote the Ḥadīth, “One who knows himself, knows his Lord” (man ʿarafa nafs-hu ʿarafa rabb-hu), one’s inquiry leads to reaching divine providence. This divine presence is embodied in the perfect man (al-insān al-kāmil) in spite of being created.

3. The Presence of the Divine Names in the Perfect Man

As Ibn Ḥarabī argues the presence of Lordship, he acknowledges the gap between the Lord as God and the servant as human existence. In the spiritual way of Islam, however, the gap in the Lord-servant relationship dissolves in the unity with God. The argument of divine presence related to the Mercy and the Lordship closely connects with the self-disclosure of Existence. This is the “downward or metaphysical” way of the discussing how Existence shows Itself to lower existence. However, there is another sort of discussion, which is the “upward or corporeal” sort of discussion: that is, how a servant reaches divinity and the Absolute One. The meaning of the aforementioned Ḥadīth “One who knows himself, knows his Lord” is shown in the relationship between the macrocosm and the microcosm. The Perfect Man is just existence who dissolves the opposite idea of Lordship-servanthood. He could integrate such opposite ideas by his embodiment of the divine presence.

Before analyzing the characteristics of the Perfect Man in macrocosm and microcosm, however, it is important to consider the idea of coincidentia oppositorum (coincidence of opposites) in Ibn Ḥarabī’s thought. This is well known as the terminology of Nicholas Cusanus (1401-1464). According to him, opposite things contradict each other in creating, whereas they are coincident in God. For example, God is maximum, but at the same time He is minimum. The maximum and minimum coincide in infinite divinity though this situation is impossible in the finite creature. This is because God is maximum as well as minimum, and unifies all existence in Him. This argument of Cusanus can be applied to the metaphysical argument of the divine names, but cannot be done to the physical argument of how one apprehends divinity. The original idea of coincidentia oppositorum in Cusanus is intended to argue the divine attributes of God, by comparison with human beings. It is merely possible to use the idea in order to overcome the theological problem of the contradiction of opposites, and express the

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miracle of God. Especially in our research, this idea is useful in the anthropomorphic situation: the condition of being the Perfect Man as a result of spiritual training and experience.

Seth, in regard to his reality and his [spiritual] rank, knows everything through his essence, whereas he is ignorant through ignorance itself on the part of his physical body. He is a knower-ignorer (al-ʿālim al-jāhil). He accepts the characteristic of opposites (al-ittisāf bi-l-ādād), as if he accepted the principle of the characteristic about that, like the Glorious (al-Jalīl), the Manifest (al-Ẓāhir) and the Hidden (al-Bāṭin), and the First (al-Awwal). He is God’s essence and not other than that.

Thus, he knows and [at the same time] he does not know, he is aware and [at the same time] he is not aware, and he perceives and [at the same time] he does not perceive. Beyond the situation of Seth (Shīth), Qāshānī comments that this quotation implies that the Perfect Man embodies the divine presence. Because he embodies the divine presence, so the opposite things are enable to coexist inside him. As God is the First and the Last, and the Manifest and the Hidden, the Perfect Man as anthropomorphism makes such opposite attributes coincide.

During the Creation, God created Adam by molding mud and breathing His breath into the body. In the Ḥadīth, the prophet Muḥammad says that God created Adam in the form of His image (i.e. the Imago Dei Ḥadīth). The religions of the Semitic tradition regard this process of animating Adam as a blessing from God, which distinguishes human beings from other creatures. Ibn ʿArabī also found the special meaning of this Imago Dei Ḥadīth and he discusses it repeatedly in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. According to him, the first Perfect Man is Adam because his creation is full of divine presence.

The prophet [Muḥammad] said about the creation of Adam, who is the blueprint (barnāmīj) which is the synthesis (jāmiʿ) for descriptions of the divine presence (nuʿūt nuʿūt)

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111 In this point, commentators have different opinions. Qaṣṣārī and Kāshānī regard it as the Reality (al-haqīqah), but Jāmī identifies it as “the essence of principle” (ʿayn al-aṣl).
112 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, pp. 67-68.
113 Takeshita points out that the phrase al-insān al-kāmil appears seven times in The Bezels of Wisdom, but four out of these seven times are in the first chapter (The Chapter of Wisdom of Divinity in the Word of Adam) of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam.

\textit{al-haḍrah al-ilāhiyyah}, that is, they [consist of] the Essence, the Attributes, and the Actions (\textit{al-afʿāl}). “Indeed, God created Adam in His form (ṣūrat-hi).” His (God’s) form is nothing but the divine presence. In this noble epitome (\textit{al-mukhtāsar al-sharīf}) -that is, the Perfect Man-, He made exist the gathering of the divine names and the realities which are outside of him in the macrocosm (\textit{al-ʿālam al-kabīr}) separated from Adam.\textsuperscript{114} Adam himself is the epitome of divine presence and the divine names, so he is the Perfect Man. This structure is a microcosm (\textit{al-ʿālam al-saghīr}), divine manifestation in the finite. Adam as the Perfect Man and microcosm is correspondent to God as the macrocosm. In terms of his name, it indicates two dimensions: Adam as an individual person and Adam as human beings generally. As Ibn ʿArabi adds in the \textit{Imago Dei Ḥadīth}, “His form” is indeed divine presence.

Concerning the two meanings in the word “Adam”: the individual Adam, and human beings in general, the former is clearly a primitive man who has his own personality. He is regarded as an apostle and prophet in Islamic tradition.\textsuperscript{115} The latter is shown in the word of \textit{banū Ādam} which means “the sons of Adam” literally and “human beings” figuratively. This indicates that each person is the posterity of primitive man, and inherits his various attributes including the spiritual fortune bestowed from God. Though all men have the possibility to be the Perfect Man, they are not anthropomorphic existents when born. Ibn ʿArabī mentions clearly that not all human beings are the Perfect Man, but Adam in person is the Perfect Man made with His own hands.

