THE DEGREE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBATING INSURGENCY
A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

A Master’s Project Submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Global Affairs

By
Ahmed Elbohy
“Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever Hearing and Seeing.” The Noble Quran 4:58
ABSTRACT

This research studied the relationship between the degree of civilian control, in military dominated political systems, and military effectiveness in combating insurgency using comparative case study analysis of Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively. In contemporary world, many states e.g. Ukraine, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are involved in irregular warfare with insurgencies which are threatening domestic security and disturbing global peace. On another front, many states, especially in the Middle East and Africa, are facing the problem of disturbed civil-military relations or weak civilian control over the military. The degree of civilian control and military effectiveness in combating insurgency, are studied and compared, in eight distinct cases from the recent history of Turkey and Pakistan. Military effectiveness in combating insurgency was studied in all cases using data, about insurgency attack incidents, extracted from the Global Terrorism Database. Comparing Turkey and Pakistan generally, the study found that Turkey is superior to Pakistan in the degree of civilian control and military effectiveness which proposes a positive relationship between the two variables. Comparing the Turkish cases against each other, however, marginalized this claim when this positive relationship was overshadowed by other factors e.g. a destabilized neighboring country or organizational confusion in insurgency’s ranks. Hoping to fill a gap in present literature about civil-military relations and military effectiveness, this thesis proved evidence on the weak positive relationship between civilian control, in military-dominated political systems, and military effectiveness in combating insurgency.

Keywords:

military effectiveness - civil-military relations – counterinsurgency – irregular warfare – Turkey – Pakistan – PKK – Taliban Pakistan – civilian control over the military – terrorism – international peace and Security
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Alison Hodgkins, my thesis supervisor, for her continued and patient help and guidance throughout different stages of doing this thesis. I want to thank my thesis readers, Dr. Hamid Ali and Dr. Kevin Koehler, for their insightful reading and helpful comments.

Nothing in this thesis could have been accomplished without the kind and unconditional care and support of my family, Mr. Tarek Elbohy (father), Mrs. Mona Elbohy (mother) and Miss Dalia Elbohy (sister).

Also I want to give special thanks to Mr. Kivanc Atak for his guidance about literature on Turkey and the PKK.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... III
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ IV
List of abbreviations ...................................................................................................... VI
List of tables ................................................................................................................ VII
List of figures ................................................................................................................ VIII

## CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

I- Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
II- Research question ....................................................................................................... 3
III- Client description ...................................................................................................... 4

## CHAPTER TWO: Research Design

I- Literature review ......................................................................................................... 5
II- Methodology ................................................................................................................ 12
III- Case Selection .......................................................................................................... 16

## CHAPTER THREE: The Degree of Civilian Control

Part One: Analyzing the degree of civilian control in the six cases of Turkey

I- A historical background on Turkey (1923 - 1980) ..................................................... 20
II- Case One: the period of direct military rule in Turkey (1980 and 1983) ................. 22
III- Case Two and Three: Özal’s period (1983 - 1993) ................................................ 23
IV- Case Four: Post-Özal period (1993 - 1997) ............................................................. 25

Part Two: Analyzing the degree of civilian control in the two cases of Pakistan:

I- Case Seven: General Musharraf’s military rule (1999 – 2008) ............................... 29

## CHAPTER FOUR: Military Effectiveness

I- The origins of Turkey’s conflict with the PKK ......................................................... 33
II- The origins of Pakistan’s conflict with the TTP ....................................................... 34
III- Comparing the overall effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and
    Pakistan .................................................................................................................... 35
IV- Comparing the effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan during each of
    the eight cases ......................................................................................................... 38

## CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion

I- Final conclusions ........................................................................................................ 46
II- Recommendations .................................................................................................... 49

## REFERENCES

................................................................................................................................. 50
List of abbreviations:

PKK: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party)
TTP: Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (Taliban Movement in Pakistan)
MGK: Milli Güvenlik Kurusu (National Security Council of Turkey)
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
GTD: Global Terrorism Database
**List of tables**

Table (1) ranking of all cases according to the degree of civilian control .................. 32
Table (2) comparing insurgency attack incidents during different Cases....................... 45
List of figures

Figure (1) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1984 and 2014)………………………… 37
Figure (2) incidents of TTP attacks in Pakistan between (2004 and 2014)………………………… 37
Figure (3) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1983 and 1994)………………………… 39
Figure (4) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1983 and 1989)………………………… 39
Figure (5) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1990 and 1992)………………………… 40
Figure (6) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1994 and 1996)………………………… 41
Figure (7) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1997 and 2002)………………………… 41
Figure (8) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (2003 and 2014)………………………… 42
Figure (9) incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (2003 and 2010)………………………… 43
Figure (10) incidents of TTP attacks in Pakistan between (2008 and 2014)………………………… 44
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I- Introduction:

One of the most important variables in international affairs, in determining status and position of states in international arena, is the state’s ability to conduct war, or in other words, its military effectiveness (Beckley, 2010, p. 45). In contemporary world, the nature of warfare is increasingly changing and developing. Direct confrontations between conventional armies of nation states are becoming of less significance than before. On the other hand, the problem of non-state insurgency and terrorist groups, is facing a lot of states both domestically and internationally e.g. in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Therefore, a thorough examination of the factors affecting military effectiveness against non-state actors in irregular warfare, is one of the most important areas of research which meets the needs of many states, international organizations and think tanks working in the field of international peace and security. The sweeping waves of democratization, regime change and the persistence of some autocratic regimes, also, are in the center stage of international events, especially in the Middle East and Africa. In this thesis, this project is addressing both international concerns, namely, civil-military relations and military effectiveness against non-state insurgency. To be more specific, this thesis examines the relationship between the degree of civilian control in military-dominated political systems and military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency, using comparative case study analysis of Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively. The researcher believes, through this approach, important lessons can be learned in the fields of civil-military relations and counter-
insurgency strategies. We hope that this thesis would add to the global understanding of the relationship between civil-military relations and military effectiveness in the context of irregular warfare with non-state actors.
II- Research question:
To examine the influence of increasing the degree of civilian control on military effectiveness in irregular warfare against non-state actors, this thesis asks one principle question; does increasing the degree of civilian control, in military-dominated political systems, have a positive impact on military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency?, and if true, what is the strength of that impact?

Answering this question, for different cases of Turkey and Pakistan, would advance our understanding about the nature of irregular warfare and counter-insurgency efforts and its relationship with regime type and more specifically, with civil-military balance in autocracies especially, those which are dominated by their military establishment. A number of states, which witnessed a turbulent history of civil-military imbalance, are also facing an unprecedented insurgency threats. A small example of these states includes, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Turkey and Pakistan. If the result of this question proved to be positive, then, it would be essential for these states and, others with similar circumstances, to pay a great attention to the effect of their troubled civil-military relations on their efforts to combat growing insurgencies within their respective jurisdiction which is threatening domestic security, distorting internal peace and degrading their position and status in international arena.

Positive answers to this question, would also urge other states, with stable democratic systems and a solid civil-military balance, to make every effort to encourage civilian control in troubled states, in order to boast international peace and security and prevent dangerous insurgency spillover effects.
III- Client Description :

The results of this thesis can benefit a wide range of international organizations and think tanks. The most significant of these organizations is the United Nations, specifically, the secretariat and the Security Council.

This project can be used by different offices and departments of UN general secretariat, which is engaged in different conflict resolution and regime formation efforts in many places in the world including Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These countries are expected to face substantial insurgency threats, even after establishing vital state institutions, and therefore, the results of this thesis can encourage them to give significant attention to civil-military balance in their future governmental systems, in order to improve their chances in suppressing these predicted threats.

In its continuous efforts in establishing global peace and security, the UN Security Council, can use the results of this thesis, to advice concerned governments, on the best degree of civilian control needed to increase these states’ ability to combat non-state violent actors. The Security Council also, on the basis of this project, can pressure autocratic governments to promote civilian control, in order to increase its effectiveness in combating terrorism and subsequently prevent its spillover to other countries.

