

Running head: TURKEY IN EGYPTIAN MEDIA

The Image of Turkey in Egyptian Media:
Content and Discourse Analysis of the Coverage in three Egyptian Newspapers

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“Every empire tells itself and the world that it is unlike all other empires”

Edward Siad (1935-2003)

Abstract

This study investigates the image of Turkey in Egyptian newspapers by conducting a content and discourse analysis of three Egyptian newspapers, *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*, from January 2012 to December 2014. Based on previous literature, this study applied two theoretical frameworks: 1) Benedict Anderson's hypothesis of imagined communities and 2) media framing theory. To apply media framing, the Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) framing scale was employed. Following that, a rhetorical discourse was used to investigate Anderson's thesis. The study's finding matched Semetko and Valkenburg's framing scale. Both indicated that the attribution of responsibility is the most frequent frame in news. Finally, the discourse analysis resulted that newspapers could be deployed as an instrument to disseminate shared thoughts and ideologies among diverse citizens.

Introduction

Benedict Anderson innovatively furnished the notion of imagined communities in his book, which carried the same name: *Imagined Communities* (1991). In his unprecedented thesis, he scrutinized the means of how individuals in a vast community ardently vindicate and stand for a shared imagined identity, where massive numbers of aliens, who have never seen nor met each other, stand together under this imaginary identity (Anderson, 1991).

Anderson critically exposed the power of media in modern societies in constructing narratives and affecting perspectives. Although his major concern was not about media, his reflection on it was thoughtful. His perspective contributed greatly to our understanding and awareness of many past events. Moreover, scholarship in diverse disciplines were inspired by his view on society and community to perceive our present differently.

Accordingly, in this study, print media will be the investigation tool. A lens to observe how national identity could be used and employed to frame and structure a set of news in a certain course in order to implement feedback on the national identity in a reciprocal process. Hence, media framing is certainly a relevant instrument. In this construct, news framing is the in-between process. In other words, the media frames ideologies and contributes to their images; then, over a course of time, these ideologies became the context in which media operate.

In social sciences, researchers create the universe of the problem through a critical observation of their reality. Moreover, they choose or select what sides, angles, and perspectives to tackle and what tools, lenses, and equipment to use, etc. Obviously, it is a subjective process.

The uniqueness of this subjectivity is its accumulation. Accumulative subjective research, in a positive connotation, would create a much bigger realization of how the events and issues under investigation could function. Hence, to a certain extent, forecasting future occurrences might be possible. Thus, one research might not make a significant impact, but the accumulation of work on a specific subject most likely inspires a change of how researchers or people, who may be of concern, perceive this topic.

Within this conceptualization, this study comes to tackle the Egyptian–Turkish relationship, its development, and how media is reflecting upon it. It is relatively clear this relationship has shifted, to some degree, from a warm relationship to a dry one after June 30, 2013. Since this date, the international relations between Egypt and many other countries have faced many obstacles, as many of these countries remain dissatisfied with the political changes in Egypt; on the other side, the Egyptian interim-government of that time considered their dissatisfaction as an unaccepted intervention on critical national issues.

So, why study Turkey and not any other country? As previously mentioned, many other countries face unstable relationships with Egypt. Qatar and the United States of America might be other examples of the unsettled relationship with the government in Cairo. To explain the rationale behind choosing to study the Egyptian–Turkish relationship and not any other Egyptian international relations, some notes need to be clarified and considered.

Egyptian–Turkish relationships came to this end for many reasons. For Ankara, what happened in summer 2013 was perceived as an undemocratic transformation in the political

scene in Cairo. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,¹ the Turkish prime minister at that time, explicitly did not accept the new political situation in Egypt when the army, headed by General Abd El Sisi,² ousted Morsi³ after a huge social movement (Tziarras, 2013).

Erdoğan has considered the army action as a military coup. Afterward, the situation was not alleviated, and the official relationship between both countries became even worse. The Turkish government hosted what it called “members of the Egyptian opposition,” while the Egyptians accused Turkey of hosting terrorists (Tziarras, 2013). Along the same line, Turkey allowed anti-Egyptian government TV channels to operate in its territories. Finally, in November 2013, the diplomatic relationship between Egypt and Turkey became threatened when Egypt expelled the Turkish ambassador in Cairo (Saul, 2013).

Other types of important relations between Egypt and Turkey should be considered as well. In this regard, nothing illustrates the positive side of the Egyptian–Turkish relationships better than the economy. The trade between both countries is nearly \$5 billion per year, while the direct investment by Turkish businessmen in Egypt is more than \$11 billion (World Bank, 2016). Thus, the later shift in the mutual relations between Egypt and Turkey deserves an investigation of the impacts of political tension on several dimensions, including media.

Hence, for the sake of discussion, it is fundamental to delineate the edges of this manuscript in order not to create the wrong expectations. In my opinion, the best method to do so

¹ Erdoğan has been serving as the president of Turkey since 2014.

² El Sisi is the Egyptian president (2014–present).

³ Mohamed Morsi is a former Egyptian president (2012–2013).

is by elimination. This study is not about political communication nor is it about international communication or international affairs, and it cannot be categorized purely under the Turkish or the Middle Eastern studies. Following a rapidly growing literature on media as an ideological disseminator, as it will be exhibited later, this study uses print media production in Egypt as a tool to read the representation of Turkey.

It is for this end that the study is organized; it starts with illustrating the context in which the Egyptian media is operating. Second, a short historical review of Turkey is provided. Then, the theoretical approach, literature review, and methodology will articulate the foundations of this research. Finally, the quantitative and qualitative analysis illustrate outcomes of this investigation. I argue that the case of Turkey in Egyptian media is a good manifestation of how news could manipulate events by framing it a certain direction. In conclusion, by doing so, there is a possibility to understand more about how the Egyptian press would be used as an instrument to publicize a dominant national narrative in society.

Historical Survey of Media in Egypt

The key aspect discussed in this historical review of media in Egypt is that current media functioning did not emerge out of a vacuum; neither is it comparable with other advanced Western media systems. On this ground, it is possible to trace its roots back to the beginning of the January 25, 2011, Egyptian revolution/uprising or even deeper than that. It is not an exaggeration to claim that media in Egypt is a product of its long history, circumstances, and other societal, cultural, and political specificities.

Media heritage in Egypt goes back to the early nineteenth century. In 1828, under the rule of Mohamed Ali Pasha, newspapers emerged, and the first official Egyptian newspaper was *Waqai Masriya* under the supervision of Rafea El Tahtawia. By the mid-nineteenth century, nearly 200 newspapers were available in Egypt, and, before the end of the nineteenth century, the *Al-Ahram* newspaper was founded by Selim and Beshara Tekla (Hassan, 2013).

The first half of the twentieth century has witnessed a distinguished flourishing in print media in Egypt. Despite the ups and downs regarding freedom of expression, the print market has remained broadly diverse in terms of genres, languages, formats, and political stances. As a result of this growing-up industry, in March 1941, the press syndicate was founded to be the first of its kind in the Arab world (Hassan, 2013).

In the same way, Egypt was also a pioneer in introducing radio service to the Arab world in May 31, 1934. Then, in 1960, during the first decade of the new republic in Egypt,⁴ the government launched the first television broadcasting service. Communication, as can be seen in Egypt, has a prolonged heritage. However, for the sake of this paper's discussion, some scenes from the republic's media is more relevant (Harper, 2014).

This review will focus on one major feature of media in Egypt: the relationship between the state and the media's narrative and freedom of expression. Then, it will be vital to locate the three newspapers under examination in this study, *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*, within the context of the development of Egyptian media.

Nasser's State and Media

Initially, after 1952, Egypt's Nasser⁵ nationalized all print and radio media and used them to disseminate the regime's narrative that was mainly the "attempts of political elites to fashion a new nation-state" with secular vision (Bier, 2011, p. 2). Along similar lines, Nasser's regime used the media to promote the "non-Western socialist models of modernization" that was apparently opposed to the modernization politics of Islam (Bier, 2011, p. 3).

Equally important, through radio, the ideology of pan-Arabism was promoted by Nasser. The "Voice of the Arabs," a Cairo-based radio station, exemplifies Nasser's vision toward

⁴ The Egyptian Republic was officially announced in June 18, 1953, after the success of the officers' movements in 1952.

⁵ Gamal Abdel Nasser was a prominent member of the officers' movement that abolished the monarchy in Egypt. He was the second president of the republic (1956–1970).

media. This radio station “was an international service, which in the 1950s and 1960s became the ‘pulpit of revolution,’ notably in the leftist revolution in Iraq in 1958” (Thussu, 2002, p. 37).

Later on, as previously noted, the national TV was founded in 1960 and was followed by the establishment of the Radio and Television Union (ERTU) in 1970. For decades, this governmental organization controlled all broadcasting services in Egypt. On the side of print media, the situation was not different. The state controlled all newspapers and print publications, and *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Akhbar*, and *Rosa El-Youssef* are just few examples (El Issawi, 2014).

The earliest scholarly production shows that Nasser’s regime adopted a one direction discourse narrative, restricted freedom of expression, and prohibited private ownership of newspapers.⁶ It is therefore not surprising to notice that “what the Egyptian press and other published sources offer[ed] is a picture of the views and orientations of the educated elite who were Nasserism’s proponents and architects” (Bier, 2011, p. 20).

Sadat’s Liberation Policies

These restraints were relatively alleviated after Nasser and during Sadat’s regime. Sadat adopted a brand-new liberal economic policy and changed Egypt’s international relations direction, especially after the Camp David Accords⁷, to become more Western-oriented. The state’s policies were reflected on media. Sadat allowed some non-governmental newspapers to

⁶ See, for example, *Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt* by Walter Armbrust (1996) and *Occidentalisms in the Arab world* by Robbert Woltering (2011); see also the memoirs of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published in 2012 under the title, *Egypt: From One Revolution to Another*.

⁷ Camp David Accords were signed on 1978 and led to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.

appear that were mainly owned by the newly emerged political parties at that time such as *Al-Wafd* and *Al'ahaly* newspapers.⁸ However, heavy censorship controlled all governmental and partisan newspapers (Hassan, 2013).

Equally important, criticizing Nasser's regime was encouraged during Sadat's ruling period. The media narrative was propagated against leftists' political thoughts, and the discourse of Pan-Arabism was drastically alleviated in the media. Chiefly, the media narrative transformed and shifted to mirror Sadat's political and social visions (Hassan, 2013).

Accordingly, although there are discrepancies between Nasser and Sadat's regimes, one can claim that they were spending media to advocate their policies and propagate a certain state ideology. Afterward, these long-lasting restrictions on media were about to lighten during the Mubarak Regime due to many internal and external factors.

Mubarak and Media Development

Initially, at the beginning of Mubarak's regime, which lasted nearly 30 years, state's policies toward media did not radically change. Transformations started to occur when private ownership of newspapers was allowed. However, the High Press Council⁹ was the only responsible body of regulating and controlling all print productions in Egypt, which means that the political regime had to permit and license any private publication (Cooper, 2008)

⁸ *Al-Wafd* newspaper is affiliated to Al-Wafd Al-Jadid political party, while *Al'ahaly* is affiliated to Al-Tagmoa political party.

⁹ The High Press Council was founded in 1975.

Along the same line, direct and indirect censorship and surveillance practices marked the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000's media environment in Egypt. Fluctuating state intervention characterized this period, and some newspapers were forcibly closed such as *Al-Dostour*, which was shut down in 1998 and reopened once again in 2005 (Krzysiek, 2009).

These restrictions did not prevent communication development in Egypt, as the end of the 1990s witnessed a radical change in media. In 1998, the first Egyptian satellite was launched to announce a new broadcasting era. For the first time, private TV channels were allowed. In 2001, *Dream TV* founded by *Ahmed Bahgat* and followed by other private TV channels (El-Issawi, 2014).

Similarly, the mid-2000s had witnessed a new wave of print journalism in Egypt. In June 2004, *Almasry Alyoum* was published as a private-owned newspaper. Although the existence of state's constraints, *Almasry Alyoum* succeeded to provide different significant content than the state-owned newspapers and achieved high readership (Cooper, 2008). This encouraged other private newspapers to appear. In 2009, *El-Shorouk* newspapers were added to the daily Egyptian newspapers (El Masry, 2011).

Although censorship underlined the second half of the 2000's media setting in Egypt, private newspapers and TV stations succeeded to provide a relatively diverse media content. During Mubarak's regime, state-owned media maintained its tradition to be the government mouthpiece. Hence, the new private media competed strongly, as they provided something that was missing in Egypt (Cooper, 2008).

The Early Days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution/Uprising

In 2010, Egyptian newspapers were divided among three main categories: 1) state-owned, 2) private, 3) and partisan newspapers, while satellite channels were distributed between private and state channels. This was the main allocation of media ownership before the 2011 revolution/uprising. Before and during the early days of the revolution/uprising, state media, including television and newspapers, stood strongly behind the Mubarak¹⁰ Regime and to a large extent ignored the revolution's events in the streets, while private newspapers provided relatively different coverage of the revolution/uprising events (Hassan, 2013).

The following day after Mubarak, on February 12, 2011, directly after his regime collapsed, the state media obviously altered its tone. The headline of the *al-Ahram* newspaper, one of the major Egyptian newspapers, was entirely different than the previous days: "The People Toppled the Regime." *Al-Ahram* was not a unique newspaper in changing its tone. The editorial line in the state media generally changed, and journalists in other state media institutions had more freedom to work (Hassan, 2013).

The state television congratulated the Egyptians because, for the first time, it considered itself "in the service of the people" (Hassan, 2013, p. 245). Observers could easily notice the changes in the media in Egypt after January 25 events in both the state and the private media. The media became more diverse and relatively professional; furthermore, fewer restrictions were placed on establishing a new media organization. Consequently, Egypt has witnessed a boom in terms of the number of newspapers and television stations (Abdulla, 2014)

¹⁰ Mubarak is a former Egyptian president.

Egyptian Media After 2011

Although the January 25 uprising noticeably pushed the freedom limits, and the security state control over the media has retreated (Hassan, 2013), many voices called for permanent essential corrections and improvements at both the legal and structural levels and in state and private media to maintain professional performance. Unfortunately, slight insignificant actions were taken in reality (Abdulla, 2014).

Since the 2011 uprising, Egypt has witnessed several political transformations. From the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) rule to the Muslim Brotherhood, the media has observed numerous changes in laws and structure, but no major reform has been achieved on the legal level or on the structure of the state-owned media (El-Issawi, 2014).

Under the rule of the SCAF, the state media quickly returned to supporting the ruling political regime. This role continued under the Muslim Brotherhood regime in 2012. When Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, came to power, the media witnessed a new movement of restrictions, and many journalists faced trial for “insulting the president” (Abdulla, 2014). Although there were restrictions on freedom of expression, the private media had relatively more space for the opposition to express themselves than the state media.

June 30 and Afterward

On June 30, 2013, due to many political and economic challenges that Morsi’s regime failed to face, millions of Egyptians led huge demonstrations to ask him to resign and to hold an

early presidential election. The protests ended with the withdrawal of President Mohamed Morsi by the army on July 3, 2013, and the 2012 constitution, which had been approved in a public referendum, was suspended by the military. On the same day, a new interim government was assigned (El-Maghraby & Abu El Ela, 2014).

At the beginning of the interim government's term, the military closed almost all television stations and newspapers that were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and many restrictions over other secular media and journalists' practices appeared on the scene, and the state media continued to support the ruling regime. Journalists faced a challenging atmosphere and were confronted by various amounts of harassment from the authorities and Muslim Brotherhood supporters (Abdulla, 2014).

