Originary Temporality in *Being and Time*

A Thesis Submitted to

The Department of Philosophy

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts

By

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Under the supervision of **Dr. Graham Harman**

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ABSTRACT

Originary temporality is a pivotal concept in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Heidegger proposes that originary temporality is the basis for all forms of time. He argues that our ordinary explanation of time is given in terms of originary temporality because the moments which make up ordinary time are modified versions of the features of originary temporality. The seemingly controversial point in Heidegger’s interpretation of time lies in his conclusion that the mode of temporality that is appropriate for the interpretation of Dasein’s Being is a “non-sequential” one. This non-sequential temporality, or “originary” temporality, is not a mode of time where the past comes before the present which is followed by the future. Originary temporality is a temporal manifold that can be present in any moment of sequential time. In other words, it is a mode of time where the future, past, and present are all there at every given moment. The main goal of this research is to present an account of originary temporality in Heidegger’s philosophy, and to assess whether this form of temporality is a literal form of time or if it is only metaphorically so. I will argue that originary temporality as a non-sequential form of time that forms a unity is a real form of time, not just a metaphorical one.

*Time present and time past*

*Are both perhaps present in time future,*

*And time future contained in time past.*

*If all time is eternally present*

*All time is unredeemable.*

T.S. Eliot

Four Quartets
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1- The Importance of the Question of Time

‘What time is it?’ seems to be a mundane question with an obvious answer. The answer lies in looking at the clock and finding that it is 6 o’clock, for example. As we speak about time in everyday life, there is no problem in regards to what is meant by time. It is a clear and well-understood concept to everyone to the extent that no one seems to question it. Time is taken as a given. It is a sequence of conjoined instances which bring us from the past to the future and from birth to death. No one asks about time because everyone has experienced time. Time is experienced differently from one person to the other. And every person experiences the variations of time; sometimes it is very slow whereas at other times, it flies too fast. But is this what time really is? Does this analysis exhaust the meaning of time? Is it sufficient to interpret time by saying that it is a series of sequential moments? St. Augustine wrote as follows in his Confessions: “What, then, is time? If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing were, there would not be present time.”

The question of time was raised thousands of years ago, with seemingly no concrete answer as to what it really is. So where does time actually lie? Time is not found on the clock, surely. The clock is nothing but a physical system where identical temporal sequences are repeated. Clocks provide identical durations that are cyclical and constantly repeating themselves. This sort of time is uniform.

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2 Heidegger, Concept of Time, 4E.
In the natural sciences, thinking is directed towards nature. In this scientific mode of thinking everything is done through calculations. It is a world of homogenous time and homogenous space. Through this way of thinking, a human being is only understood as present-at-hand, or as just an object like any other being. Presence-at-hand is Heidegger’s term to explain reality or that which exists. Dasein usually encounters everything not as present-at-hand, however, but as ready-to-hand. That is, according to Heidegger, Dasein does not stare at things and attempt to analyze everything in a theoretical manner, but instead uses tools. For example, Dasein does not think about the chair it is sitting in, but rather takes it for granted and turns its attention elsewhere. Tools must thus recede from visibility in order to be what they are. It is usually only when tools break that Dasein thinks of them. However, treating a human being as an object or as something present-at-hand cannot lead to an accurate understanding of what human being is. Human being in the natural sciences is treated as an object of science that is bound to calculative time, which Heidegger calls the linear or vulgar concept of time. In this vulgar form of time, there is no room for different kinds of experiences of it. Physicists have their own satisfactory interpretation of time. They have their own quantitative descriptions that have to do with Einstein’s relativity theory and with the vibration of atoms. But they cannot give a meaningful interpretation of what time really is.

In studying the question of time, one cannot disregard tradition and ancient philosophy. Ancient civilizations believed that time was cyclical. Their view was supported by everything which nature showed them that proved repeatability; the seasons, the ebb and flow, and the heavenly motions. Western thinkers understood time in terms of change or motion and assumed that Being is prior to time. Time was perceived as something flawed, as only the “moving image of eternity or

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Being.” In philosophy, Aristotle expressed the view that everything is predicated of enduring substance. In other words, Being or substance came first, and the cosmos is the totality of motions of substance. In this sense, time is perceived as the measure of motion. Aristotle argued that time does not have a beginning, for in order to have a beginning there must be an initial first moment of time, and in order to be able to count or consider that first moment of time, it has to come between an earlier period and a later period of time. This is inconsistent with this initial moment being the first moment of time. Similarly, time does not have an end either.

Later on in the 19th century, Henri Bergson wrote in his doctoral thesis *Time and Free Will* that in some instances quantitative changes have been confused with qualitative ones. This confusion takes place also between time and duration. Any clock measures time by numbers, but in clocks there is no duration. The duration comes from consciousness and is nothing calculable, he argues. Bergson attempts to solve the mystery of time by relating it to concepts such as the experience and consciousness of time.

Heidegger dealt extensively with the concept of time in his magnum opus, *Being and Time*. This book sets out to raise a new question about the meaning of Being. For Heidegger, time is not a being. That is, time is not something that we can measure as a preset-at-hand object. Heidegger does not separate Being from Time: instead, he shows that the distinction between Being and Time is flawed and hides the truth. Heidegger chooses Dasein as his topic since only Dasein can ask and revive the question of Being. Dasein is not something that is clearly present for human view. It cannot be made visible by describing its outer appearance, weight, or DNA, as these are only

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8 Kakkori, "Education and the Concept of Time," http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00838.x
external features. They tell us nothing of what it is like to live the life of a particular Dasein. Instead, Dasein can only be understood as the act or performance of its own Being. It is never visible from outside. We are not even visible to our own selves. To uncover the meaning of Being and to be able to inquire into it requires an acknowledgment of the role of time. Time is the horizon for all understanding of Being. By ‘horizon,’ Heidegger means that only through the concept of time that Being can be properly understood. This is not to be understood simply to mean that Dasein understands Being by way of time. In the words of his student Hans-Georg Gadamer: “True, as the ideas of Being and Time unfolded, it seemed at first simply an intensification of transcendental reflection, the reaching of a higher stage of reflection, where the horizon of being was shown to be time… But it was more than that. Heidegger’s thesis was that being itself is time. This burst asunder the whole subjectivism of modern philosophy…”\textsuperscript{10} For Heidegger, Being itself is time. That is, the question of Being is of the same essence as that of time. Being exists in the world and in time concomitantly. Being is never present, but is rather an ambiguous threefold structure.\textsuperscript{11} Dasein is “deployed in a threefold form of ecstatic time that stands outside of itself by simultaneously swinging toward the past and the future.”\textsuperscript{12}

Heidegger’s views posed a huge challenge to Western thought upon calling into question our traditional notions of time and Being. Western thinkers always assumed that Being was ontologically prior to time, and understood time in terms of motion. Time was perceived as something less than Being. Heidegger strongly rejected the separation made between Being and time, attempting to

\textsuperscript{10} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, pp. 257-258.
\textsuperscript{12} Harman, \textit{Heidegger Explained}, 59.
show that this separation is misguided and that the priority attributed to Being over time is inaccurate. Heidegger made it clear that Being is time.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{2- Description of the Study}

My thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I will discuss the importance of the question of time for Heidegger, and the significance of this research. I will examine the role that temporality plays in Heidegger’s philosophy, its importance in uncovering the meaning of Being and how Heidegger introduced a seemingly unconventional form of time as opposed to our ordinary conception of time. I will also be putting forward my research question and hypothesis, and the reasoning behind my selection. In the second chapter, I will provide and analyze Heidegger’s account of temporality. Very early on in \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger made it clear that time is the horizon that enables an understanding of Being. That is, the threefold structure of care (understanding, state-of-mind, and falling) makes it possible for us to understand what Being is. To begin this investigation, I will start by giving some preliminary details on Heidegger’s different modes of time. That will be followed by Heidegger’s account of originary temporality as a unitary non-sequential form of time. I will explain the phenomenon of Being-towards-death, which is a fundamental feature of Dasein that is considered necessary for a non-sequential manifold of originary temporality. This will be followed by a detailed explanation of the phenomenon of care as the structure of the Being of Dasein. The care structure is grounded in the moments of temporality. According to Heidegger, care is the Being of Dasein. Therefore, by understanding the meaning of care, we will pave the way to a better understanding of the concept of originary temporality. In Chapter Three, I will provide the conclusion and the answer to my research question. In the

\textsuperscript{13} Gillespie, “Temporality and History in the Thought of Martin Heidegger,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23946690
conclusion, I will argue that originary temporality as a non-sequential form of time that forms a unity is a real form of time, not just a metaphorical one.

In this study, my primary sources will be *Being and Time* by Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* by Heidegger, and *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* by William Blattner. I will complement my research using additional sources, including but not limited to Heidegger’s own lecture course *History of the Concept of Time*, along with secondary sources such as *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* and *A Companion to Heidegger*.

**3- The Significance of the Research**

Heidegger emphasized that time is the only way to understand Being. Heidegger’s main aim in *Being and Time* is the “interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.”\(^{14}\) In order to do this, Heidegger distinguished between the traditional conception of time and what he called originary time.\(^{15}\) Heidegger’s time does not have to do with the chronological form of time on clocks or calendars. For him, time is something more fundamental than how people ordinarily conceive it. With this in mind, Heidegger sets forth an original interpretation of the concept of time.