A think tank interested in civil-military relations, military effectiveness or general international peace and security issues, can benefit from this study. Examples of such think tanks may include International Institute for strategic Studies (IISS) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
I- Literature review:

A consistent examination of the questions in hand requires a reliable definition of two terms, the degree of civilian control and military effectiveness in combating insurgencies. Many scholars tried to explore what degree and form of civilian control over the military is the most suitable for performing different functions of a state, including its ability to conduct war.

Samuel P. Huntington, described his idea about this as “objective civil control” which he claimed to be a characteristic of the most advanced democracies (Huntington, 1995). In his view, this relationship should be based on four attributes, 1- a high level of military professionalism and an understanding by the military leadership of the limits of that professionalism, 2- the effective control over the military by a civil authority in which lies the power of making ultimate military and foreign policy decisions., 3- the respect of this civil authority to a certain level of military professionalism and autonomy, which results in 4- a minimum intervention of the military into politics and vice versa (Huntington, 1995).

Richard Kohn (1997) offered a theoretical definition of civilian control. He explained it to be the placement of all decisions of the government including those related to national security in the hands of civilians, that is, all decisions including security related ones are to be made or approved by civilians outside the military establishment (Kohn, 1997, p. 142). Then he acknowledged that, this theoretical definition is quite different from reality. In reality, he argued, militaries in all countries were able to secure some degree of control or autonomy especially in
issues relating to the internal management of the military or conducting war. This is mainly due to the complex nature of modern day wars requiring an increasing degree of professionalism (Kohn, 1997, p. 142). He finally described civilian control as a process rather than a fact and that the best way to understand, measure or evaluate it, is by examining the relative influence of military officers and civilian officials in decisions related to war, internal or external security and military policy (Kohn, 1997, p. 143).

Douglas L. Bland (1999) admitted that the answer to the present question, what is the best form of civilian control ?, is not obvious as many may think (Bland, 1999, p. 7). He also acknowledged the weakness or the entire absence of a theoretical framework which academics or policy makers alike can rely on (Bland, 1999, p. 9). For the previous reasons and others, Bland tried to come up with a comprehensive theory of civil-military relations which is independent from the confines of narrow specific national problems and in the same time evading limitations of previous theories (Bland, 1999, p. 10). He called his theory “the theory of shared responsibility”. In his theory, Bland argued that civil-military relations should be based on an explicit or implicit regime around which actor expectations coverage. It is through examining the dynamics of this regime, its norms, principles, rules and procedures, one can truly test the reality of civil control and know the balance of power between civilians and the military (Bland, 1999, pp. 15-18). Bland also addressed the importance of accountability in such regime. He explained that, for civil control to be real, civilians should be able to hold military commanders responsible for their actions and the dynamics of the regime should be able to demonstrate this accountability (Bland, 1999, p. 20). Most importantly he advocated using the term “civilian direction of the military” rather than “civilian control”. He explained that civilians can ensure adequate directions of the military through establishing a regime that acknowledges the role of the military
in national defense and stating the norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures which govern the shared responsibility between civilians and military (Bland, 1999, p. 19).

All the aforementioned studies, Bland to a lesser extent, addressed the problem of civilian control from the perspective of established democracies rather than military-dominated political systems, which this study try to examine. However, the researcher have used these different theories about civilian control in western democracies, and the next, about civilian control in autocracies, in developing his four flanged criteria upon which he examines the degree of civilian control during each of our cases (time periods) in the history of Turkey and Pakistan (see methodology).

The issue of civilian control over the military in military-dominated political systems is addressed by Steven Cook (2007) who discussed the absence of civilian control in autocracies like Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Cook, 2007). Cook argued that military officers may wield a great amount of influence through maintaining control over specific policy areas such as national security and foreign policy without even leaving their barracks (Cook, 2007, p. 8) he argued that, in these respective states, the military dominates the decision and policy making in all issues regarding security and foreign policy. He established that, in these countries, even if the military allows a certain degree of political openness and establish a façade of democratic institutions, they (the high command of the military) are unlikely to abandon their long-held interests in areas of national security and foreign policy, to the extent that they will be willing to use forceful interventions, if necessary, cracking down the democratic process if they feel that these interests are threatened.

Risa Brooks (2009) explained civil-military relations in autocracies as a balance of power between civilian leaders and military commanders (Brooks, 2006). However Brooks used a
combination of three factors which determines where this balance of power lies. Two of these factors are related to the military, firstly the influence of the military commanders in society and their connections with social forces, secondly the unity of the officer corps. The third factor is related to the social support of civilian leaders and the solidarity of their civil base (Brooks, 2006, pp. 403-405).

Paul Staniland (2008) used a trilogy of three factors, which he believed to predict patterns of military intervention in politics (Staniland, 2008, pp. 332-341). Derived from different theories of civilian control and military interventions e.g. theories of external/internal threats, domestic political culture, institutionalization ……etc. , Staniland trilogy of factors consists of 1) threat perception of the military, 2) civilian government legitimacy, 3) the degree of institutionalization in the political regime. Based on these three causal factors of military intervention, Staniland then proposed a combination of them producing 12 predictions of patterns for military intervention (Staniland, 2008, p. 339). He then applied this framework in a comparative study between India and Pakistan trying to explain the different trajectories that both militaries took and explaining patterns which previous theories failed to explain (Staniland, 2008, pp. 344-362).

There is another line of literature dealing with civilian control from the point of view of coup-proofing (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011; Quinlivan, 1999). However, in this thesis, we are targeting the degree of civilian-control in military-dominated political systems, where coup proofing arguments doesn’t necessarily fit.

For the second definition regarding military effectiveness, whether in interstate or irregular wars, the question is even more difficult to answer. What is military effectiveness and more importantly, how to measure it, are the fundamental questions needed to be answered in order to formulate a solid argument on the relation between civilian control and military effectiveness.
Scholars who tried to define military effectiveness often deal with regular warfare rather than irregular ones. For example Stephen P. Rosen (1995) defined Military effectiveness, his dependent variable, as the amount of defensive and offensive military power which a nation can generate out of its material resources (Rosen, 1995, p. 6). However, throughout his article, Rosen failed to give a solid examination or measurements of his dependent variable, military effectiveness. Although he proposed a measure for the ability to generate offensive military power as the ability to generate power surplus to the need for maintaining internal order to be projected abroad, and the ability to generate defensive military power as being able to resist foreign invasion (Rosen, 1995, p. 27), Rosen didn’t apply such measure systemically, instead, he based his argument on mere opinions about military effectiveness of different nations e.g. when he demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Italian army compared to the more efficient German one (Rosen, 1995, pp. 19-21). He also used a simple argument about victory and defeat when he described the subordination of India by a small fraction of the British army despite the huge disparity between India and Britain in both numbers and material in the favor of the Indians (Rosen, 1995, pp. 22-23). This method may provide guidance on how to measure military effectiveness generally, however it’s utility to my purpose is limited due to its specific dependence on evidence from interstate, regular and symmetric wars while our question is about military effectiveness in asymmetric, intrastate more irregular forms of conflict.

Risa Brooks (2006) used interstate regular wars of 1967 and 1973 between Egypt and Israel to demonstrate how the efficiency of the Egyptian army significantly improved between 1967 and 1973 (Brooks, 2006, p. 397). Brooks stated that one of the values of her study is to offer scholars and analysts tools to measure their states’ military effectiveness (Brooks, 2006, p. 401). In pursuit of her promise, Brooks offerd her readers a definition of military effectiveness not very
different from what was offered by Rosen as mentioned above. According to Brooks, military effectiveness is “the attributes of the military organization- as reflected in its internal military activities- that allow it to take its human and material strength and translate them into power on the battlefield” (Brooks, 2006, p. 406). She also noted that military effectiveness is just one factor among many which affects a nation’s probability to success in war (Brooks, 2006, p. 406). More importantly, Brooks then discussed some of these “internal military activities” which can reflect the ability of the military organization to translate its strength into power on the battlefield and which she thinks is affected by the balance of power between civil and military leaders (Brooks, 2006, p. 406). However Brook’s approach doesn’t seem to fulfill our purpose of examining military effectiveness in irregular intrastate wars due to the nature of evidence she used which is derived solely from interstate regular wars.