It is noticeable that media-reforming legislations during that period were absent. Although a new constitution that was passed in a public referendum held in January 2014 contained many articles that relatively promoted freedom of expression in many ways, this constitution was part of the road map, which was declared by the military on July 2, 2013, and not directed to reform the media in practice. While the hope of reforming media legislations in particular was at its highest, nothing happened in practice (Abdullah, 2016).

The interim government remained in power until presidential elections took place in May 2014, when Abdulfattah al-Sisi, the former minister of defense, won the elections. During the early days of his regime, hopes raised regarding reforming the state media, organizing the private media, and gaining support for freedom of the press. Yet many interventions of authorities into

media practices have been recorded, and many journalists faced trial or were in jail (Abdullah, 2016).

According to Freedom House (2016), Egypt was the world's second-worst jailer of journalists in 2015. The Freedom House organization has classified the media in Egypt as "not free." According to its 2016 report, Egyptian authorities in 2015 "continued to employ a variety of tools against journalists and media outlets that strayed from officially sanctioned narratives, including legal prosecution, gag orders, and the outright halting of operations."

Along the same lines, Reporters Without Borders (2016) ranked Egypt in the 159th place with regard to media freedom. Moreover, it described the situation of the press as extremely worrying. The report highlighted that, under the 2015 anti-terrorism law, journalists could report only official press releases when covering "terrorist" attacks.

The absence of any legal framework or any real code of ethics increased the difficulty of the journalistic situation in Egypt. Although there is a new draft of the media law, in reality, it is difficult to anticipate when the law officially will be issued. Without such regulation, debates regarding journalism practices and freedom of expression will continue in Egypt. Rasha Abdulla (2016), in her paper "Navigating the Boundaries Between State Television and Public Broadcasting in Pre- and Post-Revolution Egypt," commented on this by saying, "The January 25, 2011 revolution was a chance for reform, but not much has changed" (p. 4291).

In conclusion, this review illustrated the media context during the Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak' regimes, and before and after the 2011 Egyptian revolution/uprising. This was essential to grasp the circumstances in which the three newspapers in this study, *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*, are functioning. Certainly, these conditions have had an impact on their practices, and they should be genuinely considered.

The Dynamics of Turkey: Historical Survey

Succession of a Died Empire

The Ottoman Empire became the nineteenth century's major concern about the East due to its great influence in the world at that time. However, since its emergence in the twentieth-century, Turkey, the successor of the dissolved empire, has been seen as "an emerging regional power or a vexing problem in the construction of a new Europe" (Hale, 2013, p. 1).

Recently, the Turkish people have been feeling the growth of their country's international power and influence. The rapid boom of the Turkish economy as well as its regional and international strategic significance are among the reasons for such power (Hale, 2013). Hence, it seems critical to elaborate more on the republics' early days. Initially, between 1918 and 1923, Turkey made critical turns in its history. The Ottoman's defeat in 1918, and their drastic fall after World War I, opened the arena to all great powers at that time to intervene and divide its remaining lands (Hale, 2013).

New Modern State and New Society

In this context, and after the end of the Turkish War of Independence in 1923, the Turkish state emerged as an independent state with international acknowledgment. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the resistance leader of that time, used his influence and authority to reconstruct the Turkish society and establish a new secular modern state (Pope & Pope, 2011).

Citizenship and identity were fundamental concerns when the Turkish Republic was founded. According to İçduygu, Çolak, and Soyarik, it became a major concern in the new

Turkey to develop “a new concept of citizenship in the national polity that would go hand in hand with the nation-building process” (Kedourie, 2000, p. 187).

The concept of citizenship was perceived as one of the core issues by the founding father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Consequently, Atatürk contributed significantly toward furnishing the Turkish modern bureaucratic functioning to fasten the process of reinforcing the new Turkish identity. Moreover, the new dogma of Turkish military was shaped to protect this novel bureaucracy (Kösebalaban, 2011).

Turkey’s new ideology and citizenship were boosted through media, education, and a brand-new language. For example, Atatürk and other Turkish intellectuals shaped an obligatory school course, which tackled the question of new Turkish citizenship and ideology (Kedourie, 2000). Since then, the question of Turkey as the “motherland” has become a core element in Turkish school curriculums. In other words, “from the very start in Turkey, citizenship was officially taken to be one of the key elements of successful nation-building” (Kedourie, 2000, p. 187).

In the 1920s, as a part of unifying the concept of the newly emerging citizenship in Turkey, the republic had witnessed diverse forms of migration and asylum-seeking movements, when, chiefly, non-Muslim populations emigrated from Turkey, mostly to Greece, and Muslims or individuals with Turkish origins immigrated to Turkey. These movements were encouraged by the founders of the Turkish Republic. The purpose was to create a strong, integrated society, which was one of the main philosophies that the Turkish Republic stood upon (Kirişçi, 1996).

Forming the new Turkish society was among the significant applications of the new citizenship concept in the new Turkish Republic, and Turkish citizenship could be considered a product of Turkish bureaucracy, which had been used to disseminate the new shared ideology. Beyond its ideological implications, the “Turkish citizenship” defines citizens’ rights, obligations, and relationships with other citizens in society and government (Pope & Pope, 2011). Thus, forming the new Turkish republic could be a great manifestation of Anderson’s thesis *imagined communities* (Anderson, 1991).

Turkey: A Powerful International Actor

Over the last two decades, Turkey has witnessed radical improvement in its economy, increasing of its international influence, and more diversity of its culture than ever before (Kilberg, 2014). In surveying the historical circumstances that shaped these transformations, some elements and dynamics should be highlighted: 1) Turkish migration identity; 2) Turkey and NATO; 3) Turkey as a candidate EU state; 4) the regional character of Turkey between the Black Sea and the Middle East.

Turkish Migration Identity: Economic Consequences. Since the large-scale 1920s migration movements in modern Turkey, which were associated with the creation of the new republic, Turkey did not witness any sizable population movements until the 1960s. The 1960s has observed what might be described as a large-scale Turkish emigration. Considerable numbers of Turkish people had begun to emigrate to several destinations in the world.

The bilateral agreement between the Turkish Republic and West Germany in October 30, 1961, was the preliminary momentum for Turkish individuals to enter Europe. To a large extent, Europe was in high need of laborers to assist in the post-war reconstruction process. This agreement opened the door for the Turkish people to, initially, enter West Germany. Then, other bilateral agreements between Turkey and other European countries took place. As a result, in 50 years after this agreement, approximately hundreds of thousands of men and women from Turkey entered Europe (İçduygu, 2000).

Alongside the bilateral agreements between Turkey and other European countries, Turkey's 1961 constitution granted Turks the freedom of movement from and to Turkey; furthermore, it encouraged Turkish emigration flows as a part of a five year development plan (Ozcurumez & Yetkin, 2014). Nowadays, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish people who live outside Turkey are estimated to be about five million (as cited in Kilberg, 2014). This means that "at any one time [since the 1960s], some six percent of the Turkish population was abroad" (İçduygu, 2012, p. 12).

Turkish emigrants had a significant positive impact on the economic boost, as they retained strong economic relationships with their community. They sent remittances to their families and bought homes and other different properties; moreover, some invested their savings directly in small projects in Turkey (Aybek, 2012; İçduygu, 2012).

Furthermore, a great portion of foreign currency was used in developing and infrastructure projects. As a result, these projects contributed to the later economic flourishing

(İçduygu, 2012). Hence, it could be concluded that the Turkish migration identity, which encouraged emigration, had a substantial direct positive impact on the 2000s' economic flourishing.

Turkey and NATO. The idea of some sort of a defense pact in the Middle East emerged in the United Kingdom and the United States directly after the World War II. This was to face the expected danger of the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom desired participation of one country or more from the Middle East (Kedourie, 2000). Then, the Treaty of Brussels was signed by The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and Britain in 1948 as a mutual defense treaty.

This treaty was followed in 1949 by the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Besides Western European countries, NATO included the United States of America (Kedourie, 2000). Turkey joined this treaty in 1952 after the British–Turkish relationship was settled, and the Turkish engagement with NATO against Soviet polices was illustrious during the 1950s and the early 1960s (Hale, 2013).

In 1953, after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union alleviated the confrontation with the “West Camp” and started to transform the Soviet’s international policy to gain more support within what is called the “third world.” These new Soviet policies did not convince Turkey to lighten its involvement with NATO. As a result, tension between Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries including Egypt increased. They perceived the Turkish alliance with the West as a threat to the independence movements of that time (Hale, 2013).

Turkey as a Candidate EU State. By the beginning of the 1980s, Turkey started waves of political and economic reform. These changes did not only attract foreign investments that backed the economy, but it had many other consequences. By the end of the 1980s, the continuous improvement on these liberalization measurements, besides the economic boom, encouraged Turkey to apply for an EU membership (Kaiser, 2012).

Yet, although Turkey is not a member of the EU and only a member of the European Economic Community, it “was declared a formal candidate for full EU membership and started the accession process on 3 October 2005” (Kaiser, 2012, p. 105). This candidacy encouraged Turkey to invest in its own economy and attract more foreign capital to Turkey to benefit from the new promising country. Accordingly, the Turkish candidacy to the EU greatly benefited the Turkish economy and society (Kaiser, 2012).

The Regional Character of Turkey Between the Black Sea and the Middle East. Does Turkey belong to the Black Sea region or the Middle East? This important question has generated continuous debate among Middle Eastern and global affairs’ scholars. Geographically, Turkey is located on the southern shore of the Black Sea and close to what is called the “Middle East.” Yet it should be considered that regional terms are politically redefined (Davison, 1960).

Thus, it is possible to claim that Turkey is a Middle Eastern state that is affiliated with the Black Sea region (Hale, 2013). Initially, Turkish interest in the Middle East was derived from its military involvement with NATO when the British reduced its direct military forces in the region

after the Suez War in 1956 (Pope & Pope, 2011). Then, economic relations motivated Turkey to increase its ties with some of the Middle Eastern states (Kirişçi, 2011).

Nowadays, as Turkey is attempting to balance its relationships with NATO and Russia, the Black Sea region could be considered as a critical arena to Turkey's international relations. Additionally, some literature argues that Turkey "has considered its active engagement in Black Sea regional affairs as contradictory to its EU membership aspirations" (Petriashvili, 2015, p. 107).

On the other hand, scholars argue that the Turkish dream of joining the EU did not vanish. Current Turkish attempts to strengthen the country's relationships and influence in the Middle East and among the Muslim World could drive and motivate the EU to facilitate the Turkish process of joining the Union. When E.U. leaders see the power of Turkish politics and the Turkish economy, they might be convinced to accept Turkish membership (Kirişçi, 2011).

Based on the previously drawn discussion, it could be concluded that Turkey's concern is not focused on one region. The Middle East is a part of the complexity of the Turkish international and regional relations. To put the argument in its simplest form, it is difficult to claim that one country dominates, worries, or occupies the interest of Turkey's international foreign policy.

Theoretical approach

In this study two theoretical frameworks will be adopted: Anderson's thesis of imagined communities and the media framing theory. Although these frameworks might appear as unrelated, as they have different epistemological roots, in essence, to a large extent, they correspond perfectly to each other. Seen in such a way, the study needs both frameworks to efficiently navigate the inquiry under investigation.

Anderson's Imagined Communities

The first theoretical lens used in this study is Anderson's¹¹ thesis on nationalism. Anderson suggested that the national ideology could be disseminated and amplified through media. In any community, where all its members are not able to interact personally due to the impracticality of the idea, media can distribute and propagate the imagination of unity among them. But, even if the concept is clear, additional elaboration remains essential to grasp all the origins and dynamics in Anderson's thesis (Anderson, 1991).

Initially, Anderson noticed that, each revolution in the twentieth century defined itself as a national revolution and produced nationalistic states; insofar these new states have used national terms to define themselves, i.e., the Socialist Republic of Vietnam or People's Republic of China. It appears as if the idea on nationalism was unified with Marxist movements to inspire almost all revolutions in the twentieth century. Thus, it was necessary for Anderson to define nationalism in order to comprehend this social order and trace its development (Anderson, 1991).

¹¹ Benedict Anderson (1936-2015). Anderson is well known for his book *Imagined Communities* (1983) in which he explores major concepts regarding nationalism and its origins.

“Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson, 1991, p. 3). Benedict Anderson made this statement in his book *Imagined Communities* in a context of his endeavor to define “nationalism,” “nationality,” and “nation.” Later, Anderson sadly quoted Hugh Seton-Waston¹² who said, “Thus I am driven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists” (Anderson, 1991, p. 3).

For Anderson, the notion of nationalism is driven, mostly from Marxist literature that criticizes social classes and power struggles. Literature that failed to define one critical concept, “national bourgeoisie,” had been formulated and used in the early days of the use of nationalism, hence a failure that produced what Anderson called the “anomaly” of nationalism. Thus, one of the major purposes of Anderson’s work on nationalism was to appropriately define the “anomaly” of nationalism and its stimulus (Anderson, 1991).

More important to note is that Anderson did not mean that an “imagined community” is a fake community; rather, his idea is premised on the logical observation that, in large communities, individuals do not know each other personally. Accordingly, they depend on imagining their community and its other members, which is why all communities are imagined to a certain degree (Anderson, 1991).

¹² Hugh Seton-Waston is considered one of the earliest and best comprehensive authors to tackle nationalism in English text.

Regarding nationalism studies, Anderson developed three theoretical paradoxes that perplexed nationalism's philosophers and theorists.¹³ First, the paradox between modernity and antiquity of "nations." Nations should be perceived as a novel modern formation and not an eternal timeless notion, as nationalists often consider (Anderson, 1991).

Second, although nationality is a universal notion in the modern world, it divides and categorizes as would gender, ethnicity or religion. Third, "the 'political' power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence" (Anderson, 1991, p. 5). Masses would die for their nation—and yet the notion of "nation" is not properly defined (Anderson, 1991).

On logical ground, Anderson suggested that print media and literature are among the leading elements of disseminating and propagandizing nationalism and the sense of unity among individuals. Thus, to a large extent, Anderson received 'nationalism' as a social, economic, and cultural production. During the nineteenth century, the growing capitalism associated with the flourishing of the printing press enhanced the product of "nationalism" (Anderson, 1991).

To apply Anderson's theory on print media production, it is essential to understand how theory in media is functioning with print production. Equally important to Anderson's perspective, this study will offer media framing theory as a second necessary theoretical lens. Significantly, framing is one of the most widely used theories in which to investigate media production (Borah, 2011).

¹³ By philosophers and theorists, Anderson meant specifically: Hobbeses, Marxes, Tocquevilles, Webers.

Framing Theory

“The major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Framing extensively became the main interest for many mass communication researchers starting in the early 1990s (Borah, 2011); historically, framing research has been considered the most popular approach in the field of journalism, media, and communication studies.

Epistemological Roots of Media Framing. Erving Goffman was the first scholar to introduce the concept of framing in 1974 in his book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Goffman (1974) proposed that frames are “schemata of interpretation” that allow individuals to arrange, classify, and interpret their daily experience and the world around them (as cited in Xu, 2013). In other words, Goffman’s (1974) idea suggested that individuals structure their social perception according to a number of surrounding factors, and this perception is used by them to take actions and make decisions (as cited in Baran & Davis, 2014).

The roots of framing research are derived from literature on other fields of human sciences, such as “sociology, economics, psychology, cognitive linguistics and communication” (as cited in Bryant and Oliver, 2009, p. 9). It also draws heavily on fields such as anthropology and political science and media studies. Thus, media frames are products of gradual development in the humanities. *Media frames* refer to the active method that the media uses to shape the reality around individuals in their everyday experience (Bryant, & Oliver, 2009).