Temporality was a pivotal concept for Heidegger, one whose importance lies in enabling Heidegger to answer the question of Being. The significance of his work lies in his strategy of treading onto uncharted territories by tearing down the seemingly everlasting ordinary concept of time. Heidegger attempted to introduce an innovative, but relatively peculiar and largely complicated concept of time: that is, originary temporality. Originary temporality should be of value to anyone

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\(^{15}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 39.
who is interested in the meaning of Being in general, and in Being and Time more specifically. The concept of originary temporality stands at the heart of Heidegger’s philosophy. In spite of that, it remains one of his most obscure and underrecognized concepts. In introducing originary temporality, Heidegger distances himself from the usual understanding of time as a series of sequential nows. Thus, the uniqueness and controversiality of the phenomenon of originary temporality lies in it being a form of time that is non-sequential, yet one that also forms the basis for our ordinary understanding of time. Many have written on Being and Time in general, and on major concepts in Heidegger’s philosophy such as moods, death, and Being in particular. However, few have set out to explore originary temporality. And even those scholars who have tackled originary temporality have done relatively little to tackle the nature of originary temporality. The majority of the available researches have not really answered whether this form of temporality is a literal form of time or if it is only metaphorically so.

**4- Statement of the Problem (Hypothesis)**

Temporality is such a mysterious concept, not because we cannot find a concrete answer as to what time means, but rather because we are familiar with it to such an extent that we do not question it. Heidegger introduced a conception of time that does not seem to bear any resemblance to our ordinary understanding of time. Originary time is not ordinary time. My thesis is intended to present an account of originary temporality in Heidegger’s philosophy, showing that it is a unified and non-sequential form of time in Heidegger’s thought. I will embark on an explanation of how Heidegger attempts to destroy our ordinary conception of time as a series of ‘nows’ in favor of his own originary non-sequential form of time. Heidegger’s argument is that the form of temporality in which Dasein’s Being makes sense is a non-sequential originary temporality. Therefore, to tackle this, I
will explain world-time as a leveled-off version of originary temporality. My main aim is to answer a core question that has not been tackled much within Heidegger’s philosophy, which is: Is Heidegger’s originary temporality a genuine form of time or only metaphorically so? Put differently, can we consider originary temporality a form of time at all since it is missing the core feature of time, that is, sequentiality? I will argue that originary temporality is a real form of time where the past and the future exist in the present. The present is a culmination of the past and the anticipation or projection of the future pertaining to Dasein, which is consistent with the non-sequentiality of originary time. Thus originary temporality is the origin of time, and it is a real form of time, not a metaphorical one.

5- Literature Review

Much has been written on Heidegger’s temporality, which is considered a core topic in his treatment of Dasein’s Being. In a critical study by Margot Fleischer,16 Heidegger is criticized for his repeated attempts to consider Dasein’s Being as a whole as a rationale to introduce temporality. She also charged him with having conflated his accounts of original and authentic temporalities.

In regards to the first criticism, Fleischer argues that Heidegger’s strategy is forced and unwarranted. She questions the need for exhibiting the phenomenon of temporality to put forward the unity of Dasein’s structure, namely care: “If the structure of care does, indeed, constitute what it means for Dasein in its entirety to be, then there is no phenomenological reason for a (transcendental) analysis of temporality, that is to say, no consideration of temporality that an understanding of the phenomenon at hand as a whole demands.”17 In addition, Fleischer accuses

17 Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality” http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129808
Heidegger of needing to appeal to Dasein in its totality in order to explain the transition to authentic existence. Fleischer claims that this is an artificial appeal because after Heidegger had made it clear that care is the totality of the whole of the structure of Dasein’s Being, he realized that the point of departure of his analysis, the phenomenon of everydayness, is at odds with the consideration of Dasein’s being a whole, whereas at the same time he indicated that Dasein is against comprehending itself as a whole.\textsuperscript{18} Dasein is only a whole when it reaches death, but in death Dasein is already dead and therefore it cannot experience its wholeness. Thus, Fleischer thinks that the discussion of authentic existence does not belong within the context of \textit{Being and Time}. Finally, Fleischer suggests that temporality is supposedly required to explain what it means for Dasein to be a unitary whole. However, without a distinction between authentic and inauthentic care, the argument is not successful.\textsuperscript{19} In short, there is no need to turn to temporality if the phenomenon of care already constitutes the unitary structure of Dasein’s Being. The second concern raised in Fleischer’s study is that Heidegger confuses original and authentic temporalities. She states that Heidegger understands original temporality as “something that can be ‘carried out’ or ‘accomplished’ on an existentiell plane authentically or inauthentically or, in other words, as something that makes authentic and inauthentic temporality possible.”\textsuperscript{20} Thus, according to Fleischer, Heidegger conflates original and authentic temporalities, and fails to give a clear account of what original temporality is.

In a different study by Michael Allen Gillespie entitled \textit{Temporality and History in the Thought of Martin Heidegger}, Heidegger’s temporality is still under fire. In this study the author puts forward his claim that the goal of \textit{Being and Time}, which is to understand the connection between Being and time, was not achieved. The reason for this is that Heidegger failed to make the transition from the temporality of human being to the temporality of Being itself. The author argues

\textsuperscript{18} Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality” http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129808
\textsuperscript{19} Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality” http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129808
\textsuperscript{20} Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality” http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129808
that according to Heidegger, this failure was due to “entanglements of [Heidegger’s] own thinking in the language of the subjectivistic metaphysics which was the culmination of Western metaphysics as a whole.”\textsuperscript{21} This failure purportedly led to a major “turn” in Heidegger thought, a turn from human being to Being itself.\textsuperscript{22}

Many Heidegger scholars have disputed about whether originary temporality is authentic temporality, or if instead originary temporality alone gives rise to authentic temporality. Daniel Dahlstrom, for example, argues that originary temporality is authentic. He distinguishes originary temporality from the temporality of Dasein in general. The temporality of Dasein in general, which he believes that Heidegger refers to as ‘temporality,’ is modally indifferent. That is to say, Dasein’s temporality is neither authentic nor inauthentic. In other words, Dahlstrom perceives Dasein’s temporality in general as an abstract formulation of any Dasein and it is neither authentic nor inauthentic. Originary temporality on the other hand is perceived as an authentic form of temporality, and is the most fundamental form of human temporality that explains all other forms of temporality. Dahlstrom supports his view by noting that Heidegger deploys the term ‘authentic and originary temporality.’ \textsuperscript{23}

An opposing view comes from William Blattner, who argues that originary temporality is modally indifferent. He holds that authentic temporality is a mode of originary one. He quotes Heidegger as follows:

Forerunning [i.e., the authentic version of the future] makes Dasein authentically futural,

\textsuperscript{21} Gillespie, “Temporality and History in the Thought of Martin Heidegger,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23946690
\textsuperscript{22} Gillespie, “Temporality and History in the Thought of Martin Heidegger,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23946690
and indeed in such a way that forerunning itself is only possible in so far as Dasein, as an entity, always already comes toward itself at all [überhaupt], that is, insofar as it is futural in its being at all.  

Whereas Dahlstrom translates überhaupt into English as “in general,” Blattner translates it as “at all.” Accordingly, Blattner interprets Heidegger here to mean that authentic futurity depends on futurity at all. That is, temporality überhaupt is an originary phenomenon that makes authenticity possible. He responds to Dahlstrom that when Heidegger deploys the conjunctive phrase “authentic and originary temporality” he intends to emphasize that authentic temporality is a mode of originary temporality. In other words, Blattner argues that Heidegger’s originary temporality is more basic than authentic temporality.

Many scholars discredit Heidegger’s non-sequential temporality. One of these scholars is David Carr, who argues that temporality is something that takes the form of the past, present, and future. Temporality is a sequence for him. Carr’s account of temporality is similar to the Husserlian view of internal time consciousness: the now is not cut off from the past and the future, but is rather a now that extends backwards and forwards. Carr does not attempt to go beyond this understanding of temporality to analyze the originary form of it. In his book Time, Narrative, and History, he suggests that his focus in relation to temporality is what is already found at the level of “ahead-of,” “already-in,” and “alongside.” In short, Carr’s now is a now that is connected to the past and the future, but these moments are sequentially arranged as past, present, and future. Thus, he did not attempt in any way to explore how originary temporality makes the care structure possible.

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Frederick Olafson is another scholar who, although he alludes to originary temporality, does not really bring it into view or discuss it directly. Olafson raises the question of how the now connects with the past and the future. He acknowledges that for Heidegger, world-time presupposes a more originary form of time. However, he does not shed light on what originary temporality is. When he discusses the Augenblick, or “moment,” he says that Dasein projects the future and acts to bring it about. So although he discusses some features of world-time that hint at originary time, he never really talks about the originary form of non-sequential time.\(^\text{27}\)

Chapter 2: Heidegger’s Originary Temporality

1- Introduction to Temporality

Ordinarily understood, time has a relatively unambiguous structure and it comes in only a single mode that is comprehensible to everyone. However, this is nothing close to Heidegger’s interpretation of time and its modes. In his analysis, Heidegger provides us with three different modes of temporality: (1) Ordinary time, (2) World-time, (3) Originary Time (with authentic time and inauthentic time being its modes).

Heidegger’s interpretation of temporality is quite complicated and his different modes of time overlap to a great extent with one another. That is, it is quite difficult to probe one without referring to the other. Thus, one cannot discuss originary temporality without bringing world-time into view, while world-time must be explained in reference to ordinary time. Authentic and inauthentic times are also understandable as modes of originary time.