Some scholars, given the type of their studies, preferred a more quantitative approach in measuring military effectiveness. Michael Beckley (2010) used a quantitative approach to his measurement of military effectiveness, the loss exchange ratio (LER) (Beckley, 2010; Biddle & Long, 2004).

However, all of these literature dealing with military effectiveness depended, in their analysis, on evidence form regular interstate wars rather than conflicts which included a non-state irregular insurgency. On the other hand, Ron Tira, dealt with military effectiveness in both cases, regular and irregular conflicts, trying to review Carl von Clausewitz’s condition for military decision in battles and questioning its applicability in irregular wars against non-state actors (Tira, 2010). Tira studied three cases where the Israeli military had to fight non-state irregular actors, namely the PLO in 1982, Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008. In his book, Tira differentiates between two terms, military effectiveness and military decision. He came up with a conclusion that, a
nation’s military, is not said to have achieved decision in an irregular warfare, against a non-state enemy, in a certain period of time, as long as this enemy maintains a residual defiance capability during the course of this period. That is, as long as the irregular enemy is able to inflicting blows to the nations’ strategic center of gravity (Tira, 2010). I have benefited from Tira’s argument in developing the measure of military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency (see methodology).

As it can be observed, there is very few literature dealing with civilian control in military-dominated political Systems and even fewer dealing with state’s military effectiveness against irregular non-state insurgencies. More importantly, there is a near complete absence of literature linking the degree of civilian control over the military, in military-dominated political systems, with its military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency.

This academic gap is coupled with the fact that we are living in a world where the majority of conflicts are increasingly irregular and states are trying to explore its military’s capability to wage war against irregular non-state insurgencies. In this kind of war, where traditional military doctrine is unable to answer its needs and can’t measure its outcome, a thorough academic effort is necessary to explore such realms of security policy making. Having said that, it’s our desire that this thesis would be a useful addition to such efforts in understanding both the dynamics of civil-control in military-dominated political systems and its relationship with a state’s military effectiveness against irregular insurgencies through examining two very important countries in the international arena, Turkey and Pakistan.
II- Methodology:

In order to examine the present question, namely, does increasing the degree of civilian control, in military dominated political systems, have a positive impact on military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency?, I am going to use qualitative comparative case study analysis of Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with the Kurdish Worker’s party (PKK) and the Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively, during different time periods. Although this method doesn’t provide definite answers, it may be the best method to examine issues with a limited number of cases (Small-N problem) like the present issue (Lim, 2006, p. 20). In a global trend of democratization and an increased demand on civil and political rights, there are relative few cases, in the contemporary world, of military-dominated political systems. The problem is exacerbated because the question also demands a case where this military-dominated political system is engaged in an irregular warfare with an insurgency, adding this dimension, limits the availability of cases to a very few number. Comparative case study analysis in this contest becomes more useful than other methods, if suitable case selection is done, in insuring some measure of control and develop a deep understanding of the issue in hand (Lim, 2006, p. 20; Neuman, 2005, pp. 157-158).

The scope of this thesis includes eight time periods which represents eight distinct cases in the history of both Turkey and Pakistan. These time periods is selected according to their relevance to the conflict under analysis and variance between them in the degree of civilian control.

The degree of civilian control in each case is evaluated according to a four flanged criteria and subsequently ranked from the case with maximum civilian control to the minimum.
Military effectiveness, of the Turkish and Pakistani armies to suppress the respective insurgency, is then assessed during each of these eight cases. This assessment is done by measuring the ability, of the insurgency under study, PKK in case of Turkey and TTP in case of Pakistan, to demonstrate defiance capability, or in other words, its capability to launch attacks. Therefore, military effectiveness against an insurgency during a specific case (time period), is said to increase, as the yearly average of attack incidents by the respective insurgency decreases during this time period.

Finally, this study compares these two variables, namely, degree of civilian control and military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency, during different cases, in order to answer the present question.

The eight cases, under the scope of this analysis, includes six in Turkey and two in Pakistan. The Turkish cases are; Case One: the period of military rule in Turkey after 1980 coup between (1980 and 1982), Case Two: Özal’s 1st period between (1983 and 1986), Case Three: Özal’s 2nd period between (1987 and 1993), Case Four: post- Özal period between (1993 and 1997), Case Five: the period of legislative reform between (1997 and 2002) and Case Six: Justice and Development party (AKP) rule between (2003 and 2014). The two Pakistani cases include; Case Seven: General Pervez Musharraf direct military rule between (1999 and 2008) and Case Eight: the subsequent period of elected civilian governments between (2008 and 2014).
The degree of civilian control is evaluated in each case according to the following criteria:

- **Criterion no.1)** in any military chain of command, the top two are the head of the government, in our cases, the prime minister, and the secretary of defense, and both are civilians.

- **Criterion no.2)** the power of discussing and approving defense budget lies totally outside the military establishment or vested in a government body dominated by civilians.

- **Criterion no.3)** the military didn’t engage directly in maintaining internal security, in suppressing public uprising or civil-violence, for the period of the studied case.

- **Criterion no.4)** national security and foreign policy decision making, is completely vested in civilian institutions or in government bodies dominated by civilians.

- **Notes:**
  - ✓ The degree of civilian control, in each case, would be stronger as it fulfills one of these criteria after another.

For my second variable, namely, military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency, the researcher borrows Tira’s concept stated earlier “A nation’s military is not effective in an asymmetric warfare against an irregular enemy in a certain period of time as long as this enemy maintains a residual defiance capability during the course of this period. That is, as long as the irregular enemy is able to inflicting blows to the nations’ strategic center of gravity” (Tira, 2010).

**Military effectiveness** during each period is, therefore, assessed by its ability to suppress offensive capability of the insurgency it is fighting. The offensive capabilities of each
insurgency, the PKK and the TTP respectively, is measured by the yearly average number of attacks, it had been able to launch, during each time period. All data, regarding insurgency attack incidents, is extracted from the **Global Terrorism Database (GTD)**\(^1\). GTD is managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. It is considered one of the most comprehensive, reliable and widely accepted open-access data base, for terrorism related incidents, available for researches and academics (Lee, 2008). It has been used to conduct many studies such as; "Terrorist Incidents in India, 1998-2004: A Quantitative Analysis of Fatality Rates." (Borooah, 2009) and “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law? (Choi, 2010).

Finally, the analysis of the degree of civilian control and military effectiveness, during each case (time-period) is coupled and compared, Turkey against Pakistan generally and all cases against each other specifically, to derive answers on whether civilian control is positively related with military effectiveness in suppressing an insurgency and to explore other factors which may be more relevant.

---

III- Case selection:

As mentioned above, I am going to use a comparative case study analysis of Turkey and Pakistan. But why these specific cases?

Turkey and Pakistan have many similarities which would act as good control for some incontrollable factors. Turkey and Pakistan have the same dominant religion, as they are both predominantly Sunni Muslim counties (Nation-Master, 2015), they, also, have some degree of parity in the strength of their respective armed forces (Global-firepower, 2015), their armed forces occupy a very prestigious and central position in the respective modern history of both nations which is perceived to be the state builder, the most sophisticated and effective state apparatus (Barany, 2009; Sakallioğlu, 1997; Varol, 2013), a savior of the state (Singh & Hickman, 2013) and, more importantly, have always been interested in politics which is represented by their repeated and recurrent interventions in political affairs. Turkey suffered from four military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. On the other side, the Pakistani military staged three coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999.