On a logical ground, media framing theory draws heavily on sociology and psychology. Sociology could be considered as a macro-level approach to study the theory. It focuses on how human beings process complex information in their everyday tasks and how they construct judgments by using causal attribution. Heider (1959) defined *Causal Attribution* as the connection between an observed behavior and potential cause.

In addition, the psychological perspective is highly associated with the sociological roots. However, it functions on a micro level. Sherif (1967) showed in an experimental research that nearly all individual's judgments and perceptions occur within certain frames of reference. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) argued that all "perception is reference-dependent," which means that the same piece of information could be interpreted differently due to context dissimilarity among individuals (as cited in Bryant and Oliver, 2009).

Along the same lines, the cognitive mechanism elaborates upon media farming's effects on individuals. The theory of framing is significantly associated with attribution and prospect theories. The concern of attribution theory is to explain how message perceivers use information gained through mass media or other sources in society to reach a causal explanation of others' behaviors or to justify and simplify occurrences and events (Sherif, 1967).

From another perspective, prospect theory explains how individuals could choose among probabilistic alternatives that contain risk. For instance, people will be more likely to choose "gain," if they are in a situation that gives them two equal choices conveyed as gain versus lose.

To put it differently, “perception” is argued to be “reference dependent” in both attribution and prospect theories (Sherif, 1967).

This infers that each person can translate or decode a set of information in his/her method and based on his/her context. Nevertheless, numerous research in media framing suggests that interpretation of events, issues, or social occurrences by audiences could be manipulated and directed by news frames (Sherif, 1967).

Journalists and Their Messages. To a large extent, journalists, consciously or unconsciously, are responsible for shaping the media’s message to their audiences and deciding the message’s approach. In other words, journalists are the individuals who pick the story angle, select some information, and filter out other information about the story before delivering this story to the audiences (Gitlin, 1980). Hence, framing coordinates the relationship among several elements, including words, figures, images, and separate information, to help media consumers interpret the final message in a certain way.

In 1992, an important study was conducted by Neuman, Just, and Crigler that claimed that media frames give news stories their routes and suggested that it is important to take into account media organizational constraints, working context, and audiences’ characteristics. According to what was previously mentioned, it is obvious that individuals are dynamic components in the process of producing media and frame messages. Thus, journalists should be careful and alert while creating their messages and delivering them to diverse audiences.

Journalists can use framing techniques to shape their messages. Gasmon and Modigliani (1989) used the term “framing devices” to refer to framing techniques. According to the authors, framing devices could be phrases, images, metaphors, examples, models, or any other items that could be used in media messages to frame them in a certain way (as cited in Bryant, & Oliver, 2009). Thus, the editorial decisions that media organizations make give them a significant role in shaping audiences’ views of events and incidents (Fornaciari, 2011).

Another noteworthy point is that the relationship between political elites and journalists affects media messages. Political elites recognized the importance of media in society; thus, they keep and maintain good connections with journalists. Hence, media could be their tool to reach their audience in a desirable way. This means that politicians might direct how messages are framed (Zaller, 1992); therefore, they can manipulate public opinion.

In fact, it is significant that framing in media helps to shape the public opinion, and a considerable body of research consider it as the second level of agenda setting¹⁴ (Scheufele, 1999). Scheufele (1999) claimed that the complex process of framing helps to sell ideologies, thoughts, and ideas to individuals in order to affect public opinion.

Dynamics of Framing Effect. To a great extent, media assists audiences and individuals in deconstructing complex ideas and making it straightforwardly accessible. Naturally, humans use their own framing context to alleviate impenetrable thoughts (Goffman, 1974). Thus, media

¹⁴ The first-level agenda-setting is the capability of news to influence the public agenda by emphasizing the salient topics in news. The second-level agenda-setting is ability of news to influence the salience of topics’ attributes *attribute agenda-setting*.

might affect an individual's effort to comprehend information or certain events. In a given situation, media can suggest or emphasize relevant factors to be considered by their audiences when they are constructing their view or judgment (Druckman, 2001).

Equally important, news framing could be more critical when the occurring events are novel or do not have precedents. On the basis of this freshness, media increases its influence and authority on manipulating the given frames or meanings. For the sake of understanding new phenomena, individuals rely on media messages; therefore, they are more likely to be affected by them (Rojecky, 2005).

Wars, natural disasters, or social crises, as demonstrated by De Versse (2005), are examples of situations when individuals authenticate media messages. Additionally, in these situations, audiences rely upon and are typically trustful of the opinion or narrative of media more than themselves. Hence, the need for orientation could influence or direct a media framing effect (Matthes, 2006).

Politics could be a second example in which individuals depend heavily on media to become orientated. Because the general audience is not usually involved in political corridors, news becomes their fundamental source of information. Furthermore, in order for politicians to influence individuals, they widely approach media and media-makers. In this situation, news frames could affect audiences' perception of politics and politicians (Entman, 1993).

Along the same lines, there is growing literature on the news framing effect that suggests other complementary views. For example, some research has suggested that framing effects might occur not only because opinion leaders or political elites pursue to manipulate individuals, but rather because people desire for guidance and assistance. Therefore, they hear what elites would say (Durkman, 2011). In essence, this later point highlights an important cognitive aspect in news framing that needs more elaboration.

Cognitive Perception of News Framing. It is important to this theoretical review to highlight some factors related to audiences' cognitive process in dealing with news. Initially, on a logical ground, individuals encounter multilayer frames in any given message. This means that each individual will pass through his/her cognitive process to select the frame/frames. According to individuals' differences, this process may vary from one person to another (Chong & Drukman, 2007).

Accordingly, culture will be the second factor in this analysis. Media messages are more likely to be accepted among society if these messages were transmitted throughout societal metaphors, terminologies, connotations, and values. In this sense, culture does not interpret news frames; rather, it works as the container where individuals decode the news frames. Therefore, political elites, to a large extent, utilize "culture references" to make their media communication more feasible and attainable (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009).

Drawing on this point, media theorists have emphasized the association among cognition, second-level agenda-setting, and media framing. Media scholars differentiate between attribute

agenda-setting and media framing. Media framing has diverse effects on audiences, whereas the cognitive effect is the only key effect of attribute agenda-setting. Effects as can be seen in media framing include moral judgment, problem solution, and casual responsibility. On the other hand, second-level agenda-setting influences the salience of topics' attributes (Takeshita, 2006; Weaver, 2007).

Along the same line, media framing draws heavily on the physiological model of applicability that stimulates individuals to connect between the delivered frames by media and other precedents experience in an endeavor to locate these frames within individuals' set of knowledge. On the contrary, attribute agenda is associated with the physiological model of accessibility. Accessibility occurred when media coverage activates individuals' memory about salient issues (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2011).

Categorizing Media Framing. For a better understanding of news framing and its effect, media scholars have differentiated between several modes of framing: first, frame-building and frame-setting. The major premise of frame building is the ability of news to construct a specific frame mode over a period of time (Scheufele, 1999), while frame setting focuses more on framing effects on both the macro and micro levels (Entman, 1993).

The second type of categorization is the episodic and thematic frames. The episodic frame occurs when the given news is focusing on specific cases and issues or personal and individual experience. On the other hand, thematic frame reflects a wider image and provides a broader trend (Scheufele, 2004).

Third, scholars distinguished between issue-specific and generic frames. The issue-specific frame refers to news framing in specific issues or events; therefore, this frame could not benefit the frame-building process. Conversely, the generic frame contributes to the frame-building process through diverse topics and issues in news and refers to wider culture references (Vresse, 2003).

Closing Statement. This study examines the Egyptian–Turkish relationships’ frame building in Egyptian newspaper coverage. Thus, Neuman’s approach (1992), which was adopted by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), is appropriate to this research’s purpose. Hence, as will be demonstrated in the methodology part, their framing scale will be modified and employed to match the specificity of this study.

Media as Ideological Disseminators: A Review of Literature

Initially, in studying Egyptian–Turkish relations’ echo in media, it is essential to ask if their relationship is important and why. Furthermore, it is critical to question whether or not media can be beneficial for a better understating of this relationship. Straightforwardly, there is no easily prepared response to this complex inquiry. Hence, the upcoming literature would attempt to locate the aforementioned inquiry within the pervious scholarly production.

For the sake of discussion, this review will tackle the major elements of Egyptian–Turkish relations, media studies’ ability in investigating and influencing international relations and other nations’ images, and media’s power in furnishing a national identity. This review’s main argument is that media-framing theory could be an exceptional instrument for studying the process of manufacturing a culture narrative in society.

In order for a “nation” to define its position among other “nations,” an ideological narrative in mass media could be directed to portray or describe other societies, cultures, or countries. Hence, this literature should start by positioning the case under investigation and explore how Turkey was historically perceived in Egyptian culture.

Egyptian–Turkish Relations

Regarding Egyptian–Turkish relations, economy, regional politics, and their shared history are the major dynamics that influence their motives toward each other’s policies (Kirişçi, 2011). To a large extent, Egypt is a large market that greatly utilized Turkey’s booming economy

in the 2000s. The Egyptian economy is the fourth largest in the Middle East. Undoubtedly, it is considered a promising market for the Turkish economy (Magued, 2016).

Egypt is a signatory county on some important economic agreements such as the Free Trade Agreement with the EU and some other Arab countries, and Qualifying Industrial Zones (OIZ) treaty with the United States and Israel; furthermore, Egypt is a member in the Common Market for Eastern and Sothern Africa (COMESA). These economic agreements unlocked promising opportunities for Turkey to enter new markets, especially in Africa, or to produce in Egypt with low costs and then export to Europe (World Bank, 2016).

Hence, to benefit from this promising economic position for Egypt, Turkey took the initiative to alleviate and remove all possible barriers in bilateral relations between both countries. Although a relationship with Turkey is an advantage that could benefit the Egyptian economy, the Egyptian government “has resisted Turkey’s official initiatives in economic cooperation” (Magued, 2016, p. 20). As a result, economic relationships have been limited to the private sector (Magued, 2016).

Before the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the political relationship between Egypt and Turkey was not substantial (Kirişçi, 2011). However, the limited political harmony between Cairo and Ankara’s governments did not affect their economic relationship. The period between 2005 and 2008 had witnessed large-scale Turkish private investments in Egypt, especially in the Borg al-Arab industrial zone near Alexandria (World Bank, 2016).

Turkish investment focused on chemicals, soap, textile, automotive, and food production (Magued, 2016). From 2005 through 2008, Turkish direct investment reached approximately US\$8 billion, and the trade volume between both countries was nearly US\$2 billion (World Bank, 2016).

Despite the economic ties between Egypt and Turkey, their historical relationship was not always stable (Kalin, 2009). After the abolishment of caliphate and establishing the new Turkish Republic in 1924, the Muslim world felt betrayed by the Young Turks movement. The Islamic ideology was in its weakest position in history, and Arabic and Turkish nationalism movements were replacing the long-lasting Islamic identity (Provence, 2009).

In the new Turkey, modernization waves have divided the elites into secularism and conservatism (Göle, 1997). By that time, the debate on modernization had been transmitted to the Arab world. Furthermore, some scholars affiliated the emergence of radical Islamic movements, especially in Egypt and India, to the fall of the Islamic caliphate and emergence of secular movements in the Arab world (Antonius, 2001).

In Egypt, secularism was perceived as having an opposite identity to Islamic values. This perspective gradually changed with increasing harmony between Arab nationalism and modernization. Arab nationalism ideology as a method of modernization was not promoted as an opposite ideology to Islam; thus, it gained popularity among the Arab Muslim world (Antonius, 2001).

In this sense, the new Turkish Ideology was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being anti-Islam. Although time has alleviated this perception, the perception of Turkey itself has not been entirely positive due to several reasons (Shukrī, 2000). First, after the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, Egypt, as with other Arab and Muslim countries, affiliated the defeat with the disunity of Muslims, which resulted from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; moreover, Turkey, the successor of the empire, was disavowed for recognizing Israel and for establishing diplomatic relationships with the country in 1949 (Göle, 1997).

Second, starting from the 1952 free officer movement in Egypt until the Suez War in 1956, Egyptians disavowed elites of Turkish origins for supporting Britain and resisting national movements against the occupation. Third, the position of Turkey in the international political arena was not pleasing Egypt’s foreign policy at that time (Shukrī, 2000).

As previously mentioned, after the Second World War and during the Cold War, Turkey joined the West camp’s side. Rapidly, it became a member state in NATO (Kösebalaban, 2011). On the other side, Egypt’s Nasser kept a distance from the Western camp and considered it the main cause of all problems and troubles in the Third World. These conflicting views became huge barriers in the Egyptian–Turkish relationship (Shukrī, 2000).

Over time, and due to many geopolitical changes, Egypt and Turkey’s international views became relatively close. To some extent, Egypt adopted a liberal policy after Nasser¹⁵ and during

¹⁵ Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second president of the republic in Egypt after 1952.

Sadat's¹⁶ regime. From the opposite perspective, starting the 1980s, Turkey implemented a friendlier policy with its neighbors in mutual relationships "based on five principles: 1) zero problems with neighbors; 2) balancing security and freedom; 3) rhythmic foreign policy; 4) multidimensionality; and 5) pro-activism" (Magued, 2016, p. 18); furthermore, more bilateral agreements between Turkey and many Arab countries were founded (Kirişçi, 2011).

After clarifying some aspects that composed the historical Egyptian–Turkish relationship and before closing this topic, one important question, which is related to this study's aim, should be investigated. Can media as an important instrument in society tell us about the Egyptian–Turkish relationship and its specificity? In media studies, one can hardly find sufficient research on the Egyptian–Turkish relations.

However, studies in other disciplines considered this relation and its political, culture, and economic status (Yilmaz, 2009; Oniş, 2011; Babacan, 2011; Keyman, 2016). In mass communication studies, little research has been conducted by Turkish scholars on the Turkish soap operas as a soft power tool in the Turkish relationships with Egypt and the Arab world (Yoruk & Vatikiotis, 2013; Elouardaoui, 2014).

Accordingly, it has been difficult to define or delineate the major features regarding "Turkey" in Egyptian news. However, various beneficial elements could be extracted out of non-media research. For instance, as this study attempts to understand how Egyptian media perceived

¹⁶ Anwar El Sadat was the successor of Nasser and the third president of the republic in Egypt after 1952.

Turkey as an initial step to investigate how media could be used to disseminate and reflect a nationalistic ideology among dissimilar citizens, literature on Turkey as a political model may be essential before tackling how the media narrative in Egypt reviewed such an issue.

Turkey as a Political Model

Democracy in Turkey has notably developed since the end of the Cold War. According to many observers, minority rights, judiciary, culture diversity, human rights, and civil-military attachment have witnessed significant improvements. The major motive came through Turkish attempts to join the European Union (Hale & Özbudun, 2010).

The notion of Turkey as a political model is not new. It dates back to the republic's early days; however, it was not accepted among the new emerging Arab states (Tziarras, 2013). Although the recent development in Turkey would motivate other nations to follow its model, it is not historically clear when exactly the Turkish model was revived as a political model in the Arab world. The 2003 Iraq War might be one of the earliest incidents (Yilmaz, 2009).

During that time, the American administration revived the idea. Turkey was representing a Western-style democracy in a country with a Muslim majority. Thus, the Turkish model was in contrast with Iraq's authoritarian model. Moreover, Turkey was rebuilding and strengthening its relation with some Arab countries, including Egypt (Kösebalaban, 2011).

Starting 2011, the idea was revived more strongly after the "Arab Uprising"; some scholars argued that "Turkey saw the 'Arab Spring' as an opportunity for promoting itself as the

ideal political economic model for Arab/Muslim states in order to expand its hegemony and increase its power” (Tziarras, 2013, p. 4).

Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Turkish prime minister, wrote about Turkey’s Arab neighbors and the importance of strengthening the connection with them; furthermore, Davutoğlu highlighted that young Arab generations could be inspired by the Turkish model (Tziarras, 2013). This statement was supported by a series of studies conducted by Turkish scholars to measure the appeal of the Turkish model among individuals in Arab countries, including Egypt.

In 2009, the results showed that 61% of responders saw Turkey as a model (Akgün, Perçinoğlu, & Gündoğar, 2009). In a follow-up study in 2010, the survey revealed that responders who perceived Turkey as a model for Arabs increased from 61% to 66% (Akgün, 2011). This percentage was 67% in 2011 (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012a) and notably dropped to 53% in the last follow-up survey in 2012 (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012b).

In Egypt, the situation was not different. In September 2011, Tayyip Erdoğan, the former prime minister and the current Turkish president, visited Egypt. Although Erdoğan was celebrated as a superstar, he was highly criticized by Muslim Brotherhood elites for his statement regarding secularism. They considered his hopes to see a secular regime in Egypt as an unaccepted intervention in Egypt’s matters (Tziarras, 2013). Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s position, the Turkish model has “been widely favoured within Egypt, at least up until the mid-2013” (Tziarras, 2013, p. 11).

By mid-2013, the Egyptian narrative toward the Turkish model had radically changed. In summer 2013, as a result of the social movement, President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown by the military. Then, an interim government was created. The Turkish official narrative did not support these measurements and considered it as a coup d'état against democracy. Hence, the bilateral Egyptian–Turkish relationship has witnessed several political vicissitudes (Keyman, 2016).

Accordingly, it is relevant to ask: 1) Has the Turkish model been conveyed and promoted in Egyptian media? And how? 2) Do political changes between Egypt and Turkey affect the media narrative? In other words, does media reflect these changes? To answer these questions, this study will conduct a rhetoric discourse analysis of some opinion pieces on three Egyptian newspapers: *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*. It will also apply a quantitative content analysis to trace the changes of the image of Turkey over three years. But before discussing the methodology in details, it is critical to comprehend how media could contribute to the dominant narrative in society.

Besides this, one of the core elements of media scholarships is “an understanding of communication as a transfer of messages from sender to receiver” (Peterson, 2008, p. 87). As it became known as the theory of text’s encoding and decoding. Codes are used by media producers to create their message based on diverse circumstances and receivers decode these messages according to different conditions and occurrences.

Text's Encoding and Decoding

The theory of text's encoding and decoding could be perceived in various ways. For instance, one can perceive audiences as a passive element, while another one might perceive them as a core element in a reciprocal communication process. In both perspectives, it should be considered that the viewer or consumer of the message, whatever the model's nature, bring his/her own context to interpret the message.

Although this view might contradict with Anderson's thesis *Imagined Communities* (1991), where disseminated messages play a great role in constructing a homogeneous ideology among dissimilar society, both ideas do not deny each other. Moreover, they complete one another. Peterson, in his book *Anthropology and Mass Communication*, suggested three models to study the process between encoding and decoding messages: 1) literalism; 2) idealism; and 3) constructivism (2008). This literature will focus on the last one, constructivism (2008).

The constructivism model could adequately explain Anderson's hypothesis (1991). One reason could be because its factors are based on cultural components (Peterson, 2008), which are critical elements in Anderson's thoughts. The constructivist perspective pursues to study "Social Construction of Realities" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). This perspective views social realities as a tangible experience, "but their representation and articulation is always mediated by preexisting social and culture codes" (Peterson, 2008, p. 89). Hence, what Anderson suggested is that these social realities are reshaped over time by media to drive people, consciously or unconsciously, to construct an imagined community (1991).

New interactive media did not challenge this perspective. In fact, it enhanced Anderson's thesis. Jenkins, who furnished the concept of "participatory culture," argued that the new technology in media enhances the "imagined communities" where people who share the same ideology could reach each other easily (2006).

Culture, Ideology, Nationalism, and Media

Next, before tackling some applications of Anderson's thesis, it is important to note that, although ideology in media studies is not a novel theme, in Egypt as in the Arab world, not many studies explored this inquiry. In addition, as can be seen in media literature, some of these studies did not attempt to delineate the relationship between ideology and media.

To illustrate, a study conducted by El-Maghraby and Abu El Ela (2014) could be given as an example. The major theme revolved around international media coverage of political events in Egypt. The authors investigated how different ideologies could have resulted using diverse frames by different newspapers after the ousting of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi in 2013 following huge public demonstrations.

This study focused on news coverage frames particular during the 2013 summer events in Egypt; furthermore, it emphasized how the political change in Egypt was framed in the *New York Times* (United States), *Al-Sharq Al-Awast* (Saudi Arabia), and *Jerusalem Post* (Israel). The authors suggested that each country's ideology or stance toward the political change in Egypt affected the newspaper narrative within the country (El-Maghraby & Abu El Ela, 2014).

The major concern regarding this study is the lack of a justifiable definition of ideology. In other words, researchers did not answer the essential question of how they constructed their definition epistemologically. Thus, the definition appeared fragmented and depended mostly on a personal perspective. A subsequent problem occurred when the authors attempted to quantitatively apply this unjustifiable view.

On the contrary, others studies have adequately investigated how print media could be used as a device to publicize a nationalism narrative among dissimilar groups of citizens in a delineated territory. Correspondingly, nationalists brought media symbols to transform the abstract construct of the national identity to a tangibly defined practice.

Undoubtedly, media does not work in a vacuum. It interacts with society reciprocally; media production also reflects societal, political, and historical context. To a large extent, “imagined communities” as previously explained are constructed by media. Through the use of texts and images, media can reach and target massive audiences, and gradually it could affect, consciously or unconsciously, their relationship with abstract notions such as identity or nationalism (Anderson, 1991).

Beth Baron’s book *Egypt as a Woman* exemplifies an application of Anderson’s conception of the “imagined communities.” She notes that “methodology sets literary discourse and visual culture firmly in sociopolitical context” (Baron, 2005, p. 2). Baron examined the historical national rhetoric in media and its relation with women and the development of Egypt’s national identity (Baron, 2005).

Regarding historical research, although it is difficult to illustrate or construct historical narrative using media, it is possible to extrapolate an important historiographical chronology that is parallel to the official history. To some extent, historiography could produce a profound analysis of situations that were not possible to comprehend entirely through official history.

In her analysis, Baron realized that, because nationalism is a modern notion, new technologies have contributed to its manufacturing and made it a realistic model. Beside the text discourse, *Egypt as a Woman* adopted an iconographic analysis of women in Egyptian print media starting at the end of the nineteenth century until the 1919 revolution (Baron, 2005).

In her argument, Baron emphasized that the early “nationalists deployed an array of family metaphors to smooth over ethnic and other differences and build a sense of collective identity” (Baron, 2005, p. 17). Print text media was one of their novel tools; in addition, images and “photography became a critical part of visual culture, crucial to documenting events and packaging them for public consumption” to connect and attach them to the national unity (Baron, 2005, p. 217).

Along similar lines, Bier argues that press could be used as a historiographical mirror to the official history (2011). Her book *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt* mainly used print media to investigate critical moments in Egyptian history. The argument concluded that, during Nasser's Egypt, the state gender policy was

disseminated through print media as a method of reconstructing a new modern secular sense of nationalism among public (Bier, 2011).

Following a similar methodology, the *Palestine in Egyptian Press* book conducted a discourse analysis of the print media production in Egyptian to follow the historical question of Palestine. The Palestinian issue emerged in the Egyptian press after the First World War along with the idea of Pan-Arabism. The book deeply analyzes the interaction between both inquiries and their representation in the print production (Talhami, 2007).

Although the involvement of Egypt in both cases, Pan-Arabism and the Palestinian cause, fluctuated from one moment in history to another, the author praised the accumulative performance of the Egyptian press for being “always a witness to history” (Talhami, 2007, p. 347). It has been shown that press could affect the national discourse; likewise, it can make history (Talhami, 2007).

In conclusion, as demonstrated above, national ideology lies at the heart of the discussion on print media discourse; furthermore, print production has been used by nationalist historiography to cultivate specific and certain stimulus and memories and to suppress or discount others to present a unified nation. For this reason, media framing became a critical device that could be used intentionally or unintentionally by journalists, producers, or other gatekeepers to reflect dominant national ideologies, which could be partly fed by the state ideology. Subsequently, according to this assumption, changing in the state ideology or beliefs could mean changing in media frames.

Framing Literature

National Ideology in Quantitative Research

Drawing on the important role of news media in constructing a national image, Wei (2012) conducted his research to study how media in Hong Kong has portrayed China. Hong Kong is a special administrative region (SAR) in China with an exceptional administrative autonomy. From time to time, the argument of its affiliation to China is opened due to political or economic reasons (Wei, 2012).

In this study, the representation of China was investigated in three newspapers from Hong Kong: *Ming Pao*, *Sing Tao Daily*, and *Apple Daily*. A quantitative content analysis was conducted in 2005, 2008, and 2010. The investigation focused on repeated themes and favorability changing over time (Wei, 2012).

Wolfsfeld, Araham, and Raya (1998), in the fourth annual conference of the International Communication Association, argued that media could be a central part of shaping a country's image and might construct a country's international politics and relationship (as cited in Parfitt, Egorova, & Ebrary, 2005); therefore, Chen Wei in his study aimed to extract what he called the national stereotypes of China in Hong Kong newspapers (2012).

As for the relationship between the framing theory and the imagined communities' thesis, it became more evident from viewpoints previously mentioned. To a large extent, media framing theory was applied as a device to extrapolate a nation's stereotyping in another country's media. Thus, an essential inquiry might emerge: Could framing theory as an instrument be suitable to

understand the shared ideology of a community by studying how media in this community portrays other societies, countries, or events?

To a large extent, media literature shows little research on framing Turkey in the media. Thus, this research could fill an important literature gap. Remarkably, one of the few studies that focused on the image of Turkey in non-Turkish media was “Try a Taste of Turkey,” which examined the image of Turkey from a different perspective (Hamid-Turksoy, Kuipers, & Van Zoonen, 2014).

This paper conducted a qualitative and quantitative content analysis of travel feature stories in six British newspapers to study the representation of Turkey, Turkish culture, and Turkish people in British travel journalism. This unprecedented method allowed researchers to discover that Turks were depicted in British media and portrayed to Western readers in an orientalist manner. Turks were alienated and shown as *Others* (Hamid-Turksoy, Kuipers, & Van Zoonen, 2014).

Framing Politics

Communications research shows great concern about how the media is covering and framing events. Many studies in Egypt, other Arab countries, and worldwide have investigated media to understand framing mechanisms. One of the most significant papers that examined the content of newspapers and television productions to investigate how European politics are framed in the media was titled “Framing European Politics” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

This study was a product of a major research project to investigate five news frames specified and stated by Neuman (1992) in a previous study on framing and framing effects. Those frames were the conflict frame, human interest frame, economic consequence frame, morality frame, and responsibility frame. Neuman (1992) suggested that these were the most common frames in news stories.

Researchers significantly modified and improved the framing scale used by Neuman (1992) to investigate 2,601 newspaper stories and 1,522 television stories when European heads of states were in Amsterdam in 1997 (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The results of this significant study supported Neuman's (1992) findings and contributed greatly to framing research.

To some extent, this approach to studying framing has been academically appreciated. This recognition was reflected on the numerous replications of Semetko and Valkenburg's framing scale (de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001; d'Haenens & de Lange, 2001; Kline, Karel, & Chatterjee, 2006; Bagiev, 2012). Similarly, this study is drawing on Semetko and Valkenburg's framing scale to investigate Egyptian–Turkish relations. In the methodology part, the method of adoption of their scale will be discussed in detail.

Framing International Relationships. It is significant that international media has demonstrated some balance in representing international conflicts (Khan, Adnan, Tariq, & Jabeen, 2015). This was a conclusion of a study on the coverage of British media on Pakistani–Indian relations. The study investigated two leading British newspapers—the *Guardian* and the

Telegraph—to understand how the Pak–India relation was represented. For more in-depth exploration, the study adopted a discourse analysis method to study opinion pieces and editorials of nearly two years (Khan, Adnan, Tariq, & Jabeen, 2015).

As the Pak–India relation is critical to mid-south Asia region, researchers desired a relatively long period of study. To observe newspapers' discourse, findings were based on quantitative and qualitative content analysis. The study concluded that the two newspapers, the *Guardian* and the *Telegraph*, showed balance and neutrality in covering the Pak–India relation (Khan, Adnan, Tariq, & Jabeen, 2015). This finding contradicts many other significant historical literature regarding the coverage of global events in some international media.

A substantial body of research regarding the coverage of international news suggested that Western media, to some extent, is negatively reporting non-Western countries or the developing world. Some scholars have argued that coverage depends on the nature of the reported state; typically, the coverage of the developing countries is concerned with violence and conflict issues (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1981).

Remarkably, other scholars have suggested that media in the United States, to some extent, is geographically subjective. These media have placed emphasis on optimistic issues in North America and Western Europe, while they highlight conflicts in the Middle East and ignore other regions around the globe (Gerbner, & Marvanyi, 1977; Riffe, & Shaw, 1982).

Framing Arabs. Prominently, numerous research has tackled issues related to the framing of the Middle East and Arab World in international media. For example, the Arab–Israeli relations is observed in a prominent study conducted by Barranco and Shyles (1988). Their research examined whether or not the *New York Times* coverage of Arab–Israeli conflict is biased. The importance of this study exists in the examined dates—from 1976 to 1984, which were critical dates in Arab–Israeli relations (Barranco & Shyles, 1988).

Significantly, the study demonstrated a historical survey of one of the elitist American newspapers. The scholars used a quantitative content analysis method of a random sample from the newspaper’s articles about the Middle East. In their conclusion, the authors discovered that the *New York Times*’ coverage favors Israelis over Arabs; further, Israel received more coverage than any Arab state (Barranco & Shyles, 1988).

Similarly, the Arab–Israeli conflict was the major concern of Mohamed Elmasry’s study “Death in the Middle East” (2009). Elmasry analyzed the news coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada by the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* to examine how the newspapers framed the killings (2009). The study’s main purpose was to investigate how newspapers’ political stances could lead them to use certain framing devices to structure the final product in a certain way (Elmasry, 2009). In the same manner, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was considered by Evans (2010). His research investigated the “*New York Times*’ coverage of army sieges of two Palestinian refugee camps” (Evans, 2010, p. 210). Evans concluded that negative stereotyping was dominating the newspaper’s portrayal of these events (Evans, 2010).

Media Influences on Foreign Policy. How are international relations represented by the media? How can media influence foreign policies? There is rapidly growing literature on these two major inquiries, along with an inconclusive debate about whether or not media can affect foreign policy actors and international policymakers.

Initially, regarding media and foreign policy. Drawing from previous literature, two views could be extracted. First, media has an indirect influence on a countries' foreign policies and policymakers because it can affect public opinion. Correspondently, publics can affect their governments. The second perspective argues that media is only reflecting the official political agenda. Elite journalists and opinion leaders help strengthen the state agenda by maintaining solid relationships with state officials (Entman, 2004).

In this model, media embodies the state narrative. Thus, it strongly defends and represents the political regime (Entman, 2004). It is important to note that both models could be existing in parallel. The model's existence or absence depends upon several factors, including the state political system and its intervention in the practices of media (Cohen, 1986).

Although the second model seems matching with Anderson's description of the "imagined communities" (1991), because media here is suggesting itself as a tool to disseminate the official dominate perspective, this closeness is partly wrong. While this is the case in some countries, this model cannot be perceived as being comprehensive.