He (God) made him (Adam as the Perfect Man) as spirit (rūḥ) for the universe, and He subjected to him the high [universe] and the low [universe] because of the perfection of [his] form. As there is nothing in the universe which does not glorify God through his praising, likewise, there is nothing in the universe which is not subject to this man, since the reality of his form (ḥaqīqat ṣūrat-hi) gives him [perfection]. So, God said “And He has subjected to you, as from Him, all that is in heaven and on earth”

\textsuperscript{114} Ibn ʿArabī, \textit{Fuṣūṣ al-hikam}, pp. 348-349.
\textsuperscript{115} In general, the doctrine of Islam distinguishes the prophet (\textit{rasūl}) from the Apostle (\textit{nabī}). A prophet is sent as a new law-giver or with divine canon, but an apostle succeeds the old one and guides people. Thus, prophets are apostles, but not all apostles are prophets. However, this differentiation is not necessarily obvious in the topic of sin.

cf. “Rasūl” in \textit{EI²}. 
The Perfect Man is the one who can notice that his ontological highness is in the same position as God. In other words, he realizes the relationship of how he connects with God as macrocosm, although he is finite existence as microcosm. Because of his perfection, Adam as the Perfect Man is subjected to other creatures in the universe, whether it is high or low. This is one of the reasons why Adam is located at the highest position in the universe, and is eligible to be caliph in this world. Other creatures including angels are ordered by God to prostrate to him, since Adam was taught the names of everything, whereas other creatures were not. However, the point here is that perfection is determined in the case of Adam. In other words, human beings as a whole group still do not know what Adam was given by God. One who knows that in truth is the Perfect Man, but if not, one is called the animal man.

In his commentary on this quotation, Qaysārī emphasizes the gap between God and human beings, though Kāshānī does not mention anything about this point. In Qaysārī’s scholarship, he tends to maintain the distinction between God and human beings, and it shows in his commentary on this. According to him, the subjection of the universe to human beings is through their praising and glorifying God. Just like Lordship or servanthood between God and human beings, Qaysārī looks for this Lord-servant relationship between human beings and other creatures. The same idea of lordship and servanthood is adopted in the case of the caliphate, so that this is a different level of lordship. Thus, it is not until this remoteness between human beings and other creatures clarifies that “manifestation of Hisness and

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116 Ibn ʿArabī, Fujūṣ al-hikam, p. 349.
117 According to the Qurʾān, it is said that there are seven heavens (ṣabʿaṭ samawāt), but Ibn ʿArabī says that there are fifteen heavens, divided into higher spheres and lower spheres. In Ibn ʿArabī’s cosmology, planets and stars are located based on their ranking. See the last section in this chapter.
118 For example, the background of this idea is based on the following verses in the Qurʾān:

He (God) said: “Indeed, I know what you know not.” And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He showed them to the angels, and said: “Tell Me the names of these if you are right.” They said: “Glory to You, we have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, it is You who is the Knowing, the Wise.” He said, “O Adam, tell them their names.” And when he had told them their names, He said, “Did I not tell you that I know the unseen of the heavens and the earth? And I know what you reveal and what you have concealed.” And when We said to the angels, “Prostrate before Adam”; so they prostrated, not so Iblīs. He refused and was arrogant and became of the disbelievers (Q2:30-34)
Divinity” (al-hūwiyyah al-ilāhiyyah al-ẓāhirah) in the form of humanity becomes the real perfection.119 This means that the situation of human perfection necessitates some steps to be completed. Concerning human perfection, man comes to know the truth through unveiling and knowing entities, tasting (dhawq) and ecstasy (wijdān). In this level, there is no distinction between God and human beings, and it is a coincidence between macrocosm and microcosm. Ibn ʿArabī composes a poem about their unification.

You are servant and you are Lord. For One for Him and in Him, you are servant.

You are Lord and you are servant. For One for Him in the speech, [there is] the obligatory contract (ʿahd). 120

Every contract (aqd) [about Lord-servant relationship] is on the individual. One who is equal to the contract dissolves it.121

The oneness between Lord and servant is embodied in the Perfect Man, too. The Lord-servant relationship is dissolved in this ideal situation which is the eternal time before the primordial contract occurs. There is no distinction between them in meaning because the Lord-servant relationship had still not been concluded, so God and human beings are united. This is the reason why one who reaches this perfection is also called the “man of two eyes” (dhū al-ʿaynayn), “one who sees the Real in the creature, and sees the creature in the Real.”122 The argument of the Perfect Man is developed more concretely in order to discuss his spiritual authority because he is a form of anthropomorphism revealing the divine presence. In the next chapter, we will consider how the theory of the Perfect Man is discussed through the argument of the divine names and human names.

120 Kāshānī and Qaṣṣârī think that this part denotes the “primordial covenant” (Q7:17), which is the first Lord-servant contract between God and human beings:
When your lord drew forth the Children of Adam from their loins and their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): “Am I not your Lord?”, they said: “Indeed (balā)! We do testify!” (Q7:172).
121 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 115.
IV. The Perfect Man as a Spiritual Authority

Historically in Islamic thought, many intellectuals like Ibn Taymiyyah and ābū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), and have discussed sovereignty in the context of caliphate and Imamate. The decisive cause of the schism between Sunnī Islam and Shīʿī Islam was the succession of the caliph after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 11/632. According to the opinion of Shīʿī Muslims, ’Alī, a cousin of Muḥammad, was appointed as the caliph directly by him. Moreover, there are records even in the Sunnī Ḥadīth showing the close relationship between them.123 ’Alī did not attend the meeting at the Saqīfah of Banū Sāʿidah just after the death of the prophet. The meeting to decide the first caliph might have been the result of a compromise between each tribe in early Islam. For these reasons, the Shīʿī do not accept the previous caliphs before ’Alī, but hold that the true successor of the prophet must be ’Alī. However, it is also true that the selection of Abū Bakr could be regarded as quite natural due to his age and great service. Abū Bakr nominated ’Umar as the second caliph without having any meeting to decide his successor. Even now, ’Umar is appreciated highly at least among Sunnīs, because he governed the Islamic community (ummah) and expanded its territory. After the death of ’Umar, however, politics in Islam became more complicated, accompanied by assassinations and internal dispute between ’Alī and ’Uthmān of Umayyad clan. In spite of such confusion, the first four caliphs are called by Sunnīs “the rightly guided caliphs” (al-khulafāʾ al-rāshidūn). This was the period of ideal governance in Islam.

