The effectiveness of the European Union as an international security actor
Limits and opportunities

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Abstract

The aim of this project is to understand what factors make the European Union a more effective and decisive security actor. Following the analysis of the process that led to the current Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), three main arguments are proposed and supported by making reference to the missions debated, initiated and concluded under the Union’s flag. In particular, it is argued that European action is more likely to take place if a United Nations Security Council Resolution exists and other third parties and international organisations have deployed presence to the crisis area, if the conflict addressed is of the intra-state rather than inter-state type and if the interests and positions of Member States are aligned. Given that all Member States have veto power over military missions, consistency among their positions is, in the end, the most important factor. Moreover, three countries are shown to have a pivotal role in the debate over intervention: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Based on the analysis of the structures and arguments, the third part of this project provides some insights into the current missions in Libya, the Central African Republic and Ukraine. The overall image that emerges is that the CSDP is doomed to remain a highly intergovernmental policy and the Union will be decisive in situations of crisis only when a quick common position can be achieved among the three geopolitical players.
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List of abbreviations

AU: African Union
CAR: Central African Republic
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
EDC: European Defence Community
EEAS: European External Action Service
EEC: European Economic Community
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC: European Political Cooperation
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
ESS: European Security Strategy
EU: European Union
Euratom: European Atomic Energy Community
HR: High Representative for CFSP
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
QMV: Qualified majority voting
RPSC: Regional peace and security cluster
RSC: Regional security complex
US: United States of America
WEU: Western European Union
Introduction

Born as a project to attain security on the continent, what is today the European Union (EU) is becoming a recognised international security actor, using diplomatic, economic and military means to tackle crises outside its territory. Decisions over these matters are taken in accordance with the procedures established by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As a nascent and growing security actor, the Union, and in particular this policy, have been the subject of continuous scrutiny. Stakeholders both inside and outside its borders have at times praised and at times criticised Union’s actorness and/or the lack thereof. In particular, the EU has come under pressure for being indecisive in situations of crisis that require prompt reactions and clear answers. The aim of this project is to understand if there are factors whose presence increases the effectiveness of the Union as a security actor, by making it more assertive and decisive.

Through an analysis of various cases of both intervention and non-intervention, it is argued that Union’s actorness is facilitated by the presence of United Nations Security Council Resolution and by the presence of other International Organisations’ troops on the ground. Moreover, the Union prefers taking action when the crisis is of the intra-state type rather than inter-state. Finally, since the CFSP does not establish clear criteria for action, a pivotal factor in determining decisiveness is the presence of strong interests to act within the Union. These may come both from the Member States and from EU institutions through the High Representative for CFSP, who is also the Commission’s Vice President, or other EU officials. While the first two elements are, to a certain extent, exogenous and the Union does not have much influence over them, the third element completely depends on the wishes of different Member States within the Union and thus has a more determinant role in final decisions. As such, the roles played by all these actors will be devoted thorough attention throughout the entire project.
The project is structured as follows. In the first part the CFSP is introduced, its history is detailed so as to show how and why it reached its current form. In the second part, the three arguments outlined above are analysed by making reference to a variety of ended and continuing military and civilian missions launched by the Union since the establishment of the Common Security and Defence policy and by reference to crises that have been debated but over which no final decision to launch a mission was taken. Based on this discussion, the third part provides some insights into the three recent crises of Libya, the Central African Republic and Ukraine, where missions were established in 2013 and 2014.
Part 1

The Common Foreign and Security Policy

Although the CFSP is a relatively recent policy, the process that led to its birth and institutionalisation in the current form goes back to the origins of the Union and has thus lasted for more than fifty years. Its result is a policy that is allegedly more common in name than in practice, since in practice it is still highly intergovernmental. This first part presents the history of the term security in the European project. It demonstrates how, from a mainly internal characterisation of the term, today the Union has come to understand security issues as issues in the external environment with possible repercussions on the internal one. Following history, the term is analysed first on the intra-European level through the lens of the theories of security communities. Secondly, neofunctionalism is used to show the shift in focus to the external environment and, finally, intergovernamentalist theories serve the purpose of appreciating the current formulation of the policy.

Besides following history, this section is also structured in accordance with the Bretherton and Vogler’s model (2006). The two authors propose a model for the evolution of the CFSP that is based on the three main aspects of presence, opportunity and capability. Presence refers to the actual existence of the CFSP in its particular form. The historical analysis will detail this aspect. Opportunity considers in which cases the Union acts in foreign and security crises. To understand this, the European Security Strategy of 2003 will be analysed, together with the issues of geographical and historical proximity. Finally, capability refers to the kind of action that the Union decides to pursue: whether it agrees to commit (or withdraw) economic resources and technical aid, diplomatic efforts and military means.
1.1 Understanding European integration

Explaining the process of European integration can be tricky. While what is today the EU enjoys a level of integration that is unprecedented\(^1\) in the history of regional organisations, it is striking how, on the one hand, such deep integration was possible without resorting to a federal-state structure; on the other, how some areas still show remarkably low levels of integration when compared to the rest, with foreign and security affairs being a main example.

Today’s Union was arguably born as a security project to bring Europe together so that future wars would be avoided. In the words of Robert Schuman\(^2\), one of the founding fathers of the Union, World War II had taken place because a “united Europe” had not been achieved and “a European federation was indispensable to the preservation of peace” (Schuman Declaration, 1950). Internal peace and security constituted the founding reasons for a process that, once set in motion, kept widening and deepening and came to represent an example of what Deutsch would some years later call a security community.

A security community as described by Karl Deutsch has three main characteristics hinging around integration, value systems and the absence of preparations for armed hostilities. Integration materialises when states achieve a “sense of community”. Essential in this respect is an increase in cross-border interactions. Increased levels of interactions bring with them a higher risk of conflict, integration load, which needs to be met with adequate integration capabilities in the form of resources and institutions. The growth in integration capabilities is the key to a successful integrative process. Such an integrative process is favoured by, accompanied by and itself favours a learning process whereby patterns in cross-border interactions become regularised, allowing for predictability. In turn, the learning process leading to a security community is possible only if there is compatibility of the major values upheld by the states, so that a common and shared understanding of the integrative process

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\(^1\) According to Karns and Mingst (2010, p. 160), “The EU is a unique entity that has become deeply institutionalised and involves far more commitment than any other regional organisation” [emphasis added].

\(^2\) Robert Schuman was the Prime Minister of France in 1947-48 and then Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1953. Although the declaration goes by his surname, he was helped in composing it by a group of people, among whom were his legal advisor Paul Reuter and the economist Jean Monnet.
exists. Finally, necessary for the development of a security community, and implicit in its definition, is the lack of preparations for hostilities of armed nature among the states part to the integrative process. In this way, peace and the absence of direct violence become the political modus operandi among states, the new order based on cooperation and security (Kavalski, 2008).

When trying to explain the emergence of regional organisations such as the EU and other similar ones, Karns and Mingst (2010) identify a variety of factors that are compatible with the ones Deutsch uses to characterise a security community. These include, among the most important, the presence of a shared identity and ideology and the perceived need to defend or secure it; a high level of interdependence and the desire to be less vulnerable to external shocks; power dynamics within the region³ and the chance that a country will provide leadership and advance the project. The role of France in this last sense can be analysed and appreciated since the earliest stages of the European project – as will become clear throughout this work. Schuman and Monnet, the two founding fathers who initially exercised the highest pressures for the progress of the project, were both French; and up to British joining and, later, German reunification, the integrative process that is so fundamental to the idea of a European security community was mainly responsive to French attitudes and desires.

A security community is arguably what emerged in the case of the European Union. When today’s Union was first set up, with the Treaty of Paris of 1951, it counted only six countries and had the form of the European Coal and Steel Community. Despite seeming a small achievement when compared to current numbers, it actually had great significance. For the first time, France and Germany pooled together under a common authority their coal and steel resources, rendering war between them “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Schuman Declaration, 1950). The horrors of two World Wars had made it clear to the Europeans that the main threat to their security stemmed from within Europe itself. To be

³ There is a wide debate among academics on how to define a region and a variety of definitions exist. They will however not be explored here.
solved, it therefore required the peaceful institutionalisation of cross-border modes of interaction. In this perspective, the Schuman Declaration can be read as an act of acknowledgment that Europe already possessed common systems of values but that these needed to be shared in order to make non-violent negotiations the way to inter-state crises solution and that such sharing should be achieved through integration and the emergence of a sense of community.

Peace and security were hence at the basis of the entire European project. Was the project successful? Since achieving membership, none of the states in the Union has experienced war on its territory. The processes of integration and institutionalisation that have made this possible, in line with the idea of security community, have left the traditional concept of security on the margin. Preference has been given to achieving the goal of security by increasing the level of interdependence among countries, especially in the economic field, prompting international relations theorists to explain the European project by making reference to functionalism (or better neofunctionalism) and intergovernmentalism.

Functionalism was the theory initially used by scholars to explain what was occurring in Europe. According to this theory, integration stems from a universal concern over the advancement of welfare that leads countries to agree on social and economic questions and cooperate at the international level for the attainment of a common good. As Mitrany puts it, functionalism is “not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together” (cited in Karns and Mingst, 2010, pp. 40). As such, integration is an inescapable outcome. Haas does not believe that this theory properly explains what happened in the European case⁴. He revisits it and proposes a theory, neofunctionalism, that in the words of Rosamund “can be read at one level as a theory provoked entirely by the integrative activity among the original six member states” (cited in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, pp. 89).

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⁴“I do not deny that men, on occasion, may agree on the common good. I wish to stress merely that these convergences of opinion cannot be relied upon to operate all the time or even with reasonable frequency” (Haas, 1964, pp. 39).
Neofunctionalism holds that integration is not inescapable but rather, when supranational institutions are created, they tend to promote integration beyond their original aim. Instead of focusing on a common good, neofunctionalists argue that integration is driven by the interests and interactions of political actors and political forces, which ultimately result in the creation of a central political authority. For integration to proceed, these interests do not need to be in harmony, and actually institutions have more room for leverage if they have to satisfy a plurality of rival interests, since this allows them to promote broader-raging initiatives. Such initiatives incorporate the different interests and eventually lead to deeper integration on the regional level, since the initiatives and interests represented in them can be broad, but not too broad\(^5\).

Basic to the theory of neofunctionalism is the concept of spillover. Spillover theory holds that cooperation is an expansionary process: initial cooperation in one sector leads to deeper cooperation first in directly related areas and then in others, non-directly related ones. Besides, and in addition to, this sectorial or functional spillover, political spillover takes place, since integration on the political and social fields promotes the creation of shared political aspirations among participating states. Spillover is always cultivated, materialises with supranational institutions actively pursuing additional levels of it. Indeed, once set in place, supranational institutions are self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing. According to neofunctionalists, then, European integration aims, by cultivating processes of functional and political spillover, to build a new regional political community, which is autonomous and above nation-states.

Neofunctionalism does well in explaining the initial steps of European integration. Starting from the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951, integration expanded to the economic and energy fields with the Treaties of Rome of 1957, establishing the European

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\(^5\) The regional level is the level of analysis preferred by Haas. During the 60s, following the slowdown in European integration and following studies on the applicability of neofunctionalism to other regions of the world, neofunctionalism became understood not as a regional theory but rather as one good at explaining only what happened in the region of western Europe during the 50s and early 60s.
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Common Agricultural Policy was launched in 1962 and remained the most important policy in the Community for some decades. 1968 saw the completion of the customs union and in 1970 cooperation started on the political level with the birth of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). In 1979, direct elections of the European Parliament took place for the first time, making it the first international body to be directly elected by its citizens. 1986 saw the adoption of the crucial Single European Act, which elaborated the single market, and in 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union and the three-pillar structure. In this structure, the first pillar consists of the three communities – ECC, ECSC, Euratom -; the second pillar corresponds to the Common Foreign and Security Policy while the third deals with Justice and Home Affairs. States have devolved all or good part of their sovereignty to the EU in the first pillar while they retain control of most aspects of the second and third pillars. The subsequent Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice have further built on this structure, widening the range of issues that are regulated, to a greater or lesser extent, directly by Brussels. The Lisbon Treaty, however, envisioned the elimination of this structure and the incorporation of the three pillars into different policies and institutions. Finally, in 2002 twelve countries adopted the Euro as the single currency, renouncing to their national power over monetary policy.

Neofunctionalism, with its focus on the role of supranational institutions, well explains the way and reasons for the initial functional, political and also geographical spillover. Nevertheless, it came under attack after two major events resulted in the slowdown of European integration in the late 60s, the 70s and early 80s. The first such event is the veto, by France, over the membership of the United Kingdom in 1963 and the following Empty-Chair Crisis. This crisis arose when General De Gaulle, then President of France, decided to abstain from the proceedings of the Council for seven months in response to the move from unanimity
to qualified majority voting which was to start in 1966. Eventually, the Luxembourg Compromise was reached, which solved this crisis. Nevertheless, with its action France made once more clear to everybody its weight in Community’s decisions. The second major event was an external one. In the early 70s, the fall of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and convertibility in 1971 and the 1973 oil crisis ultimately resulted in a surge in protectionist measures, which was at odds with the basic nature of the European project. Right after political cooperation was officially launched, then, a period of stagnation in the processes of deepening and spillover took place (Moga, 2009). The result expected by neofunctionalists did not materialise. Nevertheless, the process of European integration did not stop. The outcome of the process, which better mirrors the situation that emerged during that period, and to a certain extent also afterwards, is more accurately characterised by intergovernmentalism.