It is worth noting that many scholars and commentators have disputed whether originary temporality is the authentic form of time. In section 65 of Being and Time, Heidegger focuses on authentic temporality and argues that authentic temporality is possible only because Dasein is temporal in a more fundamental way. Thus, in order to understand the possibility of authentic temporality, Heidegger says that he must show that this authentic temporality is a form of a more basic form of temporality: namely, originary temporality. Originary temporality is a form of temporality that Dasein cannot help but have.28 Since I do not intend in this thesis to assess whether originary temporality is authentic temporality or not, I will not delve into this dispute. My intention here is to lay bare what Heidegger means by originary temporality, and to assess whether this form

28 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 98 – 99.
of temporality is actually a form of time at all, or if it is only metaphorically so. I, however, hold the view that originary temporality is modally indifferent, and that authentic and inauthentic temporalities are modes of the more basic temporality, namely originary temporality.

As will be made clear, Heidegger’s originary temporality forms the basis for ordinary time. To be more specific, originary temporality is the basis for world-time which depends on ordinary time. In other words, world-time depends on originary temporality. Thus, in articulating Heidegger’s temporality, I shall begin by explaining the notion of originary temporality and its relation to the understanding of human existence as represented in the phenomenon of Being-towards death and the care structure. I will show how Heidegger’s originary temporality can be understood in a non-sequential form. To tie it all together, I will explicate his conception of world-time as a leveled-off version of originary temporality; and ordinary time as a leveled-off version of world-time. Our understanding of ordinary time is based on the assumption that time is measurable by clocks. For Heidegger, this notion of time is a distortion of temporality. However, in introducing world-time we will show how originary time, as exemplified in the unitary phenomenon of the care-structure, forms the basis for world-time.

2- **Originary Temporality**

Heidegger proposes that originary temporality is the basis for all forms of time. Heidegger argues that our ordinary explanation of time is given in terms of originary temporality because as we will see later, the moments that make up ordinary time are modified versions of the features of originary temporality. This, however, does not mean that originary temporality forms the defining features of ordinary time, but rather, that originary temporality modifies itself and its features in order to give way to ordinary time. In short, the features that define
ordinary time are derived from originary temporality, and thus ordinary time is a modified form of originary temporality. Originary temporality gets its name because it is supposed to be the origin of time. By explaining originary time, ordinary time can be made clear.\textsuperscript{29} His argument, quite simply, is that ordinary time can be assembled into a set of conceptual moments where each set is derivable from originary temporality. These conceptual moments are modified forms of the features of originary temporality. The unity of these conceptual moments that make up ordinary time is what makes ordinary time what it is. And it is in this sense that originary temporality explains ordinary time.\textsuperscript{30} As William Blattner puts it, originary temporality is “the explanatory core of ordinary time...(but) originary temporality is not the essence of ordinary time: it does not make up the defining features of ordinary time.”\textsuperscript{31} Originary temporality modifies its features to give way to the phenomenon of ordinary time. Thus, Heidegger argues that ordinary time is a modified version of originary temporality and that the conceptual moments of ordinary time are derivable from originary temporality.\textsuperscript{32} To put it clearly, originary temporality is the most basic mode of temporality. Heidegger’s conception of temporality is not concerned with clock-time, which he regards as a pure succession of empty, meaningless, and precise flow of time.\textsuperscript{33} This form of ordinary time cannot characterize the temporality which is an internal feature of Dasein’s Being. In \textit{History of the Concept of Time}, Heidegger puts it as follows: “Not ‘time is’ but ‘Dasein qua time

\textsuperscript{29} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger's Temporal Idealism}, 95.
\textsuperscript{30} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger's Temporal Idealism}, 94 - 95.
\textsuperscript{31} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger's Temporal Idealism}, 95.
\textsuperscript{32} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger's Temporal Idealism}, 95 - 96.
temporalizes its Being.” In other words, time is not an entity. Time is not something found somewhere as a framework for world events.

The seemingly controversial point in Heidegger’s interpretation of time lies in his conclusion that the mode of temporality that is appropriate for the interpretation of Dasein’s Being is a “non-sequential” one. This non-sequential temporality, or what he calls “originary” temporality, is not a mode of time where the past comes before the present which is followed by the future. Originary temporality is “a temporal manifold that can be present in any given moment of sequential time.” In other words, it is a mode of time where the future, past, and present are all there at every given moment. So right now, at this very moment, on February 24, 2016 at 9.15 p.m, the past, present, and future are all there.

In explaining originary temporality, Heidegger introduces a rather unconventional concept which is “ecstatic time.” “Ecstasy” originates from the Greek expression *ekstatikon* which means “stepping-outside-self.” It is etymologically related to the term “existence.” In Heidegger’s words: “It is with this ecstatic character that we interpret existence, which, viewed ontologically, is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes-back-to-self, and enpresents. In its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of Dasein’s Being.” In his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger argues that “the essence of the future lies in coming-toward-oneself; that of the past [having beenness] lies in going-back-to; and that of the present in staying-with, dwelling-with, that is, being-with. These

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characters of the *toward, back-to, and with* reveal the basic constitution of temporality." As shown by the toward, back-to, and with, temporality is outside itself. That is, time is carried away within itself as a past, present, and future. As futural, Dasein is carried away to its past capacity-to-be; as past, the Dasein is carried away to its having-beenness; and as present, it is carried away to other beings. However, the unity of the past, present, and future does not carry away Dasein occasionally, rather, "as temporality, it is itself the original outside-itself, the ekstatikon (ecstatic)." This “carrying away” is what Heidegger calls the “ecstatic character of time.”

Heidegger’s originary past, present and future consist of ecstatics and horizons. The ecstasy of the originary future is Dasein’s pressing ahead, and the horizon is Dasein’s possibilities or that into which Dasein presses ahead. The ecstasy of the originary past is Dasein’s being already in, and the horizon is the way things already matter to Dasein. And finally, the ecstasy of the present is enpresenting, and the horizon is the in-order-to.

Heidegger believes that the future has the priority in the ecstatical unity of temporality. It is through the future that the non-sequentiality of the past and present can be explained. This however does not mean that the unity of the three ecstases of temporality arises out of a cumulative sequence of the ecstases. The three ecstases are equiprimordial, but the mode of temporalizing is different for each. Equipromordality in this context means: if X and Y are equiprimordial, then they are mutually interdependent and one cannot exist without the other. It is not a hierarchical relation. In other words, what Heidegger means by this is that we are

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40 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 266.
43 Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, 118.
beings who are directed and oriented towards the future and to its ultimate possibility, which is death.\textsuperscript{44}

What compelled Heidegger to come up with such an unorthodox form of temporality? To answer this, we must make it clear that Dasein has a tendency to “cover things up” according to Heidegger. Dasein obscures its authentic character because it is unsettling and uncomfortable. This unsettled and disoriented character of Dasein is made obvious in the phenomenon of death, a disruptive possibility to which Dasein seeks to pay no heed. This tendency for Dasein to be inauthentic requires what Heidegger calls ‘doing violence’ in order to disrupt the usual everyday understanding of Dasein’s temporal structure. This disruption is what pushed Heidegger to go beyond the ordinary understanding of time into a non-sequential, non-successive mode of time.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, originary temporality is the form of time needed to explain Dasein’s care-structure, as will be made clear shortly. Temporality is the meaning of care, and care is the Being of Dasein. Each moment in the care-structure is grounded in a moment of temporality.

\textbf{A- Being-towards-Death}

Death is a crucial feature of Dasein that is considered necessary for a non-sequential manifold of originary temporality, as it is a feature of Dasein that cannot be assimilated to a sequential temporality.\textsuperscript{46} This understanding of death is in line with the thesis that originary temporality is a modally indifferent phenomenon because death as well is modally indifferent. It is neither authentic nor inauthentic. However, authenticity and inauthenticity are only modes that occur in relation to Dasein’s reaction to death. Simply put, if Dasein does not face death, turns away from it, and gives

\textsuperscript{44} Kakkori, “Education and the Concept of Time,” http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00838.x
\textsuperscript{45} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 93.
\textsuperscript{46} Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall, \textit{Heidegger: A Critical Reader} (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992), 112
in to the tranquilizations of the “they,” then this is the inauthentic form of death. Alternatively, if Dasein faces its finitude in a courageous manner, does not pay heed to the idle talk of the “they,” and presses ahead with its life, then this is the authentic form of death.

The phenomenon of death is defined as Being-towards-the-end, where the Being-towards-the-end constitutes Being-a-whole. Dasein, however, is never complete until its death, according to Heidegger. As long as Dasein is, then there is always something still outstanding that Dasein can be and will be. For Heidegger, what is still outstanding in this case is the “end.” The “end” of Being-in-the-world is death. Death belongs to the potentiality-for-Being: to existence. This end always determines and limits whatever totality is possible for Dasein. If Being-at-an-end is death and with it Being becomes a whole, then it would have been important to have an ontological conception of death. However, death is only in an existentiell Being towards death. So in this instance, the persistent question is: can Dasein, as something existing, ever become accessible in its Being-a-whole? At first glance, this possibility of Being-a-whole is inconsistent with the ontological meaning of care, and care is that which forms the totality of Dasein’s structural whole. Care as the basic state of Dasein is defined as: “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world).” This definition expresses the basic characteristics of Dasein’s Being: existence, in the “ahead-of-itself”; facticity, in the “Being-already-in”; and falling, in the sense of “Being-alongside.” If death or Being-towards-the-end belongs to the Being of Dasein, then it must be defined in terms of these characteristics. Therefore, the question now is: how do Dasein’s existence, facticity, and falling disclose themselves in the phenomenon of death?