The term caliph (khalīfah), which means “deputy”, is based on the Qur’ān, in which it is sometimes found. God makes Adam “deputy of God” (khalīfat Allāh) on the earth, legitimizing the authority of human beings on earth. Likewise, the word is used after the death of Muḥammad for legitimacy in order to show the succession of the leadership. Caliph in this context is “the deputy of prophet of God” (khalīfat rasūl Allāh). In regards to this phrase, Patricia Crone demonstrates that Umayyad caliphs tried to legitimize their religious authority, not using the word “the deputy of prophet of God” (khalīfat rasūl Allāh), but using the word

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“deputy of God” (*khalīfat Allāh*).\(^{124}\) This usage makes an important difference related to religious authority. In the former meaning, the viceregency is just in accordance with the acceptance of the prophecy of Muḥammad. The caliph is merely an individual who governs the universe based on the Qur’ān and the traditions of Muḥammad. On the other hand, the latter usage indicates theocracy, that God gives the caliph absolute authority. It implies the opinion that the caliph can decide anything that he wishes without referring to any words of the prophet Muḥammad. Thus, the discussion of religious authority in Islam has stemmed from various perspectives and with interchangeable word of *imām*.

In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, it is possible to regard the discussion of the Perfect Man based on the divine names as one of the arguments about religious-spiritual authority. This chapter focuses on the issue of the spiritual authority of the Perfect Man.

### 1. The Position of the caliph in *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*

Adam has an important role as the foundation of various important ideas: the Perfect Man, the caliphate manifest in human beings, the seal of the prophets, the seal of the saints, and so on. The divine names combine all of them complicatedly and subtly. The wisdoms of Ibn ʿArabī’s book start from Adam in the first chapter of *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, and end with Muḥammad in the last chapter. In other words, the circle of this wisdom begins at Adam, and terminates at Muḥammad.

In the Qur’anic narrative of the Creation, God made a caliph on earth. The verses of the Qur’ān (Q2:30; 6:165; 38:26) are the legislative guarantee for the caliphate of human beings in the world. Moreover, Adam was taught the names of things by God, whereas the angels were not (Q2:31)\(^ {125}\), and Adam was created in the form of God. At the same time as the creation, he was not only made the vicegerent of God in the world, but also was given appropriate properties to be in such position. The chapters of Adam and David (Dāwūd) of *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* are fully concentrated on the argument about the caliphate. This reason is based on the descriptions of both of them in the Qur’ān. In addition, although the word


\(^{125}\) “And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He placed them before the angels, and said: ‘Tell me the names of these if ye are right’” (Q2:31).
*khaliṭah* is also found in other chapters, most of them except in the context of Moses are repetitions of the authority of the caliphate. In this regard, Ibn ʿArabī says:

> The universe was completed through his (Adam’s) existence. So, [that] he is in relation with the universe as is if [that] stone of seal ring (*faṣṣ al-khātim*) is in relation seal ring (*al-khātim*). He is the place of inscription (*naṣṣ*), that is, symbol (*ʿalāmah*) with which the King seals His treasures. He is called (*khalīfah*) due to this. Because He is the One who preserves His creature through him,\(^{126}\) as if the seal preserves the treasures. As long as the seal of king is on it, nobody dares to open it except by His permission. So, God nominated him for the preservation of the cosmos. The cosmos does not come to an end in the condition of preservation, as long as the Perfect Man [is existent] in the universe. If not seeing him, that is, unbinding [the seal of] treasure in this world, what the Real preserved in it will not stay in it, and what will be in it goes out. [As a result of it] each of them reunites one by one, and the matter is carried to the next world. He is the seal of the treasure of the next world forever.\(^ {127}\)

In the above mentioned sentences, it is clear that the pronoun “he” properly explains Adam himself or an ideal human who can be a Perfect Man, though Ibn ʿArabī generally regards human beings as the perfect man. This wide meaning of *al-insān al-kāmil* shows the general aspect of human being. The relationship between Adam and the universe corresponds to that between the stone of a seal ring and a seal ring. Adam is the bezel of a ring bearing the various inscriptions and gems. He is the foundation of sealing the divine treasure, through which divinity is preserved in this world and shifts to the next world. Due to his role in keeping the order of the world, he is a deputy of God.

As the Qurʾān says, the angels are not aware that God has His names, or that the universe has its names. Therefore, they cannot understand “the plane of the Real” (*ḥaḍrat al-ḥaqq*) demanded for the essential servanthood (*al-ʿibādah al-dhātiyyah*), in which the divine names are decorated. This leads us to the belief that they do not truly comprehend what

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\(^{126}\) I read the text by adding *bi-hi* (through him) in accordance with Qayṣarī’s *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, though the main text does not mention it. Jāmī notes that he in the world is the Perfect Man.


\(^{127}\) Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, pp. 18-19.
Adam knows. Moreover, Ibn ʿArabī describes the relationship between Adam and the universe:

The universe is seen (shahādah) and caliph is hidden (ghayb). For that reason, the Ruler (al-sultān) is veiled. The Real described Himself as being veils of darkness which are the natural spheres (al-ajsām al-ṭabiʿiyyah), veils of light which are the subtle spirits (al-arwāh al-latifah). The universe is between subtlety and unveiling.

Thus, the universe does not perceive the Real who perceives Himself. Based on the idea of self-disclosure (tajallī), the Real is the hidden or “the hidden of the hidden” (ghayb al-ghayb), whereas the universe is seen and perceptible, described by the phrase tajallī al-shahādah. Ibn ʿArabī thought that the universe is also not aware of what Adam knows, so it is just the object of self-disclosure. The principle that Adam is the deputy indicates that he embodies the divine names (and divine presence), and that he is existent in the form of God in the universe. Concerning the qualification of deputy, he must be in a state of perfection because he has to fulfill the various demands of those who are governed (raʿāyā). In this meaning, Adam as the Perfect Man unites the form of universe (ṣūrat al-ʿālam) and the form of the Real (ṣūrat al-haqq), which is His two hands. Qaysarī comments that the former is the realities of the cosmos (ḥaqāʾiq al-kawniyyah), and the latter is the realities of divinity (ḥaqāʾiq al-ilāhiyyah). Thus, the Real and the universe necessitate the Perfect Man.

