

The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

**The Experience of Art:
Between Arthur Schopenhauer and Sigmund Freud**

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By

Sarah Ehssan Saad El Sayed Hammad

Under the supervision of **Professor Steffen Stelzer**

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis aims to juxtapose Freud's and Schopenhauer's doctrines, in the hopes of reaching a richer understanding of both thinkers. This topic has been addressed in many different ways in the past, but is far from exhausted. Both Freud and Schopenhauer believed that the way we viewed the world and ourselves was lacking, to a certain extent even distorted, and that such lack was due to our constitutional focus on ourselves, a focus developed from the absolute need for self-preservation. They both also called for a truer less distorted form of knowledge, a knowledge that could reach the essence of ourselves and therefore of the world. Freud saw that his work grounded Schopenhauer's theories in the everyday experience of individuals. This thesis attempts to continue what he started, it attempts to bring those two daring minds closer together in order for such a mutual augmentation to occur. The focal point of contact between the two will be art, the relevance of which will be made clear as we move on (Freud, 1924, p.4128).

The thesis begins, in the second chapter, by giving an outline of one of Schopenhauer's main philosophical concepts, namely, the will. The chapter will explore who and what Schopenhauer believed to be to be his main influences, and will allow the reader to get a clearer grasp on why he postulates that the experience of art, creating and contemplating it, can be a way towards salvation for the human race. It will include a brief account of the influence of Plato's and Kant's philosophies on one of his major concepts, his critique of them, and how he combined their world views. It will also include his view on how, as humans, we see the world around us in relation to our individual welfare and how, by shedding such a form of knowledge, we can reach a pure form of knowledge of the world, ourselves included. Finally, the importance of aesthetic contemplation and how it aids in the process of reaching pure unclouded knowledge, and how the artist, a man of genius, manages

to communicate his pure knowing to others through a work of art, is also discussed in this chapter.

The third chapter focuses solely on the experience of art. Schopenhauer systematically divides the arts into architecture, painting, sculpture, poetry, and music. He also explains how and to what extent each could be used as a tool for reaching pure knowing, rating some above the others. There will be a summary given for his view on each form of art and his argument as to why some are considered transcendent while others merely pleasurable.

The fourth chapter gives an overview of Freud's main concepts, and how they developed, giving the reader space to view them separately from Schopenhauer's but also to begin to form her own opinion on the extent she believes the two thinkers' work is related. It will explore the historical and theoretical context in which Freud was situated, how he came across some of his major discoveries such as repression, the unconscious, the psychic topography, and the importance of dreams in understanding our unconscious/hidden self. It will also give some insight into the importance of art and aesthetics for psychoanalysis.

The fifth chapter draws on the most apparent similarities between Schopenhauer's and Freud's work, mostly similarities Freud himself pointed out, then moves on to more speculative similarities and starts raising some questions regarding the extent of Schopenhauer's influence on Freud. Chapter five will be concluded by exploring Schopenhauer's specific influence on Freud's view of art and how art could unlock the mysteries of the unconscious.

The sixth and final chapter is a summing up of the previous chapters, exploring their implications and what they mean for the future of psychoanalysis, the future of our view on art and its importance for humanity, and of how Schopenhauer's philosophy could be approached contemporarily.

The first obstacle I faced was in putting Freud into a philosophical context. Freud had

two problems in that regard; the first being that he disliked and opposed the idea of having been influenced directly by anyone before him or of not being original, often making statements like, “psycho-analysis is always without question my work alone” (Freud, 1914, p.2878). We will see later how he vehemently denies being influenced by Schopenhauer, claiming he hadn't read his work until later in life and that the similarity in their world views was a coincidence. The second obstacle being that Freud was a physician and that the scientific field during his time was heavily influenced by 19th century scientific empiricism and was therefore, not welcoming of abstract theories. Psychiatry at the time functioned on a biological model and anything that diverged from such biological views was considered unscientific. Freud, being a man of science, faced the constant struggle of forcing psychoanalysis into the scientific mold, often at the price of disavowing the philosophical roots of psychoanalysis as we shall see later. The thesis is not meant as an act of unfaithfulness in imparting Freud's thought, neither is it a mere laying forward of his and Schopenhauer's thought as it is, it is rather an exploration of what it would mean for Freudian psychoanalysis to let itself be directly and voluntarily influenced by philosophy, since, unlike Freud, this thesis is under no obligation to 'appear scientific' or to cater to an enforced paradigm (Freud, 1924, p.4101).

Chapter 2:

Overview of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*:

The Will

Before we get into Schopenhauer's concept of the will, his theory on the essence of things and how it could possibly be reached through art, we have first to understand how and from where it sprang. In order to do that, we have to first get a glimpse of Kant's thing-in-itself, and Plato's Ideas.

One of the main concepts attributed to Kant is that of the thing-in-itself. Kant believed that the whole of our knowledge and experience was merely knowledge of the phenomena surrounding us and that we could never reach the knowledge underlying the phenomena i.e. the thing-in-itself. He believed that time, space, and causality, the forms our knowledge is conditioned by, and with which we perceive the world, belonged not to the thing-in-itself but to its phenomena. Hence their laws couldn't be valid for the thing-in-itself and its knowledge. Since all plurality, all passing away and arising, are possible exclusively through time, space, and causality, they, too, conform to the phenomenon alone and not the thing-in-itself. All this means that even knowledge of our own selves is known to us only as phenomena and not in-itself. Schopenhauer believed that not only can we obtain such knowledge in the abstract as Kant did but also intuitively, as we will see later (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.170).

Schopenhauer held both Kant and Plato in great reverence. He believed that the seeming difference between Kant's thing-in-itself and Plato's eternal Ideas respectively, was caused by their own personal individualities and style, and that the two concepts themselves were very closely related. He didn't think that the two concepts were exactly identical but that they were two different roads leading to the same goal. As we have seen with Kant and will

now see with Plato, both doctrines claim that the phenomenal world as we see it is empty and void and that its meaning is just the shadow of the thing which expresses itself in it, whether it be Idea or thing-in-itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.170-172).

Plato believed that nothing we perceive with our senses ever has any true being. Everything is just in constant becoming, and hence a thing only has relative being through interactions with other things, which means their being could just as well be called non-being. Things in this sense can never be the object of knowledge, since for something to be an object of knowledge it has to first exist on its own, through nothing else, as well as remain constant and consistent. This makes such objects mere opinions or impressions brought about through sensation. That being said, what is capable of being described as really existing are the eternal Ideas, the original forms from which everything springs. Those eternal Ideas always are, whether we are there to perceive them or not. Because of their consistency, it is only through the Ideas that any knowledge is possible (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.171).

Anything that is a representation for us has to fall under the principle of sufficient reason, which Schopenhauer defines as, “the ultimate principle of all finiteness, of all individuation, and the universal form of the representation as it comes to the knowledge of the individual as such” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.169). We conceive our representations through the forms of sufficient reason, meaning, through time, space, and causality. In order to be conceived by us, the Platonic Ideas go through a process of division, presenting themselves in all individuals and unique details through space and time, and all arising and passing away through causality. The divided Ideas presented to us are mere copies of the Ideas themselves. The Ideas themselves never enter the principle of sufficient reason. The principle has no meaning for them, and although they embody innumerable individuals who are constantly arising and passing away, they themselves remain unchanged, hence we can never attribute chance or plurality to them. It is clear by now that all subjective knowledge

has to pass through the principle of sufficient reason and therefore, Ideas are to remain outside our sphere of knowledge. Kant directly deprived the thing-in-itself of the forms of sufficient reason, while Plato denied his Ideas plurality, origination, and disappearance, in other words, the consequences of those forms (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.171-172). If we want the Ideas themselves to become the object of our knowledge, our only chance would be through eradicating all individuality in the knowing subject in order to become pure subjects of knowledge. Schopenhauer argues that this could be reached through art; his argument will be made clear as we progress (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.169).

Schopenhauer saw that Kant's thing-in-itself was a weak link in Kantian philosophy, especially given the way he inferred what is ground from what is grounded. He believed that Kant slipped when he denied the thing-in-itself the forms of sufficient reason, namely time, space, and causality, while not denying it the most universal form for all phenomena, namely being-object-for-subject. He believed that the inconsistency in Kant's work arose from his not denying being-object to his thing-in-itself. The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, is inevitably an object. Although the Idea is denied the consequences of the forms of sufficient reason or rather has not entered the principle of sufficient reason yet, it has accepted the most universal form for all phenomena, the form on which all representation depends, namely and as stated above, being an object for a subject. All things perceived by the individual subject of knowing appear in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, which makes them the indirect and therefore inadequate objectification of the thing-in-itself; the Idea on the other hand, as perceived by the pure subject of knowing, doesn't function in accordance with any principle of sufficient reason other than being object for a subject, making it the thing-in-itself under the form of representation. Now it's inferred that the Idea does not equal the thing-in-itself, for Schopenhauer the Idea is the adequate, immediate objectivity of the thing-in-itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.174-175).

This brings us to the Schopenhauerian concept of the 'will'. Schopenhauer argues that the world besides being representation/phenomena is also one common will. The world as representation being the will objectified, the will represented, becoming an object for us to perceive. The will is the thing-in-itself while the Idea is the immediate objectivity of that will at any specific given grade of objectivity. This objectification of the will contains many clear grades, the higher the grade is, the clearer and more distinctly the inner nature of the will is objectified/appears as representation. We recognize the Platonic Ideas in the grades of the will's objectivity as long as the grades are the specific species, the universal forces that function according to laws of nature, and known properties and forms of all-natural bodies (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.169,175).

This will objectifies itself as life, as existence, in such endless succession and variety, in such different forms, all of which are accommodations to the various external conditions, and can be compared to many variations on the same theme. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.220)

There is one common will shared by everyone and everything in the world. It is through being individual subjects of knowledge, and through our body being an object amongst objects functioning under the principle of sufficient reason, that we can know of particular things, of change, of plurality, and of events. Knowledge is the will's servant; it is, in general, an objectification of the will at its higher grades, and the human's organic being, be it brain, or nerves is the objectification of the will at that grade. Therefore, any representation that arises through the human perception is an instrument which serves to aid the will with maintaining and attending to the needs of such a complicated being. The individual finds himself needing to act in relation and in connections with all other objects, and in doing so is always lead back to his body, thus to his individual will. If our perception didn't start from a body, which in itself is only concrete willing, the objects as we know them would have disappeared from our knowledge, we would only understand the grades of the will's objectivity, the Ideas, and the true nature of the thing-in-itself unclouded by

individuality (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.175-176).

Now since as individuals we have no other knowledge than that which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, this form, however, excluding knowledge of the Ideas, it is certain that, if it is possible for us to raise ourselves from knowledge of particular things to that of the Ideas, this can happen only by a change taking place in the subject. Such a change is analogous and corresponds to that great change of the whole nature of the object, and by virtue of it the subject, in so far as it knows an Idea, is no longer individual. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.176)

Knowledge, as we have seen, comes into being for the mere service of the will. For the animals such servitude can never be avoided. For humans, on the other hand, avoidance is possible, but only under certain prerequisites, one of them being the creation and the reception of the fine arts. The moment such a transition in the status of knowledge occurs is sudden and doesn't last for long. The subject's individuality ceases, he/she stops perceiving objects in relation to his/her individual will, transcends the forms of sufficient reason, and perceives the objects as they are and in-themselves divorced from all relations and connections to other objects. "Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither in things, but simply and solely the what." (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.178)

When that 'remarkable' transition occurs, the human loses himself completely in his object of perception, the boundaries between perceiver and perceived intertwine, and at that moment the individual becomes a painless, will-less pure subject of knowing; it seems as if the object existed on its own with no one perceiving it. The human becomes a mirror to the object, his consciousness is no longer occupied with abstract thoughts or concepts of reason, it's filled by nothing but the calm contemplation of the perceived object. Only through such objective apprehension and contemplation of things can anything appear as delightful or interesting. As opposed to passionate love, in aesthetic contemplation, the world appears as beautiful to us, and that is so, only if it's freed from all relations to our individual wills, only if it does not concern us (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.178-179, 1966, p.371-374).