Another useful similarity, is that both militaries were engaged in a bitter irregular conflict with a non-state insurgency. The Turkish military had been in direct war with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since the 1980’s. This conflict had caused an estimated causalities between 35000 and 40000, many of them are civilians and members of Turkish security forces (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, p. 19). The Pakistani military, also, has always been facing irregular non-state insurgency threats represented by separatists’ movements in the troublesome Baluchistan region (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 42). And later by the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and other Islamist
militant groups in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other regions (Fair, 2011a, pp. 121-128).

If these many similarities between Turkey and Pakistan are useful, their differences are even more interesting. The modern Turkish state was established, from the beginning and for more than twenty years between 1923 and 1945, as a single-party autocracy ruled by two military commanders, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu respectively (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 41). Pakistan, on the other hand, from its independence in 1947, was intended to become a parliamentary democracy had it not faced later misfortunes (Barany, 2009; Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 42).

Another distinction, is the difference in the nature of interventions exercised by the two militaries. While the Turkish military establishment didn’t remain in direct power for long period of times and quite fulfilled its return to democracy promises after each intervention by surrendering power to elected civilian parties, the Pakistani military sought long periods of direct martial rule by the coup leader, causing Pakistan to endure long periods of direct military rule e.g. between (1958 and 1970), (1977 and 1980) and between (1999 and 2008) (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 50). According to Eric Nordlinge’s typology of military political involvement patterns, the Turkish military usually acted according to the “moderator” or the “Guardian” type (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 17), while the Pakistani military have always assumed the “ruler” type in all its interventions.

Although both states may seem to have close civil-military relations’ trajectories, the contemporary reality of both is largely different. While Turkey have been relatively successful in pursuing a steady path towards taming its military (Aydınlı, 2012), Pakistan is, by large, still suffering from its poor civil-military relations, moreover, its military institution is still wielding a
great deal of influence, if not complete autonomy, on matters of national security and foreign policy (Ganguly, 2015).

While turbulence of civil-military relations, in Turkey and Pakistan, covers almost the entire of these two countries’ history, this study derives evidence from certain periods of history when there were a variance in the degree of civilian control and an ongoing conflict with an insurgency.

For Turkey, this research focuses on the period between 1980 and 2014. This period starts with the 1980 military coup and the beginning of the armed conflict with the Kurdistan workers’ Party (PKK) (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 21; Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, p. 2), and ends in 2014. This period captures the conflict with the PKK from its beginning and covers almost all its phases, also this period have witnessed a variety in the degree of civilian control over the military witnessing two military coups in 1980 and 1997, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its unwavering path towards near-complete civilian control over the military (Aydınlı, 2012).

As for Pakistan, the focus of this study is on the period of the state’s struggle with the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) which started officially in 2007 with the announcement of the establishment of the TPP (Fair, 2011a, p. 123). Although TPP was officially established in 2007, its origins can be traced as early as 2004 (Zaidi, 2010). Although civil-military relations in Pakistan is still suffering the lack of civilian control over the military, this period have witnessed some changes in the balance of power between civilians and the military. During the first phase of the conflict (2004-2008), the Pakistani politics was completely controlled by a military commander, General Pervez Musharraf. The second phase of the conflict (2008-2014) witnessed the return of elected civilian prime ministers to the center of politics.
Through examining the degree of civilian control and insurgency attack incidents in each of the eight cases, under the scope of this analysis (see methodology), in both countries in a comparative case study analysis, the influence of changing degrees of civilian control, on military effectiveness in irregular conflict with an insurgency, can be observed.

Note here that, the end point of this analysis is the year 2014, which is the last year of available data in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), from which I have derived data about insurgency attack incidents.

---

CHAPTER THREE

The Degree of Civilian Control

This Chapter analyzes the degree of civilian control in all of the eight cases (time periods) under the scope of this study, after a brief historical account, in order to put them in the right context.

Part One: analyzing the degree of civilian control in the six cases of Turkey:

I- Historical background on Turkey between (1923 and 1980)

Since the formation of Modern Turkey by its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish republic was ruled by military commanders. Ataturk, a military commander himself, ruled Turkey followed by his companion Ismet Inonu, also a military commander. They both ruled Turkey through an authoritarian single-party system from 1923 to 1945 (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 41).

Establishing a multi-party system, after two decades of single-party rule, brought the new Democratic Party to power after winning the 1950 elections under the leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 20). In 1960, after being called by the government to suppress youth protests, the military decided to stage a coup and remove the democrats from office (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 21). This coup sat the stage, as discussed below, to the legitimization of military interference in politics. During this period, Iraqi Kurds revolted, and the Turkish military increased its presence in the Kurdish provinces to prevent similar revolts (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 106-107). This may represent the beginning of viewing the Kurdish problem in a pure military mindset, in the new republic of Turkey.

In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, the 1961 constitution came out with a profound military input. The new constitution created another legislative body, different electoral system, a constitutional
court and, more importantly, the National Security Council (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 22). The National Security Council ((Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) or MGK, was intended to legalize military interference in everyday politics due to the very large mandate given to it by the 1961 constitution which was further strengthened in 1983 constitution (Karabelias, 2008, p. 460). Between the years 1965 and 1971, weak and in-cohesive governments came to power. Increased political violence and civil disorder and the inability of the government to counter them, lead the military to stage their second coup in 1971 to restore public order.

Leftist organizations thrived during this period in the mid-1970’s and the early 1980’s including the Turkish Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) or the PKK, the separatist militant organization which is the focus of this analysis (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 2; Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, p. 22). Another coup followed in 1980 for similar reasons of weak coalition governments unable to restore internal order (Varol, 2013, p. 741). The 1982 constitution created a political system with two heads, the council of ministers and the National Security Council, with the latter becoming the real body running Turkey after 1993 (Karabelias, 2008, p. 460).

The autonomy of the military and its influence on Turkish politics increased through several mechanisms embedded in the 1982 constitution. The mandate of the National Security Council (MGK) was extended, its recommendations were given a special priority in the council of ministers decisions and its military membership were extended on the expense of civilians. Originally, the MGK was made to discuss matters of national security, given this new status, and due to enlargement of the notion of national security, the MGK ended up involved in a wide range of issues including setting school curricula, appointing civil servants in the southeast and proposing coalition formation between political parties (Sakallioğlu, 1997, pp. 157-158). The National Security Council MGK, later, became the most important government body dealing
with the Kurdish question and the war with the PKK (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 143-145) The 1982 constitution also increased the power of the president, who, at this time, had always came from the military (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 159).

In the following sections, I am going to apply the criteria of the degree of civilian control, which I have illustrated in the methodology section, on each of the eight cases under the scope of this analysis.

II- **Case One: the period of direct military rule between (1980 and 1983):**

First case to be analyzed is the three years of direct military rule following the 1980 coup from 1980-1983 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). During this period, all of the criteria of civilian control was violated. There were no elected government, no civilian leadership at all, the army had been directly involved in establishing internal order and ending political violence, as this was the principle reason behind the coup in the first place. All decisions, regarding national security and foreign policy, were completely made by military commanders in the absence of any elected civilian government. This period, therefore, represents the **lowest possible point** from the perspective of civilian control, in other words, it represents the complete absent of civilian control.