The other discussion of the caliph is found in the chapter of wisdom given by Dāwūd. In this chapter, Ibn ʿArabī argues (1) the comparison between Dāwūd and Adam, and (2) the difference between the deputy (khalīfah) and other kinds of authority (sultān) like prophethood (nubūwwah), apostleship (risālah), and imamate (imāmah), and (3) his opinion of the difference between “the deputy of God” and “the deputy of the apostle of God.” First, God singled out Dawūd as His deputy in this world: “O David (Dāwūd), indeed We have made you (jaʿalnā-ka) a deputy upon the earth, so judge between the people in truth and do not follow [your own] desire, as it will lead you astray from the way of God” (Q38:26). This verse shows clearly that he was nominated directly as deputy by saying “I made you,” in which the object

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130 Qaysarī, Sharḥ Fusūṣ al-ḥikam li-l-Qaysarī (vol.1), p. 295.
pronoun is second-person singular. On the other hand, it is fact that the Qur’ān does not mention any name including in Adam, when He says the deputy in the world

Indeed, I will make a deputy upon the earth (innī jāʾ il-fī-l ard khālifat-an) (Q2:30).

It is He who has made you (jaʿala-kum) deputy upon the earth” (Q6:165).

In both verses, there is no definite nomination from God to make Adam a deputy, though the former verse is particularly under the context of the narrative of Adam in the Qur’ān. As Ibn ʿArabī argues, thus, this verse does not say that God will make Adam deputy on the earth. The latter verse is also in the same case of the former one, in meaning that there is no appointment from God.

Should you say that Adam (peace be upon him) was appointed as His deputy, we said that He does not nominate like the nomination of Dāwūd. Since He said to angels, “Indeed, I will make a deputy upon the earth” (Q2:30), and He did not say “Indeed, I will make Adam deputy upon the earth.” If He had said it, it is not the same as His saying “Indeed, We made you a deputy” (Q38:26), as in the reality of Dāwūd. 131

Second, in comparison with the other name of authority, Ibn ʿArabī thinks that the nomination by God to Ibrāhīm is in the same case. In the Qur’ān, God says, “Indeed, I will make you imām of people” (Q2:124). This is not a nomination as caliph, but the imamate is as same as caliphate in the meaning of the leadership. According to Ibn ʿArabī, however, the uniqueness of Dāwūd is the “deputy of judgment” (khālifat ḥukm) which is also based on the Qur’ān. 132 Adam’s caliphate is not as high as Dāwūd’s because he does not have any necessary requirement. In other words, he is merely the first human created, so that whoever was there before his caliphate can dominate his position.

Some deputies (khulafāʾ) appointed by God are the apostles (al-rūṣul). They have apostleship, but not all apostles are caliphs. According to Ibn ʿArabī, not every apostle is a deputy, just as not every apostle is a prophet. 133 The caliph can dismiss and appoint governors freely by the sword, whereas the role of an apostle is to convey the message. According to Ibn ʿArabī, if the apostle has political power, he could be the deputy-apostle (al-khalīfah al-rasūl).

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131 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 267.
132 This verse is the same verse in which God nominates Dāwūd as deputy: “Judge between the people in truth” (Q38:36).
133 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 363.
Third, Ibn `Arabī discusses the caliphate between “the deputy of God” and “the deputy of apostle of God.” Already in the period when Ibn `Arabī was alive, the deputy was not from God, but from the apostle. This means that the caliph was the deputy of the apostle, and followed the rules which he transmitted to the people. Actually, Ibn `Arabī admitted the idea of a deputy of God, because a pious believer who follows the apostle can judge the right, and comes to receive the divine principle. Apparently, such a believer is a saint (wali) who, by reaching such a position, is eligible to be a deputy. Of course, Ibn `Arabī differentiated the apostleship from the caliphate, and emphasized the superiority of Muḥammad’s apostleship. However, one who stands in the same position as an apostle is a deputy of God esoterically, and a deputy of the apostle of God exoterically.

In truth, he (one who follows God) is special and suitable in what he realizes in the form of reception (ṣūrat al-akhdh) [of the divine principle]. He is in the place which the apostle [Muḥammad] (May God be peace upon him) confirmed the Law of one who preceded [his] apostleship. Through the existence of [previous] apostleship, he could confirm it. We follow Muḥammad in his confirmation [of apostleship before him], not the law for such previous apostles before him. Thus, the reception of the caliphate is from God, just as apostle received [apostleship] from Him. Esoterically speaking, we say of such a person that he is a deputy of God, and exoterically speaking, he is a deputy of the apostle of God.\(^\text{134}\)

Ibn `Arabī’s discussion of the caliphate is the argument of spiritual authority though which one reaches divine wisdom in preserved treasure and preserves it as deputy of God. The Perfect Man is embodied as apostle, prophet, and saint. Against the caliphate of spiritual authority, Ibn `Arabī raised the idea of the caliphate of religious/political authority, and pointed out that a deputy sitting in the position of political caliphate often mistakes his role in judgment by not following the tradition of the prophet Muḥammad and instead persisting in their personal opinion. Moreover, the political caliphate called “outer caliph” (al-khilāfah al-ẓāhirah) and the spiritual caliphate called the “spiritual caliph” (khilāfah al-ma’naviyyah) can coexist at the same time in the context of Ibn `Arabī’s thought. Thus, the term khilāfah is word which gives him the imagination of the Perfect Man.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., p. 270.
2. Muḥammad and the Metaphysical Foundation of the Perfect Man

Adam was the first human being created in the form of God, and he embodies the divine names. For this reason, he is regarded as the Perfect Man, that is, deputy in this world. In spite of his perfection, it is fact that he does not have any validity to sit in the position. His honored position is the result of an “accident,” and at least is not the necessary requirement. Again, Ibn ʿArabī did not mention the matter in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. On the other hand, Muḥammad fully satisfied the necessity of the position, as Ibn ʿArabī often cites the Ḥadīth in his works: “I was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay (bayna al-māʾ wa-l-ṭīn).” Moreover, the phrase “Muḥammadan reality” (al-ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadiyyah) in al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyyah reinforces the mythical-metaphysical foundation of his priority though Ibn ʿArabī did not use the phrase in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. Though there is no clear statement that Muḥammad is equal to the Perfect Man, it is beyond doubt that he is the Perfect Man.