When this type of contemplation happens both the object and the individual are raised

above themselves, the object is no longer a particular thing, it becomes an Idea of its species, and the individual no longer perceives particular things but rather one who perceives Ideas. Now, like the Idea, the individual becomes outside the forms of sufficient reason; time, space, and causality have no meaning for him; the world as representation comes to the forefront, the will, now adequately objectified by the Idea, attains complete objectification (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.179).

Within the Idea, there exists both subject and object, but they are both of equal worth, the object becomes the mere representation of the subject and the subject by intertwining with the object becomes the object itself. This is possible because at that moment of pure representation and complete objectivity of the will, the common will, shared by both the subject and the object, as the in-itself of the Idea, becomes completely objectified in both. Through their shared awareness the will then recognizes itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.180).

What pushed Schopenhauer to view aesthetic contemplation as the surest way to reach the state of pure contemplation was his observation on how humans view their encounters with the sublime in nature. When we view raging sea waves from afar for example, we first realize how small, weak, and insignificant we are in comparison, but then we lose ourselves in the object of our contemplation, we feel that through our common will we are one with the sublime object of nature. That lead him to conclude that the main aim of art seems to be presenting and expressing Ideas at all possible grades of the will's objectivity (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.252).

The mother of the useful arts is necessity; that of the fine arts is superfluity and abundance. As their father, the former has understanding, the later genius, which is in itself a kind of superfluity, that of the power of knowledge beyond the measure required for the service of the will. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.410)

When Schopenhauer writes about the fine arts and the artists behind them, it is to be assumed that he's writing about the genuine genius and not any other type of artist. An outline

of what he considers as genius is, therefore, necessary at this point. Genius is a prevailing capacity for knowledge of the perception/representations. One which Schopenhauer firmly believed was the source of great art, poetry, and philosophy. This type of knowledge requires that the genuine work of art doesn't follow from either contemplation or choice, it rather follows from an instinctive necessity, or what we know as moments of rapture or inspiration. At those moments the artist is relieved from the service of the will and reaches the greatest purity of knowing. The Platonic Ideas, being the object of everything, are also the object of genius, the difference being that with genius they are not apprehended in the abstract, but rather in perception. It is in this full and clear knowledge of perception that the true nature of genius lies. Genius, for Schopenhauer, springs from the same place and starting point as the ordinary intellect. What then happens is a "positive deformity" where the genius is given an abnormal excess of intellect. The genius can't help but perceive the world in its wholeness; he has too much intellect for the service of the mere individual will and hence has to employ his genius universally in the service of the whole human race (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.376-7, 380).

As humans we have two types of consciousness, one is our self-consciousness, consciousness of our individual will, and the other is consciousness of everything else that is will, namely the perceptual apprehension of objects. The two types coexist within the human but as one increases the other has to decrease. The genius is capable of momentarily quieting and denying his individual will, and of reaching enough serenity to enthusiastically enjoy life while forgetting about all personal cares and worries. This self-denial comes at a price though, the whole world as representation becomes condensed in his consciousness, he becomes aware of the in-itself of life, of the uselessness of existence, and that the will is constant suffering and fear; which in turn causes him to deny his individual will and to isolate himself from the rest of humanity (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.267, 1966, p.380, 383).

There is a fine line between genius and madness for Schopenhauer. The reason being that for both the madman and the genius, knowledge is separated from the will; the difference being that such separation occurs in the man of genius because of an excess of such knowledge, for the madman on the other hand, the will withdraws itself from the governing of knowledge and of all motives, the result being an unrestricted will moving blindly and destroying everything in its way. What most clearly sets the genius and the madman apart for Schopenhauer is the ability and power of reflection. Through a strong power of reflection, the artist is able to tangibly present all he has before his eyes, and to express, what others merely feel, in clear words bringing them to consciousness. The madman, on the other hand, lacks the power of reflection and is incapable of reflecting on his present, past, or future (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.382, 387, 402).

Talent is able to achieve what is beyond other people's capacity to achieve, yet not what is beyond their capacity of apprehension; therefore it at once finds its appreciators. The achievement of genius, on the other hand, transcends not only others' capacity of achievement, but also their capacity of apprehension; therefore they do not become immediately aware of it. Talent is like the marksman who hits a target which others cannot reach; genius is like the marksman who hits a target, as far as which others cannot even see. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.391)

The difference between the genius and someone with ordinary intellect doesn't make itself clear right away, the genius still has to consider himself in relation to time and space in order to survive in everyday life even if it causes him discomfort and melancholia. What sets the genius apart from others are the achievements he accomplishes due to his original and crucial knowledge of perception (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.378). Unlike mere talent which is too tied to the will, and which manifests itself in accurate and rapid thinking of discursive knowledge, genius is original knowledge, that is, foreign even to the artist's own ego. Where the ordinary man sees the world in its particularity and in relation to himself, the genius sees the universal in the particular to the extent that he even often forgets about his own wellbeing and needs (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.377-379, 384-385). Thus, the genius becomes a clear mirror to the world, "He does not live, like others, only in the microcosm, but still more in the

macrocosm. For this reason, the whole concerns him, and he tries to grasp it, in order to present it, or explain it, or act on it in practice. For to him it is not strange; he feels that it concerns him. On account of this extension of his sphere, he is called great” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.385).

That's why, according to Schopenhauer, the easiest route for genius to manifest itself, is through the plastic arts (e.g. painting and sculpting). There the genius has only to replicate and project his perception masterfully. With philosophy and poetry, the process is harder since genius is appealing to the imagination to transfer language (known to be associated with reason) into the realm of perception (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.378).

The work of genius as stated above arises out of Ideas, as opposed to concepts which are the source of scientific knowledge. The difference being that science works at the service of the will, it focuses on the concepts, on mere discursive knowledge connecting things to each other investigating their relations, and viewing such knowledge in its completeness. The man of science and reason always looks for functionality, for what is needed at a given time for a given situation. The man of genius on the other hand is too engrossed in objectivity to function in that way, a prerequisite for great art is, in fact, its uselessness and unprofitability. This difference between the genius and the man of science and talent explains for Schopenhauer why throughout history men of science seem to have always appeared in the right time, while men of genius always seem to be in conflict with their times. It also explains why the work of genius has a durability causing it to last for centuries while the work of science or talent seems to be constantly replaced (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.387, 390).

The Idea is conditionally communicable depending on the receiver's intellectual capacity, the receiver has to put himself in the frame of mind of the genius, that's why the most genius works in fine art are deemed obscure and inaccessible to the majority of humans. The apprehension of the Idea demands a change in the receiver; in order for an Idea to reach

our consciousness, an act of self-denial i.e. a denial of the individual will, and perceiving things in a way that completely ignores the individual will is required. Thus, leaving space for the pure mirroring of the objective essence of things. The change in the receiver, since it requires a denial of the individual will, can never originate from the individual will, it rather originates from a “temporary preponderance” of the intellect, meaning a strong pure perceptual brain excitation (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.234, 1966, p.376).

Concept and Idea are fundamentally different, but what they have in common is that as unities, they both represent a plurality of actual things (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.226). The Idea is the unity that has been divided through the spatial and temporal forms of our intuitive apprehension. The concept on the other hand, is the unity of the plurality of the modes of intuitive apprehension mentioned above, this plurality is produced through abstraction by the faculty of reason. The Idea is alive in him who cares to grasp it, and it is ever-evolving, always producing more than has been placed into it. While the concept is what Schopenhauer calls a dead receptacle, it's a vessel that merely holds what has been put inside, and where nothing new can come out (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.235).

With its ever-evolving productive nature, the Idea draws its originality from life itself, from the world, and from nature, and only an artist of genuine genius or a man who was struck briefly by genius would be able to bring it forth to our perception. Since the Idea has to remain in perception, it has to be communicated through the artwork itself. No genuine artist would be able to give a verbal conscious conceptualization of his work “He cannot give an account of his action”. He rather works instinctively, unconsciously and from mere feeling. This doesn't mean the artist doesn't have to think about the work of art being done; some thought is usually needed for clarifying the internal Idea but is never the source (Schopenhauer, 1969, 235, 1966, p.409).

The Idea being the only source of art doesn't stop some from trying to create art

through concepts, through mimicking, recycling, and sucking the nourishment out of genuine works of art. Schopenhauer has a lot of contempt for such imitators of art, even if they have skill and talent. The genuine artist on the other hand contains a productive force, he absorbs and learns from the works of other geniuses but never lets this learning come in the way of his originality; he draws his inspiration from his perceived impressions of life and nature itself. As was mentioned earlier, works that are generated from concepts appeal to the existing public when the concept portrayed is in fashion, but after a few years the concept becomes uninteresting and incoherent, while genuine works of art remain eternal, just like life and nature themselves (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.236, 1966, p.410).

Schopenhauer differentiates between the outward and inward significance of actions, the outward significance being of consequence in the actual world and functioning under the principle of sufficient reason, and the inward significance being deep insight into the Idea of mankind shedding light on parts of it that are usually ignored. The outward and the inward are independent of each other and can easily appear on their own, this is why a historically significant action, for example, can have a very trivial inner significance while a scene from everyday life depicted in a work of art can have great inner significance. Art is only concerned with the inner significance of things, the outer is of no use to it (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.230-232).

Not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom towards the solution of the problem of existence. For in every mind which once gives itself up to the purely objective concealed and unconscious, to comprehend the true nature of things, of life, and of existence... the result of every purely objective, and so of every artistic, apprehension of things is an expression more of the true nature of life and of existence, more an answer to the question, "What is life?" Every genuine and successful work of art answers this question calmly and serenely. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.406)

Fine art is of great importance and value since it encompasses the world as representation in its fullness, achieving what the world as representation achieves but with much greater concentration, intelligence, perfection, and intention. Works of art aim to show

us things as they are in reality by taking away the mist of subjective and objective contingencies. On the one hand, if the world as representation is the mirror and objectification of the will, following it to knowledge of itself, then we will find in art the clarification of such objectivity and the way in which we can begin to comprehend the will i.e. a possibility of salvation. On the other hand, art aids us in contemplating the world as representation isolated and free from the will's control, and losing ourselves in representations in that way is, according to Schopenhauer, one of the most innocent and delightful sides of life (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.266-267).

Chapter 3:

Overview of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*:

Hierarchy of The Arts

Below will be given a summary of the different forms of art Schopenhauer addressed in the two editions of *The World as Will and Representation*. Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetics is based on both his metaphysics and his knowledge of the different forms of art. Each form of art is placed in a different spot on the scale of the grades of the will's objectification, but it's important for him that we recognize that it is the same will, which is already in everyone and everything, depicted in all of them, only with different grades of visibility.

Architecture:

Architecture is a fine art, in so far as it's not considered from the angle of its will serving useful purposes. Considered from its pure, knowledge serving, angle, architecture is a fine art which brings to our awareness the Ideas at the lowest grade of the will's objectivity. Architecture reveals the basic ideas, the simplest most fundamental visibilities of the will, such as cohesion, gravity, rigidity, hardness, and complementary to those, also light. Even at such a low grade of objectivity, one can perceive the will's fundamental discord in architecture; its constant theme is support and load, the delicate suspended conflict and play between the two incorporating all the above-mentioned ideas is what deems it beautiful. Therefore, the whole is dependent on the interplay of the parts and every part is determined by its relation to the whole (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.214-215).