47 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 99
48 Heidegger, Being and Time, 293.
49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 277.
50 Heidegger, Being and Time, 279.
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 293.
52 Heidegger, Being and Time, 293.
In regard to *existence*, which is the first item in the care structure, the fact that everyday Dasein is already Being-towards-its-end, in other words, that Dasein is constantly acknowledging its death, even if in a fugitive manner, shows that this end is not something that Dasein reaches only in its demise. In Dasein, as a Being-towards-death, its “not-yet” has already been included. So in interpreting the “not-yet” as something still outstanding, one would have given a mistaken interpretation of Dasein’s lack of totality.\(^{53}\) The interpretation of the “not-yet” which was taken in the sense of something still outstanding was rejected, as it made Dasein something present-at-hand. The “not-yet” also has the character of something towards which Dasein comports itself. Dasein’s death is something impending; it is neither present-at-hand nor outstanding.\(^{54}\) Death is something that stands before Dasein. It is a possibility-of-Being that Dasein has to take over. It is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. When Dasein stands before itself in this sense, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. All of Dasein’s relations to any other Dasein become undone.\(^{55}\) As such, the existential possibility of death is based on the fact that Dasein is disclosed to itself as “ahead-of-itself.”

Death is not an add-on to Dasein at its end, but rather Dasein, as care, is the thrown basis for its death.\(^{56}\) Dasein has been thrown into its ownmost possibility which is death. Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in the state of mind called “anxiety.” Anxiety pertaining to death is anxiety “in the face of” the potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped.\(^{57}\) “For factical existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-being-in-the-world, but it has always likewise been absorbed in the ‘world’

\(^{54}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 293 – 294.
\(^{56}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 354.
\(^{57}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 295.
of its concern.” This is what Heidegger calls facticity, which is the second item in the structure of care. The last item is falling. Dasein covers its ownmost Being-towards-death by fleeing in the face of it. As a matter of fact, Dasein is dying as long as it exists, but it does so by falling. Generally, existence, facticity, and falling characterize Being-towards-the-end, and thus constitute the existential concept of death. Ontologically, dying is grounded in care.

Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s relation towards the possibility of death or towards its own not-Being forms the backbone of a reinterpretation of the phenomenon of care. According to Heidegger, care is the totality of the structural whole of Dasein’s constitution. The “ahead-of-itself,” as an item in the structure of care, indicates that there is always something outstanding related to Dasein that has not yet become actual. As part of Dasein’s constitution, it is essential to continuously have something that still needs to be settled. This lack of totality indicates that there is something still pending or outstanding that pertains to one’s potentiality-for-Being. But once Dasein exists in such a way where there is nothing outstanding anymore, then it is no-longer-Being-there. In other words, “its [Dasein’s] Being is annihilated when what is still outstanding in its Being has been liquidated.” Simply put, as long as Dasein is, as long as Dasein exists, it is never a whole. However, once Dasein is a whole, it no longer is, it loses its Being-in-the-world; thus it is never again experienced as an entity. In short, Dasein reaches its wholeness in death. Death is not considered the “end” of Dasein, for if dying in the sense of Being-at-an-end were understood as ending, then Dasein would be treated as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In death,

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58 Heidegger, Being and Time, 295.
59 Heidegger, Being and Time, 295.
60 Heidegger, Being and Time, 296.
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 279.
62 Heidegger, Being and Time, 280.
63 Heidegger, Being and Time, 280.
64 Heidegger, Being and Time, 280.
65 Heidegger, Being and Time, 281.
Dasein has neither disappeared nor been fulfilled; it has not become finished, nor is it at one’s disposal as something ready-to-hand. But in Heidegger’s words:

Just as Dasein is already its ‘not-yet’, and is its ‘not-yet’ constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too. The ‘ending’ which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end, but a Being-towards-the-end of this entity… As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.

Heidegger argues, however, that death is a condition where existence is impossible. Existence or “being-ahead” becomes impossible when Dasein perceives all possibilities as insignificant and as not connected with who it is. It is in this sense that Heidegger implies that death is inauthentic. The interest and concern of Dasein in the question of “Who am I?” and its pursuit of an answer to this question constitutes the phenomenon of Being-towards-death. In other words, if Dasein’s Being is not an issue for it, if it lacks concern about itself and its possibilities, if it does not press ahead or care about its own potentiality, then in that case Dasein is unable to project itself forward onto its own capabilities. This is the description that Heidegger gives to explain death.

Since Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein’s Being, it must necessarily be revealed in everydayness. Therefore it is important to highlight the connection between Being-towards-death and Dasein’s everydayness. Dasein’s average everydayness is an inauthentic or undifferentiated existence. It is the Being which is “between” birth and death. However, if Dasein exists factically and if its essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, then so long as Dasein exists then it must in each case, since it is a potentiality, not yet something. An entity which has existence as its

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66 Heidegger, Being and Time, 289.
67 Heidegger, Being and Time, 281.
68 Dreyfus and Hall, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 111
essence cannot be grasped as a whole.\textsuperscript{69} The Self of everydayness is the “they.” In Being-towards-death, Dasein comports itself towards itself as a potentiality-for-Being. The “they” expresses itself in idle talk. It is constituted by the way things have been publicly interpreted. Therefore, idle talk must reveal how everyday Dasein interprets for itself its Being-towards-death. Understanding, accompanied by a mood or a state of mind, is the foundation for any interpretation.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, the question is: “how Being-towards-death is disclosed by the kind of understanding which, with its state-of-mind, lurks in the idle talk of the ‘they’?\textsuperscript{71} In other words, how does the “they” understandingly comport itself towards Dasein’s ownmost possibility, which is non-relational and cannot be outstripped? What mood discloses the “they” which has been delivered over to death?

Publicly, in our daily lives, death is perceived as a constantly occurring calamity. It is yet another “case of death” of someone or the other. It is a well-known event occurring within-the-world. As such, it remains a kind of discreet characteristic of what occurs daily. The “they” have their own interpretation of death, speaking of it in a “fugitive” manner, thinking that right now death has nothing to do with us.\textsuperscript{72} Death is perceived as something indefinite which is not yet present-at-hand, and thus not threatening. Dasein interprets death by saying that “one dies” where this “one” is the “nobody.” It belongs to nobody in particular. It is viewed as something actual, yet its character gets concealed. Therefore, with such ambiguity, Dasein loses itself in the “they” in relation to a distinctive potentiality-for-Being which is Dasein’s ownmost: namely, death. Everydayness is dominated by Dasein’s evasiveness in the face of death in an attempt to keep Dasein’s ownmost non-relational possibility-of-Being totally concealed. Thus, the “they” works on providing

\textsuperscript{69} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 276.
\textsuperscript{70} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 296.
\textsuperscript{71} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 296.
\textsuperscript{72} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 297.
“tranquilization” about death. Additionally, the “they” regulates how one has to comport oneself towards death. Thinking about death is publicly perceived as a sign of insecurity on Dasein’s part and a way of fleeing from the world. The “they” transforms Dasein’s anxiety in the face of death into fear in the face of an oncoming event. Anxiety transformed into fear is a weakness that no Dasein should embrace. And therefore, according to the “they,” the fact remains that ‘one’ dies. This superior indifference “alienates” Dasein from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The tranquilization and alienation are marks of “falling.”

As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death. Being-towards-the-end has the mode of evasion in the face of it – giving new explanations for it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing it.

As a matter of fact, Dasein is always Being-towards-its-death, yet it always perceives death as just “a case of death” in others. Therefore, in falling and fleeing in the face of death, Dasein’s everydayness demonstrates that the “they” has a definite character of Being-towards-death, even when it is not engaged in thinking about death. Even in average everydayness, Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being (death) is an issue for it.

B- Temporality as the Meaning of Care

The key to Heidegger’s temporality is the way in which the past, present, and future coexist and codetermine one another. However, this does not mean that temporalizing happens by the three

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73 Heidegger, Being and Time, 297 – 298.
74 Heidegger, Being and Time, 298.
75 Heidegger, Being and Time, 298.
76 Heidegger, Being and Time, 298 – 299.
terms coming one after the other. Heidegger’s temporality is not a sequential grouping of events. ‘Temporalizing does not signify that ecstasies come in a ‘succession.’ The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as “a future which makes present in the process of having been.” According to Heidegger:

In every ecstatic, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling –that is, the unity of the care-structure.

Temporality is thus identified as the meaning of care. It makes care possible. Temporality is that which constitutes human beings as individuals who care about each other, about their own lives, and about the world in general. The Being of Dasein as a whole is defined as care. The German word for care is Sorge, which means “care” as in the sense of troubles, worries, and travails. Care is another word for the term “existence.” Dasein is care as long as it is an entity which inherits the past, is occupied with the present, and is able to act in the future based upon its understanding of the past and the present.

To better explore Heidegger’s originary temporality, we must dig into what the temporality of care means. The totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole, which is what care signifies, is

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77 Keller, Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience, 188.
79 Heidegger, Being and Time, 401.
80 Heidegger, Being and Time, 401.
82 Harman, Heidegger Explained, 69.
83 Blattner, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, 31.
84 Keller, Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience, 188.
explained in the following way: “The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the
world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).” Heidegger presents the
moments of the care structure as grounded in the moments of temporality. In the structure of care,
the “ahead-of-itself” is grounded in the future; the “Being-already-in” has the character of “having-
been” and is grounded in the past; and “Being-alongside” is grounded in the present. Thus, it can
be stated that every element in the structure of Dasein’s Being, which are existence, facticity, and
falling is grounded in an aspect of time (future, past, and present). It is worth noting that neither the
“ahead,” which includes the notion of a before, nor the “already” are to be taken in the way in which
they are ordinarily understood. The notions of “ahead” or “before” do not refer to “not yet now – but
later”; and the “already” does not refer to “no longer now – but earlier.” If the “ahead” and “before”
had this time-orientation, then to say that care has temporality would mean that it is something that is
“earlier” and “later,” “not yet” and “no longer.” In this case, care would be perceived as an entity
which runs its course “in time.” The Being of Dasein would then become something present-at-hand.
However, since this is impossible, then the time orientations mentioned above for “ahead” and
“already” must be something different from this.