Intergovernmentalism describes collaboration and cooperation at the international level in terms of national preferences, implying that the drive is from the bottom up rather than from the top down, from internal pressures rather than from external ones. To explain the result of EU integration, Puchala focuses on supply and demand mechanisms, stating that “demands from society […] brought forth a supportive response from the Commission” (1999, pp. 321) which was first rejected by national governments but then, given on-going internal and external pressures, was finally accepted. National governments, then, retain the role of arbiters over integration processes. First they aggregate domestic positions at the national level, and then they negotiate integration on the international stage. The inevitability emphasized by the concept of spillover leaves the way to purposive actions and behaviours of states in explaining the results of integration. Moravcsik (1993, pp. 480) advances the theory of liberal

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6 The move had been agreed in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome.

7 The Luxembourg Compromise was signed on January 30, 1966 and provides that "Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community". Cited from: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/luxembourg_compromise_en.htm accessed November 13, 2014.
intergovernmentalism, which hinges on three main elements: “the assumption of rational state, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation”.

According to this view, states are rational actors and decide to enter the Union, agree to policies and renounce parts of their sovereignty based on an assessment of costs and benefits, of their resources and their ability to tackle problems at the national level. The kind of problems that become relevant at the national level is driven not only by policy makers but also by citizens who can lobby for desired outcomes. Finally, the increasingly interconnected world in which we live means that states are more and more often in need of coordinating and negotiating with each other so as to implement responses conducive to positive outcomes. While this coordination is favoured by the process of spillover, its result is nonetheless not inevitable.

An analysis based on the assessment of costs and benefits constitutes also the backbone of the transaction-based theory proposed by Sandholz and Stone Sweet (1998) in order to explain the development of EU supranational governance. Although this is a relatively recent theory, it is hereafter shortly introduced because it completes and complements the theoretical background necessary to understand today’s formulation of the CFSP. The authors start form the hypothesis that “the relative intensity of transnational activity, measured across time and policy sectors, broadly determines variation on the dependent variable (supranational governance)” (pp. 4).

Transnational activity is seen as the catalyst of European integration. As it increases, the costs of maintaining national rules (to both governments and economic actors) increase while the transnational society expands. These two forces result in greater demands for supranational governance. A process of institutionalisation then follows, aimed at the creation, application and interpretation of the rules. Institutions are systems of rules in constant evolution and over which governments may become unable to impose their preferences. While
following the reasoning of Moravcsik it can be claimed that the CFSP is still highly intergovernmental because, despite integration, states still have national preferences that they are able to aggregate and advance, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet propose an explanation for these preferences. In their words: “there are few societal transactions that are impeded by the absence of a common foreign and security policy. Or, put differently, though some argue in favour of the potential benefits that CFSP would bring, few societal transactions find its absence costly. There is therefore minimal social demand for integration in that policy domain” (pp. 14).

In applying this theory, its timing has to be considered. Neofunctionalism was born in the 50s, partly in an effort to explain exactly what was happening in Europe; theorists started using intergovernmentalism to describe what was being achieved during the 70s and 80s, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet published their work on the transaction-based theory in 1998. By then, economic integration had been concluded, the Euro was on the verge of being adopted and, in the field of foreign and security affairs, the debate over Kosovo was taking place, questioning the entire existence and purpose of the CFSP, and especially calling the attention of the member states to the possibility of widening the scope of the policy by introducing the military option. Why was this policy originally put forward, why was it modified, and how has it resisted, evolved and reached its current form are the questions to which the next section tries to answer.

1.2 Presence: the EU as a security project and the security project of the EU

It is by no coincidence that the Common Foreign and Security Policy was first incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 since, after German reunification, pressures to establish such a policy mounted quickly. The end of the Cold War had a series of repercussions on Brussels. France and Germany, weary of the question of future enlargement to Eastern European countries, came to a common understanding that further policy deepening had to precede
geographical widening. Moreover, the sudden disappearance of bipolarity raised expectations that the United States (US) would decrease its commitment and withdraw substantial forces from the European continent. In light of this, granting its own security and the maintenance of a peaceful environment became a major concern for Europe (Howorth, 2009). Once the problem had been identified, it had to be decided whether to tackle it individually, with each country taking care of its security alone, or at the community level. Given the renewed emphasis on the European project that had characterised the 80s, the growing efforts and resources spent in its promotion and the desire of a just-reunified Germany to have its rearmament perceived without worries by its neighbours, it is not surprising that the need was felt for Europe to institutionalise security at the Community and later EU level.

A problem soon emerged because of the unwillingness of states to renounce sovereignty over areas that were and still are deemed of basic national survival interest. Indeed, security and foreign affairs are considered matters of “high politics” since they have the potential to impact the basic viability of the state. Given the wide range of perspectives on issues considered as threats to security inside the Union and the diversity of opinions on how to tackle them both in the national and in the international context, member states want to make sure that they maintain the ability to act independently in these fields. Although the push towards the inclusion of security and foreign affairs among the policies of the Union was partly seen as the logical continuation of the deepening process, indicating that the CFSP is the result of functionalist spillover, the need to reconcile national interests while advancing the EU project meant that the policy was approached with an intergovernmental solution. From this, the observation by Bretherton and Vogler that “despite its title, CFSP cannot be regarded as a common policy [...] rather it is a highly institutionalized and complex process of consultation and cooperation between Member State governments” (2006, pp. 163).

Although the CFSP was formally codified only with Maastricht in 1992, there previously existed structures to address matters of security and foreign affairs. As stated above,
in 1970 the Luxembourg Report launched the European Political Cooperation (EPC), an intergovernmental project with no institutional support that became the first forum for cooperation and coordination over foreign policy. A Secretariat for the EPC was established in 1987 by the Single European Act, the first treaty to give formal recognition to this process, which would remain at the level of intergovernmental exchanges between High Contracting Parties. During the 1970s and 1980s the EPC became increasingly entangled with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) creating room for enhanced dialogue and consultation with Eastern European countries. This proved to be positive and conducive to the emergence of some common positions in relation to particular issues of foreign affairs and security, as exemplified by the Venice Declaration of 1980 on the Middle East conflict and peace process. In 1990, after the Cold War was officially over and due to the pressures outlined above, the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union was convened, with the aim of transforming the EPC into a common policy for foreign and security affairs. The results of the Conference gave birth to the CFSP.

The CFSP as codified by Maastricht received several critiques for failing to clearly state strategic objectives and direction. As Fink-Hooijer points out, “[l]egally, there is no limit to the scope of the CFSP, as it covers virtually all areas of foreign and security policy” (1994, pp. 176). The treaty states that, when invoking action based on the CFSP, the Union should have among its objectives: to preserve European common values, fundamental interests and independence; bolster security at the supranational and domestic levels; maintain peace and international security as from the Charter of the United Nations; develop and strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. While the broad room for interpretation and application left by these objectives might lead to a certain degree of confusion and uncertainty, it also reflects the widely recognised objectives and norms of the European Union that have granted it the appellative of “normative power”.

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8 The objectives to which reference is made here are the ones states in section J.1 of the Treaty on European Union.
Indeed, the European Union has become increasingly perceived as an organisation which intends security not much and not merely in traditional, military terms but rather in human security ones. The Union has supported a variety of activities intended to enhance human security through the use of non-traditional instruments and in particular by focusing on the role of norms. As Stivachtis et al. (2013) point out, actions promoted by the European Union always further the norms of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Besides these “major” norms, some “minor” ones have also become part of the EU repertoire, including social solidarity, non-discrimination and minorities’ protection, sustainable development, and good governance. The focus on sustainable development and good governance are aspects strongly buttressed by the promoters of human security theories. According to these theories, the decrease in the incidence of inter-state conflict and the increase in the occurrence of intra-state conflict since the 1990s are indicative of a change in the nature of conflict. The main threats to a particular population are not represented anymore by external actors but rather by internal, domestic realities of poverty and underdevelopment. These contexts provide an ideal environment for insecurity to spread at the level of the individual and, from there, to extend to the state as a whole (Hampson, 2013; Thomas and Williams, 2013). In accordance with human security theories, the EU sees in development and poverty reduction the way forward towards security and peace.

The Maastricht Treaty created the CFSP with the following decision-making system. Proposals for action can come from the European Commission and from the Member States. This is rather intuitive. On the one hand, the European Commission is the supranational body that represents the interests of the Union as a whole and has the right to propose action and initiate legislation in most fields. On the other, the Member States may have their own interests to advance in the field of foreign and security policy especially, as will be shown below, in

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9 Theories of human security began to emerge during the 1990s. Although a lot has been written about it, there is no universally accepted definition of the concept. The two main schools are the United Nations Development Program one, which intends human security as freedom from want and freedom from fear, and the Canadian school, which focuses more on the freedom from fear part and analyses all of the issue areas proposed by the UNDP from a different perspective.
cases of historical and geographical proximity. Asking for European concerted action, rather than proceeding alone, can have benefits both in terms of resources and legitimacy. Once actions are proposed, it is up to the European Council to agree on a common strategy. The intergovernmental aspect of the CFSP becomes here extremely clear since the European Council comprises the Presidents and Heads of State of the Member States and it has to decide at unanimity. Following the decision by the European Council, the Council of Foreign Ministers is tasked with implementing such decisions by agreeing joint actions and common positions at qualified majority voting (QMV).

Given the critiques outlined earlier, the CFSP has been the subject of reforms on multiple occasions. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the post of High Representative for CFSP. The first person to assume this role was Javier Solana, former Foreign Minister of Spain and, at the time, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Amsterdam established that the HR would become part of the troika, together with the current and incoming Presidents of the European Council\textsuperscript{10}, representing the EU in international fora and on a variety of diplomatic occasions.

Considered the experience in the Balkans, and especially in Kosovo\textsuperscript{11}, in 1999 the Helsinki European Council launched the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the aim of establishing a military arm to the Union. Under the Treaty of Nice of 2003, this policy became formally part of the second pillar and the Political and Security Committee was created. As such, Nice marked a major change in the variety of means available to the Union. With the introduction of the CSDP, the Union shifted from a merely normative and civilian power to an actor with the legal ability to carry out military action. This move has been supported by some and strongly disdained by others, who see exactly in the normative and civilian aspects of European policies the main points of strength of the Union in its conduct of

\textsuperscript{10} Before Amsterdam, the troika used to comprise the previous, current and future Presidents of the European Council, and be assisted by the Commission. Given that the presidency of the Council rotates every six months, the troika has the general role to ensure continuity in the work of the Council. Its formation differs when it tackles issues in social and labour policy, economics and finance, judicial and police matters.

\textsuperscript{11} More about this below in the section on military means.
foreign and security affairs. Critics thus connote negatively the loss of this distinctive mark. However, it can be argued that with this move the Union does not aim to become a powerful military actor and in no way it aspires to a position that could challenge the role of the United States (Stivachtis et al., 2013). Rather, as highlighted by those who support the introduction of the CSDP, the military arm should serve the purpose of facilitating reaching the objectives traditionally supported by the Union in what is called its “comprehensive approach to security”.

In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon further detailed the mission of the Union as a security actor. It stated that “it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law” (Article 10A). Besides including this list of principles, Lisbon generated some major changes both in the realm of CFSP and in the EU as a whole. First of all, it dismantled the three-pillar structure, eliminating the distinction between strictly common and intergovernmental policies. Nevertheless, the reforms introduced in the CFSP structures and voting system still reaffirm an intergovernmental formula. With Lisbon, the HR becomes also the Vice President of the Commission. Proposals for action can be advanced by the HR (who therefore sort of represents the Commission in CFSP affairs) or by the member states. Again, the European Council has to take decisions at unanimity. And again, the Council of Foreign Affairs implements these decisions by agreeing joint actions and common positions. This is done generally at QMV but some exceptions exist, the major one being that QMV can never be used over decisions having military implications. On top of this, Lisbon rebranded the ESDP in terms of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), created the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European External Action Service (EEAS), analysed more in

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12 Moreover: the national brake applies, meaning that states can oppose the adoption of QMV for reasons of important national interest; constructive abstention is an option, meaning that states can abstain without blocking the decision –however, if the states abstaining from a decision represent more than one-third of the member states representing one-third of the population, the decision cannot be adopted--; the European Council can use QMV to appoint special representatives.
detail below, providing the Union with a proper diplomatic structure and with diplomatic missions in 140 countries.

1.3 Capability: how does the Union intervene?

Once a crisis reaches the top of the agenda and the European Council decides to take action, the Council of Foreign Affairs evaluates a variety of means to operationalize this decision. These can be broadly divided in three main categories: economic, diplomatic and military. The three categories are hereafter analysed. Because of the focus of this project, more thorough attention is given to the military aspect, which is peculiar of security affairs. However, given the comprehensive approach to security promoted and supported by the Union, it needs to be remembered that the Union considers these three kinds of action as equally important and that actually the decision to use military means is the most hotly debated every time a crisis emerges.

Apart from these three types of action, in the neighbourhood one additional tool has until recently been used to achieve security, that is, the promise of membership. Granting membership has been an important in the potential of the Community first and Union later for conflict resolution, allowing especially the later Union to avoid the development of conflict on the borders. However, given past overstretching, this strategy is not available anymore.