Another art which similarly depicts an interplay between such basic ideas like gravity and rigidity is hydraulics (the artistic arrangement of water). What leaves hydraulics lacking in the face of architecture is that it doesn't combine the practical with the aesthetic.

Architecture, on the other hand, has the downside of being limited by its material, it can unfold all the different forces and ideas inherent in “stone” but it can go no further. In so far as architecture affects us artistically, it affects us dynamically through the above mentioned-ideas, rather than mathematically though form, proportion and symmetry which are properties of space rather than ideas (Schopenhauer, 1969, p214-15, 1966, p.411,414).

Architecture is the only one of the fine arts that serves a practical purpose, it is very rarely created for mere artistic purposes, and herein lies both its uniqueness and limitation. It accomplishes purely aesthetic ends despite its subordination to practical ends foreign to art. On the one side it's restricted by the demands of utility and necessity, and on the other side those same restrictions are what allows it to maintain its status as a fine art. Since considering its narrow sphere, being limited by its material, and its offering the lowest grades of the will's objectivity, architecture wouldn't be strong enough as a self-sustaining art (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.217).

Amongst the fine arts, architecture, music, and poetry are the only ones that offer the thing itself, the complete expression of the Idea, rather than a copy of it through the eyes of the artist. In architecture the artist presents the object/matter itself clearly allowing it the ultimate expression of its nature and hence making it easy for the receiver to subjectively apprehend the Idea (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.217).

The artistic contemplation of architecture is an affective pure contemplation where the contemplator is freed from the suffering of individuality and of the will, and becomes a will-less subject of knowing. The delight of the receiver is not caused by the immediate apprehension of the Idea, but rather through the subjective correlative of that apprehension,

the pure will-less knowing. As we move from one fine art to another we will witness varying grades of the will's objectivity, and the higher the grade of the will's objectification, the more the contemplator will be able to shed her subjectivity and aesthetically enjoy the objective side (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.216).

Plastic and Pictorial arts:

Painting:

The real aim of painting and the fine arts, in general, is to help us comprehend the Ideas concerning the nature of the world, all whilst putting us in a state of pure will-less knowing through the aesthetic contemplation of objective beauty. In addition to this objective beauty, there is a subordinate type of beauty we find produced through the mere harmony of colors, toning, agreeable distribution of light and shade, and through grouping. This subordinate type of beauty is not vital, but it's what initially acts on the subject, it's what catches the human attention and is consequently what facilitates the conditions of pure will-less knowing (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.422).

Painting as a fine art is generally at a higher grade of the will's objectification than architecture. Within itself, different types of painting are assigned different grades of the will's objectification. The lowest grade of the will's objectification in painting belongs to still life painting followed by landscape painting. In still life painting, like in architecture, the subjective side is predominant. In those two types of painting the artist allows us to see through his eyes, and through our subjectively induced sympathy we come to feel and inhabit his state of spiritual peace emanating from the complete silencing of the will he had to achieve in order to be able to immerse knowledge of the Idea so deeply in inanimate objects and with such a degree of objectivity. Since landscape painting is at a higher grade of the

will's objectivity, and since the Ideas revealed in it are more suggestive and significant, the above mentioned subjective side of aesthetic pleasure is balanced out with the objective. Hence in landscape painting pure will-less knowing is not the main objective, the known Idea, the world as representation becomes an objective just as equally (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.218-219).

Following landscape painting at a higher grade of the will's objectivity is animal painting. In animal paintings, the objective aesthetic pleasure has an obvious supremacy over the subjective aesthetic pleasure. In the contemplation of animal paintings, we find the subjective aesthetic pleasure in the spiritual peace, channeled from the artist to the receiver through the artwork, mentioned above, as is the case with any aesthetic contemplation. The difference lies in the fact that its effect is not felt since, through the objective contemplation, the receiver is preoccupied with the frenzy and discord of the depicted will. In animal paintings, we see the will, which constitutes our inner nature, extricated from the control we display over it through thoughtfulness and reason. The will's stronger traits then lay naked before us in clear forms and figures verging on the monstrous and grotesque (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.219).

This brings us to the next type of painting and the highest grade of the will's objectivity in painting, namely human paintings. "Human beauty is an objective expression that denotes the will's most complete objectification at the highest grade at which this is knowable, namely the Idea of man in general, completely and fully expressed in the perceived form" (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.221). The difficulty that faces the artist in depicting human beauty is that even at such a high grade of the will's objectivity, the subjective could never be completely separated from the objective. The human form as an object is one of the strongest when it comes to subjective contemplation, nothing induces pure will-less knowing more, it causes humans to transcend themselves, their personalities, pain, and everything that

torments them. An appropriate depiction of beauty as the character of the individual wouldn't be possible unless the Idea the individual manifests is not seen as an accidental trait special to him/her, but rather as a side of the general Idea of mankind appearing clearly in a particular individual. The individual always belongs to humanity (its species), and humanity can only reveal itself through the individual (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.221-225). "No individual and no action can be without significance; in all and through all, the Idea of mankind unfolds itself more and more" (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.230).

The artist presents nature as he has never seen it, he surpasses nature through his a priori anticipation of the ideal, such anticipation is possible especially for the artist whose gaze is clearer than everyone else since humans are the will itself at its highest objectification merely waiting to be discovered and judged. Humans generally have the capacity of a priori anticipation to a certain extent, it is how they recognize the beautiful in nature. Just as the artist anticipates the beautiful a priori, the receiver recognizes it a posteriori even upon never seeing it before and this is further proof that they are the "in-itself" of nature, they are the will objectifying itself. This a priori anticipation of the beautiful accompanied by reason, experience and a high degree of thoughtful intelligence is what allows the artist to quickly perceive in the individual thing its idea, to understand, and to articulate nature's half-spoken words (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.222-223).

He impresses on the hard marble the beauty of the form which nature failed to achieve in a thousand attempts, and he places it before her, exclaiming as it were, "This is what you desired to say!" And from the man who knows comes the echoing reply, "Yes, that is it!" Only in this way was the Greek genius able to discover the prototype of the human form, and to set it up as the canon for the school of sculpture. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.222)

The quote above illustrates a priori anticipation in human sculpture and how it's clearly present in the Greek sculpting of human forms. For the Greek sculptors every human limb and every movement they perceived in nature was compared to their a priori half-conscious ideal and therefore was subject to their constant criticism and comparison. Only in this way were they able to bring out openly to their consciousness that a priori half-conscious

ideal, and only then were they able to reflect on it and objectify it clearly in a work of art (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.420).

Everything mentioned above concerning painting applies to sculpture according to Schopenhauer, the hierarchy of the grades of the objectivity of the will is the same, the highest grade being human sculpture followed by animal sculpture. The difference between painting and sculpture starts to become clearer when a distinction is made between beauty, in its objective sense, and grace. Beauty being the proper objectification of the will through solely spatial phenomenon, the position that objectifies the will. While grace being the proper objectification of the will through solely temporal phenomenon, the movement that objectifies the will in its most purely adequate expression. The two together represent the clearest phenomenon of the will at the highest grade of its objectification (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.223-224).

Beauty and grace are the main objectives of sculpture, while character, expression, and passion predominate in painting. Painting, unlike sculpture, therefore, has a tolerance for the ugly, it even requires that a lot of the claims of beauty be given up for the sake of the characteristic. Sculpture on the other hand, through its great demand for a universal beauty of all forms, detracts from the characteristic. From this point of view, Schopenhauer concluded that sculpture as a fine art was suitable for the affirmation of the will, while painting was suitable for the denial of the will (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.419).

Poetry:

Schopenhauer defines poetry as “The art of bringing into play the power of imagination through words.” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.424) The aim of poetry as a fine art is to reveal the Idea, to convey to its receiver the grades of the will's objectification clearly as

they have been revealed to and understood by the mind of the poet (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.242).

The true poet, a mind rich in ideas, always communicates his thoughts in the most straightforward, candid way; guided by the moment of inspiration, he doesn't consider how the work will be received nor does he have any external motives. He gathers and brings to our attention everything which is significant and essential while eliminating everything unnecessary and accidental. The false poet guided by how others would perceive him, on the other hand, hides his poverty of mind through being obscure and using uncalled for complex vocabulary. The true poet writes in order to communicate with others the loneliness he feels after discovering the world for what it is with clarity (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.229, p.248).

The genuine poet's work remains meaningful and current for thousands of years, and this wouldn't be the case if he merely presented current phenomena or the popular concepts of his time. The poet has to become the mirror of mankind which reflects its inner nature back to it. His poetry reflects all the recurring situations humans have found, find, and will ever find themselves in, and how those situations will always affect human nature through its common will. Everything that stirs the human heart, that dwells in the human breast, and nature itself are the materials and themes the poet uses to produce his poetry. The poet being the mirror of mankind and having such a wide sphere of knowledge to draw from, has the ability to transform himself entirely, to completely embody each and every character he presents whether superficially different or similar to himself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.249, 1966, p.433).

In the plastic and pictorial arts, using allegory takes away from their perception, it distracts the receiver from the given perception and leads him towards abstract thoughts/concepts. For poetry whose aim, like all art, is the knowledge of the Idea, the opposite is true. In poetry, the concept is first given in words, with the goal of leading the

receiver towards the perceptive. The perceptive in this case has to be conceived in the imagination of the receiver. The concept itself is neither the source nor the goal of the artwork. The concept is the material immediately given, the vehicle which leads to the perceptive and eventually to the Idea (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.240).

Many a concept or abstract thought may be indispensable in the sequence and connexion of a poem, while in itself and immediately it is quite incapable of being perceived. It is then often brought to perception by some example to be subsumed under it. This occurs in every figurative expression, in every metaphor, simile, parable, and allegory, all of which differ only by the length and completeness of their expression. Therefore similes and allegories are of striking effect in the rhetorical arts. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.240)

The poet has to always be careful not to get carried away with the abstract universality of the concepts. Through arranging the intersections of the concepts, he uses and harmoniously combining them, he is able to wrench the concrete, individual, representation of perception, out of the abstract universality of the concepts (Schopenhauer, 1969, p243).

A clue with which we can recognize the true poet is that he has an unforced easy nature to his rhymes; easy to the extent that we feel that they have dawned on him at the same moment the Ideas did. Rhythm and rhyme serve as aids to poetry, they are what engages and grabs the attention of the receiver before he could form any aesthetic judgments, and they are what gives a poem an empathetic power of conviction independent of all reason. Despite their importance, rhythm and rhyme could also be used as a veil which the poet uses to feel safe enough to say what otherwise could not be said. Rhythm according to Schopenhauer has its essence in time only so in Kantian terminology it belongs to pure sensibility, while rhyme, on the other hand, has its essence in sensation in the ears, therefore, it belongs to empirical sensibility. For Schopenhauer, this amounts to the conviction that rhythm is much worthier and dignified than rhyme. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.243-244, 1966, p.427-429)

The range of dominion of poetry is far greater than the other arts in virtue of concepts being the material it uses to communicate Ideas. Ideas of all grades of the will's objectivity can be expressed through poetry. It particularly exceeds other art forms when it is expressing

the Idea of the highest grade of the will's objectivity, namely the Idea of mankind. When it comes to the Ideas at the lowest grade of the will's objectivity though, plastic and pictorial art fare better than poetry since for inanimate objects and animals the Ideas that reveal their inner being can be expressed in a well devised moment. The Idea of man, on the other hand, requires movement and progression which is found in poetry and not in the plastic and pictorial arts (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244, 1966, p.424). "Revelation of that Idea which is the highest grade of the will's objectivity, namely the presentation of man in the connected series of his efforts and actions, is thus the great subject of poetry." (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244) The Idea of man is not merely revealed in his form and expressions, it's revealed in his sequence of actions accompanied by various thoughts and emotions (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244). Poetry also has a flexibility not found in the plastic and pictorial arts given that its representations take place entirely in the imagination of the receiver. It allows for a development tailored according to each individual's scope of knowledge and frame of mind and hence allows for the most vivid representations. The appreciation of plastic and pictorial arts, on the other hand, demands a certain level of cultivation and knowledge; they cannot conform to each individual mind they rather provide one moment to satisfy all (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.424-425).