Based on the analysis of the Perfect Man, it has two categories with regard to the deputyship: (1) the perfect man with a general meaning, and (2) the Perfect Man with a specific meaning. First, human beings are given the names of all things and created in the form of God, as far as they are the posterity of Adam. They look towards making other creatures on the earth obey them by force. This kind of vicegerency corresponds to “outer caliph,” which is the material authority. In this meaning, the idea that any human being could be the perfect man by birth matches our general imagination of a deputy. Second, there is the idea of the Perfect Man having superiority to others, by which someone can be the “spiritual caliph” who realizes the Truth and guides others to gnosis. The Perfect Man in this specific condition can be the holder of a hidden knowledge which is the treasure of God. Apostles, prophets and saints can be the Perfect Man. This classification makes the framework of the theory of the Oneness of Existence. The idea of the Perfect Man in the context of self-disclosure of Existence (tajallī) demonstrates the metaphysics of the divinity. Moreover, apostleship and prophethood are

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136 Chodkiewicz points out that the terms al-ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadiyyah and al-insān al-kāmil are not purely synonymous, but express differing views of man: the former is in terms of his primordiality, and the latter is in terms of his finality.

positions given by God. On the other hand, the process of becoming the Perfect Man by deeply understanding the divine principle\textsuperscript{137} is an acquired position. This is equal to spiritual training in Sufism. Ibn ʿArabī discussed the position of the Perfect Man, in comparison with the universe.

Amazingly on the matters of the being who has humanity, the highest in whole existent is the Perfect Man. Height (ʿulū) does not matter to him except adherently (bi-l-tabīʿ iyyah), whether it is place (makān), or position (makānah), that is, station (manzilah). Thus, his height is not through his essence. He is high through the height of place and the height of position, so his height is due to both [place and position]. \textsuperscript{138}

Thus human beings are the perfect man of the general meaning in accordance with our classification. However, height of rank, which shows the existential place and spiritual position in the universe, is not decided in nature. The position is not determined thorough essence. In addition, Ibn ʿArabī argues the height of rank of the Perfect Man as follows:

Concerning the deputyship among people, if their height were through the deputy [who is implicitly] essentially high, all of them will have height. When it is not general, we know that the height belongs to the position. Among His beautiful names is “the Most High” (al-Aʿlā)\textsuperscript{139}

This quotation is not related to the matter of the outer caliphate, but that of the spiritual caliphate. As far as human beings go, they are the perfect man in the general meaning, following the deputy automatically. The height of deputyship just belongs to the position, so it is said that the height is given from God adherently. In order to be the Perfect Man in its true meaning, one needs the spiritual position as divine favor.

The representations of divine favor are apostleship and prophethood, which are gifts from God to humans. Therefore, these are neither rewards as results of their efforts, nor their requirement to Him.\textsuperscript{140} Moreover, God bestows benevolence to individuals on each occasion, as one of the divine names al-Wahhāb (the Bestower) shows. Ibn ʿArabī says that the holder of

\textsuperscript{137} This point will be considered in the next section.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibn ʿArabī, Fūṣūṣ ʿal-ḥikam, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., pp. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., pp. 263.
the name Yahyā (John) as described in the Qurʾān was the first one bestowed the name. The name of Dāwūd also demonstrates a special gift from God. In Arabic writing, each letter of his name is isolated (داوود). This is because the letters comprising his name do not connect with those which follow. God intends to show through his name that Dāwūd himself is separated from the universe by God. On the other hand, the name of Muḥammad (محمد) has connected letters with the next letter (مـيم, هـ), and unconnected letter with the next one (دـال). According to Ibn Ṭ Ḥábī, he is separated from the universe, and is connected with God. In this explanation, Kāshānī comments that his name shows divine favor for the gathering of apostleship, prophethood, caliphate, kingship, knowledge (ʿilm), wisdom (ḥikmah), and disjunction (faṣl) without any intermediary.

In this way, God shows His grace in human names to give special positions to them. Without any exception, however, every human name connects with God. Based on the self-disclosure of existence, the emanation of existence in the higher level contains that of existence in the lower level. Due to the entity of existence, the divine names contain every name in the universe, so does any human name.

The divine names are every name on which the universe depends, and [every name] from the Universe is equivalent to Him or the entity of the Real. It is precisely God, not others. Thus, He says, “O you men! It is you that have need of God, while God is the Self-sufficient, the Praised” (Q35:15). It is known that we are mutually dependent, [and not the self-sufficient]. Therefore, our names are the names of God, that is, the requirement to Him is without doubt. And, our entities are nothing but His shadow (زـیللـهـوـهـ). He is [at once] our Hisness (حـوـیـیـعـاـتـنـا)، and [at the same time] not our Hisness.

In the allusion of shadow, the creature is nothing but the shadow of the Real. The entity of human beings is derived from the Real, so they enjoy the Hisness of the Real. At the same moment, however, the intensity of His Hisness is thin because humans are on a lower level of existence.

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141 “O, Zakariah! Indeed, We give you good tidings of a boy whose name will be Yahyā. We have not assigned to any before [this] name” (Q19:7).
143 Ibn Ṭ Ḥábī, Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, pp. 146-147.
Despite this thinness of existence, the prophet Muḥammad is separated from the universe, and shown his specialty. The wisdom illustrated by him is singularity (fardiyyah), because he is the most perfect of humankind (al-naw’ al-insāniyyah). According to Ibn ʿArabī, nothing starts and ends except with him.