1.3.1 Economic and technical measures

Economic and technical aid were the first means used by the Community to further foreign and security interests. Their use date back to the 1950s and 1960s, when the European Economic Community started to establish delegations in third countries. Initially, these delegations were not granted full diplomatic recognition and were only concerned with development projects. Yet, as "the 'demand for Europe' grew on the international stage, the European Commission
[took] the first steps to be present in the wider world. These were driven both by internal and external pressures. On the internal stage, the Commission, willing to increase the visibility of the Community and establish it as a legitimately recognised international player, was majorly active in outreach efforts. On the external stage, the demand for Europe came especially from the ex-colonies seeking development and technical aid. The European Agency for Cooperation was created in 1965 to advance the interests of the Union in this sense, becoming the first agency effectively dealing with foreign relations. The number of delegations grew constantly over the years moving from 21 in 1965, to 41 ten years later, and reaching 80 by the end of the Cold War.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a change in the aims of the new delegations, with security aspects acquiring more relevance in their mandates. This has especially been true for delegations set up in ex-Soviet countries. The aim of the newly born Union in these countries was to curb the instability and avoid the escalation that could stem from the power vacuum left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to prevent a similar scenario, the delivery of massive economic and technical aid was envisioned. Such delivery was also partly a response to increasing demands by some of these countries, which wished to modernise their economic, political and legal structures in the hope of becoming eligible for EU membership. Nevertheless, the stated aim of speeding up the accession process actually hid the important objective of avoiding conflict in the neighbourhood, to be reached by supporting the creation of European-like democracies and eventually their inclusion in the Union or the institutionalisation of cooperative relations. This approach was extended also to other neighbouring countries, especially in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia.

Economic measures can be used as a tool in situations of crisis also in a negative way, a process known as “aid conditionality”. Indeed, the Union can decide to withdraw or stop the

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14 Ad hoc instruments have been created for these countries, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European Development Fund. Some of the tasks and competencies of these structures are overlapping with those of the CSDP. Again, this needs to be considered in the wider perspective of the comprehensive approach, whereby these measures are considered as providing the prerequisites for security in the affected areas.
resources from being delivered, thus imposing economic sanctions. This usually occurs when gross violations of human rights are revealed. In applying this kind of sanctions, the Union tries to hit specific targets, so as not to put the entire population, and especially the poorest, under additional pressures. Moreover, the delivery of aid, as provided by existing action plans or by other instruments, can be halted in case the conditions are not met. In offering aid to third countries the Union always conditions it on the maintenance of good human rights records and the development of democratic institutions. This is congruent with its comprehensive approach, which understands stability and security as inescapably related to development, and development as dependent on good governance and a free and functioning society. Subsequent practice has not however always satisfied written laws and conditions.

1.3.2 Diplomatic efforts

The role of the EU as a diplomatic actor in foreign and international crises has existed for some time but was formalised only recently. As stated above, the Amsterdam Treaty created the post of High Representative (HR) and the Lisbon one reinforced it by transforming the Commission Delegations into proper European Union Delegations under the European External Action Service (EAS). As of December 2014, this diplomatic service counts 140 delegations with a variety of tasks. One of their main tasks is related to the presence aspect, since these permanent detachments make the outreaching efforts of the Union more permanent and visible. In the realm of security, the delegations can collect first-hand data about how crises are emerging and evolving in foreign countries. Hence, they are able to provide Brussels with continuously updated information about the situation on the ground, helping the HR and the European Council to take informed decisions.

The diplomatic efforts of the High Representative and the various EAS missions have become particularly clear during recent crises. An example is the Ukrainian crisis, which will be analysed more thoroughly below. Catherine Ashton was the HR when the crisis started. She
was active since its earlier phases, in November 2013, and Ukraine is still one of the first entries on the Foreign Council agenda one year later. Looking at longer-term cases, diplomatic action has been undertaken also with respect to the Middle East Peace Process, where the EU is one of the four parties to the on-going Quartet on the Middle East, or Madrid Quartet. Furthermore, diplomacy is used as a means of constant presence in post-conflict areas, where stability remains an issue. For example, the HR has been constantly traveling to Egypt since the fall of the Mubarak Regime in 2011 and has been engaging in talks with a variety of officials and representatives. The aim of this effort is to keep a critical eye on the neighbourhood while maintaining cooperative relations. As Catherine Ashton put it: “We are good friends, but we are also critical friends” 15. The need for this critical presence is further underlined by the fact that these countries are generally part of other frameworks, like the European Neighbourhood Policy, which require the uphold of certain standards in terms of democracy and human rights, likely to be missing in situations of crisis. By maintaining a constant presence and critical eye, the Union hopes to not have to impose economic sanctions or cuts in the conditioned aid packages established.

To help the Union maintain such a clear vision in the countries and regions that are of most interest to it and define action consistent with the needs on the ground, the Union has also created the post of Special Representative. At the time of writing, ten special representatives exist. They are active in troubled regions and countries and use their energies in efforts aimed at the consolidation of peace, stability and the rule of law16.

Again, diplomatic efforts can be used in a negative way, by imposing diplomatic sanctions on the countries concerned or on parties within them. For instance, during the Ukraine crisis the Union approved travel bans for targeted Russian and Ukrainian officials.

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16 The EU Special Representatives cover the following 10 regions, countries and organisations: Afghanistan, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Kosovo, the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Southern Mediterranean region and Sudan.
1.3.3 Military means

As outlined above, the military option has become ever more a reality over the past two decades. The eruption of the wars that led to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was accompanied by a strong debate over the possibility to have a European military force. This debate was not new. The idea of a European army had already been considered during the early 1950s when, with the Korean war on-going, the US had started to push for the rearmament of Germany so as to be able to reallocate some American troops from Europe to South East Asia and, meanwhile, to create a stronger anti-communist front in the old continent. In those circumstances, talks emerged about a fusion complète whereby national armies would cease to exist individually and would be merged into a supranational, European army under the European Defence Community (EDC). The text for the EDC was proposed by France in 1952. Needless to say, it was highly debated and the original plan never came into force. Interestingly, it was exactly the French, once more, who blocked the text from being adopted and took advantage of the political turmoil the EDC was causing to advance its private agenda. This agenda had two main objectives, both of which were successful. First, France succeeded in keeping US troops in Europe, an objective it deemed necessary because of current European weakness and because France itself was involved in the Indo-China war against the Vietminh, which was occupying most of its military potential. Being France at the time the only country in the Community with a high amount of forces and considering the historical moment, it had a special interest in American presence on European soil. Second, it managed to postpone to 1955 the attainment of full sovereignty by West Germany, thus delaying its rearmament and joining of NATO (Dedman, 2010).

Following the failure of the EDC, the choice was taken in favour of the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was approved in 1954, had 12 members, no standing forces and was part of NATO and, later, of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. Originally supposed to be the defence arm of the nascent organisation, the WEU merely served as a forum for consultation until 1984. During those years, it made significant contributions to the dialogue on European security and defence. In 1984, following a joint meeting by the defence and foreign ministers of WEU states in Rome, a declaration was released that is perceived as representing the ‘reactivation’ of the WEU. It affirmed that the WEU should broaden its scope and widen the focus from internal European matters to other regions, so as to consider the potential implications of outside crises on European security.

No other major plans were put forward calling for a European military force until the 1990s. Then, with the Maastricht Treaty under ratification and war waging in the Balkans, Europe felt that its raison d’être, the maintenance of peace and security on the continent, was at stake but was also close to be achieved. In the words of Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, “We really have today a rendezvous with history”\(^\text{18}\). And as Jacques Poos, then Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, declared: “It is the hour of Europe, not of the Americans”\(^\text{19}\). The expectations both inside and outside the Union were therefore high. Comparatively, EU performance was deemed unsatisfactory: the debate was extensive, but no united answer could be found. After almost three years of inaction, in 1994 Britain and France set up a rapid reaction force and intervened militarily, thus marking a move away from economic and diplomatic initiatives and the first ever military mission under EU auspices. The fact that Britain and France were the two countries to finally intervene is an indicator not only of their practical ability to do so, but also, and especially, about their political willingness to play a major role in EU’s foreign and security decisions. Their position as geopolitical players, analysed more in depth below, was already being built before the birth of the Security and Defence Policy.

\(^{17}\) The CSCE was born in 1973. In 1995 it was renamed Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).


\(^{19}\) Cited in: Anderson, 2007
The Maastricht Treaty established that the Council of Foreign Affairs could ask the WEU to implement decisions in accordance with the Petersberg Tasks. The Petersberg Tasks were the result of the 1992 WEU Council of Ministers that took place near Bonn, in Germany, and defined for the WEU three kinds of action: humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management.

Given the unmet expectations of the Yugoslav crises, in 1999 the Helsinki Council launched the ESDP, now CSDP, with the goal to be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 60,000 persons capable of the full range of the Petersberg Tasks (Helsinki Annex IV). The commitment of troops, however, was slow.

The Treaty of Nice of 2003 introduced three novelties in the realm of security policy. First, it incorporated the mutual assistance clause, according to which “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 [the right to self-defence] of the United Nations Charter” (TEU, Article 42.7.). Secondly, Nice created the EU civil and military planning cell. Finally, it put forward the concept of battlegroup, envisaging the creation of 18 groups of 1500 troops rotating continuously with 2 always ready to intervene upon request by the UN within 5-10 days, and others stationing in EU missions. Larger member states are supposed to have their own battlegroups while small ones can pull resources together and create a multinational battlegroup. As of December 2014, no battlegroup has been deployed yet because of political reasons, with countries, especially Germany, showing a remarkable unwillingness to commit as per the rotation calendar. Rather, bigger and longer military missions are deployed in situations of crisis if unanimously approved by the Council. No standard contingent composition exists, but rather proximity issues, especially colonial history, have a strong impact on the troops’ composition. For instance, the mission to the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR), which started in February of 2014, is commanded by a French general while the Force Commander of the
EUFOR ALTHEA mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in 2004, is Austrian. Moreover, not all countries have to commit troops in equal portions and nations that are not EU members can participate in the missions as partners. As an example, most of the troops deployed to EUFOR CAR are French while EUFOR ALTHEA has benefited from the participation of five partner nations among which are Albania, Turkey and Chile.

In 2000, following the Marseille Council, it was decided that the WEU tasks would be gradually incorporated into existing and new EU structures. This shift of responsibilities took ten years, and the WEU officially disappeared in 2011.

Despite the existence of the battlegroup concept, the commission of assets and capabilities to the Union’s missions is always voluntary and thus depends on the willingness of the member states to contribute. This has caused delays in mission deployments and it also means that often the missions do not reach the target commitment as scheduled. Partly to facilitate mission deployment and partly to avoid unnecessary doubling of resources, in 2002 the Berlin-Plus Agreement established that the Union can make use of NATO assets and capabilities for operations of crisis management led by the Union itself.

Lisbon significantly reaffirmed the solidarity clause, which states that ‘the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if an EU Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’ (TFEU Art. 222). Moreover, it underlined the importance of the concept of permanent structured cooperation. This is an agreement for ‘Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’ (TEU Art. 42.6). Member States are encouraged to: cooperate to reach objectives concerning expenditure on equipment, harmonise defence apparatuses, pool and specialise resources when appropriate, and coordinate logistics and training.

It is often believed that EUROCORPS are part of the EU structures. This is however not the case. EUROCORPS are an intergovernmental army comprising 1000 soldiers stationed in Strasbourg and supporting, upon request, organisations such as the UN, EU, NATO, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
1.4 Opportunity: when does the Union act?

1.4.1 The European Security Strategy

Although the CFSP and CSDP were both formulated in the 90s, the Union only clearly defined its security strategy in 2003 with the European Security Strategy (ESS). This document, produced by the European Council and formally titled “A secure Europe in a better world”, specifies the threats to the Union and the kind of environment that favours their formation and that thus should prompt the Union to intervene. In 2008, the Council issued a report on the results of the first five years of action on the identified threats.

According to the ESS, weapons of mass destruction are potentially the biggest threat to European security. The Union is particularly weary of an arms race in the Middle East and of the spread of biological weapons. “The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction” (pp. 4). Terrorism is hence another major threat, with Europe being both a target and a base for it. The Madrid and London terrorist attacks of 2004 and 2005 proved this point, as did the following investigations, which found that “[terrorist] home-grown groups play and increasing role within our own continent” (European Council 2008, pp. 12). Regional conflicts have direct and indirect impacts on European interests. The ESS makes reference to the ones in the Kashmir and Great Lakes regions, the Korean peninsula and, in particular, the Middle East. The same goes for failed states, among which the ESS cites Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban. Finally, “Europe is a prime target for organised crime” (pp. 4), which affects both the internal and external dimensions through cross-border trafficking of mainly drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons, and the money-laundering systems that have developed in parallel to these traffics. Moreover, a new dimension of organised crime is maritime piracy. Piracy affects especially the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden and, considering that “[t]he world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade” (Council 2008, pp. 20), can have a highly destabilising effect.
The ESS recognises that “[i]n many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict” (pp. 2). The term “human security” appears multiple times in the strategy, which defines the threats as “dynamic” and adds that none of them “is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (pp. 7). Also, most of the time these threats do not emerge independently, but rather a mix of threats is often the case, with weak and failing institutions resulting in a lack of human security that creates a favourable environment for insurgency, power vacuum, and the emergence of organised crime and terrorist groups. It is in this perspective that the comprehensive approach favoured by the Union is best appreciated. Major and Mölling (2009, pp. 21) describe the comprehensive approach as “an all-encompassing response to a crisis”. They draw the difference with the traditional approach to crises in the following terms: “[i]f traditional peacekeeping focused on containing military escalation, contemporary crisis management aims at a social, political, and economic transformation to reach a comprehensive and sustainable conflict resolution” (ibid.). Rather than a security strategy, therefore, it is argued that the ESS has more the elements of a foreign strategy.