Our personal experience is the necessary dictionary with which we understand the language of both history and poetry. We've already seen above that poetry seeks to know and understand the inner nature of man, removed from all time and relations, and history accordingly has something in common with poetry, history teaches us what is true in the universal, to know man/men, the behavior of men amongst themselves, and mostly it gives us rules of conduct based on empirical data. Although history doesn't seem to be interested in the inner individual nature of man Schopenhauer argues that some historians see history with artistic eyes, perceiving the Idea rather than the phenomenon or concept and that in cases

such as these man feels he has experienced history poetically. The same goes for personal experience; he believes humans have the capacity to view their experiences with artistic eyes and hence view them poetically (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244).

Different types of poetry exhibit different grades of the will's objectivity, and in poetry, this mostly depends on the poet since we now know that the Idea of mankind develops within the poet and that therefore the line between the depicter and the depicted is blurred. There are countless degrees of comprehension of things, of depth, and of clearness of ideas, and there are just as many poets. Excellence in poetry is not measured by the degrees mentioned above, but rather by how the poet, regardless of his degree, is able to reach the most clarity in depicting all he knows. The two extreme degrees on the poetic objectification of the will continuum are, lyric poetry/song proper, where the poet (vividly) describes his own state hence requiring a great deal of subjectivity, and the tragedy, where the poet's subjectivity completely disappears in front of the depicted. Although all forms of poetry require a genius artist, Schopenhauer believes the tragedy to be the most complete form and the hardest to achieve. Starting from the most subjective, after the poetry/song proper comes, the ballad, the idyll, the romance, the epic proper, and finally the drama/tragedy (Schopenhauer, 1969,248-248, 1966, p.425).

The characteristic nature of the song or lyric proper considered in the narrowest sense deems it, on one side, the projected willing of the poet, all willing which fills his consciousness be it the satisfied willing with all its joy or the unsatisfied willing with the sorrow it brings. On the other side, and simultaneously with it, the poet through contemplating his surroundings, becomes a subject of pure will-less knowing. This latter state of peace produced by the silencing of the will appears in contrast to the former state of agitation and passion; this contrast and interplay blended to perfection by the poet, is what constitutes the ideal lyrical state. The receiver feels the pure will-less knowing as it delivers

her from the turmoil of willing. The genuine song is an expression of a state of mind where the subjective will and the objective pure perception collide (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.250).

The more objective kinds of poetry such as the romance, the epic, and the epic proper, don't have the same interplay as the lyric proper does, although the subjectivity of the poet doesn't completely disappear in them, they rather reveal the Idea of mankind through intelligently presenting significant characters and creating a charged situation where those characters can present their inner nature. Those kinds of poetry objectify the Idea of man and reveal the depths of the human mind because the Idea of man has the ability to adequately express itself in remarkably individual characters (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.251, 252, 1966, p.432).

“At the moment of the tragic catastrophe, we become convinced more clearly than ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.433). Tragedy, the highest poetical achievements, has one main goal, that is, to portray the terrible side of life, “The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the triumph of wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are all here presented to us; and here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of the world and of existence. It is the antagonism of the will with itself which is here most completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity, and which comes into fearful prominence” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.252-253). Tragedy shows the suffering of humans both by the hands of fate through chance and error, and by the hands of humans themselves through the self-mortifying behaviors of their individual will, or through the perversity and wickedness of humans towards one another. The antagonism of the will with itself causes the humans who fundamentally share the same will to violently attack one another; they act motivated by and in relation to their surrounding phenomena therefor egoistically. This will-induced violence is only softened by the light of knowledge, refined and purified by suffering

itself, this goes on until the individual reaches the point where all veils are removed, then and only then do the previously powerful motives lose their force and does the real nature of the world act as quitter of the will and inducer of a state of resignation, and eventually leading to salvation i.e. not only giving up life but also giving up the will-to-live. That's why we often see in tragedy the noblest of men, after sudden intense suffering, start to renounce all worldly pleasures and gladly give up on life itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.253). The receiver's pleasure in poetry doesn't belong to the realm of the beautiful, it belongs to the realm of the sublime and the highest grade of it too. By allowing us to find pleasure in something which opposes the will, tragedy forces us to lose interest in the will to live in order to act in a purely perceptive way; through transcending the will to live we come to learn something that we could have never learned positively, we understand that life can never offer us true satisfaction and hence is not worth our attachment to it, we learn "that which does not will life" (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.433).

Poetry and philosophy are related in so far as they both seek knowledge of the Idea, of the inner being of humanity; difference arises in the way they seek that knowledge. We already know the poet reaches the knowledge of the Idea through first exploring the particular and individual in life and humans, and then accurately describing them and using them as examples, until he reaches the knowledge of the whole of human existence/the Idea. So, although he appears interested in the individual he actually uses it as a means to reach the whole. That's why, taken out of the context of the poems, some sentences that tragic poets wrote hundreds of years ago are still relatable and find frequent application in real life. Philosophy, on the other hand, reaches the knowledge of the Idea through seeking the inner nature of things/the truth, which expresses itself in poetry and other fine arts. Schopenhauer analogized the relationship of poetry to philosophy, to that of experience to the empirical science; whilst experiences/poetry attempts to acquaint us with the particular and the

individually important, empirical science/philosophy attempts to acquaint us with the totality of the phenomenon through universal concepts. He also suggested that philosophy was more attached to reality or in another sense older and wiser than poetry, since poetry, naïve and youthful, shows the interesting side of life divorced from the painful, even in the cases of dramatic and tragic poetry, while in reality, life is only interesting when there's pain (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.427).

We have thus far considered the fine arts as Schopenhauer classified them. We started with architecture as the objectification of the will at the lowest grade of its visibility, revealing minimal signs of the will's discord through the conflict between gravity and rigidity. Our consideration of the arts ended with tragedy, which revealed to us, with the most clarity, the highest grade of the will's objectification, namely the extreme internal discord of the will. Schopenhauer separates music from the rest of the fine arts, the reason why will be made clear as we proceed (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.255-256).

Music:

Music, unlike the other arts, does not work on copying or projecting Ideas regarding the inner nature of mankind, it rather transcends the perceptual world, it is a universal language which deeply moves man's innermost being. While the other forms of art stimulate the knowledge of the Ideas through presenting them in individual artistic works, inevitably entering the principle of sufficient reason in the process, music passes over the Ideas, freeing itself from the phenomenal world. Music is the most immediate and direct copy of the will itself without the interference of Ideas; compared to music all other arts speak of mere shadows while music speaks of the essence. Although both Ideas and music are objectification of the will, and although there are as many grades of the objectification of the

will in music as there are Ideas, they do not objectify it in the same way but rather through parallel ways. Schopenhauer points out how difficult it is to grasp such an obscure notion since what he's claiming is that music is a representation of the will, the will which we already know could never be directly represented (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.257).

Melody, however, says more; it relates the most secret history of the intellectually enlightened will, portrays every agitation, every effort, every movement of the will, everything which the faculty of reason summarizes under the wide and negative concept of feeling, and which cannot be further taken up into the abstractions of reason. Hence it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and of passion, just as words are the language of reason. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.259)

The melody for Schopenhauer mirrors man's inner nature; it mirrors the constant fruitless striving towards the satisfaction of desires. For humans, the lack of satisfaction is suffering, and the lack of young desire is stillness, boredom, and we see this striving depicted in the nature and structure of the melody itself. Music through its constant succession of cords, alternating between some exciting desire and some satisfying it, mirrors the life of the will; and just as the will's most significantly felt satisfaction and relief follows from the most intense desire we see how the satisfaction in the melody is intensified through delay and momentary dissatisfaction. Therefore, the creation of the melody is the work of remarkable unprecedented genius, a genius who has abandoned all conscious intention, all reflection, and who solely relies on inspiration. The composer (musical genius), mirrors the world and expresses it with extreme clarity in a language which his faculty of reason does not comprehend. His work stems completely out of the unconscious, explaining how more than any other artist we see in him a distinct separation between the man and the artist (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.260, 1966, p.455-456).

Every possible event and manifestation of the will that takes place within man, all manifestations which our faculty of reason allocates under the concept of emotions, can be projected through the infinite possible melodies, but only according to the kernel, the in-itself of the phenomena freed from its body. The melody never supplies us with specific emotions,

the strong affectations the experience of music provides us with, are our attempt to shape the invisible, to grasp the ungraspable will, and as our imagination is already easily stirred by music, we project suitable emotions on the music (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.261-262).

Just as the Idea of mankind as the highest grade of the will's objectification doesn't exist independent of other lower grades of the will's objectification, music as the complete objectivity of the will doesn't exist without the harmony which rises out of the interaction and union between the different grades of the will's objectification. It is only in such harmony and union does music make the inner discord of the will clearly visible (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.265-266).

Schopenhauer stresses the opinion that music is not a mere aid to poetry and that it could exist independent of it. He goes further to argue that music is the most powerful of all arts since it is self-sufficient, meaning it finds its resources within itself. He even argues that if words are added to music, they have to remain in a subordinate position adapting themselves completely to it, and in the rare cases where the words inspire the composer, words still remain subordinate since the composer brings out an inner meaning underlying the words which could have never been reached without music. The reason we welcome poetry with music and find joy in it is that our most direct and indirect methods of knowledge are stimulated at the same time in complete unity, we receive the movements of the will accompanied by their objects (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.448-449).

Music like tragedy presents to us the vivid suffering common to the human will, but they never cause us actual suffering, they maintain a pleasurable sensation even in their most painful parts. This is because we enjoy perceiving the veiled side of our will which contains all its strivings, afflictions, and sorrow. In real life our experience of suffering is different because we don't objectively perceive it as we do with the arts, our subjectivity causes us to view everything, including suffering, in relation to our individual will (Schopenhauer, 1966,

p,451).

Finally, Schopenhauer placed architecture and music at the extreme ends of the spectrum. They contrast in almost all aspects even in the form of their appearance, given the fact that architecture solely exists in space, with no reference to time, while music exists solely in time with no reference to space (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.453).

In conclusion, presented above was the summary of Schopenhauer's full series on the arts and how they reveal to us knowledge concerning our existence, on different grades of the will's objectivity. Why it was important for him to do so and why instead of opting for creating art himself he chose to write about it is a question he more or less answered when he wrote about the philosophy of history. For him history as we know it is never truthful since it only speaks of specific events and individuals, leading us to only reflect back on our subjective wills. What Schopenhauer calls for is for us to realize that however different the events and individuals we discuss are, and however many decades separate them, the will/essence in them remains one and the same, constantly and forever repeating itself. What his writing calls for is the awareness of such repetition, of finding the common consciousness, the common qualities in humanity, the bad before the good, and in realizing that whatever change we see in cultures or individuals is but a triviality. In the power of writing, he sees an act of defiance, against time which buries the Ideas and leaves us to start anew. In such defiance we would stand even against death which constantly interrupts the realization of the common consciousness. Through writing, a thought started by one person could be continued decades later by another, and understanding the past in such an active way would help in understanding ourselves, our present, and drawing conclusions as to the future. What philosophy aims to do is create concepts and a permanent universal knowledge out of the fleeting images and moments when art provides us with the truth concerning life. Since however accurately art shows us the truth concerning life, that knowledge is always fleeting

and ungraspable. What Schopenhauer is aiming for is an immortal truth (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.406, 444-446).