This period witnessed the rise of the PKK as a Kurdish insurgency intended to advance Kurdish interests through using violence. The PKK also took a big advantage of the brutal tactics, used by the military in dealing with Kurdish population, in promoting their propaganda and increasing their recruitment abilities. This demonstrates the negative consequences of a direct military rule on counter-insurgency efforts and may represent one of the intervening variables linking civilian control to military effectiveness in combating insurgency.
III- Case Two and Three: Özal’s period between (1983 and 1993):

The second and third cases was during, Turgut Özal’s period, which is between (1983 and 1993). This period can be divided into two sections, the first is between (1983 and 1989), when Özal was the Prime-minister and Kenan Evren, the 1980 coup leader, was the president. The second case in Özal’s period was between (1989 and 1993), when Özal assumed the position of the president and enjoyed both a majority in the Parliament and a prime-minister from his own Party (Karabelias, 1999, p. 136). As president, Özal’s tried to curtail the military rule in politics. His attempts to assert civilian supremacy included creating local governorships with extraordinary powers and exercising unprecedented powers over the National Intelligence Agency. He also replaced military liaisons in government with civilian administrators, brought to the public sphere the issue of military budget and declared his intension to make the chief of the general staff report to the minister of defense. He overruled the recommendation of the high command to the position of the chief of the general staff and appointed another general of his choice. More importantly Özal interfered with issues of national security and foreign policy including the Kurdish issue which were considered before as a taboo by the army (Karabelias, 2008, p. 459).

Applying the criteria of civilian control on these two periods, the following can be concluded; Case Two (Özal’s first period), saw the fulfilment of only half of the criterion no.1, where the elected civilian prime-minister, Özal, shared the decision making on national security and foreign policy of the Turkish state with a president from the military establishment and a National Security Council (MGK) clearly dominated by military commanders. Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, argue that, contrary to the wide held believe, Ö zal actually couldn’t have conducted any of his policies hadn’t it been approved by the leader of the 1980 coup, the president at the
time, General Kenan Evren (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 158). The military wasn’t directly involved in maintaining internal security fulfilling criterion no. 3. The other two criteria was not fulfilled. The national security and foreign policy decisions (criterion no.4) was vested in the military-dominated MGK. The issue of military budget (criterion no. 2) was totally out of the civilian sphere of influence and was prohibited from discussion in the parliament or any other civilian institution (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 160). It can be said that, through Özal’s first period, there were low to medium degree of civilian control fulfilling, partially, only 2 of the proposed 4 criteria.

For Case Three, Özal’s second period, he assumed the position of the president. During this period, Özal clearly fulfilled criterion no.1 through dominating the highest two civilian position and trying to subjugate the military high-command to the civilian defense ministry (Karabelias, 1999, p. 137). Criterion no.3 (military internal intervention) was also fulfilled due to the absence of internal security challenges. Özal also advocated subjugating the issue of military budget to civilian scrutiny breaking the old taboo on the issue (criterion no.2) (Karabelias, 1999, p. 137). Criterion no.4, however, was still partially fulfilled due to the presence of the National Security Council (MGK) which was still dominated by military commanders and still wielded large influence on matters of national security and foreign policy, in spite of Özal’s repeated attempts to dominate decisions in these arena. In Case Three, Özal achieved a medium to high degree of civilian control fulfilling at least 2 criteria fully and boldly challenging the military in the other two.
IV- Case Four: post Özal period between (1993 and 1997):

Case Four in this analysis would be the “post Özal period” between (1993 and 1997). In the years following the sudden death of Özal in 1993, the military was able once more to reconsolidate their grip on Turkish politics due to the relative weaknesses of political leaders after Özal, their intra-party rivalries and their need for the military support to consolidate their position in their respective parties. Following Özal’s death, Suleyman Demirel assumed the office of the presidency and Tansu Çiller was appointed as the new prime-minister. After a series of elections held between 1994 and 1996, the political arena of the Turkish republic witnessed the rise of an Islamist party, the Welfare Party. The welfare party formed a coalition government with the True Path Party. On June 28th 1996, for the first time in its history, the prime minister of the long-time secular republic, was a stern Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan (Yavuz, 1997, p. 63). Yet on the last day of February 1997, in the wake of a political scandal, the MGK issued the Erbakan-led government a list of 18 points to be implemented without delay including curtailing “reactionary Islam”. In the face of a military coup threat, Erbakan and his cabinet resigned (Ozel, 2003, p. 87).

This period was characterized by unstable relatively weak civilian governments led by civilian leaders who, most of their time, focused on strengthen their political positions and aligning themselves with the military trying to avoid alienating them (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 137-139). Moreover, this period ends by a direct military intervention which led to the overthrow of the elected government.

Although some political leaders, e.g. Çiller and Erbakan, tried to boast civilian control, they faced a little degree of success and therefore, this period as a whole can be said to be characterized by low to very low degree of civilian control over the military with almost all the
4 criteria violated with the exception of criterion no.3 and occasional trials by political leaders to fulfill criterion no.1 with mixed success. For example, at the beginning of her term as a prime minister in 1993, Çiller wanted to curve her own picture outside the shadow of the more experienced president. She proposed ideas like creating a parliamentary body resembling the National Security Council and non-military solutions to the Kurdish problem, however, under pressure from the military and her competition with the president, she gave up those progressive ideas and resorted to the traditional positions preferred by the military and turned over the conduct of the Kurdish problem and subsequently the war with the PKK insurgency, entirely to the military (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 136-138). Due to prime minister’s Necmettin Erbakan’s desire not to alienate the military further, he also aligned himself with the military position in the Kurdish issue and, as his predecessor, left the situation in the southeast and the war with the PKK to the military (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, pp. 106-107).

V- **Case Five: the period of legislative reform between (1997 and 2002):**

The Fifth case of this analysis is the period in between (1997 and 2002), this period can be called “the period of legislative reform” which is after the post-modern coup of 1997. This is the period which witnessed a serious of legislative reforms in 1999, 2001 and 2002 aiming to revolutionize civil-rights, political rights and civil-military relations (Özbudun, 2007). Civilian control was also enhanced by the formation of a strong and effective coalition government in 1999 led by Bülent Ecevit, Devlet Bahceli, and Mesut Yılmaz. Some of These leaders challenged the military publically and criticized their influence on politics as demonstrated by the crisis which erupted between Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz and the military leadership in 1998 (Varol, 2013, p. 741). This period can be said to have fulfilled Criterion No. 1 partially and Criterion no. 3 completely and failed to fulfill both Criteria No. 2 and 4. Therefore this case can be classified
as **having low to medium degree of civilian control**, which is not as high as Case Three, Özal’s second period, and not as low as, Case Four, the post-Özal era.

**VI- Case Six: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Rule between (2003 and 2014):**

The sixth case in this analysis, is the period of the Justice and development Party (AKP) rule between (2002 and 2011). It is been obvious that the AKP, under the leadership of its charismatic leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had been successful in curtailing the military influence in politics and establishing nearly complete degree of civilian control. From the point of its stunning win in 2002 general elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey sought to embark on solving the problem of military dominance over politics. It benefited from curbing military constitutional prerogatives in 1999, 2001, 2002 constitutional amendments of 1982 constitution. Through these amendments, the parliament changed the structure of the National Security Council (MGK), the historical avenue of military interference in politics, increased the number of civilian in its membership to be superior to that of the military, asserted its advisory role, removed the ban on civilians to hold the position of its secretary general and curbed its executive powers (Karabelias, 2008, p. 461; Özbudun, 2007, p. 193). The parliament also passed a number of reform packages for some laws regarding the National Security Council (MGK) in order to decrease its executive powers. One example of these packages is the Seventh Harmonization Package of (Law # 4963) which entered into force on the 7th of August 2003 (Özbudun, 2007, p. 194). In his paper Özbudun, acknowledges the fact that, all these constitutional reforms, doesn’t end the military influence in politics, which can only be weakened through strengthen the legitimacy of civilian governments (Özbudun, 2007, p. 195). The AKP government, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, fulfilled this requirement to a large extent, and reinforced its legitimacy through winning national elections of 2007, 2011, 2015 and subsequent parliament majority for
the next 17 years, allowing it to rule Turkey alone for all these years with remarkable success in all fields. In July of 2011, the army chief of staff resigned in protest to the AKP’s policies on staff promotions, followed by the chiefs of the air force and the Navy, which consolidated the AKP’s grab on power and supremacy over the military (Taşpınar, 2015).