In other words, not only authoritative regimes that control media are able to create a unified national narrative, but also other democratic systems could fashion a similar narrative. In fact, the notion of “nationalism” was partly a product of Western democracy. The process of using media to generate a sense of a unified identity among the public needs time. To a large extent, time is necessary to observe the transformation and evolution of nationalism in society (Gellner, 1983).

Framing and Society

Framing Social Events. Journalism practices during crises are usually different than its normal functioning, which emphasize the importance of investigating them. Regarding how news can frame societal events, Occupy Wall Street might be a noteworthy example. On September 17, 2011, a social protest movement began in New York City’s Wall Street financial district against inequality in individuals’ social and economic conditions in the United States and around the globe. The movement had received significant worldwide attention (Sanchez, 2016).

Kaibin Xu (2013) investigated how American newspapers framed the protests by conducting a content analysis on two eminent newspapers: the *New York Times* and *USA Today*. Xu proposed a typology to analyze how media could frame social movements, which contained six framing devices to cover all elements that the media could use to frame social protests negatively: the lawlessness frame, show frame, ineffective goals frame, public disapproval frame, use of official sources, and negative impact.

Framing Muslims. Some research has adopted framing sectors or groups in society. Muslims in the United States could be an example. Generally, regarding their issues and coverage, media in the United States reflects existing negative stereotyping and has failed to remain balanced. Other recent studies focused on this theme such as “Islam Through Editorial Lenses: How American Elite Newspapers Portrayed Muslims Before and After September 11, 2001” (Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010).

This research investigated the content of three major American newspapers: the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times*. One critique could be pointed to this study, which started with a negative assumption that Muslims in the United States were treated badly before and after the incident of September 11. The results, to some extent, contradict this assumption. The study showed that Muslims, to a large extent, were treated neutrally before September 11 (Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010).

Although this criticism could be serious, the study significantly adopted one noticeable measurement scale, which is the favorable and unfavorable news nature. This scale is not dependent on journalistic ethics, professionalism, objectivity, or subjectivity. It is based on identifying news’ attributes (Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010).

If news stories are covering nonviolent, positive, or peaceful news, they will be considered as favorable stories. If news stories are covering negative, violence, or an unstable event, they will be considered as unfavorable. In this scale, the story might be completely

objective and professional, but it is considered as unfavorable because the editorial team selected a negative or depressing issue to cover (Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010).

Although this scale could receive some criticism because it ignores the objectivity factor of news, it might contribute notably to the framing theory and its endeavor to measure the shared narrative in society. Applying the scale on a large news sample could infer what types of news are favorable/unfavorable to a specific media organization; furthermore, tracing changes of favorable/unfavorable news might be possible.

Egyptian Newspapers and Media Framing

Framing is relatively prominent in the literature in the Egyptian press, and quantitative content analysis as a method of analysis is widely used. Generally, studies that considered the Egyptian press could be divided into two main chronological categories: 1) studies conducted before the 2011 Arab Uprising; 2) studies conducted after 2011.

Regarding the pre-Arab uprising research, serious investigations started after the flourishing of privately owned newspapers. Research conducted by Cooper (2008) and Shahin (2010) could be some examples. Cooper (2008), by applying a quantitative content analysis, discovered that the journalism practices had radically changed after introducing private newspapers like *Almasry Alyoum* into the market to compete with state-owned newspapers. Private newspapers were more likely to tackle sensitive issues, such as governmental corruption and human rights issues, than state-owned papers (Cooper, 2008).

Using the same methodology, Shahin (2010) studied the coverage of the 2010 Shura Council elections. He compared coverage among private, state, and partisan newspapers. Shahin concluded that coverage on private and partisan newspaper was more comprehensive than state newspapers; furthermore, state-owned newspapers were obviously supporting the ruling party of that time, the National Democratic Party, while other newspapers, private and partisan, adopted more balanced coverage (Shahin, 2010).

The nature of the post-Arab uprising period was different. For instance, Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) inserted social media platforms besides traditional newspapers in their study. The authors conducted a content analysis to compare how state newspapers, private newspapers, and significant posts on social media framed January 2011 events in Egypt. The authors' major finding was that social media was more positive toward protestors than were state and private newspapers (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

Conclusion

Initially, this literature survey endeavored to delineate the fabrics of Egyptian–Turkish relationships and the possibility of media studies' ability to reflect them. This was a prerequisite to argue that media framing theory could be an excellent device to investigate the manufacturing process of culture narrative in society.

One important conclusion that could be deduced is that instability in Egyptian–Turkish relations is not historically new. However, geopolitics and economy are essential components that should strengthen their relationship. Second, regarding the main argument of this review, it could be drawn that media framing theory is a beneficial tool for investigating political stances

and culture narratives in the Egyptian press. In addition, for the benefit of this study, some components could be extrapolated from literature such as the time element, types of newspapers, and the subject of study.

First, the time frame element is critical. In order to appropriately comprehend the frame building process and the trend of framing, a relatively long time is needed. Furthermore, culture narrative needs to be reflected in media. Drawing on previous literature (Barranco & Shyles, 1988; Baron, 2005; Talhami, 2007; Bier, 2011; Wei, 2012), this study will deploy a content analysis of three years' time period to benefit from the characteristics of long periods.

Second, the type of newspapers in every study depends on the nature of the study itself. This study will investigate three elite Egyptian newspapers—*Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*—due to several factors including their popularity. This research is not the premier in investigating elite newspapers. Previous literature shows that elite newspapers are highly examined due to their great influence in society; moreover, they were expected to follow some journalistic standard in their practices (Elmasry, 2009; Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010; El-Maghraby & Abu El Ela, 2014; Xu, 2013; Khan, Adnan, Tariq, & Jabeen, 2015).

The final point is the subject of study, Turkey's coverage in media as a question of investigation is important in regards to diverse causes. First, the Turkish culture is rich and its international relations are diverse; moreover, as previously shown, Egyptian–Turkish relations are relatively indispensable. Second, there is a shortage in research in this arena, which makes this study relatively novel.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

RQ1: Which of the three frames used in this study was dominant in the coverage of Turkey's news in Egyptian newspapers?

RQ2: How did the three frames change over the time of the study?

H1: The various events in Egypt during the three years—2012, 2013, and 2014— led to a shift in the coverage of Turkey's news in Egyptian newspapers from positive to negative.

H2: To a large extent, the changes in newspapers' narrative regarding Turkey during the period of the study altered the discourse of the imagined Egyptian identity.

Methodology

In aiming to specify the nature of Turkey's image and to articulate the contributing components of constructing a national narrative in Egyptian media, this study proceeded with quantitative and qualitative approaches. The two methods were deployed to investigate the research inquiry from different perspectives.

The quantitative content analysis method will help with obtaining objective results that could be representative of the whole population in this study. On the other hand, the qualitative discourse analysis is necessary for investigating the study's inquiry in detail. Qualitative discourse analysis allows access to meanings and connotations within the context of surrounding life circumstances (Burns, 2000). Furthermore, it will be obtainable only to investigate the second hypothesis of this study through the discourse analysis method.

Deployed Methods

Content Analysis. Initially, this study will use a quantitative content analysis method to investigate three Egyptian newspapers: *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*. All three are considered elite newspapers. *Al-Ahram* is one of the oldest leading newspapers in Egypt and the Arab world. It was founded in December 1875 by Selim and Beshara Tekla.¹⁷ After 1952 and until now, it became owned by the Egyptian state, and its narrative is considered as a pro-government.

Almasry Alyoum and *El-Shorouk* are private newspapers owned by investors and businessmen. *Almasry Alyoum* was founded in 2004 as a private investment. Compared with the national/state newspapers, in a relatively short time, it succeeded to achieve popularity among readers as one of the earliest private daily newspapers in Egypt. Following the same line, *El-Shorouk* was established in 2009. Both *Almasry Alyoum* and *El-Shorouk* provided an attractive content, filled and contributed to the pre-2011 newspapers' market flourish. To a large extent, they could be considered as elite private newspapers, as their journalistic traditions were settled long before the post-2011 Egyptian media market.

To a large extent, they could be considered elite private newspapers or, more accurately, newspapers of record, as their journalistic traditions were settled long before the post-2011 Egyptian media market. Newspapers of record are characterized by their large circulations, organized news-gathering systems, and good reputations (Martin, & Hansen, 1998).

¹⁷ The official website of Al-Ahram newspaper: <http://www.ahram.org.eg/>

Although it is hard to find recent and accurate figures regarding newspapers' circulations in Egypt, some statistics that the Arab Journalists Network presented in 2015 could be illustrative of the circulation setting. According to the Arab Journalists Network, the *Al-Ahram* newspaper is the newspaper with the largest circulation in Egypt, with nearly 180,000 copies circulated per day. *Almasry Alyoum* has the third-largest circulation, with approximately 100,000 copies circulated per day, whereas *El-Shorouk* has the fifth-largest circulation, with roughly 25,000 copies circulated per day (Shihata, 2015).

As an added value to this study, I wanted to include *Al-Wafd* as a fourth newspaper. *Al-Wafd* represents another dimension of Egyptian newspapers: partisan journalism. However, its online archive did not include all of the required dates, and their print archive was not accessible. Thus, this study focused on the three mentioned newspapers.

As previously clarified, the three newspapers have different production contexts and diverse ideologies, which make their final products different from each other. Thus, they could be considered as a suitable purposive sample for examining the Egyptian newspapers' coverage of Turkish news during the period between January 2012 to December 2014.

Content analysis is an appropriate method for this study as it is a quantitative, systematic, and objective method that can help in classifying media messages; furthermore, sample errors can be calculated and measured. Webster's Dictionary defines the term "content analysis" as "analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material (as a book or

film) through classification, tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable effect” (as cited in Krippendorff, 2013, p. 1).

Hence, quantitative content analysis is a great tool to describe communication contents and to test hypotheses of communication messages’ characteristics; moreover, through content analysis, a comparison between messages in media and the real world would be possible (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). Content analysis, as a method of analysis, relies on widely diverse techniques to deal with texts in order to generate an appropriately fitting analysis (Krippendorff, 2013).

Rhetoric is ideological. The conceptualization of “rhetoric is ideological” denotes an altered distinctive approach of rhetoric studies (Stacks & Salwen, 2009). Operating with such an approach requires adopting a theory lens so as to expose the adopted path rhetoric employed to the structured organism of domination in society. Rhetorical studies on ideological domination is an approach to grasp and recognize and delineate “the clashing of identities” (Stacks, & Salwen, 2009, p. 238).

The ideological rhetoric perspective is more than an instrument to express opposing views in politics. More importantly, it “treats rhetoric as the purveyor of ideology” (Stacks & Salwen, 2009, p. 238). Along the same line, a sizable number of thinkers criticizes the understanding of ideology to be interpreted as a real embodiment of power interactions. As such, it is crucial that scholarships and “researchers investigate how rhetoric is both created and constrained by powerful interests throughout society” (Stacks & Salwen, 2009, p. 238).

In this study, the rhetorical discourse analysis of newspapers' material work, through Anderson's hypothesis, is employed as a method to investigate dominant and powerful interests in Egyptian society. The newspapers' narrative regarding Turkey and Turkish political elites could mirror: 1) How Egyptian elite journalists and writers perceived Turkey and the Egyptian-Turkish relation? 2) How the press views and locates its society by reflecting on other societies? 3) How the journalism narrative reflects and contributes to a bigger dominant narrative in society.

Sampling

Regarding the quantitative part of this research, the study adopted a hybrid sample technique. In the first place, a non-random purposive sample was used to select the newspapers based on reasons previously mentioned. Later on, news stories were identified in a different method. It was problematic to study the whole population due to two main reasons. First, the examined time frame is three years. Second, the total population of the three newspapers under investigation consists of 3285 newspaper issues. As it is unnecessary methodologically and unbeneficial to study this large number, a monthly stratified sample was conducted to select the newspapers' issues. Next, all news stories that mentioned Turkey in these issues were coded.

Robinson and Riffe (1995) experimented with the monthly stratified sample technique and discovered that 12 newspaper units per year is sufficient sample to examine the whole year; moreover, they discovered that it is the most efficient sample for newspapers or magazines followed by a 14 issue random sample technique (as cited in Wimmer & Dominick, 2014).

Throughout this technique, 36 issues were selected from each newspaper with a total number of 108 issues. Finally, the article was used as the coding unit of analysis.

Based on the aforementioned method, 158 news articles were selected: 41 from *Al-Ahram*, 48 from *El-Shorouk*, and 69 from *Almasry Alyoum*. The distribution of news pieces over the three years was as follows: 54 from 2012, 47 from 2013, and 57 from 2014. In the quantitative part of this study, all opinion pieces were excluded from the sample. Opinion articles by definition are opinionated.

Hence, opinion pieces are not matching the quantitative part goal, which is to investigate news articles objectively as possible. Ideally, news articles are assumed to be objective and reflect facts, numbers, and do not represent any opinions. However, in reality, ideology, political stances, and many other circumstances might intentionally or unintentionally intervene in the news selection in editorial rooms. Thus, this study is privileged to extrapolate the produced frames out of these production context. Following, all excluded opinion pieces were examined rhetorically in the qualitative section.

Among the final coding units, 10 news stories were randomly selected for a pilot study to examine the weak points in the codebook. Based on the feedback, the total stories were divided between two trained independent coders. Afterward, 15% of the original stories' number were randomly chosen for the inter-coder reliability test.

Measurements

To locate which frames are commonly existing in the news stories, a set of questions, established and developed by Semetko and Valkenburg, was employed (2000). The original scale contains 20 questions that were designed to measure the existence of five frames defined by Semetko and Valkenburg: 1) the attributing of responsibility frame; 2) the human-interest frame; 3) the conflict frame; 4) the morality frame; and 5) the economic frame (2000).

In this study, I applied only three frames, the attributing of responsibility, conflict, and economic frames. These frames were hypothesized that they mostly appeared in the context of Egyptian–Turkish relationship. To meet the purpose of this study, few questions were discounted, other questions were added, and some original questions of the Semetko and Valkenburg’s scale were modified (2000).

Accordingly, the three frames were represented in 14 questions: five questions to answer the attribution of responsibility frame, five questions to answer the conflict frame, and four questions to answer the economic frame. Each question had two answers yes or no—“Yes” coded as 1 and “No” as 0. The variable under each frame was intended to locate the frame existence or absence (see Appendix 1). The advantage of the binary scale is that it allows a high inter-coding reliability, despite the fact that it might produce more errors than other scales such as the Likert scale.

Another essential point is that this study was not the first to modify Semetko and Valkenburg’s scale. Other preceded studies used their method with alternation such as de Vreese,

Peter, & Semetko (2001); d'Haenens & de Lange (2001); Kline, Karel, & Chatterjee (2006); Bagiev (2012), and this research followed their rules of modification.

Development of Scales. Subsequently, after the sample coding was finishing, a principle component analysis was conducted on the 14 questions using varimax rotation to examine to what extent questions under each frame is reflecting it. In this analysis, all questions were clustered under three factors: attribution of responsibility, conflict frame, and economic frame (Table 1).

The final scale alternation occurred in two dimensions. First, all variables loaded with less than .50 were excluded from the final analysis. Second, all misloaded variables were disqualified from its frame. Although misloaded variables might reflect an affiliation to another frame, it could mislead the final result, as it is not designed to answer that frame. Consequently, final variables that represented the three frames in the analysis became 11 questions: four questions to answer the attribution of responsibility frame, three questions to answer the conflict frame, and four questions to answer the economic frame.