Chapter 4: Overview on Freud

Before delving into Freud's take on art and Schopenhauer's both direct and indirect influence on him, it's best to give a summary of psychoanalysis, its basic concepts, and their application.

Freud was a physician interested in mental disturbances, in “functional” nervous diseases (what later came to be called neuroses), hysteria in particular, at a time when the biological model was the most prominent, and when physicians were trying to explain psychic disorders physically. His curiosity concerning hysteria was particularly about how patients who are physically healthy could suffer from severe somatic (bodily) symptoms such as paralysis. From a scientific point of view, it didn't make sense, and during his training under Charcot, a neuropathologist at the time, at the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, Freud's confusion grew when he saw Charcot hypnotize such hysteric patients and successfully suggest their symptoms away. Such confusion led Freud to the realization that the line humans had set between their body as object and mind as subject wasn't as clear as had been previously assumed.

At first, Freud used hypnosis and suggestion, but he soon realized that not every patient could be hypnotized and that even if hypnosis worked it would simply work on resolving the symptoms and not on making the cause of such symptoms appear to the patients once they are in a waking state. Then moving away from hypnosis and suggestion he established a new method which came to be known as psychoanalysis. That method starts off by inviting the patient to make themselves comfortable on the analytic couch with the analyst sitting behind them and out of their field of vision, and by the analyst assuring the patient of the session's confidentiality and nonjudgmental attitude. Now relaxed and free from many sensory impressions, the patient is asked to “freely associate”, to say whatever comes to their

mind involuntarily, skimming the surface of their consciousness, however irrelevant, disturbing, unimportant, distressing, or embarrassing it is. In collecting and focusing on this usually discarded material Freud noticed that there were apparent gaps in the patient's memories, areas where the connection was broken, and where the patient felt apparent discomfort at either trying to focus on retrieving such memories or at actually retrieving them (Freud, 1904, p.1556).

One of Freud's most important concepts, that of repression, sprang from this above-mentioned observation. Freud observed how his neurotic patients were mostly leading “normal” lives up until they were faced with an experience which caused a distressing and self-contradictory affect or idea to appear, and which they had to quickly forget since it threatened to collapse their psychic structure. Freud concluded that repression was the force which caused such forgetfulness in order to avoid the un-pleasure which conscious knowledge of the repressed would cause. He also concluded that a defensive force, resistance, was at play in order to protect the repressed material. Resistance works by either completely blocking the material from reaching consciousness or by distorting it and hence making it harder to recognize. Consequently, the greater the resistance the greater the distortion. Symptoms are one of the outcomes of repression when the distressing material is repressed it is not completely erased, it always finds ways to manifest itself in unusual ways, namely, the symptoms. Freud then developed what he called “the art of interpretation” in order to make the pure unconscious repressed material conscious. Psychoanalytic interpretation applied to all types of free association stretching from the resistances of repressed material mentioned above to dreams, unexplained bodily symptoms, bungled actions, and slips of the tongue. The art of interpretation together with the free association provided the basis of the psychoanalytic technique. The end goal of such a technique was neither merely making the unconscious completely conscious nor revealing all repressed material, it was rather a

tackling of the roots of psychological ailments, in the hopes of the symptoms completely disappearing, meaning, of the practical recovery of the patient's health (Freud, 1904, p.1557-9) (Freud, 1924, p.4106).

Although Freud abandoned hypnosis very early on in his psychoanalytic career, it served as a clue to what would later be one of the main concepts he's associated with, namely the unconscious. Freud noticed that under hypnosis his patients recalled traumatic experiences, and immoral, contradictory, or unusual fantasies, which didn't leave memory traces in their consciousness, but hugely affected their conscious life through neurotic symptoms. Physicians at the time, as we have mentioned earlier, were explicitly biologically oriented and a concept such as the unconscious, despite Freud's claims at its scientific nature, was met with opposition and distrust. For philosophers, on the other hand, the matter was split, some believed that the mental was merely a phenomenon of consciousness, while others, most notably Schopenhauer, had long theorized the existence of an unconscious mental faculty. That being said, Freud felt he was the first to ground the abstract philosophical concept of the unconscious and make it tangible (Freud, 1924, p.4102-p.4104) (Freud, 1925, p.4124).

The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand, processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would be bound to stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes. (Freud, 1915, p.2996)

The core of the unconscious consists of all kinds of different and contradicting wishful/instinctual impulses, which all coexist without being influenced by each other since the system of the unconscious has no regard for reality and is therefore without the concepts of time and contradiction; it is the realm of the illogical. "There are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees of certainty The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the

system Cs.” (Freud, 1915, p.3009-10) All which is repressed is unconscious, but the unconscious is not merely the repressed. Further proof of the unconscious is that in everyday life we often think, feel, and do things that seem to have no conscious motive, and which might even contrast with our conscious processes; we also wake up remembering dreams that don't seem to make any sense to us. Before anything enters the unconscious, it has to pass through a censorship which then decides whether the resistance should keep exerting effort to repress it or whether it is to be free, not conscious yet, but with the possibility of becoming conscious at any time. Consciousness is an extremely 'fugitive' state, economically not everything can stay conscious at the same time, the mind would be overwhelmed, and so, the preconscious, a derivative of the conscious and the third element of the conscious/unconscious topography, exists to hold all that has the capability of being called into consciousness. The preconscious differs slightly from the conscious; the preconscious is the system which endows the material which is to become conscious with temporality, it controls the reality testing and hence doesn't allow for contradictory wish fulfillment, and it is also the container of all conscious memory (Freud, 1915, p.2997-9, p.3010).

The division between Freud's three topographical psychical processes is not permanent or absolute, we saw that what is preconscious can be made conscious, that what is unconscious can possibly be made conscious through external, most likely, psychoanalytic help, in states of psychoses (loss of the reality/imagination barrier), or even in dream states as we will see later, and that the preconscious can temporarily become unconscious in the cases of forgetting names and of general slips of the tongue. As for the communication between the three psychical processes, Freud argues that it is wrong to assume that the preconscious does all the psychical work while the unconscious rests or that their relationship is merely one of repression where the preconscious throws its unwanted material in the abyss of the unconscious. The unconscious is very much alive and active and maintains a relationship of

cooperation with the preconscious at times (Freud, 1940, p.4970). The unconscious as per our understanding so far is guarded by resistances that don't allow the repressed material to exit. The resistance doesn't function when material is flowing in the other direction though. Which means that the unconscious is often affected by external perceptual experiences. Whether such external perceptions have the power to cause any change in the unconscious is another matter. Psychoanalytic treatment is built on the prospect of influencing the unconscious through conscious processes and proves that despite it being a hard task it's not impossible. Another unelaborated yet note-worthy observation of Freud's is that the unconscious of one person can directly react and influence the unconscious of another without such communication having to pass through the conscious (Freud, 1915, p.3016).

Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception - that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world. (Freud, 1915, p.2995)

Freud believes that reality will always remain unknowable to us and that therefore true knowledge of our psychical apparatus is extremely hard to achieve. Since just like any other type of knowledge, knowledge of the psychical apparatus is reached through the medium of the apparatus itself, but that humans nevertheless need to figure out how to apply a system of inference to themselves, meaning they should try to view their mental processes objectively, to detach from their subjective conflicts and begin inferring and constructing a number of unconscious processes that seem to underlie and control their mental life in order to insert them into conscious processes (Freud, 1915, p.2993).

We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions - which we imagine, that is, as resembling a telescope or microscope or something of the kind. (Freud, 1940, p.4957)

Freud was not the first to make this above-mentioned assumption, but he believed that

the way he worked out the concept was a scientific novelty. According to him philosophers before him did tackle the concept although only in abstract terms, he argues that the difference between what he did and what philosophers had always done is that he grounded philosophical theories in lived experiences, he reached knowledge of this psychical apparatus through investigating human beings and their individual development (Freud, 1940, p.4957).

The investigation started with the study of the most archaic and obscure province of the aforementioned psychical apparatus, namely, the id. The id according to Freud forms the core of our being, it is present at birth, it is our constitution, our temperament, and everything that is inherited. This implies that the instincts we are born with find their initial formulation in forms unknown to us (Freud, 1940, p.4957).

The id exists in the realm of the unconscious, it expresses the true purpose of a single organism's life, which is the satisfaction of its innate needs, and it doesn't give any regard to keeping the organism alive or protecting it, but soon the human being in whom the id is the sole ruler has to face the real world, the real world being a myriad of undifferentiated sensory stimulations threatening to penetrate the subject after that realization. Freud theorizes a portion of the id has to undergo mandatory development, it has to form a shield to protect against un-pleasurable stimuli. This new province is thereafter called the ego, the ego not only acts as a shield from stimuli, it also becomes the intermediary between the id and the external world, and since it does so it connects between sense perception and muscular action, which means that it controls all voluntary movement (Freud, 1940 p.4957).

In the course of the id's development some of its contents remain unchanged/innately present and therefore inaccessible at the core of the unconscious and some are transported into the preconscious state and therefore absorbed into the ego since the ego has the quality of being preconscious; the ego could, during its development, decide to return some of its material to the unconscious id, such acquired id material is what we consider the repressed.

The ego has the task of self-preservation in the external world, it does so through storing up experiences about different events and stimuli in the memory, then using such experiences, to send danger signals to the person by means of anxiety in order to activate flight from excessively strong stimuli, to cope with moderate stimuli, and to actively bring about advantageous changes in the external world. In the internal world, on the other hand, it has to win control over the instinctual urges of the id, it has to decide which instincts would be appropriate to act on without causing the person acting on them or others harm in the external world, which instincts are to be acted on immediately, and which should be postponed until an appropriate time. For this reason, the ego is the faculty in charge of repression. What guides the ego in its operation of instincts is the amount of tension found in the instinct itself or caused by it, the rhythm of changes in tension for the ego translates as pleasure and un-pleasure, the decrease of tension being pleasure and the increase of it being un-pleasure. The instincts represent the somatic demands on the mind, and the ultimate cause of any activity, in themselves they are ungraspable, they can only be known or understood through the ideas attached to them. Both the ego and the id operate under the pleasure principle (seeking pleasure/avoiding un-pleasure), in the ego, the operations of such pleasure-seeking are clear as was just mentioned, in the id, on the other hand, things are more complex. The id, despite the fact that it is cut off from the external world, has a perceptual realm of its own, which gives it the ability to acutely detect all its internal changes, especially the fluctuations of the tension of its instinctual needs, and translate them to our conscious perception as feelings of pleasure and un-pleasure. It seems that the highest aim of our psychic apparatus is, pleasure, a state of (Nirvana) which could only happen through the extinction of instinctual needs. The problem which arises here is that the knowledge available of the id is reached through the medium of another agency, and although affects (pleasure & un-pleasure) reach us directly from the unconscious, the ideas and instinctual impulses attached to them remain

unconscious, which therefore then causes them to attach to conscious substitutive ideas or aims that determine their future qualitative character. The more we delve into the unconscious id the more we grasp its illusive contradictory nature (Freud, 1940, p.4957, p.4973, p.5005).

Freud calls the representation of sexual instincts libido. Sexual instincts for Freud are much more complex than the need for a genital union between two people, and he acknowledges that such complexity in the theory of sexuality had been reached before in the work of Schopenhauer. The instincts in general and the urgency they present themselves with often gets in the way of self-preservation, they can lead to extreme conflicts with the external world, and even to extinction, the ego in this case has to often raise its defenses and deny the sexual instincts any satisfaction causing them to seek satisfaction in indirect ways by either assuming the unhealthy deflected satisfaction of symptoms, to assume the neutral way and manifest themselves in dreams, or to assume, through the help of psychoanalysis, the healthiest satisfaction, namely, sublimation, as we will see later on. Freud based his libido theory on the assumption that the libido is not originally tied to the outside world but rather to the person/ego itself, and that only later on after realizing that the outside world satisfies its vital needs does the libido start flowing to external objects. After that moment the libido instincts are differentiated from the self-preservative instincts. The ego should ideally act as a reservoir for the libido from which it can allow for a flow from and to objects. Psychoanalytic treatment attempts to free the libido from the objects it had previously been bound to for unconscious reasons and to place said libido at the conscious disposal of the patient (Freud, 1917, p.3609-10) (Freud, 1924, p.4125).