1.4.2 Proximity

The threats outlined in the ESS become even more pressing when they emerge in the neighbourhood. The strategy clearly states the importance of this geographical area, saying that the Union should “promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean” (ESS, pp. 8). The maps in Appendix A show the countries, type of mission (military or civilian) and width of the missions initiated or concluded under the auspices of the ESDP. As can be seen, the Union has a tendency to act in two groups of countries, corresponding to two kinds of proximity relation: geographical and historical.
The first group is that of the neighbourhood in strict terms - geographical proximity. The Union has developed a proper policy to deal with geographically close countries, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which includes 16 countries and has the major aim of granting stability on the borders. ENP, CFSP and CSDP are sometimes clashing or overlapping. An example is the crisis in the Sahel. Morocco is formally part of the ENP and the Union has undertaken some action and discussion about the Sahel crisis within the frameworks of the CFSP by designating a Special Representative for the Sahel. However, no CSDP mission has been created specifically for this crisis. Geographical proximity extends beyond the ENP. Countries that are not included in it, especially the Balkans, have been the object of European action on various occasions, even before the CSDP was born. Indeed, the wars that led to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the early 90s were the first instances where the Community was willing and to a certain extent asked to intervene. Over the decade since the ESS was first released, the Union, while promoting good governance in the neighbourhood, has arguably not been able to achieve it, as attested by the high levels of public corruption reported for most of these countries.

The other group of countries where the Union has been highly active comprises the ex-colonies. Proximity, in this case, hinges on close historical, legal and language relations. The countries included in this second group are mainly in Africa and the Middle East. The kind of conflicts that they are experiencing are mostly of the post-colonial type and stem from ethnic, territorial and religious disputes. Often times, these countries are still extremely poor and underdeveloped, making the European comprehensive approach to security a highly valuable option. Hence, military missions are generally coupled with high levels of humanitarian and

21 The countries falling in the scope of the ENP are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Ukraine. Algeria is part of the ENP but is still negotiating an action plan. Belarus, Libya and Syria are part of it but remain outside most of its structures.

22 The EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) has among its objectives that of helping the Malian government to exercise fully its sovereignty over the entire territory of the country. It thus includes part of the Sahel, despite not being specifically dedicated to it.
technical aid. Where the crisis is still on the escalation phase or where no unanimity of decision can be reached over the creation of a military mission, civilian missions are encouraged.
Part 2

Factors favouring European intervention

In the first part of this project, the aspects of presence, capability and opportunity have been extensively analysed. This second part outlines when the Union intervenes, or refrains from doing so. Given the focus of the present project, the opportunity aspect is the most relevant one. The coming sections are concerned with understanding, given past experiences, what kind of factors favour or constrain the willingness and ability of the Union to intervene and in particular develop and deploy a mission. I will analyse the effect on final decisions of, first, the presence of a UN mandate and of intervention by other international actors; second, the effect of the nature of the conflict, especially whether it is internal or inter-state; and finally, the role played by the member states, their preferences and their motivations.

The following analysis focuses on the missions carried out within the framework of the CSDP. Since its launch and as of December 2014, thirty-three missions have been launched. Of these, eleven are military and the rest have civilian character. The coming sections devote more attention to military missions, which are analysed by making reference to EU documents, press releases and other existing literature. Moreover, some civilian missions are presented as well, based on their relevance to the analysis.

2.1 International presence, U.N. resolutions and the quest for legitimacy

The ESS recognises that “[European] security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system” (pp. 9). Multilateralism is hence a major objective of the Union in its action in the realm of foreign and security affairs and, as further stated by the Strategy, the Union needs “to be more active, more coherent and more capable” (pp. 11). In light of this, my main first argument is phrased as follows:
The European Union only takes action in the presence of a UN resolution and when other third parties and international organisations are involved in efforts of de-escalation and resolution on the ground.

Why should this be the case? Acting only in the presence of UN Resolutions ensures that the Union is acting in accordance with international law. Given the normative aspects of the European approach, this is extremely important. Indeed, it is among the aims of the Union to support the spread of the rule of law and of internationally accepted norms. In this way, as stated in Part 1, regularised patterns of interaction emerge, allowing for predictability within the system. In a way, by doing so the Union is trying to extend the norms whose emergence resulted in the European security community, a successful project, beyond its borders.

2.1.1 United Nations’ mandates

This argument has received support over the years by a variety of events. First and foremost, it has been noted that everything the Union does in the field of security is connected to the objectives set out by the UN in its Charter and subsequent Resolutions (European Council, 2008). Of the eleven military missions initiated and completed under the CSDP framework, as can be seen from the table reported in Appendix B, seven received an ex-ante, explicit approval by a Resolution of the Security Council. For the two missions in the territory and off the coast of Somalia23, the UN did not explicitly approve a European action but rather, in multiple Resolutions, called for international intervention in the area. Based on these, the EU decided to launch Operation Atalanta in December 2008 to combat piracy and permit the delivery of aid by the World Food Programme. This is the first and only naval operation ever launched by the Union, and is still on-going as of December 2014. The UN has endorsed this operation and

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23 Operation EUTM Somalia and EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta.
commended the Union for it in subsequent Resolutions. The only mission for which no specific UN mandate exists is Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This was the first military operation ever to be carried out within the framework of the CSDP. The operation came in response to an explicit request by the Government of Macedonia. The UN had nevertheless issued two resolutions in 2001 that, despite not specifically authorising a European action, did not rule out third-party intervention.  

Being a Resolution an instrument of law, however, it is subject to the interpretation of its readers. As such, if the resolution is not clear in its statements of what it is permitted under it, differing interpretations can emerge and possibly result in disagreements and conflicts. Two cases are exemplary in this respect: the discussions over the establishment of a mission in Afghanistan in 2001 and of one in Iraq in 2003.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States declared what became known as the “war on terror”. On September 12, the Security Council issued Resolution 1368 where it “unequivocally” condemned the attacks, called “on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors” (paragraph 3) and expressed “its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations” (paragraph 5). The Resolution did not explicitly authorise action. Nevertheless, the words “all necessary steps” left wide room for interpretation. While the Bush administration interpreted them as allowing, or at least not prohibiting, military intervention, in Europe the issue was debated more strongly. All EU countries recognised the challenge and threat posed by terrorism and were sympathetic with the issue. However, the fact that the Resolution did not expressly authorise military intervention resulted in a debate over the legitimacy of such action.

24 In 2001, the UN Security Council issued Resolutions 1345 and 1371, which did not explicitly call for European action. This is understandable since the CSDP was launched by the Helsinki Council in 1999 but was incorporated into the Treaty of Nice only in 2003.
The United States and the United Kingdom tried to curb this debate by making reference to self-defence, a right entrenched in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Some European countries responded by claiming that, at the same time, Article 2(3) of the Charter states that “[a]ll members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”. In this perspective, the EU welcomed the subsequent Resolution 1373 of September 28, which focused on the financial feasibility of terrorist groups and held that all states shall prevent, suppress, freeze, prohibit and refrain from providing any financing to terrorists. Although some Member States favoured intervention under the EU flag, the issue of a European mission never became strong on the agenda because the US called for intervention under NATO, stressing the clause whereby an attack on one member shall be considered as an attack on all. Intervention took place through NATO and, in 2003, NATO became the leader of the International Security Assistance Force, an all-encompassing mission aimed at reconstruction and at the establishment of good governance in Afghanistan. Within this mission, the European Union has played a role through EUPOL, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan.

The debate over possible EU intervention was not so swift when America called for European support in the war in Iraq in 2003. Allegedly, Iraq was producing nuclear weapons and had not upheld his promises in response to Resolution 1441 of 2002, where the Security Council had asked it to cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission and with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Resolution recalled that, should Iraq keep violating its obligations, it would “face serious consequences” (paragraph 13). Nevertheless,

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25 UN Charter, Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

26 NATO charter, Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
the Resolution did not explicitly authorise the use of force and, on top of this, no proof existed that Iraq had nuclear weapons, nor that it had the capability to produce them.

A harsh debate emerged in Europe. While those against intervention, with France in the first line, advanced the cited arguments, those in favour of it, particularly the United Kingdom, claimed that, by not intervening, the credibility and perceived legitimacy of the Security Council would be lost, and a dangerous precedent would be created\(^\text{27}\). These arguments did not result to be strong enough and no CSDP mission was approved. Some countries, notably Britain, unilaterally decided to support the US-led intervention, but the EU only intervened in Iraq in 2005. The CSDP mission, known as EUJUST LEX-Iraq, is a civilian crisis management mission launched upon the request of the Prime Minister of the Iraqi interim government, Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Al-Jaafari wished to create a class of prepared professionals ready to set up and work in the criminal justice system. The mission, which ended in 2013, was therefore mandated to “address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and mid level officials in senior management and criminal investigation. This training shall aim to improve the capacity, coordination and collaboration of the different components of the Iraqi criminal justice system”\(^\text{28}\). The mission statement further indicates that “[t]he training activities shall take place in the EU or in the region and EUJUST LEX shall have a liaison office in Baghdad”\(^\text{29}\). The facts that the mission was launched only upon the request of the Iraqi government, that it was not headquartered in Baghdad and that it had civilian nature all support the claim that the EU was unwilling to intervene where a specific Security Council authorisation to use force lacked.

\(\text{27}\) This section analyses only the legal arguments in the debate over intervention in Iraq. In section 2.3 other arguments will be presented.

\(\text{28}\) Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP, Article 2, paragraph 1.

\(\text{29}\) Ibid., Article 2, paragraph 3.
2.1.2 Multilateralism

As stated above, “effective multilateralism” is a main objective of the European Security Strategy. This is the case because of a normative aspect, namely that the Union believes multilateralism brings increased legitimacy to the missions and results in reinforced international institutions, and because of practicality issues. Indeed, intervening with others or where others are already present allows for economies of scale, a more efficient use of resources, and for coordination of actions by different actors, and thus a more comprehensive and, theoretically, effective management of the crisis. As Appendix B shows, of the eleven military missions carried out under the CSDP framework, in only one case no third parties were present. This is the case of the naval operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. Nevertheless, also in this case some third-party intervention exists in the sense that the mission took over from a NATO operation, Operation Allied Provider, which began upon request of the UN Secretary General on October 24 with the aim of escorting World Food Programme ships and conducting patrols to deter pirate attacks. The NATO mission formally ended on December 12, when Operation Atalanta started. Considering the existence of the Berlin-Plus Agreement, it is plausible that the new EU command made use of NATO assets already in place.

The main partner for the EU in military operations is the UN. In seven of the crises tackled by EU military missions, the UN had its proper mission and in one (UNAMID in Darfur) a hybrid mission composed of UN and African Union (AU) troops was created. UN missions tend to have a bigger size and last longer than European ones. As Gowan (2009) comments, “the UN and EU are the Obelix and Asterix of international security: one handling big, slow missions while the other concentrates on smaller, flexible, operations”30. The Union collaborates also with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is involved mainly in conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and central Asia; the African

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30 This comment was first published in another piece by the same author, “The EU still needs UN Peacekeepers”, which appeared on May 21, 2008 in the independent online newspaper EU Observer, available at www.euobserver.com.
Union and NATO. Additionally, missions by non-governmental organisations sometimes exist on the ground, as was the case in eastern Chad in 2008 with Christian missions. 

In most of the cases, European intervention follows the one by other international actors and often the EU is specifically mandated to support them. This was exemplified by the mission EUFOR DR Congo, deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The mission was launched in June of 2006 upon a request by the UN and in agreement with the country government. Authorised by Security Council Resolution 1671, it had the aim of supporting MONUC, the UN mission to the DRC, to secure the area during the historical elections. It lasted for five months, so was short when compared to the UN one. The elections proceeded in a relatively smooth way, making the operation successful according to its defined goal. However, as two scholars noted before its launch, the operation was to be “limited, brief, risk-averse and ultimately ineffective” (cited in: Rodt 2011). Indeed, the operation had no effect on the general on-going conflict in the DRC, Europe secured the area around the capital for the election period, but kept most of its troops in nearby Gabon. After its mandate was successfully concluded, it was quick to leave.

The Union, however, can also intervene before other parties do so. In January 2008 it launched EUFOR Tchad/CAR, a military mission based on Resolution 1778 of September 2007. Part of the European regional approach to the Darfur crisis, EUFOR Tchad/CAR

31 In Chad, a combination of religions are practiced. More than one-third of the population is Christian, making it one of the two major religious groups, the other being Muslims. Christian Aid is very active in Chad and, while advancing its missionary purposes, it has also been dealing with influxes of refugees coming from neighbouring Darfur.


33 The UN has had a mission in the DRC since 1999. Started as MONUC, in 2010 the name was changed to MONUSCO, a mission with a larger mandate. In its application of the comprehensive approach, the EU launched also two civilian missions in the DRC, EUSEC DR CONGO - an advisory and security reform mission, and EUPOL KINSHASA – aimed at helping set up an Integrated Police Unit and train them to international standards.

34 While the operation achieved its goal, thus being successful on Rodt’s internal attainment criterion, it was only partially successful with respect to the internal appropriateness one. This point is analysed further in section 2.3.

35 The comment first appeared in the International Herald Tribune in a piece written by Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian Giegerich and titled “In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation”. The article is available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/12/opinion/12iht-edhaine.1954062.html? r=0
preceded the deployment of UN mission MINURCAT. In fact, MINURCAT took over from the EU on March 15, 2009 following Resolution 1834. The EU and UN cooperated closely to make the handover swift. The UN was already tackling the Darfur conflict through other missions, which however did not cover refugees in that particular area.