The temporality in terms of which care is described is of itself a “structural unity, and thus
care can be described as unitary (or more unitary than it would otherwise be) in virtue of
participating in that structure.” In short, originary temporality is Dasein’s care structure. Therefore,
I shall now turn to an account of the constitution of care by providing a clear temporal interpretation
of the items of its structure which are: understanding, state-of-mind, and falling, where each of these
phenomena has a temporal dimension.

85 Heidegger, Being and Time, 237.
86 Heidegger, Being and Time, 375.
88 Heidegger, Being and Time, 375.
89 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 123.
The Temporality of Disclosedness

Care is the Being of Dasein, and disclosedness is “the way in which that being is disclosed to, or there for, Dasein.” Heidegger argues that Dasein is open to the world through disclosedness. As he puts it:

> The temporal interpretation of everyday Dasein must start with those structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself: understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse. The modes in which temporality temporalizes are to be laid bare with regard to these phenomena, and will give us a basis for defining the temporality of Being-in-the-world.

Heidegger identified four constituents that make up the disclosedness structure, namely: understanding (projection), state-of-mind (mood), falling, and discourse. Each of the first three elements discloses a specific element in the care structure stated above. That is, understanding represented in existence as grounded in the future in the “ahead-of”; state-of-mind represented in facticity as grounded in the past in the “already,” and falling represented in falling itself, which is grounded in the present in the “Being-alongside.” Discourse does not stand for any aspect of time. Accordingly, discourse will be excluded from my discussion here. In analyzing understanding, state-of-mind, and falling we can thus examine Heidegger’s originary form of time.

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90 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 54.
91 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 54.
92 Heidegger, Being and Time, 384.
Understanding (Existence)

In Blattner’s interpretation, understanding is linked with projection, and ability.⁹⁴ Heidegger explains existence in saying that the essence of Dasein lies in its existence. In the formulation of the structure of care, the temporal meaning of existentiality or existence is indicated by the expression “before” or “ahead.”⁹⁵ The meaning of existentiality is the future. Heidegger argues that the future is not meant to indicate the sense of “not yet now but later”⁹⁶ (Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, p. 105). He does not use the “ahead-of-itself” in the care structure to signify that something that did not happen now but is expected to happen later. For example, in saying that “I am not yet a philosophy professor,” this does not mean that I am not a philosophy professor now, but later I will be or I am likely to be a professor in the future. This is not Heidegger’s intention when he uses “not yet.” The future which he refers to is not the future that lies ahead or in advance of the present. It is not the future that will someday be present.⁹⁷ “The future is not something that is not yet actual, but likely someday will be. The future is not going to be.”⁹⁸

Dasein is this entity which always has an understanding of itself, and this sort of self-understanding constitutes who it is.⁹⁹ Dasein is characterized by understanding, which is a futural moment of human existence. For Heidegger, understanding is not a cognitive ability, but rather a practical one. It is a competence. One understands something not when one grasps its content (its what) but when one can cope with it. For example, I understand being a teacher because I am competent at being one. I can understand a laptop because I can use it. However, I do not understand spaceships or aircraft because I cannot operate them. Thus, to understand something is to be

competent with it.\textsuperscript{100} Understanding is the Being of the “there” in such a way that “on the basis of such understanding a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of looking around, and of just looking.”\textsuperscript{101} It is an aspect of Dasein’s Being which is always what it understands itself to be.\textsuperscript{102} Through understanding, Dasein always knows what it is capable of. So, understanding something means to let it have a certain role for me.\textsuperscript{103} I understand a laptop in letting it play the role of a laptop for me. In an existential manner, understanding is projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.\textsuperscript{104} In understanding oneself in a projective manner, the future is the basis for this understanding. Projection is futural as it throws itself into projected possibilities.\textsuperscript{105} In other words, projection is the way in which Dasein orients itself towards the future. For example, I may understand myself as an astronaut by projecting myself forward into an astronaut’s way of life. This projection is not intended to be a cognitive or imaginative one, but is rather a form of conduct. Heidegger characterizes it as “pressing ahead” into that activity which one understands oneself to be. So, to project myself forward into an astronaut’s way of life does not mean fantasizing about or planning to be one, but rather actually setting about doing anything and everything which astronauts do. Put differently, Heidegger identifies what Dasein existentially is with its abilities-to-be or with its possibilities which are its “not yet.” That is, “Dasein is ‘not yet’ what it presses ahead into.”\textsuperscript{106} The temporalizing of the future takes various forms. Heidegger uses the term “anticipation” to denote the authentic future. This shows that in existing authentically, Dasein comes towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Factically, Dasein is always

\begin{footnotes}
\item[100] Dreyfus and Hall, \textit{Heidegger: A Critical Reader}, 103.
\item[101] Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 385.
\item[105] Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 385 - 386.
\item[106] Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 103.
\end{footnotes}
“ahead-of-itself,” but it is inconstantly anticipatory in regards to its own existentiell possibility. Heidegger uses the term “awaiting” or “expecting” for the inauthentic future. The understanding of oneself as the they-self in regards to what one does is possible in this mode of the future. And only because factual Dasein is thus awaiting its potentiality-for-Being, and is awaiting this potentiality in terms of that with which it concerns itself, can it expect anything and wait for it.

Understanding is futural, yet it is also temporal; that is, it is determined by having been and by the present. In the authentic present there is a way of Being-alongside the things of concern, which is designated by the present. That authentic present, which is held in an authentic temporality, Heidegger dubs “moment of vision.” The moment of vision should be understood in an active sense. Heidegger explains it as follows: “the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness.” The moment of vision cannot be explained in terms of the “now,” for in the moment of vision nothing can occur, but one can encounter that which can be “in a time” as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Not every present has the character of a moment of vision. The inauthentic present, alternatively, is what Heidegger calls “making present.” The making present is the inauthentic kind of future which is irresolute and does not have the character of the moment of vision. Making present can be elucidated only in terms of the

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107 Heidegger, Being and Time, 386.
108 Heidegger, Being and Time, 386.
109 Heidegger, Being and Time, 386 – 387.
110 Heidegger, Being and Time, 387.
111 Heidegger, Being and Time, 387.
112 Heidegger, Being and Time, 388.
temporal interpretation of falling into the world of one’s concern where such falling has its meaning in making present.\textsuperscript{113} With respect to the past, Heidegger uses the term “repetition” if Being-as-having-been is authentic.\textsuperscript{114} The inauthentic past however is when Dasein projects itself inauthentically towards possibilities which were drawn from the object of concern in making it present; this is possible only because Dasein has “forgotten” itself in its potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not a failure to remember, but is rather what Heidegger calls a “positive” ecstatical mode of one’s having been. It has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost “having been.” It is an inauthentic way of having been, and is therefore related to the thrownness of Dasein.\textsuperscript{115} In spite of Dasein being characterized by its thrownness, yet there are possibilities inside this thrownness.\textsuperscript{116} “Dasein is ‘thrown possibility,’ which could easily be rephrased as ‘past future’.”\textsuperscript{117} Dasein is more than what it factually is, since it is always ahead of itself by projecting new possibilities on the world.\textsuperscript{118}

**State-of-Mind (Facticity)**

State-of-mind is linked with facticity, affectivity, and attunement.\textsuperscript{119} In the formulation of the structure of care, the temporal meaning of *facticity* lies in the character of “already” or “having been.” The meaning of the “already” is something that has already been thrown. Dasein exists as the thrown entity it is because care is based on the character of “having been.” As long as Dasein factically exists, it is never past, but rather always has the character of “having been” in the sense of “I am-as-having-been.” An entity is called “past” when it is no longer present-at-hand, which is not

\begin{footnotes}
\item[113] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 388.
\item[114] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 388.
\item[116] Harman, *Heidegger Explained*, 68.
\item[117] Harman, *Heidegger Explained*, 68.
\item[118] Harman, *Heidegger Explained*, 68.
\end{footnotes}
the case with Dasein as it can never be present-at-hand, arising and passing away in time with a bit of it past already. Dasein can only find itself thrown.¹²⁰ One’s state-of-mind or mood temporalizes itself in having been, that is, in the past.¹²¹ “Moods temporalize themselves – that is, their specific ecstasies belong to a future and a present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstasies are modified by having been.”¹²² State-of-mind or mood is the aspect of Dasein’s Being which is determinative. Everything that Dasein encounters, from the simplest and most irrelevant events to the most substantial ones, matter to it.¹²³ Each of Dasein’s possibilities matter to it. So for example, being an astronaut is challenging and rewarding. Dasein cannot help but be in one mood or another. Even when Dasein is in a satiated state, it is still in a mood. There is no way for Dasein to escape being in a mood. In every case, the “there” is disclosed by one’s mood. Having one mood or another brings Dasein face to face with its own thrownness.¹²⁴ Having a mood shows how things are going and informs Dasein that it is always thrown into a situation.¹²⁵ Heidegger defines Being-thrown as “finding oneself in some state-of-mind or other.”¹²⁶ One’s mood is revealed in the manner of turning away or turning towards one’s own Dasein.¹²⁷ Overall, moods are Dasein’s primary access to the world. They are not some sort of inner psychological state; rather they are a way of being-in-the-world.¹²⁸ Understanding is always associated with some state-of-mind or mood. They are related to one another and are equally important. So, we press into possibilities which we pursue because they

¹²⁰ Heidegger, Being and Time, 376.
¹²¹ Heidegger, Being and Time, 390.
¹²² Heidegger, Being and Time, 390.
¹²⁴ Heidegger, Being and Time, 389.
¹²⁵ Harman, Heidegger Explained, 68.
¹²⁶ Heidegger, Being and Time, 389.
¹²⁷ Heidegger, Being and Time, 390.
¹²⁸ Harman, Heidegger Explained, 68.
matter to us. Dasein presses ahead into being a musician, for example, because it is fulfilling. If such a possibility did not matter to it, it would not pursue them.129

Moods are ontically familiar to us. They are regarded as fleeting experiences which impact one’s psychical condition. Moods are only possible in regards to what they signify or how they signify it only in relation to temporality.