To sum up, The AKP reaped the benefits of parliament-approved constitutional amendments, in the period of legislative reform, which curtailed military powers in the MGK rendering it a civilian-dominated advisory government body. With the most resilient obstacle in the face of civilian control tamed, the AKP succeeded in fulfilling criterion no.4, where national security and foreign policy decisions is made in civilian-dominated government bodies. Their fulfilment of criterion no.3 was clearly evident in their managing of the 2013 Taksim-square youth protests without inviting the army to intervene (Becatoros & Keaten, 2013). As for military budget (criterion no.2), the situation is far from the traditional taboo, now, the parliament openly discusses the budget, have debates about it and announce it for public scrutiny (Kemal, 2014). It can be observed that, the AKP have fulfilled almost all the 4 criteria achieving a high degree of civilian control. However, it is worth noting here that Turkish civilians haven’t reached yet a complete degree of civilian control which resembles that of modern western democracies, rather, the Turkish military still exercise a degree of influence and pressure on civilian leaders (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 128-129).
Part Two: Analyzing the degree of civilian control in the two cases of Pakistan:

Pakistan has witnessed three military coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999. For the purpose of this analysis, the focus is on two distinct periods of Pakistani politics between (1999 and 2015).

I- Case Seven: General Musharraf’s Direct Military rule:

Case Seven is between (1999 and 2008), This period witnessed the direct military rule of General Pervez Musharraf (Singh & Hickman, 2013, p. 45). It resembles the period of the military junta rule in Turkey following the 1980 coup, the only exception is that the Pakistani case lasted for 9 years in contrast to 3 years in the Turkish one. During this period none of the four criteria of civilian control was fulfilled, pushing the degree of civilian control to its minimal level, or in other words, civilian control was completely absent and for an extended period of time. A serious of actions done by Musharraf completely consolidated his military rule. After the 2002 referendum and elections, it was apparent that Musharraf was intending to consolidate his military rule (Talbot, 2002, p. 325), For example, in summer of 2002, he announced constitutional changes, in August, he issued “the Legal Framework Order”, which expanded his presidential powers to unprecedented realms including; the power to dissolve the Parliament, dismiss elected officials and appoint military commanders (El-Khawas, 2009, pp. 98-99). Another example is the formation of a military-dominated National Security Council which resembled the MGK of Turkey (El-Khawas, 2009, p. 99). By October 2004, Musharraf held dually the positions of the president and the army chief, had a prime minister and a parliamentary majority from the party he secretly established and have weakened all other major political parties (El-Khawas, 2009, pp. 100-103).
II- Case Eight: post Musharraf democratic period between (2008 and 2014):

This case is in the period immediately following the end of General Musharraf’s Rule after his defeat in February 2008 (Nelson, 2009, p. 16). This case covers the period between (2008 and 2014). This period witnessed the rule of elected civilian governments and the first peaceful transition of power from a civilian government to another after 2013 general elections. However, the winning party, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, still faced mass opposition protests and allegations of poll rigging (Jaspal, 2015 pp. 69-74). The Pakistani elected civilians may have achieved partial success in criterion no.1, where the head of the government is an elected civilian leader, however, it is clearly evident that they, the civilian leaders, are facing a complete failure in wielding power in the areas of national defense and foreign policy decision making (Yusuf, 2014, p. 92). For example, in 2009, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, was given an unprecedented extended term as the army chief, which proved the inability of the civilian leaders to manage national security policy independent from the army commanders (Fair, 2011b, p. 101). Also, at the climax of political crisis of 2013, one of the opposition leaders, Imran Khan, organized a huge march in the Pakistani capital. When the police seemed unable to handle the situation, Sharif called the army to help the police in restoring public order. The government asked a military commander to mediate between it and Imran khan (Jaspal, 2015 pp.72). This demonstrates the civilian leadership dependence on the military to provide internal security and mediate between rival civilian groups, largely violating criterion no.3. With criteria no.1, 3 and 4 violated, civilians can only be said to have achieved a very low degree of civilian control. Some scholars, e.g. Savail Hussain and Mehreen Malik, argue that, in such a turbulent environment of civil-military relations, no comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy can be drafted (Yusuf, 2014, p. 94).
In conclusion, the degree of civilian control, for Turkey, can be described in six distinct cases between (1980 and 2014). **Case One** between (1980 and 1983), the degree of civilian control was at its minimum level, **Case Two** between (1983 and 1989), during Özal’s first period, the government enjoyed low to medium degree of civilian control. **Case Three**, Özal’s second period, between (1989 and 1993), he enjoyed a medium degree of civilian control. In the post-Özal period, **Case Four**, between (1993 and 1997), the degree of civilian control was at a very low level. **Case Five**, during the era of legislative reforms between (1997 and 2002), Turkey witnessed a low to medium degree of civilian control and the beginning of real democratization. **Finally**, during **Case Six**, the AKP and its leaders were, eventually, able to achieve high degree of civilian control fulfilling almost all of this study’s four criteria.

In Pakistan between (1999 and 2014) can be divided into two cases. **Case Seven** is between (1999 and 2008) during General Musharraf’s rule, witnessed no civilian control at all. **Case Eight**, between (2008 and 2015), saw only limited degree of civilian control.

**Table (1)** shows the ranking of the previous eight cases according to the degree of civilian control. From this ranking, it can be seen that, the state of civilian control, in Turkey, is far more advanced than in Pakistan. Five out of six of the Turkish cases proved to be better than any Pakistani case, with significant increase in the degree of civilian control over time. On the other side, for Pakistan, its two cases are lagging behind in the ranking constituting two of the lowest three cases in this analysis.

In the following Chapter, military effectiveness of the armies of both Turkey and Pakistan, is compared, during the overall period of analysis and in each of the eight cases specifically, in combating the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (Case Six)  
AKP Party Rule (maximum) | 2003 - 2014 | Turkey | High degree of civilian control | # 1 |
| (Case Three)  
2nd Özal’s period | 1989 - 1993 | Turkey | Medium degree of civilian control | # 2 |
| (Case Five)  
The period of legislative reform in Turkey | 1997 - 2002 | Turkey | Low to Medium degree of civilian control | # 3 |
| (Case Two)  
1st Özal’s period | 1983 - 1989 | Turkey | Low to medium degree of civilian control | # 4 |
| (Case Four)  
post-Özal period | 1993 - 1997 | Turkey | Very low to low degree of civilian control | # 5 |
| (Case Eight)  
Pakistani civilian rule after Musharraf | 2008 - 2014 | Pakistan | Very low degree of civilian control | # 6 |
| (Case One)  
Military junta rule after 1980 coup in Turkey | 1980 - 1983 | Turkey | No civilian control - only limited period | # 7 |
| (Case Seven)  
General Musharraf’s rule (minimum) | 1999 - 2008 | Pakistan | No civilian control + extended period | # 8 |

Table (1): ranking of the eight cases according to the degree of civilian control
CHAPTER FOUR
Military Effectiveness

In this chapter, the effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan in suppressing the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP) respectively, is measured, during the overall time period of the analysis and in each of the previous eight cases, in order to examine this study’s main question, does military effectiveness against an insurgency increases with the increase of the degree of civilian control?

However, it is essential, first, to embark on a brief account about the origins of both conflicts, before analyzing, in detail, military effectiveness during each of the eight cases.

I- The origins of the Turkish conflict with the PKK:

The Kurdish Workers Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), was first established in the mid 1970’s as a Marxist-Leninist militant student organization, under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK held its first secret congress in 1978 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 22; Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, p. 2). In the midst of rising political violence and subsequent military coup of 1980, the PKK leaders, including Öcalan, fled to the neighboring Syria, where they lived, organized themselves and trained under the sponsorship of the Syrian regime (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 22). The brutal repression of the Kurdish population in the southeastern provinces under the military-coup regime in the early 1980’s, cultivated necessary circumstances for the development and thrive of the PKK as a militant organization (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 110-111). The PKK started its first insurgency in 1984 in order to liberate the Kurdish people and establish the independent Kurdistan state (Eccarius-Kelly, 2011, pp. 3,111-112). On August 15th, 1984, the PKK launched two simultaneous guerilla attacks against Turkish forces, this event marked the beginning of the thirty-years armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish separatist
insurgency, which remains un-concluded until the time of performing this study (Özcan, 2012, p. 195).