Considering the case of Operation Concordia in Macedonia cited earlier, and not mandated by the UN, it took over Operation Allied Harmony in March of 2003. Allied Harmony had been launched by NATO in December of the previous year. Also, the Berlin-Plus Agreement, allowing it to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for its own missions, had been concluded only in 2002. Most of the NATO mission was composed by Europeans, making the taking over a relatively easy process. Since this was EU’s first military mission, having NATO structures already on the ground allowed it to avoid problems in deployment and was instrumental in making the mission quickly successful. Moreover, OSCE had deployed a mission in Macedonia since September 1992, providing continuous reports about the situation on the ground and how it was changing. In light of this, the Union had plenty of reliable information useful for appreciating the nature of the environment and planning a suitable operation. As such, multilateralism has allowed the Union to be more effective since its earliest military action.

Not only in its military missions, but also in the civilian ones does the EU advocate multilateral intervention. Considering the example of Iraq, the mission statement for EUJUST LEX holds that the mission shall be “independent and distinct but shall be complementary and bring added value to ongoing international efforts, in particular of the United Nations, as well as develop synergies with ongoing Community and Member States efforts. In this context, EUJUST LEX shall liaise with Member States who presently conduct training projects”. The last part of this statement refers to the fact that occasionally the Union collaborates with its

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37 The missions deployed for the Darfur conflict included AMIS by the UN, a NATO support mission and later a hybrid mission by the UN and AU called UNAMID.

38 Ibid., see above: note 29, Article 2, paragraph 5.
own Member States. In Iraq, Germany has been engaged since 2003, supporting a variety of programmes especially in the fields of rule of law and human rights. Germany has assumed a leading role in EUJUST LEX while at the same time collaborating with the UN and other third parties. As such, it has acted both as part of the EU and in a bilateral relation with it.

Apart from taking action under UN mandates and in coordination with other third parties, the EU can also decide not to intervene despite being specifically asked to do so. This happened most blatantly in 2008. In that year, the UN asked the Union to intervene again in the DRC in support of its MONUC mission there. The mission “was to serve to protect vulnerable refugees against an impending man-made humanitarian disaster” (Pohl 2014, pp. 195). The European Union had already intervened militarily in the DRC twice. First, it had launched Operation Artemis in 2003 and then, in 2006, EUFOR DR Congo had followed. Both interventions had been short, the first lasting two and a half months, the second lasting five, and aimed at supporting MONUC. Following the offensive mounted by militia in eastern DRC in the autumn of 2008, which displaced 200,000 people, the UN asked the EU to intervene again. Pohl titles the section of his article dealing with this fact “From EUFOR to NOFOR” (ibid.). The Secretary General went so far as to send a letter describing “EU reinforcement as ‘necessary’, ‘essential’ and ‘critical’” (Ibid., pp. 197) given that the situation on the ground was one of “near total disintegration of the Congolese national armed forces” (Secretary General, 2008). Nevertheless, the letter went unanswered, putting into question the trustworthiness of the Union as an international security actor. As analysed more in depth below in part 2.3, while legitimacy and multilateralism are important to the Union, more determinant in eventually deciding whether military intervention will take place are the wishes and preoccupations of the Member States.

39 In the realms of human rights and the rule of law, Germany has collaborated with the United Nations Development Programme, the European Technology and Training Centre, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, the Judicial Education and Development Institute in Baghdad, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.
40 The original letter by the Secretary General, dated December 4, 2008, is available at: http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxxyy/0/50/29/09/20081208180218514.pdf
2.2 Crises nature and the preference for intervention in intra-state crises

Countries can enter security crises because of a variety of reasons. Conflicts having as their origin disagreements related to territory, religion and ethnicity are well known. But also, countries can enter into conflict because of ideology differences or incompatible systems of values. Sometimes a mix of these reasons exists, making the appreciation of the exact roots of the conflict difficult. In all cases, widespread poverty and underdevelopment result in grievances that make descending into a crisis more likely. Apart from the roots of the conflict, its nature can be defined also along another line, that of domestic versus international conflict. It is to this line that the EU seems to be paying more attention. The second main argument of this project then goes a follows:

In terms of nature of the conflict, for the European Union to intervene it has to be of the intra-state type rather than interstate. The roots of the conflict (ethnicity, territory, religion, politics) are not a factor considered when deciding over intervention.

Given the nature of today’s conflicts, this does not come as a surprise since the number of interstate conflicts in the world decreased significantly after World War II. Considering the first decade of existence of the ESDP/CSDP (1999-2008), for which the PRIO/UCDP database contains data, out of the almost 80 conflicts reported for the period only 4 are defined as interstate, 18 governments are cited as the main party in internationalised internal conflicts, and 55 as the main party in purely internal conflicts.\(^{41}\)

\(^{41}\) Governments can appear more than once if they are involved in conflicts on different fronts, with different sovereign and/or non-sovereign actors at the same time.
While the PRIO/UCDP database lists four possible types of conflicts (extrastemic, interstate, internal and internationalised internal), in my database I only differentiate between inter and intra-state conflicts. While the EU did not intervene in any of the interstate conflict as identified by PRIO/UCDP, I count Georgia, Afghanistan and Iraq (internationalised internal in PRIO/UCDP) as interstate ones. I also consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an interstate one after the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. While the number of interstate conflicts in the world has decreased, applying this definition allows me to identify some patterns when comparing EU interventions in intra-state versus inter-state conflicts, especially with respect to the kind of mission established. There is a strong preference for establishing military missions in intra-state conflicts rather than inter-state ones. Of the eleven military missions deployed, eight tackled domestic crises. The missions to Darfur and Mali were concerned with domestic conflicts but were undertaken in a regional perspective. For Darfur, the Union adopted a regional approach because of the pressures created by the continuous flow of refugees, requiring coordination with neighbouring Chad and, to a certain extent, with the Central African Republic. In Mali, the Union established a mission following the escalation of the crisis between the government and the Tuaregs. However, increasing tensions with the Tuaregs have affected the entire Sahel region, intensifying a conflict that had never been settled but used to be more dormant. The change in the situation on the ground happened after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the consequent return of armed Tuaregs from that country. Finally, Operation Atalanta takes place mainly in international waters, tackling an issue, that of piracy, which is not properly affiliated with any state.

The picture is more varied for civilian missions. Of the twenty-two civilian missions initiated and concluded under the CSDP framework, six were established in conflicts that I deem interstate: two in the Palestinian Territories, one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, one in Georgia and one to deal with the border issues between Moldova and Ukraine (an issue not included in PRIO/UCDP. All of these missions address judiciary and police weaknesses, and
are aimed at stabilisation and confidence building. The most recent civilian mission that tackles an inter-state conflict is the one launched in Georgia in the aftermath of the six-days war of August 2008 with Russia. EUMM Georgia coordinates its efforts with those of UNOMIG and of the OSCE office. Its main purpose is to monitor the actions of the parties and “to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.” The mission is still on-going as of December 2014.

Among the other civilian missions, two address domestic crises within a regionalised conflict, EUCAP SAHEL Mali and EUCAP SAHEL Niger. Moreover, one missions tackles the issue of weak maritime governance off the Horn of Africa and in the western Indian Ocean. This mission, called EUCAP NESTOR, focuses on Djibouti, Somalia, the Seychelles, Tanzania and Yemen. Although no inter-state conflict exists among these countries, the mission deals with weaknesses in maritime governance that affect a variety of countries in the same area. Its objective is the development of self-sustainable capabilities for enhanced maritime security. Given that maritime governance requires coordinated efforts by multiple countries, the mission also aims to develop best practices for cooperation in accordance with international standards. In doing so, it is often challenged by the different levels of development and states’ capabilities of the concerned countries and by the different cultures.

As stated in Part 1, the European Security Strategy identifies regional conflicts as one of the main threats to the interests of the Union. However, tackling a regional security issue by supporting multinational intervention, as is the case in EUCAP NESTOR, is a hard task. Such interventions require willingness on the part of the afflicted states to collaborate and coordinate their actions. Assuming that this is the case in theory, it might still be difficult and time-consuming to transform it into practice. The fact that EUCAP NESTOR is now entering its thirtieth month of deployment, with no prospects for a quick ending, supports this point. As an

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42 Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP, Article 2, paragraph 1.
43 EUCAP NESTOR was launched on July 16, 2012 through the Council Joint Action 2012/389/CFSP.
alternative, the Union has decided to launch independent missions in the various countries affected by the regional security issue. Such is the case in the Sahel, where the Union created two separate civilian missions in Mali and Niger and a Special Representative mandated with coordination and monitoring tasks over them.

Interestingly, the ESS cites the regional conflicts of Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean peninsula and the Middle East as having impacts on Europe. However, no mission has been deployed to tackle any of them besides the Middle East, further supporting the argument that intervention in regional, inter-state crises is not preferred by the Union. As far as the Middle East is concerned, of the four civilian missions deployed there only two tackle a regional conflict, namely the ones in the Palestinian Territories. EUPOL Afghanistan and EUJUST LEX-Iraq, on the other hand, are deployed to countries where war was not initiated by a regional country but rather by an extra-regional one. Although those wars have been interlinked with previously existing regional dynamics and their results have affected the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict and created new dynamics within it, they were not initially declared as part of the regional conflict.

What stems from the entire discussion above is that, while Europe recognises regional conflicts as a main threat to its interests, it does not tackle them through a regionalised approach. As can be seen from Appendix B and Appendix C, missions tend to be launched either to tackle conflicts that are specifically intra-state or to deal with domestic aspects of regional conflicts. In those occasions where action was taken in the presence of purely intra-state conflicts it was nevertheless done through a civilian rather than a military mission. Two reflections need to be added in this context, respectively on proximity and on the changing nature of conflict.

While it is true that the ESS holds the above-cited regional conflicts as a main threat for Europe, only the one in the Middle East can be considered proximate to the Union according to both the geographical and historical criteria outlined in Part 1. The Korean peninsula has no
kind of proximity to Europe, since it is neither geographically close nor is there a history of colonisation connecting it to a particular country in the Union. The Kashmir conflict has some historical proximity to the Union, since it stems from the partition of India and Pakistan by Britain in 1947. According to that partition, the Kashmir region, which is mainly inhabited by Muslims, belongs to Pakistan. India, however, believes it has a historical legal right to controlling it. Besides historical proximity, the reason why the Union considers the conflict over Kashmir as a major threat is because both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, and the ESS holds weapons of mass destruction as possibly the main threat to Europe, especially if in conjunction with terrorist groups, whose presence has been confirmed in Pakistan.

Finally, the African Great Lakes Region has tight historical proximity to Europe despite being geographically distant. The Region covers the countries of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC. Of these, the first three were originally conquered by Germany. After the defeat of Germany in World War I, the League of Nations decided that Burundi and Rwanda would become part of the Belgian empire, which included the DRC, while Tanzania was absorbed into the British Empire, which counted among its members Uganda as well. The main conflict in the Region is the one affecting the eastern part of Congo, the area of the country exactly covered by the lakes. Following the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, eastern DRC was afflicted by influxes of refugees from both the Hutu and Tutsi groups. Subsequently, clashes motivated by ethnicity and the presence of vast reserves of natural resources broke out and have continuously affected the area. All this seems to be more in support of that part of the ESS that urges the Union to “think globally and act locally” (ESS, pp. 6).

44 Although not by a European country, the entire Korean peninsula was nevertheless colonised. In particular, it was annexed by Japan in 1910 and ruled by it until the Japanese defeat in World War II. Afterwards, the North of the peninsula fell under the wing of the Soviet Union, while the South entered the sphere of influence of the United States.

45 The Hutu, Tutsi and Batwa, the three groups inhabiting Rwanda, are three different races of the same ethnicity.

46 The conflict in eastern Congo has its roots in the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda of 1994, which left millions of refugees. Lots of them sought refuge over the border in the DRC and settled down there. In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda attacked eastern Congo in order to find the perpetrators of the genocide who had escaped there. Since then, eastern Congo has remained the subject of continued offensives and shifting coalitions. For a brief account of the history of the conflict, please check: http://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict.
The findings of my analysis lead me to rephrase my argument in a way that does not reflect the opportunity aspect – when does the Union intervene? – but rather that focuses on the capability one:

*Despite the decrease in interstate conflicts, when deciding how to intervene in one such conflict the Union never considers military missions.*

Considering the roots of the conflict, my argument holds that they do not affect the decision of the Union to intervene. Focusing on military missions, four of the missions launched dealt with conflicts that stemmed from territorial disagreements, three from ethnic incompatibilities, one from political ones, one from religious beliefs and then there is Somalia. The roots of the Somali crisis date back to the colonial era and the governance structures imposed by the colonisers, the United Kingdom and Italy. These were in antithesis with the traditional framework based on pastoral tribes. The system survived for some time after independence, but the government never became strong. A political crisis emerged in the late 80s, within the context of the Cold War, resulting in the shift from Soviet backing to American backing, which led to increased corruption and subsequent escalation. Somalia is now considered a weak state, but it arguably never was a strong one. The nature of the crisis is hence difficult to define. State failure has also allowed the emergence of piracy as a money-generating business. In light of this, the EU has launched two operations, EUTM Somalia and the naval Operation Atalanta to tackle piracy, respectively in 2010 and 2008. Both operations are still on-going as of December 2014. Neither of them seems to have had a tangible effect on the issue of state failure, but Operation Atalanta has been praised for allowing the delivery of aid and for making the vital trading routes of the Horn of Africa safer.