The Temporality of Fear and Anxiety

Heidegger gives special attention to bad moods as they cover up the environment in which we exist.130 He uses the phenomena of fear and anxiety for the temporal interpretation.131 Fear is an inauthentic state-of-mind. It is a fearing “in the face of something threatening – of something which is detrimental to Dasein’s factual potentiality-for-Being, and which brings itself close…within the range of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves.”132 Fear has to do with fear of specific entities: for example, witches, murderers, or deadly diseases.133 Normally, an awaiting of something is one of the things that brings about the temporal constitution of fear.134 The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits and makes present.135 Heidegger gives an analysis of fear which, predictably, has a threefold structure. When fear occurs suddenly, it is called alarm. When fear is the fear of something unfamiliar, it is dread. If the fear is both sudden and unfamiliar, it is known as terror.136

130 Harman, Heidegger Explained, 68.
131 Heidegger, Being and Time, 390 - 391.
132 Heidegger, Being and Time, 391.
133 Harman, Heidegger Explained, 70.
134 Heidegger, Being and Time, 391.
135 Heidegger, Being and Time, 392.
136 Harman, Heidegger Explained, 68.
Unlike fear, anxiety, or Angst in German, has no specific object. It is the condition when Dasein is indifferent to everything.137 What gives us anxiety is not something specific, but rather being-in-the-world as such; “we have angst about Dasein’s own potentiality for Being.”138 According to Heidegger, “anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost Being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday familiar Being-in-the-world.”139 Anxiety is anxiousness in the face of nothing.140 “Being-in-the-world…is both what anxiety is anxious in-the-face-of and what it is anxious about.”141 That in-the-face-of which one has anxiety does not have the character of ‘expecting’ or ‘awaiting’ but rather one has anxiety in-the-face-of what is already ‘there’ – namely, Dasein itself. The phenomenon of anxiety brings one back to Dasein’s thrownness as something possible which can be repeated.142 “The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatical mode of this character.”143

Both phenomena, fear and anxiety, tend to coincide where the entity by which both structures are filled is the same – that is, Dasein.144 However, neither of them occur in isolation from experience. Fear is caused by entities with which we concern ourselves environmentally, whereas anxiety arises from Dasein itself. When fear bothers us, for example, it is caused by that which is within-the-world. Anxiety, however, is not directed at something definite that one can concern oneself with. It springs from Being-in-the-world as thrown Being-towards-death.145 Although both phenomena are grounded in having-been, they have different sources in regards to their

137 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 78.
138 Harman, Heidegger Explained, 70.
139 Heidegger, Being and Time, 393.
140 Heidegger, Being and Time, 393.
141 Heidegger, Being and Time, 393.
142 Heidegger, Being and Time, 393 – 394.
143 Heidegger, Being and Time, 394.
144 Heidegger, Being and Time, 393.
145 Heidegger, Being and Time, 395.
temporalization in the temporality of care. Anxiety comes out of the future of resoluteness, whereas fear comes from the present.¹⁴⁶

**Falling**

Falling is the third constitutive item in the structure of care and disclosedness. Falling is a rather ambiguous term. It is quite unclear how Heidegger uses it to fill out the structure of care.¹⁴⁷ However, he describes Dasein as “Being-alongside” or being amidst other entities. Thus, the falling that belongs to Dasein is a Being-alongside.¹⁴⁸ This “Being-alongside,” which indicates falling, is possible in making present. Being-alongside, according to Heidegger’s usage, has to do with Dasein’s familiarity with the entities that are in the world.¹⁴⁹ Falling is Dasein’s tendency to “fall away from authenticity and onto the world of its mundane concerns in fleeing from the anxiety of a confrontation with death.”¹⁵⁰ Resolute Dasein can bring itself back from falling so that it can be authentically there in the moment.¹⁵¹ The temporality of falling becomes quite obvious in the phenomenon of curiosity. Curiosity is Dasein’s distinctive tendency where it concerns itself with a potentiality-for-seeing. “Seeing” here is a broad kind of awareness which makes the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand be encountered “bodily” in regards to the way they look. Falling is grounded in the present. Curiosity is constituted by a making-present. In other words, in curiosity we are kept awaiting something.¹⁵²

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¹⁴⁸ Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, 55.
¹⁴⁹ Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, 55.
3- World-Time

Ordinarily and traditionally understood, time is a unified phenomenon, either because time is a continuous flow where each of its elements is made possible by the whole or because the past, present, and future are linked together. Heidegger, however, rejected both conceptions of time. He rejected the earlier conception as he does not think that time is a continuous flow. He rejected the unitary understanding of time in order to replace it with his own originary temporality.\textsuperscript{153} Heidegger’s originary time is central for explaining all other forms of time. However, the question remains: can Heidegger prove that originary temporality is a form of time? In order to be able to give an answer to this, I have to explain what world-time is. The time we encounter in our daily lives is not an originary form of time. According to Heidegger, in our everyday experience, there are two sorts of time; ordinary time and world-time. When we contemplate time and think of it in a disengaged manner, we conceive it as ordinary time. It is a pure container of events. However, when we are engaged with it, it is world-time. It is the meaningful sequential time.\textsuperscript{154} It is a qualitative sort of time that is dated by relevant events. For example, dinner time, class time...etc. World-time is a time of “significance.” It is a time to do one thing or another. So, dinner time is the time to eat dinner and class time is the time to go to class.\textsuperscript{155} It is defined in terms of its relation to human interests, whereas ordinary time is independent of human interests. Everything that happens takes place in world-time: elections, weddings, birthdays, etc. According to Heidegger, the world in which Dasein lives is temporally articulated. That is, everything happens in the world, and can be measured by when and for how long they happen. This when and for how long are not understood in terms of

\textsuperscript{153} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 124.
\textsuperscript{155} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 96 – 97.
clock-time, but rather in the sense of how events are located in relation to other meaningful events in the world.\textsuperscript{156}

The time that we ordinarily and usually encounter in our everyday lives, the time that we read from the clock, the time that is appropriate or inappropriate for this or that task is “world-time.” Heidegger identified four features which characterize it: datability, spannedness, significance, and publicness. Significance is a feature of world-time where the time is always time in order to do or accomplish something. It is the totality of relations of the for-the-sake-of-which, for-that-purpose, and in-order-to. Whether the time for something is right or wrong has the character of significance. The second feature is datability, a feature of world-time where time appears to Dasein as the time when such-and-such happened.\textsuperscript{157} By datability “we denote the relational structure of the now as now-when, of the at-the-time as at-the-time-when, and of the then as then-when.”\textsuperscript{158} Every now relates to a “now when such and such is occurring or in existence.” Even if one cannot determine the exact time of “at the time when,” the relation still holds. The indefiniteness of the date does not indicate a shortcoming in datability. Heidegger gives the example of saying “at the time when the French were in Germany.” The date might not be determined calendrically, but it is determined by a particular historical happening.\textsuperscript{159} “Every now, every at-the-time, and every then is datable by its very structure, always already related to something, and in its expression is more or less definitely dated from something.”\textsuperscript{160} The third feature is the spannedness of world-time. The world-time spans from a “before” to an “after” and is characterized by a “during.” When someone says “then” while starting from “now,” there is always a definite “meanwhile” until then. This “meanwhile” is what we call duration. Time stretches out from the “now” till the “then.” The “meanwhile,” the “during,” and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 262.
\item Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 262.
\item Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 262.
\item Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 262.
\item Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 263.
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the “until then” are called the spannedness of time. Every “now,” “then,” and “at the time” is stretched within itself: “now during the lecture.” No “now” can be punctualized. The fourth and last feature is publicness. World-time is publicly there for Dasein. It is publicly comprehensible and available so that Dasein can make reference to it. When someone says “now,” everyone understands what this now means, even though each might date the “now” as starting from a different event or thing, for example, “now, when the professor is speaking” or “now, in the morning.” The “now” is intelligible to everyone without having to agree on a specific dating of it. This public accessibility of the “now” to everyone characterizes time as public. The “now” belongs to no one because it is accessible to everyone.161

Heidegger offers an explanation as to why world-time has precisely these four features: “It is datable, because the originary Present is an enpresenting and thus necessarily involves encounter with things and events in the environment. It is spanned, because the ecstatics (the originary future, Present, and past) form a unity. It is significant, because the originary Present is an enpresenting specifically of in-order-to relations. It is public, because originary temporality is outside itself. Finally, world-time is sequential, because it is an iterable application of the originary Present.”162 Thus, the time which we express as the “now,” “then,” and “at-the-time” has the characteristics of significance, datability, strechedness, and publicness. According to Heidegger, each of those three time determinations – now, then, and at-the-time, is spoken out of the unity of an enpresenting-expecting-retaining.163

162 Dreyfus and Hall, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 121.
CHAPTER 3: Conclusion

1- Tying it all Together

Heidegger's temporality makes it clear that each “moment” in Dasein's existence must include all three temporal ecstases. This form of non-sequential temporality, or what Heidegger calls “originary” temporality is not a mode of time where the future comes after the present which comes after the past.\(^{164}\) Originary temporality is “a temporal manifold that can be present in any given moment of sequential time.”\(^{165}\) As Blattner puts it, Dasein’s originary temporality is an interpretation of the care-structure.\(^{166}\) Each event in Dasein’s life is constituted by thrownness, representing the past; projection, representing the future; and falling, which represents the present. In other words, each event transcends itself to encompass the past and the future along with the present. Dasein is the combination of the three temporal moments. This is why Heidegger argues that “the future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present” and that “temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been.”\(^{167}\) The intriguing question at this point, however, is how originary temporality is a unitary form of non-sequential time? To answer this, we need to analyze further how understanding, state-of-mind, and falling (which constitute the structure of care) are perceived temporally.