II- The origins of the Pakistani conflict with the TTP:

Around the year 2004, some groups of Islamic militants began operating under the name of “Taliban Pakistan” in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Pashtun settled areas in northwestern Swat. These groups successfully established Islamic sharia law in large swaths of land under their control (Fair, 2011a, p. 122). In 2007, it was officially announced that an umbrella organization called “Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan” (TTP), was established under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed by a US drone attack in 2009 and was succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud. Under the leadership of Hakimullah, the TPP consolidated and intensified its operations against the Pakistani military and security forces (Fair, 2011a).

Until 2010, The Pakistani army had launched a total of four military campaigns against the TTP in Swat region, the first three witnessed mixed results with a failure to establish permanent presence or hold ground in the militant regions (Fair, 2011b, p. 103). The 2004 army campaign in South Waziristan, against Nek Mohammad Wazir, represents a stark example of these failures, when Nek Mohammad managed to reach a stalemate with the army followed by a peace deal (Fair, 2011a, p. 124). Only in May 2009, the army was able to launch a successful campaign in Swat region, code-named Operation Rah-e-Rast (Operation Path of Righteousness), and it was able to establish law and order in the region, even though, on the expense of local discomfort from permeant military occupation (Fair, 2011b, p. 103; Yusuf, 2014, pp. 74-75).
III- Comparing the overall effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan:

In this section, and the following one, the researchers use data about insurgency attack incidents, derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)\(^3\), to assess the PKK and TTP ability to launch attacks, in other words, to measure their defiance capability and subsequently assessing the effectiveness of the Turkish and the Pakistani military in suppressing them respectively. The yearly average of insurgency attack incidents in each period is used to test if military effectiveness in each case is positively affected by its ranking in the degree of civilian control established in the previous chapter.

*Figures* (1 and 2), describes the number of the attacks of the PKK and the TTP respectively during all the time period under the scope of this study. *Figure (1)* describes perfectly the rise of the PKK first insurgency in the mid-1980’s after the suppressive period of direct military rule following the 1980 coup in Turkey. It can be seen that the rate of PKK attack incidents had greatly declined, in less than a decade from the beginning of its rise in 1984. The sharp increase in the beginning of the 1990’s can be explained by the eruption of the second Gulf war in 1992 and the opening of the Turkish-Iraqi border to the movements of PKK back and forth seeking refuge and logistical support. *Figure (1)* also demonstrates the overall suppression of the PKK attacks between (1995 and 2011), only to increase again in 2011 after the eruption of the Syrian civil-war in mid-2011 (Rodgers et al, 2015), the increase which didn’t last long before being suppressed again in less than 3 years. *Figure (2)*, on the other side demonstrates the Pakistani army’s ineffectiveness and the increasing capability of the TTP to lunch attacks despite the short-lived suppression after 2009 military campaign. It can be seen that, after a full decade from the

---

beginning of the conflict with the TTP in 2004, the Pakistani army is still facing failure in suppressing the TTP, which is still able, until 2014, to show significant defiance capability proved by the increasing rate of attack incidents in Pakistan. Comparing these two figures (1 and 2), shows the overall difference in effectiveness between the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan in combating the PKK and the TTP respectively, with the former being more successful in suppressing the insurgency it’s facing. Given the overall superiority of Turkey in the degree of civilian control, established earlier, this can be used as an evidence on the positive effect of the degree of civilian control on military effectiveness in irregular warfare against non-state insurgency. This superiority of the Turkish military effectiveness can also be demonstrated by the average number of incidents in both countries per year. The average number of incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1984 and 2014) is 42.4 incidents per year, while, the average number of TTP attack incidents in Pakistan between (2004 and 2014) is 98 incidents per year. It can be noticed that the yearly average of TTP attack incidents is more than double that of the PKK, which demonstrates the far superiority of the TTP over the PKK in showing a defiance capability and subsequently, the Superiority of the Turkish military over its Pakistani counterpart in suppressing the insurgency it is facing.
**Figure (1):** Incidents of PKK attacks between (1984 and 2014)
Total number of incidents = 1271

**Figure (2):** Incidents of TTP attacks in Pakistan between (2004 and 2014)
Total number of incidents = 1078
IV- Comparing the effectiveness of the militaries of both Turkey and Pakistan during each of the eight cases:

In this section, the rate of attack incidents of the PKK and the TTP is studied and compared during each of the eight cases of this analysis.

Figure (3) shows the rate of incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey during Özal’s period between (1983 and 1993). During this period the PKK launched a total of 797 attacks, which is 79.9 incidents per year. It also can be seen that there was a gradual rise in rate of attacks, a short decline, a sudden increase in 1992 and a sharp decline by 1994. As noted earlier, this sudden increase in the number of incidents is due to the first gulf war in 1990-1991. During case two, during 1st Özal period, between (1983 and 1989), which witnessed a low to medium degree of civilian control, the PKK launched a total of 112 attacks (Figure-4), which represents 16 incidents per year. In Case three, During Özal’s second period between (1990 and 1992), which had a medium degree of civilian control, and is the 2nd highest period in the ranking above, the total number pf PKK attack incidents was 518 incidents (Figure-5), which is 172.6 incidents per year. This sudden increase in PKK offensive capability, as noted before, has nothing to do with the degree of civilian control, rather, it can be explained by the eruption of the 1st gulf war, which increased the PKK’s tactical and logistical capabilities through porous borders with a destabilized neighboring Iraq. Figure-5, however, demonstrates the continued suppression of the PKK during most of the period. It also shows the immediate success of the Turkish military, during this period, to suppress PKK offensive capabilities by 1992.
Figure (3): Incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1983 and 1994)
Total number of incidents = 797

Figure (4): Incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1983 and 1989)
Total number of incidents = 112
Case Four, during post-Özal period, between 1994 and 1996, the PKK launched a total of 219 attacks, with an average of 73 incidents per year (figure-6). The incidents of PKK attacks were only high during the first year and it soon declined during 1995 and 1996. This conforms with the turbulence in the degree of civilian control which followed Özal’s sudden death in 1993.

Figure-7 demonstrates the rate of PKK attack incidents in Case Five during the period of legislative reform between 1997 and 2002. The PKK launched a total of 56 attacks during this period, with an average of only 8 incidents per year. It can be noticed that, after 1999, the PKK attack incidents (its defiance capability) was completely suppressed. This can be attributed to the arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, and the subsequent organizational confusion inside the PKK (Marcus, 2007; Radu, 2002).
**Figure (6)**: Incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1994 and 1996)
Total number of incidents = 219

**Figure (7)**: Incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (1997 and 2002)
Total number of incidents = 56
Case Six, during the rule of the AKP party between (2003 and 2014), which is characterized by a high degree of civilian control and was ranked first among other cases in the scope of this analysis, the PKK launched a total of 366 attacks (figure-8), an average of 30.5 attack per year. This high incidence of attacks, however, is attributed to the eruption of the Syrian civil war in mid-2011 and not to changes in the degree of civilian control. This can be proved by looking to the pre-war data, namely, the number of incidents between (2003 and 2010), excluding the years of Syrian unrest between 2011 and 2014. Figure (9) demonstrates the rate of PKK attack incidents between (2003 and 2010). During this period, the PKK launched a total of 110 attacks, a yearly average of 13.75 incidents.