His wisdom is [the wisdom of] singularity (fardiyyah), because he is the most perfect existent in this humankind. Thus, the matters are begun with him and ended (khutima) [with him]. He was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay. Through his elemental origin (bi-nashaʿati-hi al-munṣuriyyah), he is the seal of the apostles, and first (awwal) of the three singular ones, insomuch as all others derive from this firstness (awwaliyyah) of singular ones. Thus, he is its entity. He (be peace upon him) was the clearest evidence for his Lord, and he was given the totalities of words, which is the names named by Adam.\textsuperscript{144}

The proof of his uniqueness is based on his fundamental position at the seal of apostleship, and the first singularity of three. About the latter of “the first of three,” Qaṣṣarī regards the three as “the absolute Essence” (al-dhāt al-ahadiyyah), “divine degree” (al-martabah al-ilāhiyyah), and the “Muḥammadan spiritual reality” (al-ḥaqīqah al-rūḥāniyyah al-Muḥammadiyyah) which is called “the first intelligence” (al-ʿaql al-awwal), and regards the first as the “Muḥammadan spiritual reality.”\textsuperscript{145}

In the same part, however, Kāshānī’s understanding is complicated. In the solidarity of Muḥammad, he shows the perfect gathering of the one (ahad), the even (shaf’), and the odd (watr). According to him, each of them shows the emanation of Existence: one means the one spring of “the Essence of the Absolute Oneness” (al-dhāt al-ahadiyyah). The “even” indicates the Absolute Oneness (aḥadiyyah). Moreover, the odd consisting of knowledge (al-ʿilm), the knower (al-ʿālim), and the known (al-ʿmaʿlūm) is equal to the Integrated Oneness (wāḥidiyyah). Muḥammad is the one who understands the subtle relationship among knowledge, the knower, and the known.\textsuperscript{146} In this way, Qaṣṣarī and Kāshānī interpret differently what the first of the three means, but they share the same idea that this word

\textsuperscript{144} Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, pp. 377-378.
\textsuperscript{145} Qaṣṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam li-l-Qaṣṣarī (vol.2), 1328.
\textsuperscript{146} Kāshānī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, pp. 538-539.
expresses the ontological explanation of Muhammad’s position related to the self-disclosure of Existence.

Because of his realization through his prophethood and metaphysics, Muḥammad is the clearest proof for his Lord. This point leads to the relationship between God and Muḥammad. As discussed above, the divine name of al-Rabb is the outer name of Allāh, whereas Allāh inwardly integrates other divine names below the Merciful. The relationship of Muḥammad to God is as same as that of Perfect Man to the hidden treasure of God. That is, as the Perfect Man is the seal of the treasure and the proof of divine gnosis, Muḥammad is the seal of the prophets (khātim al-anbiyāʾ) and the proof of his Lord. However, the universe necessitates the Perfect Man for preservation of it even after the seal of the prophets. The argument of the seal of the saints originates in this point.

3. Human Perfection through Sainthood: the Heirs of the Prophet

The Arabic term walī (pl. awliyāʾ) is translated literally “to be near,” and is translated generally “friend of God” in the context of the Qurʾān.147 The term al-Walī is one of the divine names in spite the of Lord-servant relationship between God and human beings. In the context of Sufism, it is translated “saint,” who is nearer to God than ordinary people. Thus, some Sufi who has wilāyah or walāyah (sainthood) is regarded as a walī (saint), and is the object of saint veneration. Ibn ʿArabī also develops the concept of sainthood fully in the context of Sufism.

The death of the prophet Muḥammad caused many problems in Islam because he was the seal of the prophets, meaning that no new prophet will appear with revelation or new laws. People face the problem that they cannot receive the direct message from God concretely, and the universe leads to a spiritually inactive situation. Concerning the latter meaning, the lack of the Perfect Man would be the disorder of the universe because the highest among prophets and apostles - all of whom are the Perfect Man - will never appear in this world. Instead of him, saints inherit the spiritual caliphate whether it is the “deputy of God” or “deputy of apostle of God,” and preserve the mystical knowledge of God.

147 “God is the Friend of those who believe” (Q2:257).
“He is the Friend, the Praiseworthy” (Q42:28).
Know that sainthood (*wilāyah*) is the comprehensive and universal sphere (*al-falak al-muhīṭ al-‘āmm*), so it will never cease. The sainthood has [the faculty of] universal communication (*anbāʾ*) [with God]. As to the legislative prophethood (*al-nubūwwah al-tashriyyah*) and apostleship, they ceased. It stopped at Muḥammad (May God peace and blessing upon him), so there is no prophethood after him, meaning [there is neither] anyone who legislates (*musharriʾ*), nor anyone who is legislated, nor any prophet who is legislator.149

The apostleship represented by Muḥammad is called the “legislative prophethood,” which is lawgiving. He brought law and gave the community divine rule. After Muḥammad, the “universal prophethood” (*al-nubūwwah al-ʿāmmah*), which is prophethood without law, remains. This universal prophethood is equal to sainthood, which started from the past without start, and lasts forever.

In accordance with the Oneness of Existence, *al-Walī* is a divine name. This name can show the relationship between God and man though they are in a Lord-servant relationship. The friend of God is one of the names which denote the nature of the relationship like the apostle of God or the prophet of God. After Muḥammad, the name *al-walī* has an important role to indicate the supreme name which shows such relationship (*al-Walī*) and the friend of God (*al-walī*). The friendship between God and man derived from the divine name *al-Walī* has lasted forever in this world and the next world, as well as being adopted for the living and the dead.