Starting off with understanding or the future, Heidegger argues that existence is being-ahead-of-itself, where “ahead” suggests futurity. However, it is not as obvious as it seems. Heidegger states clearly that “while the ‘ahead’ includes the notion of a ‘before,’ neither the ‘before’ in the ‘ahead’

\(^{166}\) Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, 104.
\(^{167}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 401.
nor the ‘already’ is to be taken in terms of the way time is ordinarily understood.” Thus, the ‘before’ does not mean ‘not now but later’ in the sense of ‘in advance of something.’ It does not mean that this or that task is going to happen at a later time. For example, the possibility of becoming an astronaut is futural, not because it is not yet actual but only possible. Rather, it is a possibility that can never be actual. As Heidegger puts it “by the term ‘futural,’ we do not here have in view a ‘now’ which has not yet become ‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself.”

The future which Dasein goes towards is not something that could be actual. What does this mean? The point here is not that there are specific requirements or conditions for being an astronaut that cannot be satisfied. Rather, adopting a role, or to use a term that Blattner coined, “casting oneself in it” is not attempting to bring about a possible future state of myself. Casting myself as an astronaut does not come to an end in success or failure. Casting myself as an astronaut “does not terminate” at all. This is the key here. Casting myself as an astronaut is not an end in itself, but rather something that is continuously futural with respect to action. It is not something that I can take for granted. Being an astronaut is a possibility that stands before me. Therefore, “the role…never describes what I have been, but only what I can be.” This is in line with Heidegger’s thoughts that Dasein is never complete. It has a goal that is always outstanding.

There are objections here which state that once I pass certain required tests, for example, then I am an astronaut. According to Blattner, unless one continues casting themselves in that specific role, then one cannot say that one is this or that particular thing. So even after passing the required

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168 Heidegger, Being and Time, 375.
169 Heidegger, Being and Time, 373.
tests to become an astronaut, one has not become an astronaut, for being one is never a fact about me such as my height for example. But I can only be an astronaut only as long as I cast myself as one.  

So, “the factual (faktisch) sense in which I am something,…is not the same as the factual (tatsächlich) sense in which I am so many feet tall, or brown-haired.” The sense of “being something” is different in the former case (being an astronaut) than in the latter (being so many feet tall). What Dasein can be is not something that it can actually have become. To say for example that a hammer can be destroyed means that destruction is something that could take place, yet it has not happened. However, what I can be is not something which I can have become, and neither is it something that can happen to me. What I can be is not something that I can do. What one can do is something which can be accomplished and finished, whereas what one can be is something that one can cast himself as.

The “not yet” thus becomes clear in this sense: the sense of “ability” which characterizes Dasein. Yet this does not mean that Dasein is able to become or that it is not yet, but will be later. That is why Heidegger argues that the “ahead” does not mean “not now but later.” The “not yet” that Heidegger intends is not meant in the sense of a “possible actuality.” Rather, the “not yet” is to be understood as a possible “role” for Dasein. Dasein’s roles are its abilities-to-be.  

Saying that “Trump is not yet President” means that he is not one now, but he will be or most likely will be in the future. We view the event of him becoming the President as something looming in the horizon. In saying this, we view Trump being President as an event that will likely occur in the future. At the moment, we view this event as futural, which will someday be present, and then will be past. We think of this event as falling in a temporal succession. However, this is not what Heidegger thinks of Dasein’s futurity. The future which Heidegger has in mind does not refer to a future that lies ahead

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172 Dreyfus and Hall, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 105.
of the present or a future that will someday become a present.\textsuperscript{175} Heidegger’s future “is not something that is not yet actual, but likely someday will be. The future is not going to be.”\textsuperscript{176} The future does not succeed the present. In other words, Dasein’s possibilities cannot be actualized in the present. For example, I cannot have become an astronaut, even though I am pressing ahead into becoming one. This is what Blattner calls the Unattainability Thesis. Simply put, the Unattainability Thesis states that “the future – Dasein’s for-for-the-sake-of-which – is not going to be, because self-interpretive abilities are not attainable.”\textsuperscript{177} In saying that Trump is not yet President, Heidegger argues that this “not yet” is not successive. It is not something out in the future coming to present. Rather, the “not yet” maintains its futurity. It is an unattainable future.\textsuperscript{178}

So what does it mean that Dasein’s possibilities cannot be actualized in the present? And what does it mean that I cannot have become an astronaut? This is not related to certain qualifications that one cannot satisfy (let’s say I am claustrophobic so I do not have the ability to get into a space shuttle). Being an astronaut is futural in relation to what I am doing now. Heidegger, however, does not refer to attaining the social status that gets passed to a person upon occupying a certain role or occupation. Heidegger differentiates between social statuses and existential possibilities, which are abilities-to-be. Existential possibilities have to do with self-understanding with which one relates to by pressing ahead into.\textsuperscript{179} Thus, it is in this sense that the originary future is purposive, in the sense that Dasein presses ahead into possibilities.\textsuperscript{180} So in our example, to throw oneself into the possibility of being an astronaut is to have a purpose or aim. Heidegger uses the term “for-the-sake-of-which” to describe the act of Dasein pressing ahead into something. So in preparing

\textsuperscript{175} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 105.
\textsuperscript{176} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 105.
\textsuperscript{177} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 107.
\textsuperscript{178} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 107.
\textsuperscript{179} Dreyfus and Wrathall, eds. \textit{A Companion to Heidegger}, PDF e-book, 314.
\textsuperscript{180} Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 107.
to become an astronaut, in doing what astronauts do, Dasein thus acts “for the sake of” becoming one.\textsuperscript{181} It must be highlighted that there is a difference between pressing ahead into an ability-to-be and pursuing goals that flow from that ability-to-be. Pressing ahead into some for-the-sake-of-which is purposive, but not goal-directed.\textsuperscript{182} So for example, the purposes which make up being a professor are not goal-directed. Anyone who acts for the sake of a specific purpose, being a professor in this case, understands these purposes in regards to their significances. Suppose a professor perceives the education of students as something extremely valuable. So as long as the professor’s activity of education is directed towards such purpose (the worthiness of education), it subjects itself to the internal standards of being a good educator.\textsuperscript{183} In “pressing ahead into some way to be, Dasein is aiming for something.”\textsuperscript{184} This is not meant in the sense of intending a specific goal. And thus, realizing a goal does not indicate the futurity of such aiming. The pressing ahead is rather a direction. This pressing ahead or for-the-sake-of-which cannot be present or past because then Dasein won’t press ahead into it.\textsuperscript{185} That is, according to the Unattainability Thesis, as stated above, abilities are not attainable.

So just like in understanding, the future never becomes a present; Heidegger argues that the “already” in “being-already-in-the-world,” relates to a past that was never present. Dasein’s facticity makes up its past or its already being in a world. The “already” needs to be formulated in a way similar to the “not yet.” So an example involving the use of “already” would be something like “Obama is already President.” Thus, if Obama is already a president, then this presumes that at some point he was not yet President.\textsuperscript{186} According to Blattner: “X is (now) already F entails that X was

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\item[181] Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 108.
\item[183] Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 109 - 110.
\item[184] Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 110.
\item[185] Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 110.
\item[186] Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 112 - 113.
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(back then) not yet F, as long as ‘F’ ranges over a domain of changing items.”\textsuperscript{187} “Because the ‘F’ is supposed to range over attunements, and because attunements change, the entailment should hold.”\textsuperscript{188} To further elucidate this, we have to recall the “not yet” mentioned earlier along with the “already.” In our standard use of language, if “Dasein is (now) already F, then it was (back then) pressing ahead into F.” We ordinarily think of anything which already is as once having not yet been. But this is not what Heidegger intends. Here Blattner coins another term, the “Nullity Thesis” meaning that “Dasein cannot press ahead into its attunements.”\textsuperscript{189} In other words, Dasein cannot press ahead into or choose how things matter to it. So “Dasein is (now) already F” does not mean that “Dasein was (back then) not yet F.” It is in this sense that Heidegger denies the sequentiality of originary temporality. Heidegger’s future will never be present, and his past never was.

So, Dasein’s originary past is its attunements. As a Dasein, I am already “thrown” into the world. However, attunements are not past in the sense of the different historic events of one’s life. Rather, attunements belong to my ‘beenness,’ to my originary past.\textsuperscript{190} “My attunements were not at one time present, after which they slipped into the past. Rather, at every moment that an attunement characterizes me, even at its first moment, I am already thrown into it; it is already past.”\textsuperscript{191} In other words, Dasein cannot change who it already is attuned to be; it cannot choose or press ahead into not being who is has been. It is stuck with who it has been.\textsuperscript{192} Dasein finds itself with its own attunements that it cannot control its determinacy.\textsuperscript{193} So a Dasein who is already an astronaut cannot choose not to be one, however, it may be able to choose no longer to be one.