Table 1. Factor Analysis, Varimax Rotation

Framing Items	Factors		
	1 Attr. of resp.	2 Conflict	3 Encon. Cons.
Attribution of responsibility			
Does the story suggest that Turkish government has the ability to alleviate the problem in whole or its part?	.740	163	.044
Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?	.546	.269	-.116
Does the story suggest solution(s) to the whole or part of the problem/issue?	.796	.001	.057
Does the story suggest that an individual/group of people in Turkey (not necessarily Turkish) is (are) responsible for the issue/problem?	.006	.454	-.266
Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?	.783	.088	-.038
Conflict frame			
Does the story reflect disagreement between Egyptian and Turkish parties/individuals/groups/governments on any issue/level?	.115	.604	.206
Does one party/individual/group/country reproach another? (Egyptians reproach Turkish and vice versa)	-.015	.733	-.005
Does the story suggest that Turkish government is in charge of the issue/problem?	.214	.684	-.018
Does the story refer to Egypt as winner or loser?	-.126	-.201	.624
Does the story refer to Turkey as a winner or loser?	-.311	.168	.198
Economic frame			
Is there a mention of Egyptian financial ties with Turkey or Egyptian financial losses or gains now or in the future?	-.073	-.125	.824
Is there a mention of Turkish financial losses or gains now or in the future?	-.141	.082	.733
Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved?	.058	.078	.808
Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?	.089	.091	.772

Other measurements. To answer the first hypothesis: The various events in Egypt during the three years—2012, 2013, and 2014— led to a shift in the coverage of Turkey’s news in Egyptian newspapers from positive to negative, a 3-point Likert scale has been used to measure the positivity and negativity in news stories. The story was coded as positive if the overall tone was praising Turkey on any level; illustrating positive economic, culture, or political occurrences; and if the news was positively opinionated. The story was coded as negative if the general tone was condemning Turkey on any level, illustrating the Turkish bad international relations with Egypt or any other countries, and if the story was negatively opinionated.

Second, for more in-depth understanding of the nature of news stories regarding Turkey, this study replicated a measurement designed by Trevino, Kanso, and Nelson (2010). In this measurement tool, the news stories are categorized as favorable, unfavorable, and neutral. This measurement is not investigating the objectivity, the professional journalistic practices, positivity, or negativity. The story was coded as favorable if the news was presenting good/favorable events/issues in or for the country; moreover, if the story is attributed to stability or success such as economic dealings or victory against terrorism.

On the other hand, the story was coded as unfavorable if the news is attributed to instability, presenting undesirable events, economic and political challenges, or reporting possible dangers. For example, instability in economy or terrorism attacks in Turkey are unfavorable news for the Turkish people. This variable was measured on an ordinal level, as it was difficult to assume any distance between elements.

Inter-coder Reliability

To measure the consistency among coders, several methods were deployed. First, percent agreement was calculated, and it was 85% on the overall coding. Second the percent agreement was counted for the attribution of responsibility, conflict, and economic frames. The results, respectively, were 66%, 75%, and 91%.

Due to the nature of the study, the overall percentage agreement did not reflect the real consistency. Accordingly, an overall Krippendorff Alpha formula was calculated, and the outcome was 68%, which is an acceptable level of reliability. Krippendorff Alpha's acceptance level starts from 65% to 75%, and it depends on the nature of the study (Krippendorff, 2013). Therefore, in this study the level of consistency is satisfying.

Analysis and Discussion

Getting a Sense of Data

The aim of this analysis is to recognize the main characteristics of the gathered data; then it might be possible to generalize beyond it. It is vital to distinguish how the news was constructed before tackling the main research questions and hypotheses. In order to achieve that, illustrating some descriptive results would be an appropriate method.

Among the 158 news stories, 52 pieces covered Turkish internal affairs and 106 pieces covered Turkish international affairs. The data appear to suggest that freedom of speech and freedoms in general were the major concern of the three newspapers' coverage of Turkish internal affairs¹⁸. Fourteen out of 52 pieces focused on journalistic practices and freedom violations in Turkey, roughly 26.9%.

Regarding Turkey's international affairs,¹⁹ Egypt was the major theme. Nearly half of the news stories that focused on the international affairs of Turkey focused on the Egyptian–Turkish relationship. Then, the Turkish–Syrian relationship came in the second place with approximately 10% of the stories covering Turkish international activities.

On this basis, it seems fair to elaborate more on the news of the Turkish–Egyptian relationship²⁰. Pearson chi-square between the years and types of news concerning their

¹⁸ Appendix B illustrates the covered Turkish internal affairs' frequencies.

¹⁹ Appendix C illustrates the covered Turkish international affairs' frequencies.

²⁰ Appendix D illustrates the covered Egyptian-Turkish news percentage.

relationship was conducted and the outcome shows that the Goodman and Kruskal tau = .022 ($X^2 = 14.763, p < .05$). This means that years and genres of news are significantly related.

As Table 2 shows, the year 2012 has witnessed the highest number of news regarding Egyptian–Turkish relationships. The number reached 18 news stories. However, 10 pieces of these stories were categorized under “other.” In this study, “other” meant sports, culture, or entertainment news. In 2013, the number of political news significantly increased to reach 10 pieces, 60% of the Egyptian–Turkish relations’ coverage of that year, and the overall number dropped down in 2014 to five pieces. Another noteworthy point is that economic news decreased from seven pieces in 2012 to five in 2013, and only one piece was coded as economic news in 2014.

Table 2. Cross Tabulation of Egyptian–Turkish Relations’ News Items

		Egy.–Turk. pol. relations	Turk. intervention in Egy. domestic affairs	Egy.–Turk. Econ. relations	Others	Total
Story	2012	2	3	7	10	22
Year	2013	10	0	5	3	18
	2014	5	2	1	2	10
Total		17 (34%)	5 (10%)	13 (26%)	15 (35%)	50

A closer look at the nature of these news stories concerning the Egyptian–Turkish relationship demonstrates that they are mostly negative and unfavorable toward Turkey. Although the stories might be objective, newspapers, in their coverage of political news, chose to focus on terrorism, corruption, and the uncomplimentary Turkish–Muslim Brothers relationship. Statistically, the Pearson chi-square reflects the significance of this finding, Goodman and Kruskal tau = .035 ($X^2 = 13.537, p < .05$).

Along a similar line, the one-way ANOVA test shows a significant association between the stories that focused on Egyptian–Turkish relationship on news and the positive/negative overall tone of these articles at the $p < .05$ level [$F(3, 46) = 3.248, p = .030$]. The overall mean 2.14 might be deceptive if the details would not have considered (Table 3). Breaking down this number illustrates that economic news mean is 2.54, and other news mean is 2.33. To a large extent, both means drafted the overall mean. As shown in Table 3, economic and other news highly appeared in the year 2012. On the other hand, the year 2014 was characterized by little coverage of the Egyptian–Turkish relationship. This might be associated with official swinging relationship between Egypt and Turkey after summer 2013.

Table 3. Description of News' Overall Tone of Egyptian–Turkish Relations

	N	Mean (Std. Deviation)
Turkish–Egyptian political relationship	17	1.76 (.831)
Turkish intervention in Egypt's domestic affairs	5	1.80 (.837)
Turkish–Egyptian economic relationship	13	2.54 (.776)
Other Turkish–Egyptian relationships	15	2.33 (.617)
Total	50	2.14 (.808)

Other essential points are how was the news written? What sources were used? These are central factors when attempting to grasp the nature of our data. Results show that the majority of stories were dependent on the internal staff of the newspapers. Forty stories (80%) were written by newspapers' staff, two stories (4%) depended completely on wire services, and only one story (2%) was written by a combination of both (Table 4).

Table 4. Cross Tabulation of Byline Authors and Egyptian–Turkish Relations’ News Items

News items	Byline: Author of the Article				Total
	Staff	Wire services	Combination: staff & wire service	Other	
Turkish–Egyptian political relationship	16	0	0	1	17
Turkish intervention in Egypt’s domestic affairs	3	1	1	0	5
Turkish–Egyptian economic relationship	9	0	0	4	13
Other Turkish–Egyptian relationships	12	0	1	2	15
Total	40	1	2	7	50

Although the majority of news stories have known authors, very few of them depended on direct sources/quotes. Out of the 50 stories, only 15 (30%) quoted an Egyptian source/official/person, and the Turkish quotes were even lowest, as only eight stories (16%) quoted a Turkish source/official/person. Whereas the needs of news might vary from one story to another, depending on its nature, these low percentages could raise a credibility question. Hence, credibility in Egyptian newspapers might be an important topic to investigate in future research.

Frame Analysis

This part will focus on answering the first two research questions: RQ1) Which of the three frames, used in this study, was dominant in the coverage of Turkey’s news in Egyptian newspapers? And RQ2) How did the three frames change over the time of the study? To answer these questions, an analysis of the modified Semetko and Valkenburg’s scale will be demonstrated.

The data gathered in this study show that the attribution of responsibility frame is the most frequent frame used in the three years among all newspapers with a mean score of (.33). The conflict frame came second with a mean score (.14), and finally, the mean score of the economic frame is (.08).

Among the 158 stories, 102 used the attribution of responsibility frame (or at least one of its cluster), 69 used the conflict frame (or at least one of its cluster), and 24 stories used the economic frame (or at least one of its cluster). Table 5 illustrates the affirmative answers of each cluster in the scale. However, it is essential to distinguish between the frame appearance in the news and the affirmative answers. Each frame appearance is expressed in the affirmative responses' mean. Accordingly, one cluster affirmative answer cannot ensure the significance of a frame.

Yet a closer look at the data of affirmative answers indicates that some variables have a significant appearance, and it is noteworthy to mention them. For instance, in the attribution of responsibility frame, the affirmative answers reached 50.6% gained for the question: Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue? While it reached 32.3% for the question: Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?

Additionally, in the conflict frame, the affirmative answers were nearly 33.5% for the question: Does the story suggest that the Turkish government is in charge of the issue/problem? Whereas it was approximately 17.7% for the question: Does one party/individual/group/country

reproach another? (Egyptians reproach Turkish and vice versa). On the other hand, the economic frame' clusters did not achieve significant affirmative answers.

Table 5. Affirmative Answers' Distribution

	Frequency	Mean (Std. Deviation)
Framing Items		
Attribution of responsibility		
Does the story suggest that Turkish government has the ability to alleviate the problem in whole or its part?	23.8%	.25 (.43)
Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?	50.6%	.53 (.50)
Does the story suggest solution(s) to the whole or part of the problem/issue?	22.0%	.23 (.42)
Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?	32.3%	.34 (.47)
Conflict Frame		
Does the story reflect disagreement between Egyptian and Turkish parties/individuals/groups/governments on any issue/level?	09.1%	.09 (.29)
Does one party/individual/group/country reproach another? (Egyptians reproach Turkish and vice versa)	17.7%	.18 (.39)
Does the story suggest that Turkish government is in charge of the issue/problem?	33.5%	.35 (.49)
Economic Frame		
Is there a mention of Egyptian financial ties with Turkey or Egyptian financial losses or gains now or in the future?	07.3%	.08 (.27)
Is there a mention of Turkish financial losses or gains now or in the future?	07.9%	.08 (.28)
Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved?	09.8%	.10 (.30)
Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?	04.9%	.05 (.22)

The variation of frames is important because it could indicate when and where each frame was adopted. In such a way, the translation of data could be more valuable and would make more connotations. For instance, how Egyptian newspapers framed Turkey before and after June 30, 2013, is a vital inquiry, and it would be obtainable after this analysis.

Subsequently, to examine how usage of the three frames were varied among the newspapers and time period, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted: 1) between the three frames and the newspapers, and 2) between the three frames and the three years under investigation.

Regarding frames/newspapers variance relation, the attribution of responsibility, conflict, and economic frames, respectively, at $p < .05$ level were $[F(2, 155) = 2.045, p = .133]$, $[F(2, 155) = 1.663, p = .193]$, and $[F(2, 155) = 2.161, p = .119]$. As data demonstrated, none of them was significant, which means that the three newspapers, *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*, equally used the three frames (see Table 6). Moreover, to a large extent, it could be concluded that they shared the same narrative toward Turkey.

Table 6. Cross Tabulation of Frames/Newspapers²¹

Newspaper	Attribution of responsibility	Conflict Frame	Economic Frame	N
<i>Almasry Alyoum</i>	.36 (.35) ^s	.19 (.29) ^s	.05 (.17)	69
<i>El-Shorouk</i>	.26 (.28) ^s	.28 (.22) ^s	.07 (.07)	48
<i>Al-Ahram</i>	.39 (.36) ^s	.32 (.05) ^s	.13 (.28)	41
Whole Sample	.33 (.33) ^s	.28 (.22) ^s	.08 (.21)	158

^s $p < .05$

²¹ Appendix E: Frames/Newspapers chart.

Equally important, previous results might indicate that the news tone on the three newspapers was changing in a similar way. Nevertheless, the second multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), between the three frames and years under investigation, was necessary to grasp the time effect on news framing.

The data generated by this analysis showed a significant association between the attribution of responsibility and conflict frames and the three years under examination. Respectively, at $p < .05$ level they were $[F(2, 155) = 13.198, p = .00]$ and $[F(2, 155) = 4.534, p = .01]$. On the other hand, results show no significance regarding the economic frame and the three years. At $p < .05$ level, it was $[F(2, 155) = 2.160, p = .119]$.

As Table 7 demonstrates, the year 2014 displays a relatively high appearance of the attribution of responsibility and conflict frames. Notably, they were less used in 2012 and 2013, which reflect a tangible change in all newspapers' narrative among the three years. Another noteworthy point is that the use of economic frames alleviated by time. However, statistically, it is not a significant observation.

Table 7. Cross Tabulation of Frames/Years²²

Year	Attribution of responsibility	Conflict Frame	Economic Frame	N
2012	.24 (.28) ^s	.18 (.21) ^s	.11 (.28)	54
2013	.23 (.32) ^s	.25 (.31) ^s	.10 (.23)	47
2014	.50 (.34) ^s	.26 (.29) ^s	.03 (.09)	57
Whole Sample	.33 (.33) ^s	.21 (.28) ^s	.08 (.21)	158

^s $p < .05$

²² Appendix F: Frames/Years chart.

In general, the frame analysis indicates that the most common frame is the attribution of responsibility frame followed by the conflict frame. In contrast, the economic frame is rarely used. A closer look at the data shows significant increase in using the frames by time except with the economic frame. A comparison between the first and last years in this study shows that the use of attribution of responsibility and conflict frames increased. The attribution of responsibility frame was the highest in 2012 and 2014. Thus, although the adoption of frames was increasing, the highest adopted frame did not shift from one frame to another.

The data yielded by this section demonstrate that the connection between political events and newspaper's frames should be recognized. Moreover, an association between newspaper's narrative and the state political stance might exist in Egypt. However, to understand such association, a closer examination is needed. Before starting this analysis, however, it will be beneficial to conduct a trend analysis to investigate in depth the relationship between time and newspaper framing regarding Turkey.

Trend Analysis

In order to investigate the first hypothesis on this study—the coverage of Turkey's news in Egyptian newspapers shifted from positive to negative—a trend analysis was conducted to investigate the distribution of the overall tone toward Turkey in newspapers' coverage. Afterward, it is valuable to tackle more details regarding some other important trends related to the variance of data among time and newspapers.

Initially, after excluding the neutral coverage, the data appear to suggest that the overall negative coverage was higher than the positive coverage. In detail, 58 (36.7%) news stories were coded as negative, 38 (24.1%) stories were positive, and 62 (39.2%) stories in the three newspapers were neutral. Although the coverage tendency appears to be neutral, the occurred shifts over the three years give a significantly different interpretation.