The instinctual stimuli's force comes from within the human mind, and that's what makes it so difficult to abandon. If one receives unwanted physical stimuli, for example, the first reaction would be to run or shield oneself from such stimuli until they dissipate. With

instinctual stimuli, on the other hand, one is incapable of running away from him/herself, one also realizes that they are a constant force that never dissipates without being satisfied in any way possible (Freud, 1915, p.2958-9).

Freud narrows down all instincts to two basic instincts, the Eros, the self-preservative, species preservative instinct which allows for libidinal activities whether self/ego love, or object love, and whose final goal and striving is to unify, bind, and connect, and the Thanatos, the destructive instinct whose final goal is to lead all which is living into its original early inorganic state, and which is therefore also called the death instinct.

During childhood, a relatively long period when the child has to be dependent on its parents, the ego develops a special agency which internalizes the paternal function, this third and final province of the structure of Freud's psychic apparatus is called the super-ego. Once the super-ego emerges and becomes differentiated from the ego it becomes yet another power the ego has to take into account. A power which harshly judges the ego watches over it and censors its strivings, ready to punish it at any moment. The super-ego's main function seems to be the limitation of satisfaction, it is in charge of what we think of as our conscience, it punishes the ego for actions and un-acted on intentions with equal harshness, through inducing fear, anxiety, and guilt, the ego then has to constantly find a way to obtain satisfaction whilst keeping the super-ego content. The ego has the task of simultaneously satisfying the demands of the super-ego, the id, and reality/the external world, all whilst reconciling their demands with one another. The relationship between the ego and the super-ego is fundamentally built on fear and is understood when it is traced back to the child's relationship with, and attitude towards its parents first and foremost, then less so their families, teachers, respected social figures, culture, and the social milieu which they represent. The super-ego as mentioned above is the internalization of the paternal function,

but it's severity as Freud pointed out is not directly related to the severity of the paternal figures. If the paternal figures were too strict and punishing during the ego's early years, the ego, too fearful, realizes it can neither pursue instinctual satisfaction nor appropriately react to such severity, and therefore internalizes and reflects back the aggression it feels towards them. If the paternal figures were too permissive on the other hand, the ego realizes it needs an internal regulatory punitive system and therefore develops a severe super-ego (Freud, 1940, p.4958) (Freud, 1930, p.4519, 4524).

In a way the ego and the super-ego are derived from the id, the id and the super-ego don't have a direct connection since the ego acts as an intermediate between them, they do have one thing in common though, both the super-ego and the id represent influences from the past. The id being the influence of heredity, and the super-ego being the influence of what has been internalized and taken over from other people during childhood, whereas the ego is determined by experiences both current and past (Freud, 1940, p.4958).

Freud also saw that it was almost impossible to assign the two basic instincts, Eros and Thanatos, to one or the other provinces of the mind, they almost never appear in isolation from each other and it seems to him that both the life and death instincts where available, fused together, during the time when the ego was not yet differentiated from the id, and that the Eros preservative instinct might be what precipitated the split in order to neutralize the destructive tendencies (Freud, 1940, p.4960).

Thus it may in general be suspected that the individual dies of his internal conflicts but that the species dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world if the latter changes in a fashion which cannot be adequately dealt with by the adaptations which the species has acquired. (Freud, 1940, p.4961)

The death instinct comes to our attention when its destruction is directed outwardly. Before the formation of the super-ego and if the super-ego is too weak, the death instinct threatens to destroy the external world. What the super-ego does is that it fixates a substantial amount of the aggressiveness of the death instinct unto the ego and hence operates as a self-

destructive instinct. It again falls on the ego to find a way for some discharge of destructivity without disturbing the external world and to protect the psychic apparatus from internal destruction. Unlike the death instinct, the life instinct's functions start from the inside out. The life instinct's libido seems to be stored up in the ego where the instant of the self/world separation happens and when the possibility of self-love occurs, and it is only after the occurrence of self-love is object/other love possible (Freud, 1940, p.4961).

There can be no mention of Freud without his work on dreams, dreams as Freud argued are 'the royal road to the knowledge of the unconscious', they are the best indication of dynamics of the unconscious. The concept of dream work very briefly is that during sleep the defenses of the ego are weakened and the repressed unconscious material starts surfacing. The ego possibly considers this a compromise, an act of compliance to the id that doesn't allow for the resistance to completely subside, therefore the material is usually a disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes. The dreams in a way resemble the neurotic symptoms in their structure, they, like the symptoms, appear nonsensical at first glance but once subjected to free association and interpretation, we are lead to their hidden meaning. A dream is therefore also a harmless useful temporary madness which can easily be terminated through an active act of will by the subject at any time, and after which psychic functions can resume normally (Freud, 1940, p.4980-82).

Psychoanalysis, Freud believed was the first to point out a weakness in our repressive psychic and cultural systems; he believed that there should be a reduction in the severity with which we disavow and repress our instincts and that there was an immense need for a new system of truthfulness where the repression of certain instinctual impulses is replaced with the much better and more reliable sublimation (Freud, 1924, p.4128). As is clear by now, repression is a subjugation of the immoral side of humanity, usually sexual, aggressive, or

selfish impulses, it results from either facing such forbidden and crude impulses from the external world (trauma), or facing them from within (fantasies). Repression is considered an incomplete subjugation though since the repressed impulses always find a way of expressing themselves as symptoms and in extreme cases causing debilitating illness. The repressed finds expression in symptoms because the instinctual impulses eventually always get their satisfaction, repression also requires a great expenditure of psychic energy and its removal would result in a saving of energy from an economic point of view (Freud, 1924, p.4106).

The aesthetic appreciation of works of art and the elucidation of the artistic gift are, it is true, not among the tasks set to psycho-analysis. But it seems that psycho-analysis is in a position to speak the decisive word in all questions that touch upon the imaginative life of man. (Freud, p.4117, 1924)

The imagination in Freud represents the freedom from repression, it protects the Idea/id which it is committed to. Through having access to the ego, imagination is capable of transporting material from the unconscious to consciousness through the act of creating art. After transcending its illusory nature, knowledge of the imagination alone is capable of “the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality” (Marcuse, 1955, p.140-143). The imagination has the power to reconcile and portray the contradictory unconscious/id without facing resistance from the ego. In Schopenhauerian terms, the imagination allows the chaotic universal will to be an object of our perception through the Idea.

There emerges from time to time in the creations and fabrics of the genius of dreams a depth and intimacy of emotion, a tenderness of feeling, a clarity of vision, a subtlety of observation, and a brilliance of wit such as we should never claim to have at our permanent command in our waking lives. There lies in dreams a marvellous poetry, an apt allegory, an incomparable humour, a rare irony. A dream looks upon the world in a light of strange idealism and often enhances the effects of what it sees by its deep understanding of their essential nature. It pictures earthly beauty to our eyes in a truly heavenly splendour and clothes dignity with the highest majesty, it shows us our everyday fears in the ghastliest shape and turns our amusement into jokes of indescribable pungency. (Freud, 1900, p.570)

Freud claimed that art and philosophy can be interpreted as dreams, that it is possible for psychoanalysis to detect the path leading from the instinctual unconscious wish to the work of art, to detect the emotional impact the work of art leaves on the observer, and to

detect both the affinity and difference between the artist and the madman (neurotic). While dreams, art, and philosophy project the results of unconscious functioning, psychoanalysis reflects such projection inwards towards self-understanding. (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.286)

The artist's ability to project his unconscious material could be the reason why Freud associated the artist with the madman. Like the madman, the artist does not repress his unconscious affects and instinctual impulses. Another affinity the artist has to the madman is also the fact that they both see the world for its truth, they both see the suffering and fear which permeates it. The complete withdrawal of the ego would mean chaos, nothing would stand in the face of the ravenous unconscious id's instincts, but in the artists, a letting go of the control of the ego is required in order for the unconscious to be able to show itself (a letting go of the individual will in Schopenhauerian terms). The difference between the artist and the madman resides in the artist's ability to sublimate. Through his strong power of reflection, the artist is able to project all he has before his eyes, and for that to occur, the previously unconsciously repressed has to be made conscious, to be accepted, and to be integrated into our scheme of perception. So, although both artist and madman have an issue with repression, the artist is able to find an outlet for the material meant for repression (Freud, 1924, p.4117).

Psychoanalysis has been explicitly concerned with the question of art since Freud realized, as early as 1910 in *Leonardo Da Vinci And A Memory Of His Childhood* that he couldn't write about human conscious and unconscious experiences without writing about art. "Another path led from the investigation of dreams to the analysis of works of imagination and ultimately to the analysis of their creators - writers and artists themselves" (Freud, 1914, p.2902). Since then the tradition of exploring art has lived on in psychoanalysis and has been inherited by many other traditions (e.g. the modern art therapy schools). Earlier we mentioned that Sublimation was the healthiest form of instinctual satisfaction. Psychoanalysis

discovered that there was an aspect of creative mental work that attends to the fulfillment of long-repressed wishes without meeting any frustration from the external world. Freud believed that the myths, works of imaginative writing, and of art had a strong yet incomprehensible connection to the unconscious. For that reason, psychoanalysts since the time of Freud have been interested in works of literature, art, and the psychology of artists. "Fate can do little against one", in whom the yield of pleasure from artistic, psychical, and intellectual work is heightened (Freud, 1930, p.4479). Such a claim is similar to the resignation in the face of tragedy which Schopenhauer associates with the denial of the will-to-live achieved through art. During the process of sublimation, the instincts, now known to have the ability to readily change their object at the hopes of satisfaction, allow themselves redirection from their original aims, thus allowing their energy to be at the disposal of the 'cultural development', and in that act of redirection most of the significant cultural achievements are reached. Sublimation for Freud could have been very possibly forced upon the instincts by civilization (Freud, 1924, p.4116-25) (Freud, 1930, p.4494). Freud was faced with a lot of critique when suggesting that our highest cultural achievements and our ability for fine art which we pride ourselves in as a species is the outcome of the redirection of the same crude and 'animalistic' urges that we denounce and have no wish of being reminded of (Freud, 1924, p.4125).

Substitutive satisfaction provided by art is according to Freud an illusion, but one which is psychically effective and enjoyable due to the role of phantasy/imagination in mental life. Art is capable of causing us to withdraw from the pressure of our instincts and the un-pleasure of the external world, but Freud doesn't believe it's strong enough to make us forget real misery. When the ego was developing its sense of reality, the imagination was absolved from the obligations of the reality-testing, it was set apart as the agency through which the fulfillment of difficult wishes could be carried out. The fact that the imagination

doesn't go through reality testing and ties it to the unconscious and hence places art under the dominion of psychoanalysis. The artist finds happiness in giving his phantasies body, it is a satisfaction objectively less intense than those of the crude impulses, but it does, oddly enough, offer the artist and the observer an adequate refined form of satisfaction. Through the power of the artist, works of art are enjoyed by those who aren't creative themselves (Freud, 1930, p.4474-80).