Civilian missions, as can be seen from Appendix C, show patterns similar to the military ones, in the sense that their deployment does not follow a rationale based on the nature of the conflict. Nevertheless, these missions tend to be deployed more often when the crisis is
not in a phase of escalation anymore or as active components of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Hence, some of them are deployed where a situation of insecurity develops out of weak governance and unstable institutions. Often, civilian missions concur or follow military ones. This case is best illustrated by EUPOL PROXIMA/fYORM in the former Republic of Macedonia. The mission, which has civilian nature, was launched on December 15, 2003 following the end of the military one that had been deployed since the end of March. In this way, the Union tried to create first a secure environment and then institutions that would grant the survival of the achieved security.

2.3 Member States’ interests

The decision to intervene ultimately depends on the interests of the Member States, especially when they envisage the launch of a mission, since personnel contributions are voluntary rather than compulsory. Moreover, for military missions unanimity is required at the European Council level. For these reasons, the third argument of this project reads as follows:

*The European Union decides to launch a mission under the CSDP framework when the Member States interests with respect to the crisis situation converge or when dissenting voices are not strong enough to impede action.*

Keohane claims “EU operations have been most effective when there has been a clear convergence of Member States interests” (2011, pp. 202). While this might seem a very intuitive statement and is widely acknowledged, it has not resulted in likewise clear policy practices. In an organisation such as the European Union, with twenty-eight Member States all having veto power, reaching unanimity is a challenging political exercise. The different foreign
and security interests of the Member States are determined by a combination of geography, history, domestic politics, and economics.

First, geographically all countries tend to value more their relations with their direct neighbours because, should a crisis escalate right outside their borders, it could potentially pose a direct threat to their own security. Secondly, from the historical perspective, states with a history of active colonisation put strong emphasis on their relations with the ex-colonies. Some countries, notably France and the United Kingdom, are to a certain extent still legally bound to the territories they once administered. On the other hand, for Member States that have a history of passive colonisation and imperialism and especially for the countries that used to be under the Soviet influence, current relations with their own “ex-administrators” weigh heavily on their choices in the realms of foreign and security policy. Thirdly, given that contributions to missions are voluntary, governments have to be able to convince their electing publics of the importance of allocating resources to missions in often distant places, whose impact on the domestic environment is rarely directly appreciable by the medium voter. Domestic politics, in a context like the current one where resources are becoming ever scarcer, have acquired a pivotal role in defining the approach governments adopt in the debate over a potential intervention. Finally, economics weighs on the final result of the debate not only in terms of financial resources to allocate to the mission, but also in terms of trade patterns and the related economic interdependence.

More often than not, it is a combination of these factors that ultimately leads a government to adopt a particular stance in the debate. Member States historically tied to third countries where a situation of crisis or escalation develops usually have stronger economic ties with those same third countries than do other Member States. The same goes for migration patterns. EU countries with a history of colonisation are often the arrival point of influxes of migrants from the now independent ex-colonies. When migration from specific countries is strong, the new communities become important constituencies in domestic politics and gain the
ability to have a fundamental voice in the decisional process. Finally, geography has an all- 
encompassing role on both trade patterns, and hence economic wellbeing, and on migration 
routes, and hence on social security systems. It follows that countries that directly border with 
a state where a crisis emerge or that are anyway closer to conflict areas have a stronger interest 
in bringing these conflicts to the top of the European agenda and find a solution conducive to 
de-escalation.

2.3.1 Under the influence of domestic politics
Bringing an issue to the top of the European agenda is a political act. When the mechanisms 
described above are taken into the political discourse, processes of securitisation and de- 
securitisation take place. Buzan and Waever define securitisation as “constituted by the 
intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects” (1998, pp. 25). According to this constructivist argument, an issue 
becomes a security issue when, through political discourse, it is constructed as an existential 
threat that requires the application of emergency measures, possibly allowing the government 
to break free of the rules.

The process of securitisation was especially blatant in the debate that led to the launch 
of the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission in 2008 with France’s domestic politics, and therefore the 
French government, proving crucial in the launch of the mission. By 2007, the conflict in 
Darfur had come to the attention of the international community. Calls for action by non-
governmental organisations and advocacy groups had received particular media coverage after 
actor George Clooney had spoken up for the people of Darfur, stating that the “genocide” 
going on in the area would be on the watch of the international community. The French public, 
which in 2007 was being called to elect a new President, notoriously likes being perceived as 
ethical, as the one that “is doing something” to resolve crises, and just as notoriously has a 
strong fascination for the American actor (Pohl, 2014). By a combination of action by the
media and advocacy groups, the Darfur issue became a hot topic in the period preceding the French elections. Candidates started including the issue of Darfur in their campaign, so as to raise consensus and improve their public perception, to the point that the main candidates committed, in a written document, “to mandate the French forces garrisoned in Chad and the Central African Republic to effectively protect the refugees, displaced persons, and members of humanitarian organizations who operate in these countries […] To use all influence to make possible a European action to protect the civilian population of Darfur, notably to put into place humanitarian corridors”\textsuperscript{47}.

When the new government came to power, the French public expected delivery on electoral promises. At the European level, however, establishing a mission in Darfur was perceived as a highly risky option, even as a counterproductive one, since it would have not been supported by the Sudanese government, which might in retaliation have blocked access to humanitarian aid. Member States were not willing to take this risk. The focus shifted to deploying a mission to help Darfur refugees that were fleeing into neighbouring Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). Again, a problem emerged. France had a national military mission established in Chad and a small military presence in the CAR, both of whom are French ex-colonies. This made some Member States weary of being perceived as intervening in support of French colonialism. Nevertheless, no country wanted to be identified as the one preventing the Union from carrying out a mission that would bring improvement to the tragic situation and, as Pohl comments, no “EU government wanted to take it upon itself to stop Sarkozy”\textsuperscript{48}.

While the pressures of domestic public opinion acted as a catalyst for the French government to insist that a mission be established within the CSDP framework, when the issue, upon French request, was first discussed in the Council in June of 2007, officials in Brussels had already been briefed by Paris. Indeed, Bernard Kouchner, the newly appointed French

\textsuperscript{47} Cited in Pohl 2014, pp. 197-198.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
Foreign Minister, held Darfur as one of his priorities and had invited a delegation of EU officials to the French military headquarters in May, demanding that they do not discuss the issue with anybody (Dijkstra 2012a). Although discussion among Member States and the creation of consensus took time, as attested by the fact that the mission was launched only at the beginning of the following year, progress on the ground proceeded faster. In June, Kouchner visited Chad to discuss the possibility of deploying military presence with President Déby. At that same time, a UN delegation was visiting the country. The Chadian Foreign Minister informed the UN delegation that “following discussions with Mr. Kouchner the President had agreed, in principle, to the deployment of an international military presence in eastern Chad composed of French and other European Union forces”\(^{49}\).

When the possibility of a mission was first discussed in Brussels, Germany was holding the Union presidency. While not being openly against intervention, for the reasons analysed above, the German attitude cannot be described as enthusiastic. Over the summer, the presidency rotated to Portugal, which was more openly pro-intervention, and in July planning finally begun, based on the options paper that European officials had in the meantime prepared. The existence of the options paper meant that finalising the planning took less time than it would otherwise have. Nevertheless, getting the Member States to agree on the final objectives and on the provision of troops and resources was a lengthy process, and the operation was formally launched only at the beginning of the following year. Dijkstra argues that early involvement of European officials in the planning of both military and civilian missions is important for purposes of venue shopping, conflict expansion and issue framing, and that these actions are instrumental in setting the issues high on the Union agenda\(^{50}\). In this operation, he holds that early involvement was particularly important for framing the issue as a humanitarian

\(^{49}\) Cited in Dijkstra 2012 (b), pp. 463.

\(^{50}\) Dijkstra (2012 b) defines venue shopping as an exercise “whereby actors test the receptiveness of different venues” (pp. 456) and decide to discuss the issue in the one that they deem most receptive. Conflict expansion means “enlarging the group of involved actors with those that support the issue” (Ibid.) in order to shift the balance between those supporting and those opposing the issue. Issue framing is “about changing the dominant discourse” (pp. 457). In undertaking all of these actions, early movers benefit from a clear advantage.
one rather than a strictly military one. Despite this, final decisions on the content and form of the mission always depend on the wishes of the Member States. In this case, the change in presidency was pivotal in allowing the mission to take place\textsuperscript{51}.

In the end, the military mission was approved at unanimity and EUFOR Chad/CAR became the largest operation ever carried out by the EU in Africa up to now. It was also the most multinational, even though France contributed more than 50 per cent of the troops while some countries contributed as little as ten troops when the mission was at its peak of deployment\textsuperscript{52}. According to Rodt (2011), the mission successfully attained its objectives, which were limited to protecting civilians, facilitating the delivery of aid, contributing to the protection of UN personnel and preparing for eventual handover to the UN. As such, it lasted for one year and then the UN mission MINURCAT was deployed, making use of the structures created by the EU. However, Rodt also points out some weaknesses. The deployment took a long time, an avoidable accident occurred and, more importantly, while the operation had positive effects in the decided area of operation, it had no impact on the general crisis.

2.3.2 Member States and the transatlantic relation

Earlier I argued that the Union is more likely to act when other third parties and international organisations are active in the efforts of de-escalation. If those same third parties with whom the Union has so often collaborated are part of the escalation process, however, the effect on the discussion over intervention can be completely different. A case in point is, again, the debate over a potential EU intervention in Iraq in 2003. Besides the legal uncertainty described earlier, a major divide existed between the perspectives advanced by the Atlanticists, the non-Atlanticists, the neutrals and the undecided. The Atlanticists, driven by Britain, included

\textsuperscript{51} Usually, every government gives itself some objectives to reach during the six-month period while it holds the presidency. While action connected to the Darfur conflict was not envisaged in the German presidency’s objectives, it became part of the Portuguese agenda.

\textsuperscript{52} At its largest point, the operation included 3628 troops were present on the ground, representing nineteen countries, three of which were third parties (Albania, Croatia and Russia). Moreover, twenty-three EU countries were represented at the operation headquarters in Europe.
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Romania and were in favour of intervention in Iraq in support of the US. On the other hand, the non-Atlanticists were driven by France and included Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Slovenia and three of the neutral countries (Sweden, Austria and Finland). Among the undecided were Greece, which was in a difficult position given that it was holding the Presidency, Ireland, a neutral country but highly influenced by the United Kingdom, Turkey, Lithuania and Malta\(^5^3\).

Two dynamics played a significant role in the adoption of positions by the various European countries. The first revolves around the perception of the United States. For the United Kingdom, the US has been an ally for a long period of time and the two countries have generally responded to international crises in similar ways and have usually been supportive of each other in matters of security. France, on the other hand, has a history of opposition to the US, and especially to what they perceive as the hegemonic role that America wants to play in Europe. As Flockhart (2006) stresses, the opposition of France to the US has not traditionally been in terms of foreign policy content but rather regarding who should define such content and lead the effort. Other countries, among which are Albania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, decided to intervene, even by committing little resources, because of their reluctance to antagonize the United States. This decision, especially since it came from countries that were under evaluation for possible access to the EU, was highly criticised by France.

The second dynamic concerns the role of NATO in the conflict, which has two sides. The first is related to NATO per se. NATO is a military alliance on which the euro-Atlantic security community is based. A security community “is built around a shared conception of the principles underlying specific policy issues” (Ibid., pp. 24). As such, it is the result of a culture that has become well established over the years. The advent of the Bush administration brought

\(^{53}\) Please note that not all of the countries listed were part of the EU. However, considering all of them allows for a better appreciation of the decision-making environment.
about a change in this culture which was not shared, explained and negotiated with the other parties in the community and that entailed a break away from the known “normal politics”. The foundations of the new war on terror had not been clearly detailed to the European counterparts, some of whom perceived that the United States was shifting back, from a multilateral approach to security within NATO to a more unilateral stance. Furthermore, the focus of the Bush administration on the concept of a “coalition of the willing”, emphasising a take-it-or-leave-it rationale, did not help to curb this perception. This non-negotiated change in culture helps understand the reaction of France that, differently from usual, supported a completely opposite position with respect to the content of the policy. Hence, the timing of the crisis, which occurred at a moment when the long-established culture within NATO was being challenged, made a unified European response even more improbable.

The second aspect of the role of NATO deals more directly with the European Union and its own policies. On the one hand, the tradition on which NATO is based is different from the emerging European view on security. Namely, NATO was born as a military alliance and hence understands security in the traditional way while the EU advocates a comprehensive approach to security. At the same time, however, the treaty of Nice, which was under ratification in that same year, incorporated the CSDP among EU structures, thus stressing the Union willingness to be more active in the security realm also through the use of military means. Nevertheless, as Salmon points out, a fundamental philosophical difference exists within the Union between “an increasing pacifist, Kantian worldview of western continental Europeans and a Hobbesian worldview on the part of central and east Europeans” (2006, p. 70) whereby the first are in favour of a “European Europe” defence while the latter prefer the “Atlantic European” framework. Different interests and values meant that ultimately the EU could not speak with a single, coherent voice and no military mission was launched in Iraq under the CSDP framework. Rather, some countries unilaterally supported American action and then NATO established a Training Mission in 2004.
2.3.3 France, Germany and the United Kingdom – or the proud, the rational and the islander

The European Union counts twenty-eight Member States, all having veto power over the military missions to be lead under the CSDP framework. As can probably be already appreciated from the above discussions, however, three Member States constantly play a pivotal role in this kind of decisions: France, Germany and the United Kingdom\(^\text{54}\). For each of them, two different factors affect their behavior towards potential missions.