This name (*walī*) remains to apply to the servants of God in this world [the alive] and the next world [the dead]. The name [of *walī*] which is peculiar to servant, excluding to the Real- remains until the end of prophethood and apostleship. However, God shows subtlety through servants, and left the universal prophethood (*al-nubūwwah

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148 Ibn ʿArabī distinguishes “legislative Prophethood” (*al-nubūwwah al-tashriyyah*) from “universal Prophethood” (*al-nubūwwah al-ʿāmmah*). The former is the Prophethood which is brought with law, but the former is the one which is not brought with law (Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-hikam*, p. 205). In *al-Futūḥat al-makkiyyah*, the former corresponds to “legislative Prophethood” (*al-nubūwwah al-tashriyyah*), and the latter corresponds to the “absolute Prophethood” (*al-nubūwwah al-muṭlaqah*).

Concerning “absolute Prophethood,” see Ibn ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥat al-makkiyyah* (vol. 2), p. 53; Takeshita, “Ibn ʿArabī’s Theory of the Perfect Man and Its Place in the History of Islamic Thought,” p. 120.

al-ʿāmmah) which does not have legislation with it. Moreover, He left legislation for them in individual effort (al-tashriʿ fi-l-ijtiḥād) for fixation of opinions. And, He left legacy (wirāthah) for them in legislation. The prophet said, “The scholars (ulamāʾ) are the legacy of prophets.”

Instead of direct law or revelation, God gave people after Muḥammad some tools instead of the prophet. The first is universal prophethood, that is, sainthood. The second is legislation by themselves through individual efforts (ijtiḥād). The third is the legacy of scholarly discussion in the Islamic sciences. Concerning the relationship between prophethood or apostleship and sainthood, Ibn ʿArabī regards that sainthood is the base of prophethood and apostleship. Both prophethood and apostleship derive from sainthood and knowledge (ʿilm). As whoever knows himself knows the Lord, obtaining mystical knowledge of God leads to becoming a true knower (ʿārif). Compared to “legislative apostleship” which bears law, sainthood seeks knowledge by saying “O my Lord, increase me in knowledge” (Q20:114). Through sainthood and obtaining knowledge, one becomes perfect and a true knower: the Perfect Man. Thus, it is clear that perfection through sainthood demonstrates an upward direction from lower existential level to higher existential level. In this sense, it is possible to say that the spiritual training in Sufism aims to reach the sainthood. Ordinary man steps up to God from low to high so that he becomes the Perfect Man by acquiring sainthood.

Every prophet from Adam enjoys the “Muḥammadan reality” in which Muḥammad is manifest ontologically in his niche (mishkāh). In spite of the fact that the prophecy of Muḥammad was the last in time, he is always located as the first in terms of ontology. Moreover, even when he was in the condition of clay, his reality (haqiqatu-hu) is existent which indicates the Muḥammadan reality in the self-disclosure. In this sense we understand “I (Muḥammad) was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay.” He always displays his prophethood through other prophets beyond time and space, whereas other apostles could be apostles only when they are sent to the people. In this sense, apostles except Muḥammad were restricted. Ibn ʿArabī suggests an existence that can be higher than apostles.

150 Ibid., pp. 204-205.
151 Ibid., p. 207.
This knowledge [of gnosis] is not [attained] except through the seal of apostleship and the seal of saints. Nobody among those posessing apostleship or sainthood can understand it except from the niche of the seal of the apostle, and nobody among those posessing sainthood can understand it except from the niche (mishkāh) of the seal of the saints. As a result, no apostle can understand it when he [tries] to understand it except the niche of the seal of the saints. This is because the prophet and the apostle-meaning legislative apostleship (nubuwwat al-tashrī‘)-have their roles end, while sainthood does not cease. Thus, the apostles who belong to saints cannot understand what we have mentioned except from the niche of seal of the saints. How are they lower than sainthood? Though the seal of the saints follows the judgment brought by the seal of the prophets of legislation, that does not diminish his position (maqām-hu), or contradict what we have said about him. In one sense, he is lower [than an apostle], and in another sense he is higher [than an apostle].

As we understand in the consideration of the Perfect Man, height of spiritual rank is not inherent to human beings or the Perfect Man. Rather, one has to acquire it through one’s own efforts. However, the niche here, which is a kind of height, is given inherently. The niche of the seal of the apostles was given to Muḥammad, and the niche of the seal of the saints is to be given to someone. The niche makes a difference between the holder of it and non-holders, so that the seal of the saints is lower than an apostle or a prophet in some sense, and higher than them in some sense. Truly, even a prophet, apostle, and saint of high status cannot reach gnosis except with the height of the seal of the prophets and the seal of the saints. In other words, the seal of the prophets can access what the seal of the saints reaches, but such special people need to elevate themselves until the niche at which both seals are located. For this reason, Ibn ‘Arabī says that the seal of the saints was a saint when Adam was between water and clay. Ibn ‘Arabī seems to have a unique idea that this world will last without end. The end

152 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
153 As a proof on it, Ibn ‘Arabī raises the example of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644) in the war of Badr. Concerning to the treatment of enemy’s captures, ʿUmar had the opinion that they should kill them, whereas Ābū Bakr (d. 12/634) issued that they should ransom them. At that time, Ābū Bakr’s idea was accepted, but later the verse of the Qurʾān (Q8:67) proved that ʿUmar’s opinion is right: “It is not for a Prophet to have captives [of war] until he inflicts a massacre [upon Allāh’s enemies] in the land. Some Muslims desire the commodities of this world, but Allāh desires [for you] the Hereafter. And Allāh is Exalted in Might and Wise” (Q8:67).
of sainthood is the end of this world, but this world will not be able to end until sainthood is sealed. Sainthood is the spiritual deputyship for preserving the treasure of God and bringing order in the universe.

In spite of the special status of the seal of the saints, he also follows the law brought by Muḥammad. It neither contradicts sainthood, nor lowers the level of the seal.\footnote{Ibn ʿArabī, 
Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 41.} This is because Muḥammad is also a saint and a prophet, so he can share what the seal of the saints has intrinsically. Beyond the commonness between both, the existence of Muḥammad itself has incomparable property with the seal of sainthood.