Finally, psychoanalysis demands a distinction between the knowledge of the analyst and that of the patient. The analyst doesn't tell the patient what she has discovered about his psyche right after she acquires such knowledge. The analyst's knowledge is put off until the moment the patient seems to be about to make the same discovery himself, if the analyst is too hasty in giving interpretations, the information would either provoke extreme resistance causing further repression or it could threaten to stop analysis altogether. The mode in which the patients gain knowledge about themselves is of great significance and will be discussed later. In the face of the ego's forces fighting against itself, repression, un-pleasure at laying itself open, guilt arising of its relationship with the super-ego, and the satisfaction of instincts the illness provides, the patient's capacity for instinct sublimation and transcendence, as well as the patient's relative intellectual powers are the constituting factors to whether the patient has favorable or unfavorable prognosis (Freud, 1940, p.4988-9).

Chapter 5: Freud and Schopenhauer's Philosophy

You may perhaps shrug your shoulders and say: 'That isn't natural science, it's Schopenhauer's philosophy!' But, Ladies and Gentlemen, why should not a bold thinker have guessed something that is afterwards confirmed by sober and painstaking detailed research? (Freud, 1933, p.4711)

Schopenhauer's influence on Freud is undeniable, its extent on the other hand is debatable. We know Freud had a great deal of respect for Schopenhauer's thought and that he himself recognized many similarities in their theories. This chapter will start with presenting the most prominent similarities in Schopenhauer and Freud's thought and as we move on it will get to other less obvious similarities, all whilst demonstrating why Freud believed his work grounded Schopenhauer's thought in the experience of individuals.

Probably very few people can have realized the momentous significance for science and life of the recognition of unconscious mental processes. It was not psycho-analysis, however, let us hasten to add, which first took this step. There are famous philosophers who may be cited as forerunners - above all the great thinker Schopenhauer, whose unconscious 'Will' is equivalent to the mental instincts of psycho-analysis. (Freud, 1917, p.3615)

Many of those who investigated the relationship between Freud and Schopenhauer such as, R. K. Gupta (1975), D. W. Hamlyn (1988), Young and Brook (1994), and Robert Grimwade (2011), amongst many others, claimed that Schopenhauer's will was parallel to Freud's id, that they were both ravenous blind raging forces unknown/unconscious to us which nevertheless held complete control over us.

Hamlyn saw that if we employ our intellect in investigating our psychic nature we are bound to conjure a theoretical need for a hidden powerful aspect of the psyche since consciousness can't account for everything (Hamlyn, 1988, p.5-6). Gupta also claimed that Freud's beliefs concerning the human condition were aligned with Schopenhauer's general concepts. He saw that the will and the id are both irrational, that they only act or wish, and that they are concerned with satisfying their needs at any price, to the extent that they wouldn't even care about the survival of the individual in whom they present themselves. He

said that there was never enough satisfaction to quench their thirst, that both their desire systems rely on alternating tension and relief. (Gupta, 1975, p.722-723). Grimwade also saw that Freud and Schopenhauer shared a common world view and had similar philosophical affinities. He pointed at both their pessimistic views regarding the power of human intellect and reason in the face of powerful conflicting unconscious forces, and regarding human nature in general, and that they both claimed mental illness was a disorder of the memory (Grimwade, 2011, p.149).

Gupta does mention a fundamental difference between the will and the id, which is that the id is individual while the will is general and to be found everywhere, and that the will, once objectified, brings its survival force with it, while the id needs the ego for protection (Gupta, 1975, p.723). I believe a distinction, which hasn't been addressed in any of the previous studies, needs to be made between the free all-encompassing world-will and the will objectified in the individual. The one all-encompassing will shared by everyone should rightly be equated with the Freudian unconscious. Considered from the view of consciousness they are both illogical, both follow an obscure system where good and evil are meaningless, both don't follow the laws of contradiction, are free of doubt, morality, negation, and are timeless. Although the will and the id share a great many similarities, like those of acting on pleasurable instincts, being a body of unconscious drives, being timeless, and irrational, the id is merely a province in the individual's psychic apparatus, one that is there from the very first second of the individual life. The unconscious reflects itself and communicates through the id up until the psychic apparatus is alerted, through the preservative instinct Eros, that the individual in which it resides would perish if left to the blind force of the unconscious and is in need of preservation; from there arises the ego which is first and foremost a self-preservative province. So, if there is a great deal of similarity between the id and the world-will it is because the id is unconscious.

We could probably also rightly equate the id with the Schopenhauerian Idea, the Idea being the highest and clearest objectification of the will, one that does not function under the principle of sufficient reason and therefore could not have the qualities of space, temporality, and causality, but which nevertheless has the quality of being object for a subject as it is already individuated in a subject; the same applies to the id, it shares almost all the characteristics of the unconscious, and like the unconscious it doesn't follow the laws of reason or logic, but it has the quality of being object for a subject, of being a part of the individual's mental apparatus. It could be argued that the id is dynamic while the Idea is not, but just as the id is part of a dynamic unconscious, the Idea is the clearest representation of the dynamic will and therefore is obligated to have the will's chaos and activity represented through it. The unconscious and the universal will/thing-in-itself are exclusively approached through our arduously reached knowledge of the id/Idea. It could even be speculated that it was through such objectification of the will/unconscious into the id/Idea that the Eros preservative instincts were able to gain ground on the Thanatos destructive instincts and form the ego. The individual will in this case should therefore be equated with the ego, they are both the product of the individuation of an all-encompassing force. They both aim at the preservation and protection of the individual from the external world and from its internal conflicts alike. The forms of sufficient reason apply to the ego and the individual will, giving them control over conceptual and logical knowledge and authority over the individual's decisions regarding what is considered safe and what is not, which humans are to be considered trustworthy and even potentially helpful, and which excitations are to be allowed into consciousness and which aren't, in most cases at least, as we shall see later.

The large extent to which psychoanalysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer - not only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the mechanism of repression - is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life. (Freud, 1925b, p.4234)

Robert Grimwade Mentioned in, *Between the quills: Schopenhauer and Freud on sadism and masochism*, that Freud was alive at a time when Kant's and Schopenhauer's works were on 'every bourgeois coffee-table', so despite Freud's claims at not having read Schopenhauer before coming up with his theories, Schopenhauer's thought was in the immediate consciousness around him (Grimwade, 2011, p.168). Many, such as Young and Brook (1994) have investigated whether Freud was earnest in his claims of having not read Schopenhauer earlier in his life or whether he wasn't. Although inconclusive, through tracing young Freud's philosophical influences, the literary trends at the time he was in university, and the “curiously ambivalent” pattern of his mentions of Schopenhauer, Young and Brook (1995) concluded that the similarities couldn't have possibly been confined to cultural influence. Such investigations, for the purpose of this thesis merely shed light on the difficulty of tangibly tracing Freud's work to Schopenhauer. What remains clear to us is the uncanny similarity between their doctrines.

Freud equated health with true knowledge of the self which requires a disavowal of our usual mode of knowledge and leads to an avoidance of future maladies, as he articulated:

You behave like an absolute ruler who is content with the information supplied him by his highest officials and never goes among the people to hear their voice. Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn first to know yourself! Then you will understand why you were bound to fall ill; and perhaps, you will avoid falling ill in future. (Freud, 1917, p.3614)

After Freud came out with his psychoanalytic theory and technique, and especially after he developed the complete structure of his psychological apparatus, he was met with a lot of denial and opposition. He believed that such strong denial and opposition was due to psychoanalysis being a huge injury to man's narcissism, the fact that the ego is not master in its own house, that the ego could extend beyond the individual, that some force he is unaware of controls the experiences he thinks he consciously engages in, that the mental does not coincide with the conscious, that the apparently most trivial and obscure mental functions can have a repressed meaning and causation, and that symptoms were substitutive satisfactions,

was a tough pill to swallow by most. What is conscious is usually enough to cover a person's basic needs, which, more often than not, helps maintain the illusion that one knows all that one could possibly know, the deficit starts to make an appearance through instinctual conflicts. At this time the illusion of consciousness breaks and 'the will extends no further ' than what is known, the ego realizes that knowledge reaches it through untrustworthy and incomplete perceptions. Freud also compared this narcissistic injury to both, the biological blow man received when the wall of superiority he had set up between himself and other creatures was destroyed through Darwin's theory of evolution, and the cosmological Copernican blow when man discovered that the universe doesn't revolve around him/the earth. It was in the same paper *A difficulty in The Path of Psychoanalysis* where Freud spoke of the affective difficulty humans encounter in attempting to understand psychoanalysis and of Schopenhauer taking the first step into knowledge of the unconscious that he spoke of how Copernicus' discovery was already made long before Copernicus' time. That fact didn't stop it from being the Copernican discovery, so it is probably correct to assume that Freud felt the same way about Schopenhauer's influence. Freud believed he became deserving of his discovery once he tied his name to it. He acknowledged the fact that Schopenhauer made the same discovery before him, but given the scientific paradigm he tied himself to, he believed, as we saw in the first quote in this chapter, that through 'sober pain-staking and detailed research' he elevated Schopenhauer's discovery from the passive abstractness he associated philosophy with, into the active evidence-based realm of science. Philosophy, unable to reach any deep self or world understanding, resorts to the imagination to create meaning. This for Freud means that any understanding of the unconscious in philosophy, or in our case that Schopenhauer offers, is a mere wishful speculation (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.281). Freud didn't settle for merely making a discovery and sharing it with mankind. Injuring/helping mankind with his discovery required force and the ability to withstand the backlash of the

injured, something Freud didn't believe philosophy was capable of. That's why he claimed that while he was being attacked and rejected Schopenhauer was looked at with respect and reverence for making the same discoveries. (Freud, 1924, p.4107) (Freud, 1925, p.4129) (Freud, 1917, p.3614-15).

If such a sorrow, such painful knowledge or reflection, is so harrowing that it becomes positively unbearable, and the individual would succumb to it, then nature alarmed in this way seizes on madness as the last means of saving life. The mind, tormented so greatly, destroys as it were the thread of its memory, fills up the gap with fictions, and thus seeks refuge in madness from the mental suffering that exceeds its strength, just as a limb affected by mortification is cut off and replaced with a wooden one ... (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 193)

Another similarity between Freud and Schopenhauer is in their explanation of madness and its relationship to repression. Schopenhauer focused on the psychic origin of madness whilst acknowledging its possible somatic causes, and also acknowledging the great characteristic similarity and intertwining of the psychic and the somatic in madness, how a psychic pain can appear as a bodily discomfort and vice versa. He theorized that madness occurs when the thread of the memory breaks, but the mind distorts and modifies it enough, so it appears whole. He summed it up by saying “we can regard the origin of madness as a violent “casting out of one’s mind” of something” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.401). For the said casting out to occur, a setting in, of something else has to occur, which is what Schopenhauer speculated happened in most cases; he also spoke of the rarer 'reverse process', where the mind is fixated on, sets in, one thought, while casting out all others. This reverse process happens in cases of trauma (sudden frightful occurrences), or love frustration (a longing for a person or an object) (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.401). We can already equate the first case where the casting out of one's mind and setting in of something else occurs with Freud's theory of repression, which states, as we have already seen, that if the mind is faced with unwanted, contradicting, or disturbing material, it represses such material into the unconscious out of conscious reach and the resistance replaces such material with potential symptoms. As for the second case of fixation, Freud too speculated that the only experiences strong enough to

break through the ego defenses were traumatic excitations. When the traumatic excitations are too intense, the ego defenses cease to work, and the mental apparatus gets flooded with stimulus hence fixating on the unwanted experiences. (Freud, 1924, p.4106)

In both cases mentioned above the sure sign of madness is when a person cannot trust their perception, when they are unsure of whether their recollections are true or not.

Schopenhauer made sure to differentiate between this inadequacy in reality testing, and between the inability to tell whether a recollection was a mere dream, which in this case wouldn't be a sign of madness. The madman can, on some occasions, think properly, or even have creative ideas (flashes of wit), but he can never be trusted when it comes to past perceptual recollections (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.401).