As can be evinced by the above discussion, for France colonial history plays the major role in its decision to propose and support missions at the European level. According to the Graduate Institute of Geneva\(^\text{55}\), in 2010 the French military was the largest military in Europe. Looking at data for 2009, France had troops deployed as part of seven UN missions, two NATO missions and six EU missions. On top of this, France was involved in ten bilateral military cooperation missions aimed at protecting French nationals, cooperating with government forces in the provision and maintenance of stability, and creating structures for cooperation among the local government and other third parties. Of these ten missions, nine are deployed in ex-colonies and one is deployed to the United Arab Emirates with the objective of supporting other French troops in the various operations in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, in 2009 France had three national military missions deployed to CAR, Chad and the Ivory Coast\(^\text{56}\).

Speculation exists about the reasons for such a strong international presence. Some refer to colonial guilt as the main pressure behind it. Considering the preference for intervention in ex-colonies, this is expectable. However, others prefer to use national interest and the desire to maintain a sphere of influence as a reason, which in realist terms makes more sense. Turning to what was explained in Part 1, one could even hold that France is trying to

\(^{54}\) The order in which the three countries have been cited is purely alphabetical.


\(^{56}\) These missions were respectively for CAR Operation Boali, for Chad Operation Epervier and for the Ivory Coast Operation Licorne.
export the model of security community that brought peace to Europe to its ex-colonies, supporting cross-border relations, especially with France itself, in order to establish a sense of community. Interpretations and theories hence vary, with every author using the one that better fits their ends. As Pohl points out, France also likes being perceived as the one who “is doing something” (2014). I consider this the second main factor constantly affecting its positions towards the launch of missions. Of course, national interests play the major role, but French national pride and French pressures have been instrumental in the approval of a variety of EU missions and French contributions have been determinant in their deployment and success.

As far as Germany is concerned, one main factor is its own post-World War II history and the process of normalisation of its foreign policy. In 1998, the German coalition government decided that “German foreign policy is peace policy”\(^\text{57}\). This statement did not come at any time, rather the Kosovo crisis was on-going and news about Serbian atrocities were spreading. Despite the statement, in the spring of 1999 Germany participated in the air raids on Serbia, its first use of the military for combat purposes since World War II. Normalisation seemed to have been completed, and Germany was not treated as a special case for foreign policy purposes anymore. The Iraq conflict, however, had a strong impact on German preferences. Germany was ostensibly against intervention and did not agree with the stance adopted by the United Kingdom. While since Maastricht Germany had been seen as supporting more and more the British attitude towards the EU, after 2003 Germany has strengthened its relations with France (Schweiger, 2004). In this context, “peace policy” has acquired a new meaning. Rather than non-interventionism, it now stands for a preference for multilateral engagement in crises with a strong humanitarian component with the aim of alleviating the suffering on the ground and contributing to the building of peace.

Nevertheless, Germany remains a highly rational actor, and foreign policy is no exception. As the main contributor to the European budget, contributing around 20 per cent of

\(^{57}\) Cited in Schweiger 2004, pp. 37.
the entire budget alone, Germany pays a great deal of attention to the calculation of risks, costs and benefits. The lack of enthusiasm to initiate a mission dealing with Darfur under its presidency exemplifies this point. The same goes for the EUFOR DR Congo mission, ultimately launched in June of 2006. The request for a mission to support the UN during the Congolese elections was articulated in 2005. As stated above, the concept of the battlegroup was developed with the exact aim of always having troops ready to be deployed upon request by the UN. The then standing battlegroup that would have had to be deployed to assist the UN was the Franco-German one with additional Belgian troops. However, in practice, the major component of the group was German, meaning that Germany would have had to be responsible for most of the risk on the ground, on top of bearing most of the operation’s costs. Given its already high contribution to the European budget, convincing the German public to sustain such an additional expense was politically inconvenient. Hence, the position of Germany in the debate was based on a rational calculation of risks and costs. In the end, rather than making use of the Franco-German battlegroup, a wholly European mission was established.

Finally, the factors continuously influencing the British position with respect to launching new missions are the Atlantic relation, analysed above, and the presence of a strong anti-European constituency on the island. The relation between the United Kingdom and the EU has for the most part been one of “opportunistic disapproval”. For a long time, Britain was affected by “Europhobia” (Schweiger 2004) and cherry-picked European policies, refraining from signing most of them or signing with strong reservations. This practice was suspended in 1997 when, after almost two decades of conservative ruling, the Labour government driven by Tony Blair came into power. Under Blair, the United Kingdom began to get more and more positively involved in the EU. Its involvement was almost horizontal across policies, and Britain started making its voice heard also in the realm of foreign and security affairs. In 1999, when no strong response to the Kosovo crisis could be obtained at the European level, Britain

and France cooperated in the launch of the European Rapid Reaction Force, which was European in its name, but bi-national in its composition.

This enthusiasm for engagement, however, did not last long. The financial crisis of 2008 had strong repercussions in Europe, and Britain was no exception. Calls for reductions in the British contribution to the European budget emerged and anti-Union feelings started spreading again. These feelings have now become so strong that the current conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, especially after the referendum on Scottish independence, is considering the possibility of a national referendum over British membership in the Union.

2.3.4 What does all of this entail?

Given the different attitudes and reasons driving the three countries with a more pivotal role in the CSDP decision-making agenda, it is not surprising that whenever an issue gets on this agenda an exercise of coalition and consensus building follows. Both the three countries and officials in Brussels get involved into processes of issue framing to convince the other Member States about the validity of their position. In turn, these states are not just followers; they have their own preferences, preoccupations and interests, and the political debate continues up to the moment when a consensus on the form and content of the mission emerges. If consensus cannot be reached, it is necessary that at least all Member States approve the mission, even if afterwards they decide not to commit any resources to it, or else they decide to abstain from the vote based on their right to constructive abstention. In this way, the disagreeing opinion of some Member States will be clear but the mission will have the possibility to proceed nonetheless.

A second unsurprising fact is that, in view of all the different positions and interests that need to be considered, it is easier to build consensus around deployment if a third party already has troops or a civilian presence on the ground. Hence, apart from the efficiency gains

59 The United Kingdom is the fourth major contributor to the budget of the EU, contributing around 12 per cent of the total budget.
from cooperation and coordination that were outlined in part 2.1, there is an element of safety. The argument goes as follows: if somebody else is already there or is thinking about heading there then, first, it means that the mission is actually feasible, and second, there might be a chance for us to establish a common mandate with them or a bridging mission with final handover to them, which thus reduces the risk, provides a deadline and makes shorter, and hence less expensive missions possible. If a Member State has a strong interest in launching a mission, the presence of third parties facilitates the process of convincing the others to support it.

When the interests of Member States converge, however, the presence of third parties on the ground is not strictly necessary. The case of Georgia is exemplary in this respect. In 2008, Russia declared war to Georgia and a conflict erupted that lasted for few days, from August 7 to 12. Although the armed conflict ended with a quick Russian military victory, animosity between the two countries over the status of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions persisted. On this occasion, the EU was quick to establish EUMM Georgia, a civilian mission aimed at monitoring the Parties’ actions and their compliance with the peace agreement. Both OSCE and the UN had missions deployed in Georgia since the crisis of the early 90s. However, their mandates were not quickly updated following the changing situation on the ground, and the EU mission was the only one with a mandate aimed at addressing the 2008 crisis specifically.

The war ended on August 12, after French President Sarkozy, who at the time held the presidency of the EU, brokered a ceasefire organised around six main points calling, among others, for the initiation of an international debate over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The existence of convergence of Member States’ interests, namely to avoid a prolonged war involving Russia so close to the Union, meant that the Union was able to

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60 The conflict concerns the status of South Ossetia, a Georgian region whose inhabitants are of a different ethnicity and that, since 1918, have questioned their Georgian nationality. The conflict was born as a territorial one, but has since been framed more and more in terms of ethnicity. Russia has been providing overt assistance and support the Ossetians and, after the 2008 war, established a military base in the region.
advance a common position on the crisis since its earliest phase, to intervene in it with a coherent voice and to make the Parties feel all of its weight as a political actor. On a side note, the fact that France, a major player, was holding the presidency arguably did not damage the EU probability of success in its action.
Part 3

Reflections on current crises and interventions

During 2013 and 2014, the EU has launched five missions under the framework of the CSDP, all of which are still on-going as of December 2014. Two of these missions are of the military type, deployed respectively in CAR and Mali, and the other three have civilian nature and have been launched in Ukraine, Mali and Libya. Given that they are relatively recent, not much literature exists about them yet. This final part of the project aims to reflect on three of these recently deployed missions. Based on the discussions in the previous parts and especially on the three arguments outlined in Part 2, I will try to provide some reflections and insights into the decision-making process and eventual missions launched in Ukraine, CAR and Libya. I will not focus on the two missions tackling the Mali crisis because they are part of the comprehensive approach to the Sahel problem, for which a proper discussion would require a paper by itself.

3.1 Libya

In 2011, Libya was one of the countries involved in what came to be known as the “Arab spring”, a series of uprising against repressive regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. In Libya, the Gaddafi government used all means to quell the rebellions, which rapidly turned into a civil war. On March 17, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1973, authorising the “Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, […], to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (paragraph 4). The Resolution
also established a No Fly Zone, banning all flights in the Libyan airspace except for the ones with humanitarian purposes and authorising Member States “to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights” (paragraph 8). Based on this Resolution, on March 31, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector with the following elements: an arms embargo, a no-fly zone and actions to protect civilians. Moreover, with Resolution 2009 of September 2011, the UN established the mission UNSMIL, mandated to “restore public security and promote the rule of law” (paragraph 12.a).

The first two criteria outlined in Part 2, regarding the presence of a UN Resolution, of other third parties’ and of an intra-state conflict, were both satisfied. In light of this, how did the EU respond to the crisis? The Libyan crisis reached the top of the European agenda quickly. This is mainly due to the fact that Libya is geographically close to the EU. Moreover, given that the Arab spring was spreading quickly and affecting a wide portion of the European neighbourhood, with possible repercussions on the security of European borders, it received extensive attention. Following Resolution 1973, the EU approved a military mission to Libya. Through Council Decision 210 of April 1, it launched EUFOR Libya with a humanitarian mandate to “contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of dispersed persons, [and] support, with specific capabilities, the humanitarian agencies in their activities” (Article 1, paragraph 2). However, the Decision also specifies that the EU shall conduct the military mission only if “requested by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)” (Article 1, paragraph 1). That request was never articulated, prompting Ana Gomes, a journalist for the online publication EU Observer, to wonder whether EUFOR Libya was an April fool’s joke.

The decision to authorise a mission with purely humanitarian assistance purposes reflects the inability of the Member States to reach a common position on a full-scale military mission. Four voices played the major role in the European debate over Libya. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, were strong supporters
of a full-scale mission, early movers in the UN and active participants in the NATO-led Operation\textsuperscript{61}; Germany abstained from voting on the UN resolution, and strongly advocated the humanitarian stance of the European mission; Italy changed its mind as events developed, from an initially un-supporting position to a final supporting one. As Varvelli (2014) demonstrates, while in the end all members agreed to launch the mission, the reasons for their position were different and concerned with both domestic and national foreign policy considerations. France’s policy in the Arab world was deeply influenced by its own Maghreb community; the British attitude was influenced by its alliance with the US, where President Obama favoured intervention, and by concerns over regional instability in North Africa; in Germany, elections were scheduled for the spring of 2011 and the electoral campaign mood turned the traditionally value-oriented German foreign policy into an anti-intervention one; finally, Italy was initially inactive in an attempt to avoid jeopardising its privileged relationship with the Libyan regime and to avert a governmental crisis, since the Northern League, part of the right-wing government, strongly opposed intervention. In this context, the fact that the UN never requested Europe to intervene came as a relief to many.

In 2013, with UNSMIL deployed in the country and given the deteriorating security situation created by the power vacuum and consequent fight for power, the EU decided to launch mission with the aim of addressing border management control. EUBAM Libya started in May and has civilian nature. It was launched in response to an invitation by the Libyan transitory authorities, has an initial duration of two years and is part of the EU comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction in the country. It cannot carry out any executive functions and its activities are limited to training, mentoring and capacity-building. Seminars have been delivered especially in the areas of aviation security, customs best practices, maritime search and rescue and fight against organised crime.

\textsuperscript{61} Gomes recalls that she “was warmly greeted in the streets and on the frontline, near Adjabya, with young people shouting cheerfully: ‘Merci, Sarkozy!’”
Building consensus around a mission with civilian nature and with these characteristics, especially when other missions are already deployed on the ground, is a much easier political exercise than the one required for military missions. Reaching the objectives of such a mission is an easier task as well, since they are mainly concerned with delivering training, which the Union has done extensively. As reported by EU press releases and by the mission factsheet, hundreds of border management staff members have been trained both at the mission’s headquarters in Tripoli and in a variety of other sites. While, as Rodt would say, the mission has reached its “internal attainment” goals, in terms of external attainment it has not had a noteworthy effect. The political climate has worsened rapidly since 2013, and in mid February of 2014 rumours spread over a potential military coup, a possibility that was dismissed by Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. Two months later another military coup allegedly took place. In June a new Parliament was elected in a contested climate, prompting new riots between the previous and current governing parties. In September, the UN started a reconciliation process. At the time of writing, however, the political situation remains unstable, as do borders, with organised crime – especially arms going to Egypt and the Sahel and people’s trafficking over the Mediterranean – spreading unchecked\(^\text{62}\).