Figure (8) : incidents of PKK attacks in Turkey between (2003 and 2014)
Total number of incidents = 366
As for Pakistan, General Musharraf military rule witnessed the beginning of the conflict with the TTP in 2007, when a group of militant commanders announced that they are operating under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). The organization also consolidated its structure under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 (Fair, 2011a, p. 123). Year 2008, also was the year in which the military rule of General Musharraf came to an end. Therefore, I am going to use data about TTP attacks between 2008 and 2014, which is the period of civilian rule after Musharraf and represents Case Eight in this analysis. During this period the TTP launched a total of 1040 attacks, an average of 148 attacks per year (Figure -10), which is the highest yearly average rate of attack incidents in all the eight cases in the scope of the present analysis. This period, also, witnessed the lowest degree of civilian control, apart from the two cases of direct military rule in both Turkey and Pakistan. This gives credence to the claim that increasing the degree of civilian control has a positive impact on military effectiveness in irregular warfare against a non-state insurgency. Table (2) summarizes the previous analysis.
In conclusion, the analysis of military effectiveness during different cases proved the following. Generally, the Turkish military is far more superior to its Pakistani counterpart in suppressing the insurgency it is facing. Case Eight witnessed the highest yearly average of insurgency attack incidents, which conforms to its low status in the degree of civilian control. Case Five proved to be the lowest case in terms of yearly average insurgency attack incidents, followed by Case Two and Case Six. Case Six and Case Three represent two challenging cases to the claim that the degree of civilian control has a positive impact on military effectiveness in suppressing insurgency. In The following section, a final conclusion of this study and its implications for different actors, is presented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Degree of civilian control</th>
<th>Total no. of attacks</th>
<th>Yearly average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case Six</td>
<td>2002 - 2014</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>High degree of civilian control</td>
<td>366 (110)</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP Party Rule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(maximum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Three</td>
<td>1989 - 1993</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Medium degree of civilian control</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>172.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Özal’s period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Five</td>
<td>1997 - 2002</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Low to Medium degree of civilian control</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>period of legislative reform in Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Two</td>
<td>1983 - 1989</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Low to medium degree of civilian control</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Özal’s period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Four</td>
<td>1993 - 1997</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Very low to low degree of civilian control</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the post-Özal era</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Eight</td>
<td>2008 - 2014</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Very low degree of civilian control</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civilian rule after Musharraf’s era</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case One</td>
<td>1980 - 1983</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>No civilian control - only limited period</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military junta rule after 1980 coup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Seven</td>
<td>1999 - 2008</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>No civilian control + extended period</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Musharraf’s rule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (2): comparing insurgency attack incidents during different Cases
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion

I- Final conclusion:

In this thesis, we examine the following question; does the increase in the degree of civilian control, in military dominated political systems, positively impact military effectiveness against non-state insurgency in an irregular warfare?

In order to answer this question, this project compared both the degree of civilian control (the independent variable) and the military effectiveness against non-state insurgency in irregular warfare (the dependent variable), using comparative case study analysis of both Turkey and Pakistan and their conflict with The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP) respectively, during different time periods. The scope of this analysis included eight distinct cases (time periods), six of which was in Turkey and other two in Pakistan. In Chapter Three, Each case was analyzed against a four flanged criteria to rank them according to the degree of civilian control over the military during this time period. In Chapter Four, military effectiveness of the military against the respective insurgency, was examined for each case (time period). This was done by measuring the extent of the military suppression of the insurgency it is facing, in other words, to what extent was the respective insurgency able to demonstrate a defiance capability through the number of attacks it successfully launched during each case?

Comparing these two variables in different cases, a number of conclusions can be made.

First, Turkey is far superior to Pakistan in the degree of civilian control, with 5 of its 6 cases proved to be the highest in the ranking. The Turkish military, also, proved to be superior to its
Pakistani counterpart in suppressing the insurgency it is facing (the PKK). This may provide evidence of the positive relationship between increased civilian control and military effectiveness in irregular warfare.

Secondly, the superiority of the Turkish military over its Pakistani counterpart is also demonstrated by its ability to suppress the PKK in a short period of time after each boast in its capabilities (see Figure 1). On the other side, the Pakistani military have failed, until now, to suppress the TTP defiance capability, despite repeated campaigns in areas of its support (Figure 2).

Thirdly, although comparing the cases of Turkey and Pakistan may prove the positive relationship between civilian control and military effectiveness, comparing Turkish cases against each other defies this claim, or at least, marginalizes it. Case Three, 2nd Özal’s period, which is the second highest in the degree of civilian control, witnessed the highest yearly average in the no. of attacks by the PKK, even higher than the Pakistani cases. This proves the devastating effect of a destabilized neighbor, in this case Iraq, on military effectiveness in suppressing insurgency. This effect of a destabilized neighboring country, is also demonstrated by the increase of the yearly average of PKK attack incidents, during the AKP party rule, after the eruption of the civil war in Syria in mid-2011 (Figure 8). Both cases, namely, Case Three, 2nd Özal period and Case Six, AKP rule, are the highest two ranking cases in the degree of civilian control, however this superiority in civilian control was greatly shadowed by the effect of a destabilized neighboring country, which boasted the capabilities of the PKK and negated the effect of civilian control on military effectiveness. However, removing the effect of a destabilized neighbor, in Case Six of AKP party rule from 2003 to 2010 (Figure 9), we get the expected result of an effective military related to an increase in civilian control.
Fourthly, other factors may also be very crucial in curbing insurgency’s defiance capabilities other than the degree of civilian control. For example, organizational confusion inside the PKK following the arrest of its leader in 1999, represented a direct factor behind decreasing its offensive capabilities to its lowest level in Case Five, during the period between 1997 and 2002 (see figure-7 and Table-2).

Fifthly, Cases Two and Eight, demonstrate the drawbacks of direct military rule on subsequent civilian governments. In both cases, the insurgencies, PKK in case of Turkey and the TTP in case of Pakistan, was able to thrive and intensify their capabilities, in the aftermath of a direct military rule (see figures 1 and 2). This may be due to grievances cultivated after the unopposed military suppression of local population in insurgency-supporting areas during direct military rule, which results in increase of population support for the insurgency and a boast in their recruiting capabilities.

Finally, this thesis provides evidence on the positive relationship between civilian control and military effectiveness against non-state insurgency. However, it should be noted that this positive relationship is insufficient, alone, to claim direct causation, especially if this relationship is not very strong and proved to be overshadowed by other factors, such as a destabilized neighboring country or organizational confusion inside the insurgency itself.

Looking for other linking variables and causal mechanisms between civilian control and military effectiveness is essential to assert positive relationship between them. Examples of these causal factors may include increased military professionalism or more peaceful ways by which civilian governments tackle its minority problems, rather than harsh ways used by civilian governments which precipitate grievances and force people to violence.
Following is the last section about important recommendations based on this conclusion.

II- Final recommendations:

This thesis provides evidence on possible positive relationship between civilian control and military effectiveness in combating non-state violent actors. Given the devastating threats such actors present to peace and security in contemporary world, the following recommendations can be made:

1- Different United Nations Organs, political convoys and other mediating actors should take this result in consideration when proposing future political systems in countries emerging from violent unrest e.g. Libya, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. Future political orientations in these countries should pay good attention to civil-military balance, in order to improve its odds against insurgencies it is expected to face.

2- Countries with military-dominated political systems and also facing non-state militant groups, such as Egypt and Algeria, should move forward in increasing the degree of civilian control following the footsteps of Turkey, if they want to achieve positive results facing these militant groups.

3- Different human rights groups, can use the results of this thesis, to prove the devastating results of severe and violent oppression of minorities, which leaves huge grievances and boasts capabilities of insurgencies.

4- Since this thesis doesn’t prove causation, the results of this research doesn’t provide definite answers about the positive effect of civilian control on military effectiveness in irregular warfare. Therefore, further research in the subject should address possible linking factors and causal mechanisms between the two variables.

Thank you
References