The seal of saints is the saint (al-walī), the heir (al-wārith), and the looker at [whole] grades (al-mushāhid li-l-marāṭib). It is excellent among excellence of the seal of the prophets, Muhammad (peace and blessings of God upon him) is the guardian (muqaddim) [of the Community], (honorable title of) Sayyid, preceding Adam in opening door of intercession (shafāʾah). [Here] he defines (ʿayyana) what spreads universally as level and in particular (ḥāl-an khāṣṣ-an). In this special level, he precedes the names of divinity.\footnote{Ibid., p. 44.}

The seal of sainthood as well as the seal of prophethood are the two wheels for maintaining the universe and preserving divine knowledge. Ontologically speaking, though human creation has a large gap in rank from the prophet Muḥammad, their human perfection is executed through sainthood. As a result of their perfection, the Perfect Man who embodies the divine names and divine presence reveals himself in the universe, being the true knower and the spiritual deputy. The saint is the heir of the prophets and the bezel of divine wisdom: this process lasts perpetually as if it is a circle, with neither beginning nor end.

The Perfect Man has a privileged rank in the universe because God gave Adam knowledge of the names and created him in His form. He is the seal of the treasure of God, so that he is called a deputy (the Perfect Man in its specific meaning). Human beings as his posterity inherit him, so Ibn ʿArabī also regards them as the “perfect man” innately (the perfect man in its general meaning). In creation, the prophet Muḥammad has special status. The wisdom of singularity showed by him is that he is the seal of the prophets and gives
ontological prestige to other created things like the Muḥammadan Reality (*al-ḥaqqah al-Muḥammadiyyah*). After him, sainthood was left for people to reach gnosis through obtaining knowledge. The saints are the heirs of the prophets, and they maintain the universe by preserving divine treasure.

In the intellectual history of Islam, Ibn Ṭabarī presented a new perspective of Islamic ontology in the context of the divine names, which is based on the Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and previous theological speculations. Thus, his thought is epoch-making in the meaning that it opens new aspects of divine knowledge.
Conclusion

We have considered how the divine names are discussed in Ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of the Oneness of Existence. Historically, he is one of the most controversial thinkers in terms of others’ evaluation of his thought. Some intellectuals like Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Dhahabī, and their followers had a hostile attitude towards him, whereas some like Ibn Ḥajar and al-Sha’rānī appreciated his thought very much. In the academic world of Islamic Studies, moreover, scholars have engaged with Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought. Academic results have been published at high levels, but discussion about the divine names based on the name itself and about the relationship between the divine names and the Perfect Man is not clearly undertaken.

The Oneness of Existence brings another meaning to the concept of *tajallī* (self-disclosure), which means the ontological self-disclosure of Existence from the One to many. In the purest level of Existence, It cannot be described with any word (the level of Essence of Existence or the level of Being *qua* Being). The divine name *Allāh* which is the persona form of *allāh* comes into existence, just after the determination of Existence. In other words, the name of *Allāh* is the appearance of existence in the process of determination. The first self-disclosure is the undescribed emanation of the unlimited Existence, and the Real appears by determination in the stage of Absolute Oneness (*al-ḥadiyyah*). Next, the second self-disclosure is the emanation of a fixed entity (*ʿayn*) and, through shifting from existential essence to divine essence, the name of *allāh* comes into existence. God as *Allāh* is as a result of the appearance of the divine persona, and a result of the determination of the unlimited Existence in the stage of the Integrated Oneness (*al-wāḥidiyyah*). Other divine names also appear in the plane of divinity. “Name” in general has five properties and consists of three parts: essence, attribute, and action. This framework in “name” is derived from the divine name, and from the fixed entity of divine names.

Among the divine names, the name of *Allāh* is the first name showing divinity. The Lord (*al-Rabb*) has the external role of God as a relationship with creatures, whereas God (*Allāh*) integrates other divine names internally. Following both names, the Mercy (*al-Rahmah*) is ranked, and the essence of the Mercy is included in other names. As far as the
divine presence consists of essence, attribute, and action, its visible appearance is the divine names. In this meaning, the divine name is a “thing” which stems from essence and contains the divine presence. The Mercy executes the deed of preparedness (isti’dād) in order to affect the Essence of it to other names. The process of preparedness is equal to that of acquiring a name after nameness. Moreover, the Lord necessitates the servant to have a Lord-servant relationship. This Lord-servant relationship based on the primordial contract cannot be dissolved, whereas the lord-servant relationship in human world could be dissolved. The Perfect Man embodies this divine presence in the perfect situation, and becomes the mediator between God and human beings.

The Perfect Man has a privileged rank in the universe because God gave Adam names of things and created him in His form. He is the seal of the treasure of God, and for this reason he is called a deity (the Perfect Man in its specific meaning). Human beings as his posterity inherit various natures him, so Ibn ʿArabī also regards them as the “perfect man” innately (the perfect man in the general meaning). The prophet Muḥammad has special status in creation. The wisdom of singularity possessed by him is that he is the seal of prophets and he has ontological prestige over other creatures through the “Muḥammadan reality.” After him, sainthood is left for people to reach gnosis through the attainment of knowledge. The saints are the heirs of the prophets, and they, true knowers, maintain the universe by preserving divine treasure. Thus, the Perfect Man has an important role of ithmus (barzakh) by acting as bridge between supreme Existence and universe.

In the intellectual history of Islam, Ibn ʿArabī had a new perspective of Islamic ontology in the context of the divine names, which is based on the Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and previous theological speculation. His thought is epoch-making in the meaning that he opened new aspects of divine knowledge and a new interpretation of the Qurʾān.
Appendix I: The Distribution Chart of *tajallī* in *Laṭā‘if al-i‘lām fi ışhārāt ahl al-ilhām*

The number after each term is the one used in Kashani’s work. An asterisk (*) means that he does not indicate exactly any equivalent word in his definition. For example, if the sentence is “*al-tajallī al-dhāti:* it is the *tajallī awwal,*” the word *al-tajallī al-dhāti* is categorized into the *tajallī awwal.*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>The first self-disclosure (<em>al-tajallī al-awwal</em> 293)*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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### The List of Divine Names in the Works of Islamic Thought

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<td>al-Raḥmān</td>
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