The point here is that the yearly mean²³ of the overall coverage tone shifted from (2.19) in 2012 to (1.94) in 2013, then to (1.53) in 2014, and this shift is statistically significant. ANOVA results on the $p < .05$ level was [F (2, 155) = 11.745, $p = .00$]. This means that coverage tendency was changing constantly from positive in 2012, between neutral and negative in 2013, then to negative coverage in 2014.

To investigate more detail, a second-level analysis was conducted on more precise time units. The three years was divided quarterly into 12 periods. The mean of the overall tone toward Turkey for each quarter is demonstrated in Table 8. Then an ANOVA was conducted. The results on $p < .05$ level was [F (11, 146) = 3.364, $p = .00$]. This indicates a significant shift from positive to negative coverage and supports the previous analysis conducted on the years.

²³ As the mean cannot be higher than 3 (positive) and less than 1 (negative), the range between 1 to 1.7 could be considered as negative coverage tendency.

Table 8. Overall Tone Toward Turkey Distributed Quarterly

Periods quarterly	Mean (Std. Deviation)	N
01. Jan.– Mar. 2012	2.00 (.78)	11 (06.9%)
02. Apr. – Jun. 2012	2.13 (.72)	16 (10.1%)
03. Jul. – Sep. 2012	2.12 (.69)	17 (10.8%)
04. Oct. – Dec. 2012	2.60 (.69)	10 (06.3%)
05. Jan. – Mar. 2013	2.30 (.68)	10 (06.3%)
06. Apr. – Jun. 2013	2.09 (.70)	11 (06.9%)
07. Jul. – Sep. 2013	1.92 (.79)	12 (07.6%)
08. Oct. – Dec. 2013	1.57 (.64)	14 (08.9%)
09. Jan. – Mar. 2014	1.33 (.49)	12 (07.6%)
10. Apr. – Jun. 2014	1.50 (.76)	14 (08.9%)
11. Jul. – Sep. 2014	1.73 (.79)	11 (06.9%)
12. Oct. – Dec. 2014	1.55 (.76)	20 (12.7%)
Total	1.87 (.77)	158 (100%)

The data suggest that months between October 2013 and June 2014 demonstrated the highest negative coverage overall tone among the whole sample. In detail, the mean between October 2013 and December 2013 was (1.57), between January 2014 and March 2014 was (1.33), and finally between April 2014 until June 2014 was (1.50)²⁴.

Despite that the mean of the overall tone did not notably drop in the first period after June 30, 2013, it dropped drastically starting Oct. – Dec. period. A closer examination of these dates indicates a probabilistic association between the news tone and one important diplomatic crisis between Egypt and Turkey. In November 2013, Egypt withdrew its ambassador in Turkey and expelled the Turkish ambassador in Cairo.

²⁴ See Appendix G: trend chart.

In conclusion, the analysis of the previously demonstrated data greatly supports the first hypothesis of this study: That the various events in Egypt during the three years—2012, 2013, and 2014— led to a shift in the coverage of Turkey’s news in Egyptian newspapers from positive to negative. Moreover, the data were advantageous to the degree it allowed a closer examination of how the trend was developing.

Along the same line, it is valuable to examine the news tendency nature toward Turkey. The general numbers show that the unfavorable news stories were the highest at 93 (58.9%); then the favorable stories come next 43 (27.2%), and finally the neutral stories were the lowest at 22 (13.9%). The general numbers indicate a clear tendency regarding news stories about Turkey; moreover, the yearly shifting of the tendency variable is equally descriptive.

For example, the unfavorable news stories increased from 25 in 2012 to reach 43 in 2014. On the other hand, the favorable news decreased from 22 in 2012 to six in 2014²⁵. To examine the significance of this observation, a Pearson chi-square test was conducted, and the results shows that Goodman and Kruskal tau = .006 ($X^2 = 14.279$, $p < .05$). The outcomes significantly support the observation.

It is also beneficial to see the association and distribution of the overall tone and news tendency among the three newspapers. First, regarding the distribution of the overall tone toward Turkey, Table 9 shows the mean distribution. To a large extent, it is observable that all means are equal, which indicates that all newspapers were adopting almost the same narrative.

²⁵ See Appendix H: News tendency/Years chart.

Table 9. Overall Tone Toward Turkey Distributed on Newspapers

Newspaper	Mean (Std. Deviation)	N
<i>Almasry Alyoum</i>	1.91 (.70)	69 (43.7%)
<i>El-Shorouk</i>	1.88 (.79)	48 (30.4%)
<i>Al-Ahram</i>	1.80 (.87)	41 (25.9%)
Total	1.87 (.77)	158 (100%)

Similarly, the distribution of the news tendency toward Turkey shows close numbers. For instance, unfavorable news stories were the highest in the three newspapers²⁶, *Almasry Alyoum* at 39 (56.5%), *El-Shorouk* at 26 (54.2%), and *Al-Ahram* at 28 (68.3%)²⁷, which support the previous indication that all newspapers are implementing nearly the same editorial line.

In Conclusion

The data investigated by this study were able to describe the nature of coverage and the used frames. The results showed that the most common frame among the three newspapers was the attribution of responsibility. Furthermore, the analysis of the three years (2012, 2013, and 2014) clarified how the frames were changing over and supported the study's first hypothesis.

Yet to investigate the second hypothesis—To a large extent, the changes in newspapers' narrative regarding Turkey during the period of the study altered the discourse of the imagined Egyptian identity—an in-depth qualitative analysis is required. Thus, a rhetorical discourse analysis of some selected opinion pieces and news stories will be conducted.

²⁶ See Appendix I: News tendency/Newspapers chart.

²⁷ Percentage is calculated via numbers of news stories in each newspaper.

Turkey from Model Nation to Cautionary Tale: Qualitative Analysis

When Benedict Anderson provided his thesis on nationalism, he did not mean to specify a media theory. However, he unlocked an extraordinary lens through which to view the role of media in society. Print media made it possible for a massive population to know about each other indirectly. For instance, newspapers could make their readers feel that they were unified in language, place, and time and could give the authority the power to manipulate this feeling. Afterward, by the beginning of the 20th century, radio joined print production in causing a feeling of imagined community, followed by television, satellite, and the Internet.

In this analysis, the hypothesis under discussion is that newspaper narratives regarding Turkey during the period of the study altered the discourse of the imagined Egyptian identity, which corresponds to Benedict Anderson's thesis on imagined communities. According to this thesis, the media is responsible, to a large extent, for disseminating a shared thought and ideology among dissimilar citizens. It is important to note that the underlying responsibility for disseminating ideas may assist in building a big narrative in society, but may not necessarily result in direct effects on individuals.

Taking into consideration Anderson's thoughts, then, the question is what type of message is disseminated by Egyptian newspapers. Investigating these messages would allow us to deeply understand more about the imagined community they contribute to constructing. For this purpose, the study will critically investigate the rhetorical discourse of 24 opinion pieces in

three Egyptian newspapers: *Al-Ahram*, *El-Shorouk*, and *Almasry Alyoum*. These pieces were selected from the excluded quantitative study's sample.

This analysis considers all opinion pieces written between January 2012 and December 2014, and for the sake of organization, the pieces are introduced chronologically to reveal a sort of unity and harmony in the authors' thought processes. Hence, it is legitimate to ask more questions regarding these opinion pieces: Did they refer to concepts such as nationalism, patriotism, society, or identity in their discourses? How did they describe Turkey? And in what context was Egypt mentioned? The authors of the opinion pieces may not necessarily have referred directly to Egyptian society or identity as the main topic of their writing, but their manuscripts might tell us something about how they perceived Egyptian society.

It is equally important to clarify that the time variable was essential in previous literature that tackled the notion of identity in media, such as the works of Laura Bier (2011) and Beth Baron (2005). Both scholars in their historical studies investigated media over a long period of time. Accordingly, they were able to argue about the Egyptian identity in media. This analysis examines a relatively short period. Thus, in its conclusion, it will be hard to make claims regarding the Egyptian ideology. What can be provided is a description of media reflection in this regard.

Turkey as a Model: From Early 2012 to Early 2013

In November 9, 2012, *El-Shorouk* newspaper celebrated the publication of the Arabic translation of the book *The Turks in Egypt and Their Culture Legacy* by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu

(2012). Mona Abu El-Nasr²⁸ in her article²⁹ highly praised the book and the Turkish culture. She reflected on the effect of Turkish culture on Egypt and even used the term “the Turkish Dream” in Egypt rhetorically in mimicry of the phrase “the American Dream.”

Abu El-Nasr was not the first to recall the Turkish model in Egypt after 2011. In fact, this narrative, to a great extent, was dominant among journalists and writers in Egypt. While some of them directly advocated the Turkish model, some other writers questioned the model itself, advocating its positives and highlighting its negatives. In conclusion, however the model was treated, it was obviously present in the Egyptian press in 2012.

Belal Fadl³⁰ produced a series of long essays to address and analyze the Turkish model.³¹ In these essays, Fadl argued that advocating the Turkish model blindly as a project of modernity in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood project is inadequate and has several shortcomings. However, he praised the later development in Turkish politics and stated that the best way to achieve the Turkish model in Egypt was by learning from historical mistakes. In his view, the biggest obstacle to advancement in Turkey was the military. Military intervention in political life destroys it, and Turkey was only able to achieve stability when this issue had been solved. Finally, he concluded by warning that a model of modernity with military protection cannot survive.

²⁸ Mona Abu El-Nasr: journalist and writer at Anadolu news agency.

²⁹ *El-Shorouk* newspaper archive, Friday, November 9, 2012.

³⁰ Egyptian journalist and script writer.

³¹ *El-Shorouk* newspaper archive, Wednesday, June 4, 2012, Wednesday, July 11, 2012, and Wednesday, July 18, 2012.

Fadl in his essays promoted a modern Egypt by pointing to the Turkish model. This series of essays used more academic terms than rhetorical expressions, and the author referenced many academic sources in his survey of the long historical struggle in Turkey, so that the reader could check his information easily. Finally, Fadl drew a comparison between the military and Islamists in Turkey and Egypt. This comparison was to advocate a nontotalitarian and nontheocratic image of Egypt.

Fadl was not the only writer to imagine Egypt as a nontotalitarian and nontheocratic state. Salah Salem³² advocated almost the same principles that were suggested by Fadl. He said that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt should follow Erdoğan's steps and respect secularism to achieve a modern state.³³ In the contrast to the Turkish model, he described Egypt as a distorted totalitarian state and suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood should not be afraid of secularization. The author clarified that the current altered model of secularism in Turkey did not contradict Islam. In short, Salah Salem praised the Turkish model and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, locating Egypt in opposition to Turkish advancement.

Along the same line of argument, other journalists and writers praised the Turkish model and wrote that Egypt should learn from its advantages and simultaneously preserve the Egyptian identity. A notable wave of writings came from authors who personally visited Turkey after 2011 to study the Turkish model and from Egyptian journalists who worked there. There are many

³² Salah Salem: journalist and writer at *Al-Ahram* newspaper.

³³ *Al-Ahram* newspaper archive, Sunday, December 23, 2012.

examples that could illustrate this wave of literature, and the subsequent discussion will exemplify two prominent instances.

As stated in his article³⁴, Ahmed Samir³⁵ visited Istanbul precisely to observe and comprehend the elements of the Turkish model, and he asked himself whether it was an appropriate Islamic model to follow. Samir did not appreciate what he described as secular signs in the Turkish culture. However, he argued that Egypt should follow the successful model of the Turkish economy. Samir portrayed his imagining of the Egyptian ideology by criticizing what he did not like in Turkey. For instance, he criticized Turkey for abolishing the adultery penalty and death sentences, actions that he considered un-Islamic.

In his conclusion, Samir declared that the Turkish model did not impress him. Subsequently, he believed that Egypt could produce its own model of modernity. Samir expressed his opinion rhetorically in the article's title, "Turkey: The Very Islamic Model." His use of the word *very* before *Islamic* was meant to connote the opposite meaning. His rhetoric seemed to suggest that he did not want to see Egypt following this un-Islamic model.

Conversely, Hisham Ezz El-Arab³⁶ used rhetoric to express his appreciation of the Turkish model. In his article "What Egypt Can Learn from Turkey?"³⁷ he used the Turkish expression *yavaş yavaş* (Turkish for "bit by bit") to advocate for a gradual transformation toward

³⁴ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Monday, July 23, 2012.

³⁵ Ahmed Samir: journalist in *Almasry Alyoum*.

³⁶ Hisham Ezz El-Arab: marketing manager for a commerce company in Istanbul and writer in *Almasry Alyoum*.

³⁷ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Monday, November 19, 2012.

the Turkish model in Egypt. Ezz El-Arab, who lives in Turkey, encouraged Egyptian political leaders to adopt the AKP³⁸ and follow in Erdoğan's steps to reach all people and employ secularism. In his view, secularism is the protectorate of democracy.

This phase was delineated with searching and advocating for the upcoming Egyptian identity; furthermore, it was characterized by diversity of opinions between authors who advocated for the Turkish model and those who did not. Articles were mostly based on personal experience or academic sources. Rhetoric was used moderately to summarize an argument or to clarify a point of view. In summary, imagining the Egyptian ideology was a product of a critical review of the Turkish model.

Turkey is Not Similar to Egypt: From Early 2013 to Mid-2013

On May 28, 2013, a wave of social movements started in Istanbul, Turkey. Activists were mainly protesting the new urban plan regarding Taksim Gezi Park. As a result of violent police behavior, protests sparked in many other cities outside Istanbul. Then activists' demands widened to include issues such as human rights, freedom of expression, and government infringement on secularism (Shafak, 2013).

In parallel, social-political movements in Egypt against Mohamed Morsi were growing by the day, such as the Tamarod (Arabic for "rebellion") movement, which was collecting

³⁸ AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi "Justice and Development Party", The ruling party in Turkey.

people's signatures to end the rule of Morsi's regime. Significantly, journalists and writers were comparing the Turkish and Egyptian political scenes.

The majority of the sample from this period argued clearly that it is difficult to find similarities between the two countries for several reasons. For instance, Marwa Maziad³⁹ wrote about how the protests in Turkey constituted a social resistance movement and not a revolution, as they were perceived in Egypt.⁴⁰ Maziad argued that this resistance movement was necessary to avoid a future revolution.

The author claimed that the current movement in Turkey could be compared only to the incomplete resistance movement in Egypt against the 1970s moral conservatism after Sadat called himself the "Believer President." Maziad used examples from Egyptian films to rhetorically criticize the tendency toward moral conservatism in Egypt in the 1970s. In her view, the "original national image" of Egypt is not morally conservative; moreover, the cultural shifts occurred for political reasons.

Wael Kandil⁴¹ had different reasons to find the comparison between Egypt and Turkey invalid.⁴² Although he reflected on the same events, he used a different method in his reflection than Marwa Maziad had. Kandil sarcastically criticized individuals who were pleased about events in Istanbul and considered the movement a true revolution against political Islam.

³⁹ Marwa Maziad is an expert on Middle East Media and Politics.

⁴⁰ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Sunday, June 9, 2013.

⁴¹ Former journalist at *El-Shorouk* newspaper.

⁴² *El-Shorouk* newspaper archive, Wednesday, June 12, 2013.

Although Kandil's rhetorical tone was clear, he did not use it to explain or clarify a specific argument. Another important point is that the author drew heavily on rhetoric to locate Egypt among these events. For instance, he said that dreamer revolutionists imagine Egypt as the center of all the world's revolutions. Then, he expressed his displeasure with such an idea and claimed that a similar movement in Egypt would be a "mass suicide party."