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\item Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 113.
\item Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 113.
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\item Dreyfus and Wrathall, eds. \textit{A Companion to Heidegger}, PDF e-book, 315.
\item Dreyfus and Wrathall, eds. \textit{A Companion to Heidegger}, PDF e-book, 315.
\item Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 87.
\item Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 115.
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Future projections are only possible in light of attunements. Without attunements, Dasein cannot settle upon one projection or another, because they will all be equally indifferent. That is why attunements are important in projecting oneself into possibilities. In a less theoretical formulation, we can say that every projection in Dasein’s life is guided by certain limitations. So a certain Dasein cannot cast itself as a professional soccer player because it is not physically fit. This is a form of limitation. However, another form of limitation is on the indifference pertaining to my projection of these possibilities. That is to say, I do not have the liberty of indifference. For example, if I am choosing to pursue a career in either medicine or law. Heidegger argues that upon facing this choice, I do not have the freedom to be indifferent to both possibilities. Each of the possibilities means something to me. A career in medicine means helping the ill, while a career in law means authority and power. Being inclined to choose this or that depends upon what sort of person I find myself to be. It depends on state-of-mind or affectivity. What does Heidegger mean by the sort of person ‘I find myself to be’?^194^ This is a “basic way of being attuned to the way things matter.”^195^ In other words, I find myself as a person who likes helping others, and thus I turn towards a career in medicine. State-of-mind or “affectivity lets possibilities show up in determinate ways, and matter to me in determinate fashions.”^196^ Thus, I can already care about helping others, or about power or money. And this kind of “already caring” about something guides my decision. It is essential to remember that Dasein is already thrown into a world. I am already entangled within the available possibilities.^197^ At every moment, “I am not a ‘worldless subject,’ that is, I do not stand naked, uncaring, and indifferent before these possibilities. I am worldly, for I come fully armed with

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attunements which modify the way these possibilities show up for me.”198 In other words, my encounter with my own possibilities is already guided by my affectivity.199

Heidegger argues that Dasein does not choose to press ahead into its attunements, since its attunements are already a characteristic of it. Attunements are always already there. I am overwhelmed by them. They beset me. So if I am sad I cannot choose to be happy. I can make a choice to play certain music or go to a place that makes me happy. However, becoming happy in this case is only a consequence of something that I choose to do. What is more important here is that I can never make a choice in an unattuned manner. When I choose to go to a place I like in order to change my attunement from sadness to cheerfulness, this choice is guided by my attunements. Making myself cheerful is a task that matters to me, but being cheerful is not an option, but an attunement which already structures how things matter to me.200 Attunements are universal features of our experience in such a way that our going about business in the world is always guided by attunements which ground our pressing ahead for-the-sake-of-which. If we are to press ahead into our possibilities, then attunements must be there to guide our projections. The “already” consists in the determinacy which forms the ground on which Dasein projects, a ground that must be already functioning for Dasein to be able to project. However, this “already” does not indicate a sequential past; neither does it indicate how Dasein was.201

It is in this way that Heidegger explains this aspect of care in relation to originary past as “being-already-in.” That is, our attunements constitute the way that things already matter to us. Having attunements, as Heidegger puts it, is our way of already-being-in-the-world. So, just like Dasein’s possibilities are revealed as possible through understanding, so they are also revealed as

mattering to it differentially by its attunements. As Blattner puts it, “just as understanding propels us onward into possibilities that do not lie in the future of clock-time, so attunement reveals to us the ways in which these possibilities are already meaningful, though this does not mean that they were meaningful in this way in the past of clock-time.” Thus, Heidegger links attunements with an originary past in the same way in which he links understanding with an originary future.

Heidegger does not give as much attention to the present. Existentially speaking, the present does not mean presence. According to Heidegger, Dasein is always dwelling with extant beings which are at hand. Beings are there in Dasein’s present. Only in the form of “enpresenting” that Dasein is futural and past. The originary present requires an originary past and an originary future. The ecstatics of the originary present is enpresenting or making-present: “As expecting a possibility the Dasein is always in such a way that it comports itself enpresentingly toward something at hand and keeps this extant entity as something present in its, the Dasein’s, own present.” The horizon of the enpresenting is the in-order-to. This “in-order-to” is Heidegger’s term for “involvement relation that binds the available to the human practices in terms of which they make sense and are defined.” For example, cement gets deployed in house repair because it is in-order-to bind objects together. So the in-order-to constitutes the importance or significance of the available. The “nows” are significant only in terms of the “in-order-to” relation.

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204 Dreyfus and Hall, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 110.
205 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 266.
206 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 266.
2- Conclusion: Is Originary Temporality a Real Form of Time?

All of the previous discussions have been for the sake of tackling one core question: is Heidegger’s originary temporality a real form of time, or only a metaphoric one? In other words, can we call originary temporality time? I hold that originary temporality is a real form of time, not a metaphorical one, and that world-time is a derivative of it. In the coming few pages, I will illustrate why I defend such a view.

Originary temporality is a form of time where the past, present, and future do not come in sequence, but are constantly temporalizing themselves in every ecstasis. The three ecstases do not follow each other, but are equiprimordial, equally basic. The past and future moments exist in the “now,” in the present. Originary temporality is a form of time where things already matter to Dasein based on its attunements, according to its originary past. It is also a form of time where Dasein projects itself towards its own future possibilities in the originary future. Dasein’s present is a culmination of its past and an anticipation and projection of its future. So when Dasein reaches out to its past, it is in the present of the past. It is in this sense that past never was. Alternatively, when Dasein reaches out to its future, it is in the future of the present. And it is in this sense that the future will never be present. Dasein’s past never was, and its future will neither come to be nor fail to come to be.

Medard Boss, a Swiss psychoanalyst and psychiatrist as well as a mentor and close friend of Heidegger, supports this view. He holds that the past, present, and future are unitary phenomena, coexisting together, and consequently, non-sequential. In a study entitled Education and the Concept of Time, Boss was quoted arguing that human temporality is made up of three extensions: the past, the present, and the future, where none of them can disappear from humans’ life.209

World-time can be analyzed into a set of moments, each of which can be perceived as a modified version of originary temporality. Those modified moments which constitute world-time and obtain together as a unity can be explained by interpreting world-time as derived from originary temporality.\textsuperscript{210} Thus, world-time is a “modified, and therefore dependent, version of originary temporality.”\textsuperscript{211}

How then can world-time be modified to be interpreted as a version of originary temporality? As mentioned, world-time is the sequence of significant, dated, spanned, and public nows. In stripping sequentiality out of these four world-time features, we get originary temporality in the following manner. \textit{Datability} loses its connection to any temporal position. The now does not then have any ordered sequence. \textit{Spannedness} when stripped from sequentiality ceases to connect the now to an earlier and a later now. \textit{Significance} no longer transforms the now into a then when this or that task is complete, because the now does not span to a then. \textit{Publicness}, however, does not seem to undergo any changes in stripping sequentiality from the now. From this we can see that originary temporality consists of features which, when modified by sequentiality, make up the features of world-time. Therefore, world-time is what it is because it is a derivative of originary temporality. Originary temporality is originary time because it explains the features of world-time.\textsuperscript{212}

Thus, world-time which has the time determinations of the “now,” the “then,” and the “at-the-time” is what it is only by being a derivative of originary temporality. The originary past, present, and future are employed in a way which lies in advance of the ordinary or world-time. The unity of the past, present, and future is originary time. Temporality temporalizes itself in this unity of those three ecstases.\textsuperscript{213} “Expecting, the future, retaining, the past, and enpresenting, the present – all

\textsuperscript{210} Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 165.
\textsuperscript{211} Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 165.
\textsuperscript{212} Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 166.
\textsuperscript{213} Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 266.
of these express themselves by means of the now, then, and at-the-time.” This is how Heidegger shows that originary temporality is the most basic form of time.

Heidegger reckons that all forms of time arise out of originary temporality. According to Blattner, by “arising out of,” Heidegger means some conceptual “degeneration,” which is a form of “leveling off.” Thus, world-time is leveled-off into ordinary time in the sense that datability and significance do not show up and that ordinary time is but a pure succession of nows. World-time (its significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness) is reduced to spanned and public nows. The nows in the ordinary time are spanned and public, but not datable or significant. Just in this sense that ordinary time is a leveled-off version of world-time; world-time is also a leveled-off version of originary temporality. Spannedness, as an aspect of world-time, can only be explained in this sense, or else it will remain vague. The spannedness of world-time is a leveled-off form of the unity of originary temporality, the way in which the originary past, present, and future are intrinsically connected to one another, which opens up the now moment. That is, the world-time which spans from a “before” to an “after” is a leveled-off form of the unity of the originary past, present, and future. Therefore, the three different forms of time (originary temporality, world-time, and ordinary time) form a degenerating series. Ordinary time can be perceived as a thinned-out version of world-time, and “world-time as a disconnected abstraction from originary temporality.” This provides a quite satisfactory explanation as to why originary temporality is a real form of time, and the most basic one.

This analysis of Heidegger’s originary temporality, however, necessitates bringing up many questions which require further research. How is world-time connected to the ordinary conception of

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214 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 266.
time as a pure succession of insignificant nows? How acceptable is Heidegger’s argument that originary temporality is a real form of time? Finally, Heidegger did not make it really clear whether world-time arises out of originary temporality or if it is only a modified version or a derivative of it. Therefore, an unanswered question remains: would world-time still exist in some way or another in the absence of originary temporality?
Bibliography