### 3.2 Central African Republic

Since December 2012, the Central African Republic has been afflicted by an intra-state conflict, which broke out between the government, Christian and Muslim factions. At the end of 2012, rebel groups of Seleka ethnicity and Muslim religion from the north reached the capital in the south and overthrew the government of President Francois Bozize. They remained in power for ten months in a situation of growing instability and insecurity. At the end of 2013 they were forced out of power as well, and a civil war followed, which resulted in

\(^{62}\) Reliable information about the scope of organised crime is still lacking. Reports about it come mainly from media outlets and the author had informal conversations with a journalist working on this topic.
what Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called “ethno-religious cleansing”. At the end of January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza, mayor of Bangui, was elected as interim President. The situation started improving only at the end of the spring. In July of 2014, a tentative ceasefire agreement was mediated by the President of neighbouring Congo and signed in Brazzaville.

In December 2013 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2127, allowing the deployment of the African Union mission MISCA. In turn, this mission was supported by Operation Sangaris of the French government, which included 2000 troops. On top of its effort in support of the AU mission, France also started creating pressure for a EU military mission. Again, the first two arguments outlined in Part 2 of this project were satisfied, since both a third party was already present on the ground and the conflict was of the intra-state type. My attention hence shifts to the third argument, about cohesiveness in Member States’ interests and positions. According to the reports of the African Research Bulletin, the United Kingdom was weary of launching a new military mission under the CSDP framework: “As over Mali, London is worried that Paris is drawing too deeply on the European Union [EU] and its African Peace Facility at a time when the AU Mission in Somalia (Amisom) will need more money for a new offensive against Al Haraka al Shabaab al Mujahideen” (Vol. 50, pp.19873).

The British position was most likely driven by two main facts. On the one hand, France was asking for the deployment of a Union mission in yet another of its ex-colonies. The military mission to Mali had been deployed upon French pressures only one year before and was still on-going; also, discussions over a possible civilian mission to Mali, which was eventually launched in April, were under way. Following the same line of reasoning, Britain was seemingly more concerned with its own ex-colonies, Somalia being one of them\(^63\). On the other hand, as repeated historical events attest, Britain values the transatlantic relation with the

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\(^63\) Somalia was conquered by both the British and the Italians. Britain was the first to establish trade treaties with Somali chiefs in the 19th century. Shortly afterwards, Italy started its own colonisation of the area, which focused mainly on the southern part of Somalia, while the UK retained most of the northern part. From 1941 to 1949, Britain ruled both the south and the north as protectorates. In 1949, the UN granted Italy a trusteeship that covered most of the pre-1941 Italian possessions, while Britain was recognised what is now Somaliland. The country was united and finally granted independence in 1960.
US relatively more than any other European country. While President Obama was in principle not against intervening in the CAR, he did not seem enthusiastic about sending American soldiers there. Both in Mali and the CAR international intervention has taken place through the UN and, to a certain extent, the AU. In Somalia, on the other hand, a NATO mission has existed since 2007. Hence, London was more eager to scale up action in Somalia, where the existence of the NATO operation signalled a more supporting role of the US, rather than initiating a new mission in the CAR, where the US was acting only through the UN. In light of the growing concerns over a potential genocide and increasing international pressures, however, Britain, while not enthusiastically approving EUFOR CAR, did not veto it.

As far as Germany is concerned, Chancellor Angela Merkel in mid-February expressed her wish to bolster German-French military cooperation, especially in African countries and regions wrecked by conflict (Ibid., Vol. 51, pp. 20043). As reported by AFP, the Chancellor stated, after a Franco-German meeting of February 15, that “[m]ore convergence is possible” notably in terms of cooperating in Mali or the CAR. This statement came when the EU had already transmitted, through a letter of January 21 by the High Representative to the Secretary General, its wish to deploy a military mission in the CAR as part of the international efforts to curb the on-going crisis. The letter had been followed, on January 25, by UN Security Council Resolution 2134, which allowed the EU to take all necessary measures to re-establish peace. Hence, the words of Chancellor Merkel can be considered as an attempt to improve the perception of EUFOR CAR in Europe and convince other Member States to provide troops and resources.

EUFOR CAR was eventually launched on April 1, 2014, exactly three years after the launch of the “non-mission” in Libya. It reached full operational capacity on June 15. Among the Member States contributing troops, Britain is expectedly absent. Noteworthy, instead, is the

absence of German military troops. Notwithstanding Merkel’s declaration, Germany started contributing personnel to the mission only in mid-June and its contribution is limited to professional Staff Officers with non-military tasks employed in the branches of engineering, operation planning and intelligence. While such a decision by Germany follows rational calculations of costs and risks, and is therefore understandable, it nevertheless questions the trustworthiness of EU leaders’ words and, once again, underlines how domestic politics and trends affect the final decisions of Member States with respect to European CFSP.

Despite this, up to now EUFOR CAR seems to be successful in the attainment of its internal objectives. Also, since the launch on the UN mission MINUSCA in September, more coordination is taking place with this third party, as auspicated by France, in view of an eventual full handover to them. On the ground, the situation improved over the summer but fighting broke out again in November.

3.3 Ukraine

The most recent mission launched within the framework of the CSDP is EUAM Ukraine. The mission dates to July 2014 and is of the civilian type. It tackles the crisis that emerged at the end of 2013 in Ukraine, after the then President Viktor Yanukovych postponed, allegedly due to Russian pressures, the signing of the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. Protests broke out in Maidan Nezalezhnosti, that came to be known as Euromaidan Square, escalating into a violent conflict between pro-Europeans and pro-Russians. The Crimean Peninsula, inhabited mainly by Russian descendants and whose belonging to Ukraine has been constantly questioned over the years, became the region best symbolising this conflict. In March of 2014, at the height of the fighting, it held a referendum deemed illegal according to international standards and strongly condemned by the UN. The result of the referendum was Crimean independence and its subsequent annexation by Russia.
Considering the position of Ukraine and the fact that the pro-European argument is a major one in the conflict, it is not surprising that Ukraine reached the top of the Union’s CFSP agenda straight away and, one year well into the crisis, it is still there. How did Europe react?

Only one Resolution has been passed by the Security Council over the crisis period. This is Resolution 2166 of July 21, 2014 condemning the downing of a Malaysian Airlines Flight that happened on July 17. In its condemnation, the Security Council does not make any reference to the conflict on the ground; all its focus is related on the plane. The fact that no other Resolution tackling the conflict exists is not surprising at all, however, since Russia is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Indeed, while the conflict is strictly intra-state, Russia has actually been playing a major role in it. It initially was an open supporter of the pro-Russian government and then of the separatist movement in Crimea. After the illegal referendum, it de facto took control over Crimea. At the beginning of December 2014, it “stationed about 4,000 troops with their equipment and ammunition in north Crimea on the border with Ukraine” (IANS, Dec 6).

Given the absence of a Security Council Resolution authorising action, it is not surprising that Europe has not deployed a military mission. Actually, Brussels was probably relieved by the impossibility of even thinking about such an option. Europe has been looking at Ukraine through the prism of its relations with Russia and, once again, the debate over the crisis has been structured around the opinions and positions of France, the United Kingdom and, especially in this case, Germany. Parkes and Sobják (2014) call this triplet the geopolitical players, who look at Ukraine through the prism of their relation with Russia and at Russia in terms of peer-to-peer engagement among regional hegemons. Apart from the geopolitical players, the two authors identify other four clusters of European states grouped around common positions: the No-Voice Europeans, “worried about jeopardizing their economic relations with Russia”; the Crusaders, mainly Eastern European countries highly dependent on
Russian gas but, at the same time, cognizant of their shared border with Ukraine and hence mixing “normative concerns with more direct material interests”; Normative Europe, not bound by existential interests but nevertheless “ready to stand up for democratic values and seeking to spread respect for human rights as a matter of principle and with few geographic restrictions”; and the Bandwagoners, south-eastern European countries “unwilling to take initiative”. With such fragmented and varied positions, the discourse promoted by the big three has become predominant.

Such discourse is based on the acknowledgment that, as Münchau wrote in the Financial Times in March 2014, “member states have become dependent on [Russian] gas and money. Russia supplies 40 per cent of German gas imports. Almost 5 per cent of German manufacturing exports go to Russia. Russian money, some of it illegal, finds its way into the financial centres and property markets of London and Cyprus”. In this context, and given the economic crisis affecting Europe, all of what Brussels could agree to were sanctions in the form of travel bans and asset freezes to targeted Russian and Ukrainian officials and banks. Their effect has been at most negligible and, as could be expected, has not had any impact on the situation on the ground and the illegal annexation of Crimea. In light of all this, the civilian mission launched in July by the EU in Ukraine has a purely domestic focus and is mandated to assist the country in advancing security sector reform, especially in the fields of police and the rule of law.
Conclusions

This project has aimed to appreciate the effectiveness of the European Union as a security actor, with effectiveness defined in terms of decisiveness in situations of crisis, where a EU mission is advocated and debated. After explaining the process that lead to the formation of the CFSP and the reasons for its current, intergovernmental framing, three main factors were shown to play a decisive role in EU decision-making: the presence of a UN Security Council Resolution and of other third-party involvement in the crisis; a crisis of the intra-state type; and alignment among EU Member States’ positions. If all of these conditions hold, the EU is highly likely to quickly agree on a common position and launch a mission, also of the military type.

However, while the first two conditions are often met, the third one seldom is. Member States have different interests due to a combination of historical, geographic, economic and political factors and preferences that result in different and sometimes irreconcilable positions over foreign and security affairs, as exemplified by the analysis of the Iraqi debate. In light of this, as Zwolski (2012) comments, “the extent to which the EU can be considered a security actor depends largely on the definition of security”: some Member States have an economic-based notion of security, others are more concerned with the influence of crises on domestic politics and debate potential interventions through the lenses of electoral support, others still have a strong normative approach and look at European actorness in terms of ethics and international standards. Given these wide-ranging differences in Member States’ opinions and approaches, the comprehensive approach generally adopted by the EU is in a way necessary to accommodate all of the different wishes.

Among all these wishes, the ones of France, Germany and the United Kingdom have been the most pivotal ones. Parkes and Sobjâk refer to the relations between Germany, the United Kingdom and Russia as “a gentleman’s club of the Big Three”. I believe this definition
applies to a certain extent also to the relations between the three European countries, considering themselves peer geopolitical players with a final, determinant role in the launch of every mission under the CSDP framework. While the preferences of other Member States can be accommodated, the ones of these need to be aligned, or at least not in strong opposition, if the Union is to eventually launch a mission. The role of these three countries in European foreign and security affairs is not driven only by their contributions to the budget. If Germany and France are respectively the first and second major contributors to the European budget, Italy contributes more than the United Kingdom does but its voice is not as determinant as the British one. Rather, a factor of presence, of desiring to play a determinant role even despite unsupportive general stances towards the Union (as is the case in Britain), or even though a non-interventionist attitude is spreading (as facts rather than words testify is happening in Germany), is what makes these three countries the main actors in European CSFP.

It is difficult to decide if their imperialistic pasts play a role in this attitude. France is the country for which this seems to be most strongly the case, since it has been advocating missions and sending troops, sometimes also independently of the EU, to a variety of ex-colonies. However, pride and a relatively big army do play a role in French decisions. The United Kingdom seems to be more driven by its decline as a world power rather than by interest in its ex-colonies, as attested by the fact that it continuously supports US positions, probably seeing in its alliance with the most powerful country in the world a way to remain among “those who move the threads”. As far as Germany is concerned, finally, despite normalisation of its foreign policy has undisputedly been achieved, the ghost of its 20th century domestic history as initiator of two World Wars is still haunting it, making rational calculations over costs and benefits the preferred way to tackle its non-interventionist stance.

In this context, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, of which the Security and Defence Policy is part, is doomed to remain a highly intergovernmental policy and the Union will be decisive in situations of crisis only when a quick common position can be achieved
among the three geopolitical players in crisis of mainly intra-state type where a UN Security Council Resolution exists and preferably other third parties have deployed their troops.
Appendix A

### Appendix B – Military Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Duration (months)</th>
<th>UN resolutions</th>
<th>EU resolutions</th>
<th>Third Parties Involvement</th>
<th>Nature of crisis (1)</th>
<th>Nature of crisis (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUTM-Mali</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>18-02-2013</td>
<td>continuing</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2085/2012</td>
<td>COUNCIL DECISION</td>
<td>UN: MINUSMA</td>
<td>Intra-state BUT effect on regional Sahel conflict</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta</td>
<td>Military (Naval)</td>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia</td>
<td>8-12-2008</td>
<td>continuing</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 / 2008. UN called for int'l action with several res. &amp; commended the EU mission - endorsement rather than authorisation.</td>
<td>COUNCIL DECISION</td>
<td>Op Atalanta followed Operation Allied Provider by NATO (24/10 to 12/12/2008)</td>
<td>Int'l waters</td>
<td>Piracy</td>
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<td>EU support to AMIS</td>
<td>Civilian or military</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>18-07-2005</td>
<td>31-12-2007</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>1547, 1564, 1574, 1590, 1593</td>
<td>COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2005/557/CFSP</td>
<td>AU: AMIS / NATO support mission / later AU&amp;UN: UNAMID</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>1551/2004</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>Previous resolutions: 1345 &amp; 1371 / 2001</td>
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<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
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## Appendix C – Civilian Missions

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<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Duration (months)</th>
<th>EU resolutions</th>
<th>Third Parties Involvement</th>
<th>Nature of the crisis (1)</th>
<th>Nature of the crisis (2)</th>
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<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>EUCAP Nestor</td>
<td>Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Yemen</td>
<td>16-07-2012</td>
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<td>30-09-2010</td>
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<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
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Bibliography