In a series of three articles⁴³, Amr El-Shobaki⁴⁴ agreed with the previously presented ideas. However, his narrative was different. El-Shobaki claimed that it is not valid to compare Egypt and Turkey because their history is different; moreover, Erdoğan and his political party are not like Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, and their political party. The economic boom achieved by Erdoğan gives him legitimacy, whereas Mohamed Morsi is still building his fragile legitimacy. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood Islamizes their politics, but AKP works in a secular system. In conclusion, El-Shobaki indirectly criticized the political system in Egypt by analyzing the situation in Turkey. His imagined Egypt is a civil modern state.

To summarize, this phase was characterized by different features than the first one. First, the authors used slightly more rhetoric to express their opinions and thoughts. Second, the notion of the Turkish model disappeared and was replaced by another narrative that could be summarized to express that the ideas of Turkey and Egypt are not similar. Referring to or drawing the identity of Egypt was a hidden concept covered by other narrative or thought.

⁴³ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Sunday, June 2, 2013, Monday, June 3, 2013, and Tuesday, June 4, 2013.

⁴⁴ Amr El-Shobaki is a former member of the Egyptian parliament, academic, and writer.

Turkey is the Enemy of our Unified Nation: From Mid-2013 to Late 2014

After summer 2013, the political disagreement between Cairo and Ankara increased. The Turkish government did not accept the political changes in Egypt, and the Egyptian interim regime considered the Turkish stance an unacceptable intervention. Correspondingly, newspapers' tone significantly changed, and the rhetoric of the imagined identity appeared extensively.

For instance, Salah Montaser⁴⁵ wrote an article titled "The Turkish Plan to Rescue Muslim Brotherhood: A Parallel Government and Military Base in Upper Egypt"⁴⁶ to argue that Turkey was operating powerfully to destroy the unity of Egypt and Egyptians. Furthermore, he argued it was planning for a "Free Egyptian Army." At the end of his article, Montaser declared that sources he used might have been exaggerating, but it is better to be careful than ignore information.

Thereafter, the metaphor of Turkish enmity even increased. For instance, Ali El-Said⁴⁷ praised the Egyptian identity, suggesting that Egyptians do not deploy lies in politics like the Turkish⁴⁸. Moreover, El-Said described Turkey as the "European Dog" at Europe's gate with Russia and the "American Bear" in the heart of the Middle East. He accused Erdoğan for destroying Turkish politics, violating human rights, and suffocating journalism. The author honored the Egyptian ideology that abolished Erdoğan's Ottoman dream on June 30. El-Said

⁴⁵ Salah Montaser is an Egyptian writer.

⁴⁶ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Sunday, August 25, 2013.

⁴⁷ Egyptian journalist and writer.

⁴⁸ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Wednesday, August 28, 2013.

used nationalistic metaphors similar to those of Nasir's Republic, and he directly referred to the bad Arab-Turkish relationship of the 1950s and 1960s.

Following the same line of argument, Ahmed Gamal⁴⁹ described the Turkish people as arrogant Ottomans⁵⁰. He referred to the long historical Ottoman-Arab relationship to denote that Ottomans were occupiers who came to invade and destroy the Arab nation. He rhetorically connected between the current Turks and the ancient Ottomans to advocate his argument. Turkey is the major destroyer of the Arab and Egyptian culture.

He used the example of female beauty to clarify his point. In his view, Egyptian men historically viewed female beauties as having brown skin, dark eyes, and curly hair. Ottomans affected men's perception of beauty, however, and Egyptian men became more attracted to blonde white women. In conclusion, the metaphor used by Gamal signifies his praising of the unified Egyptian nation and its resistance to the new Ottoman invaders.

Another wave of writings about Turkey came before and after Egypt had expelled the Turkish ambassador in November 2013. This wave included articles of some well-known Egyptian writers and elite journalists such as Amr Abdel Samie,⁵¹ Morsi Atallah,⁵² and Makram Mohamed Ahmed.⁵³ Chiefly, it is possible from their writings to articulate the imagined

⁴⁹ Ahmed Gamal is an Egyptian writer.

⁵⁰ *Almasry Alyoum* newspaper archive, Tuesday, August 27, 2013.

⁵¹ Amr Abdel Samie is an Egyptian journalists and TV personality.

⁵² Morsi Atallah is a former chairman of Al-Ahram Organization.

⁵³ Makram Mohamed Ahmed is a former leader of Egypt's press syndicate.

community they advocated for. Hence, it is important to highlight that their perception of the Egyptian ideology is aroused in their writing attacking Turkey and Erdoğan.

On October 29, when the Turkish Republic Day came, anxiety was dominating the Egyptian-Turkish relationship. Amr Abdel Samie was one of the journalists who called for a boycott of this celebration and asked officials and journalists not to go to the Turkish embassy⁵⁴; furthermore, he asked to cut diplomatic relations with Turkey. Samie said that Egyptians should unify to protect national security and stand up to liars who support terrorists. Similarly, Morsi Atallah described the Turkish and Erdoğan as liars who had a “demonic” plan to destroy Egypt,⁵⁵ but the patriotic Egyptians were unified behind Sisi. Additionally, he said that Turks were holding pictures of Sisi in their demonstrations against Erdoğan and his party.

Complementary to this, Makram Mohamed Ahmed attempted to analyze what he called the “Turkish Project.”⁵⁶ In his view, what had happened in Egypt in June 30 had destroyed Erdoğan’s attempt to revive the Ottoman project. This project was an alternative one after Turkey had failed to join the European Union, Ahmed added. To summarize, the author signifying the Egyptian unity by referring to the Turkish and Muslim Brotherhood loses.

Generally, this phase was characterized by an extensive use of metaphors to denote the Egyptian ideology. The unified nation was standing against the enemy. Authors recalled the 1950s and 1960s metaphors to imagine Egypt fighting its enemies. Another essential point is that

⁵⁴ *Al-Ahram* newspaper archive, Sunday, November 10, 2013.

⁵⁵ *Al-Ahram* newspaper archive, Tuesday, January 23, 2014.

⁵⁶ *Al-Ahram* newspaper archive, Tuesday, December 23, 2014.

very few academic or reliable sources were used by writers to support their arguments. For instance, Salah Montaser cited a source that he himself described as unreliable. Other pieces were pure opinion. Authors presented their personal thoughts based on unsupported statistics or stories.

In Conclusion

Illustrating the three phases was beneficial to the extent that it enabled an in-depth analysis of newspaper narratives over time. These narratives could be summarized as follows. Between early 2012 and early 2013, newspapers looked to Turkey as a model. The post-2011 Egyptian identity was still debatable. A moderate number of metaphors were used, along with more personal and academic sources. Between early 2013 and mid-2013, there was no serious mention of the Turkish model. The narrative focused on distinguishing between the Egyptian and Turkish identities. Finally, between mid-2013 and late 2014, writers extensively used metaphors to identify the unity of Egyptians against their enemies, including Turkey, which was directly described as such.

The noticeable point is that journalists did not play a role in this narrative transformation. It can be observed, for instance, that writers who advocated for the Turkish model did not participate in describing Turkey as an enemy. Thus, it can be extrapolated that the narrative transformation was an institutional organized process, not a series of individual acts. The same newspaper editorial policy that allowed the earlier narrative to appear at one time allowed another sort of narrative to appear later. In this process, the big narrative is more important than individuals. Accordingly, writers who follow the narrative will have their articles printed in the papers.

Conclusion and Recommendations

I would like to address several issues in this part, but, initially, it is important to indicate the study's limitations. The main limitation of this research is that it did not tackle the issue under investigation from the human participants' perspective. It focused on analyzing the produced media to articulate its nature. Thus, the results cannot argue any effect on individuals in society. This limitation could be a recommendation for future research. Investigating how individuals perceived the image of Turkey would be an important complement to this manuscript.

The study's findings could be summarized in three points. First, the results indicated that the most common frame in news coverage about Turkey was the attribution of responsibility frame, followed by the conflict frame, and the economic frame came at the end. This finding corresponds to the famous study conducted by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). They drew the same conclusion in their results.

Second, the study denoted that the shift of the coverage of Turkey's news in Egyptian newspapers from positive to negative was statistically significant, and this result was supported by the discourse analysis of the three newspapers. Thirdly, it could be inferred from the discourse analysis that changes in newspapers' narratives regarding Turkey during the period of the study led to a change in the press discourse of the imagined Egyptian identity.

To clarify, when the Turkish model was debated between early 2012 and early 2013, the vision of modernity and Egyptian ideology were reflected throughout this debate. Between early

2013 and mid-2013, referring to the Egyptian identity was a hidden debate through a larger narrative that mainly differentiated between Egypt and Turkey in terms of their political natures. Finally, between mid-2013 and late 2014, articles widely used linguistic metaphors to recognize and delineate the Egypt's' identity against its opponents as well as to highlight the unity of Egyptians against their enemies.

This finding corresponds to Anderson's thesis of imagined communities, where the media is largely responsible for disseminating shared thoughts and ideologies among diverse citizens (1991). However, in this study, it is difficult to assume a relationship between these messages and people in the community. Yet the following discussion aims to highlight some issues and suggest selected recommendations.

The Turkish Model

Another essential point is the notion of the "Turkish Model" and how it would be possible to position this notion. Through this study, it could be argued that the Turkish Model is no longer debated. Since 2012, the idea has faded with time. This observation is a match with Zenonas Tziarras's (2013) argument. At the end of 2013, Tziarras claimed that applying the Turkish model in Egypt is not possible due to the differences in political culture between both countries, Egypt and Turkey, and the summer 2013 disagreement made it even harder.

Media Professionalism

On the basis of the evidence currently available, it seems fair to suggest that media organizations are responsible for delineating the larger narratives in the final production. The

discourse analysis concluded that authors who supported or debated the Turkish model in 2012 were different from those who portrayed Turkey as an enemy of Egypt in 2014, which means that newspapers are responsible for editorial policy and its change. Moreover, they choose authors who will fit their editorial lines. To a limited extent, this point alleviates journalists' responsibility of contributing to the big narrative in society. However, in this study, the three "diverse" newspapers were not diverse, which suggests another critical question: who controls the media in Egypt?

Media Literacy

Another essential point is to what extent media is able to continue playing a role in disseminating narratives in society. It seems difficult to anticipate. However, it is critical to consider some contemporary issues. Globalized media and the Internet have made it very possible for individuals to pick what narrative they want and then ignore others. At least through the last decade, media has become an interactive tool in which there is no difference between "media" and "society." In fact, societies have become mediatized to the degree that any attempt to separate, including the legal separation, between media professionals and media consumers might rapidly fall.

On this ground, the term "separation" would be considered outdated. Hence, the significance of media literacy emerges. In this construct, the whole society, including journalists, must be involved in media literacy. The current rapid flow of media messages requires the critical consumption of information and narratives. This could also be important for

differentiating between false and reliable sources of information. Spreading media literacy would help in creating critical media makers and consumers.

Recommendations

After the period of this study's investigation, several critical events occurred in Turkey, such as the Ataturk Airport attack, the attempted coup, and the Russian ambassador's assassination. Observation indicates that Egyptian press extensively covered those events. Thus, the first recommendation is to investigate the coverage of Turkey after 2014 in future research.

The second recommendation is to tackle the previously mentioned question—who controls the media in Egypt—in detail. Although it is not an easy question to answer, future research might find an appropriate method for tackling it. Along the same lines, it is important for future studies to investigate the credibility of Egyptian media and how journalists use sources in their stories.

The final suggestion is to replicate the complete study while considering media literacy to be an active variable. In other words, instead of examining the narrative of traditional media, this study could investigate interactivity regarding news coverage on Internet-based news platforms. Interactivity could reflect how individuals interact with media message critically.

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Appendix A

The Codebook

- Coder ID:
- Unit Title:
- Unit ID:
- Unit Date
 1. 2012
 2. 2013
 3. 2014
- Newspaper Name:
 1. Almasry Alyoum
 2. El-Shorouk
 3. Al-Ahram

Byline: Author of the article

1. Staff, including staff reports, editors, guest contributors, readers. They are usually identified with their full names in the story Byline.
2. Wire services, such as Associated press, Reuters, etc.
3. Combination of staff authors and wire services. This category is usually identified with the full names of the staff author and the name of the wire service.
4. Other. Any authorship that is neither staff nor wire service. Also articles without authors.

General news theme

1. Turkish Internal affairs (go to the internal affairs)
2. Turkish International affairs (go to the International affairs)

What internal affairs theme of News item/Issues discussed? (Select the dominant theme)

1. Turkish-Kurds news
2. Turkey and Secularism
3. Turkey and Political Islam
4. Freedoms in general including freedom of speech in Turkey (Including any story about journalism practices or polices in Turkey)
5. Turkey and terrorism
6. Other Internal Affairs

What international affairs theme of News item/Issues discussed? (Select the dominant theme)

1. Turkey international relationship with other countries (Egypt, Syria, Israeli or GCC NOT included in the story)
2. Turkey international relationship with Egypt (Egypt is the main country in the story)
3. Turkey international relationship with other countries (Egypt mentioned with other countries in the story)
4. Turkey international relationship with other countries (Syria, Israeli or GCC are mentioned with other countries in the story)
5. Turkish-Syrian relationship (Including stories about Turkey and Syrian refugees. If other Arab refugees including in the same story with Syrian refugees such as Iraqi or Palestinian refugees, it will be considered in this category) (If the story from the Syrian perspective and Turkey is included even with other countries, it will be considered in this category)
6. Turkish-GCC relationship (Gulf States Countries include: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar)
7. Turkish-Israeli relationship
8. Other

Theme of News item/Issues discussed regarding the Turkish-Egyptian relationship

1. Turkish-Egyptian political relationship (Military relationship included in this category)
2. Turkish intervention in Egypt's domestic affairs
3. Turkish-Egyptian economic relationship (Tourism-Trade)
4. Other Turkish-Egyptian relationships (Such as culture relations/ Intellectuals from both sides commenting on the relationship)

Please, answer the following questions and fill out the code sheet

YES=1 NO=0

Attribution of responsibility frame

1. Does the story suggest that Turkish government has the ability to alleviate the problem in whole or its part?
2. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?
3. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the whole or part of the problem/issue?
4. Does the story suggest that an individual/group of people in Turkey (not necessarily Turkish) is (are) responsible for the issue/problem?
5. Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?

Conflict frame

1. Does the story reflect disagreement between Egyptian and Turkish parties/individuals/groups/governments on any issue/level?
2. Does one party/individual/group/country reproach another? (Egyptians reproach Turkish and vice versa)
3. Does the story suggest that Turkish government is in charge of the issue/problem?
4. Does the story refer to Egypt as winner or loser?
5. Does the story refer to Turkey as a winner or loser?

Economic frame

1. Is there a mention of Egyptian financial ties with Turkey or Egyptian financial losses or gains now or in the future?
2. Is there a mention of Turkish financial losses or gains now or in the future?
3. Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved?
4. Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?

Sources Used:

1. News Agency
2. Another Newspaper
3. Egyptian governmental or official sources
4. Turkish governmental or official sources
5. Other sources
6. No Sources mentioned. (This should NOT be checked unless none of the other options are checked)

Is there any direct quote in the article from the Turkish side?

1. Yes
2. No

Is there any direct quote in the article from the Egyptian side?

1. Yes
2. No

Is there any indirect quote in the article from the Turkish side?

1. Yes
2. No

Is there any indirect quote in the article from the Egyptian side?

1. Yes
2. No

Overall tone

The overall tone toward Turkey is:


1. Negative
2. Neutral
3. Positive

The news tendency toward Turkey:


News could be totally objective and follow all professional roles. Favorable and Unfavorable is a different measurement

1. Favorable
2. Unfavorable
3. Neutral/Balanced


Appendix B




Appendix C




Appendix D




Appendix E




Appendix F



Appendix G



Appendix H



Appendix I