Every new adverse event must be assimilated by the intellect, in other words, must receive a place in the system of truths connected with our will and its interests, whatever it may have to displace that is more satisfactory. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.400)

Humans as we have already seen, relate all their perceptions and experiences to their individual will/ego, and therefore when something happens which causes a stirring of the will, whether through causing un-pleasure, wounding the ego, or interfering with wishes, they tend to not be able to view such interferences objectively or to investigate them properly.

What the will chooses to do in the face of such inconvenient interferences is to, 'unconsciously sneak off from them', while putting more attention on remembering pleasurable sensations. If the human is faced with events the will is completely unable to bear, the assimilation or modification of memory threads carried out by the will fails, and whole events or memories are suppressed beyond the intellect's grasp. The intellect renounces its nature for the sake of protecting the will's pleasure. "In this resistance on the part of the will to allow what is contrary to it to come under the examination of the intellect is to be found the place where madness can break in on the mind." (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.400)

Mentioned is another point of similarity between Freud and Schopenhauer. Despite the fact that Freud believed he was the first to tackle the inadequacy of the repressive forces in the

face of blind satisfaction seeking instincts, he believed that in connecting resistance with memory lapses he was separating himself from the philosophical tradition. (Freud, 1914, p.2885) We see here that Schopenhauer thinks of the repressive forces as the doorway to madness, and as we have seen and will see later, they both choose to solve the problem of repression through art. Freud solves it through sublimating the instincts meant for repression, and Schopenhauer through turning away from the individual will and the instincts that exist under its dominion.

When Schopenhauer spoke of the artist as the mirror of mankind, bringing to its consciousness everything it does and feels, he meant that the artist, being in a state of pure knowing, has given up his consciousness for the sake of letting his intellect roam free of the laws and relations of the will in order to mirror the objective world. On the one hand freeing the intellect means things cease to be perceived in their relations, it means the forms and colors of things appear in their true essence, on the other hand it has implications for the person who's 'goaded by no willing' (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.249) (Schopenhauer, 1966, P.373).

The similarity between the madman and the artist for Schopenhauer resides in the fact that for both the madman and the genius the intellect is separated from the will. If the will sees everything in relation, it's with the aim of preserving the individual, so it makes sense that once the will loses control over the individual, and with the blind world-will in charge, that the human/artist, now interested in the theoretical and the objective, ignores all that is personal and practical and almost stops paying attention to their welfare. The freeing of the intellect also means that the artist becomes more sensitive and susceptible to feeling all emotions in their fullness, to lacking the coolness and sobriety of the rational man guided by his will, all whilst feeling a prevailing melancholy that results from seeing the world in its true essence, namely suffering. Now such high sensitivity, lack of rationality, and inclination

to mood swings, all cause the artist to live in isolation from the rest of humanity. It is difficult for others to accept him and for him to find anyone similar to himself (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.384-385, p.389). For Freud, as we have seen in chapter four, the similarity between the artist and the madman resides in the fact that, like Schopenhauer's artist he is free from the pressure of the ego's resistance and repressive forces giving him the ability, like the madman, to project unconscious material. In moving away from the ego's control, Freud's artist has to live with the weakening of the preservative instincts that come with such control, and therefore like Schopenhauer's artist is left vulnerable to the effects of external and internal stimulus.

With them it is willing, with him it is knowing, that prevails; hence their joys and pleasures are not his, nor his theirs. They are only moral beings, and have merely personal relations; he is at the same time a pure intellect that as such belongs to the whole of mankind. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.390)

The difference for Schopenhauer between the madman and the genius is that the separation of intellect from the will in the man of genius is caused by excess of the knowledge of the essence of things, while for the mad man on the other hand, the will withdraws itself from the governing of knowledge and of all motives. The result of madness is that the will moves blindly and destroys everything in its way while the result of genius is that the artist reflects such blind will as he sees it. In the genius the will's induced violence is softened by awareness, by the light of metaphysical knowledge. Such knowledge in the face of great tragedy, the most intense exhibition of the ruthlessness of the will, for example, sends the individual into a state of resignation, a denial of the will-to-live, which Schopenhauer believes is a road to salvation. Freud makes a similar distinction between the artist and the madman. For him the madman is controlled by either the blind forces of the unconscious id or the symptoms resulting from inadequate repression. What differentiates the artist is his power of reflection, the ability to suppress instead of repress exhibited in the conscious awareness of the instincts that need to be sublimated, satisfied in a way which

doesn't meet any resistance from the internal and external world.

Schopenhauer claims that there is a great deal of similarity between the artist and the child as well, in both there is a great deal of energy directed at mental activity, for the child it's because of its developmental nature while for the genius it's because of the excess in intellect (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.393). He claims the similarity between them could also be caused by the fact that, as opposed to normal adults, they both are driven by intellect, the brain, and are not occupied with sexual instincts, the will's/ego's needs, and therefore have more time and mental capacity for theoretical work. They both view the world from the point of knowing and not that of willing, they view it as something strange, exciting, 'a drama', and therefore with objective eyes (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.394-395). "The relationship between the two shows itself primarily in the naivety and sublime ingenuousness that are a fundamental characteristic of true genius." (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.395) Psychoanalysis would agree with such a statement to an extent, given the fact that the artist sublimates the sexual instincts amongst other such as violence.

To make the matter clear, let us compare our consciousness to a sheet of water of some depth. Then the distinctly conscious ideas are merely the surface; on the other hand, the mass of the water is the indistinct, the feelings, the after-sensation of perceptions and intuitions and what is experienced in general, mingled with the disposition of our own will that is the kernel of our inner nature. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.135)

Although Freud believed he was alone in his call for critical self-reflection, in his call for caution at accepting anything our faculty of reason offers without attempting to understand what lay behind it, Schopenhauer's formulation of the unconscious in that quote could easily pass as a quote by Freud. Schopenhauer gave examples of the desires we hide from ourselves in order to uphold a positive image we may have of ourselves, and of the wishes we don't know we have until they are fulfilled. He even alluded at a dynamic unconscious, saying that the intellect cannot "penetrate into the secret workshop of the will's decisions" (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.210), and that all our perceptions and the judgments we

consciously make are a result of an automatic unconscious process “in the deep obscure depths of the mind” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.136).

The human generally, being an objectification of the will, has access to the inner nature of things through consciousness of his own inner-self (not to be confused with the relative-self). As we have already seen, such self-knowledge is not an easy task; we cannot grasp the essence of things through the Ideas alone or through any seemingly objective knowledge for that matter, and even if we get past the objective perception we are then faced with the harder task of getting past our own individual will, eliminating all willing (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.364). In our immediate perception of the world we almost always view things in relation to ourselves/our individual will, and therefore we only perceive them relatively and not in their absolute essence or existence. The will with all its emotions and passion has a tendency to falsify our knowledge, we tend to base our judgments, our decisions of aversion and affection, and even our original perceptions of things on mere preferences. Such limiting relative perception doesn't just apply to objects, it applies to our perception of other humans, as well as our perception of ourselves, and Schopenhauer believes that such a relative mode of perception is not only the involuntary norm for humans but also is the only available form of perception for some (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.372-373).

A task such as eliminating willing cannot arise from a conscious act of the will itself, even if we consciously make such a decision, its main force is beyond our control. Since our consciousness is split into self-consciousness, consciousness of our individual will, and consciousness of the world, consciousness of all other perceptual experiences and apprehensions, it makes sense that a turning away from the will would involve the latter type of consciousness. “Accordingly, the consciousness of other things, or knowledge of perception, becomes the more perfect, in other words the more objective, the less conscious of ourselves we are during it” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.367). Through introspective self-

observation we can easily come to the realization that the more pressing one of the two types of our consciousness is, the more the other withdraws. As we have already discussed, focusing on the object and detaching from the subject creates a state of pure perception, a pure will-less knowing, whether through encounters with the sublime or through a strong, solely perceptual, excitation of the brain, the turning away from the will becomes possible and objects present themselves with clarity and distinctness. We come to apprehend the universal will in things as well as in ourselves. Our consciousness then becomes almost the mere channel through which the perceived objects appear as representations, in such a state we can no longer tell whether we, as individuals, belong to the world or not (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.367-368).

When Schopenhauer spoke of representations falling under the principle of sufficient reason, through time, space, and causality, he claimed that we had to eradicate our individual subjective knowledge in order to become pure subjects of knowledge. If we didn't have our bodies, which are concrete willing as our modes of perception, we would have been able to grasp the true nature of the thing-in-itself unclouded by individuality. In the Freudian context the ego is the obstacle in the individual's way towards pure knowing/ knowledge of the unconscious. The ego employs the intellect in the service of the pleasure principle in the same way that knowledge exists for the service of the individual will. The human is capable of salvation from such servitude through the fine arts; Schopenhauer describes it as a moment where the subject's individuality ceases, where they stop perceiving the world through viewing the object in relation to themselves but rather when the boundaries between perceiver and perceived, blur and the human becomes a mirror to the object. Only then is he able to turn away from the individual will.

In *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud speaks of an 'oceanic feeling', meaning a feeling of overwhelming unity with the world, a dissolution of the ego and becoming one

with the external world as a whole. This concept of a fleeting oceanic feeling which encapsulates our relationship with the external world may sound odd in the context of Freud's concept of the psyche, but Freud argues that the ego does not have as clear boundaries as we would like to think, for psychoanalysis had already discovered that the ego extends inwardly into the unconscious, and that in certain pathological cases (psychosis) the boundary between the ego and the world becomes unclear (Freud, 1930, p.4465-6).

The ego originally included everything but with the passage of time and being exposed to un-pleasurable experiences it detaches itself from the external world and what we are left with later on are only the shriveled remains of the once intimate feeling and all-inclusive bond the ego and the world had. The healthiest state the mature ego could attain, for Freud, is a state of mobility where it is free to extend to objects and retract back into the subject. When the oceanic feeling comes about, it is there as a reminder what once was and of what could be, a time without individuation. Freud also connected the oceanic feeling to states of meditation and mystical rituals where the fixation on bodily sensation, thought and breath regulation, can cause new sensations of selfhood and a regression into the earlier state of ego extension. For many people this originary feeling of oneness exists on equal footing with their mature demarcated ego feeling, for those people the oceanic feeling of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe is much easier to come about. Although Freud claimed that art is one of the few things which could induce the oceanic feeling, he didn't go into the details of such a process, or whether he had in mind the artist when he wrote about those who experience a high originary feeling of oneness (Freud, 1930, p.4467-8, p.4472).

Freud viewed psychoanalysis as an affirmation of Schopenhauer's theories on unconscious processes, repression, and the importance of the sexual instincts in the life of man; that being said, an important distinction between Schopenhauer and Freud's views is in the highest form of 'salvation', that is, the solution, according to each to the problem of being;

for Schopenhauer as we have already seen, it's the denial of the will to live, the turning away from the individual will, while for Freud, it's the regulation of instincts and moving towards civilization. "What we call happiness in the strictest sense comes from the (preferably sudden) satisfaction of needs which have been dammed up to a high degree, and it is from its nature only possible as an episodic phenomenon." (Freud, 1930, p.4475) Schopenhauer speaks of desire in the same way, if a situation which originally caused pleasure is prolonged, the pleasure turns into mild contentment, it is our fate to feel pleasure in a contrast and very rarely from a state of things, our happiness is restricted by our constitution. With the passage of time and the increase of un-pleasurable encounters with the external world, man's idea of happiness stops being the pursuit of pleasure and starts to be the mere avoidance of un-pleasure. Freud recommends that we seek happiness through becoming members of the human community and through working for the good of humanity against nature, subjugating it to the human will; but he also believes that we can reach happiness through complete isolation, a turning away from the world and from the inner instinctual needs, that such happiness would then be the happiness of quietness. All that being said, when it comes to happiness Freud believes that each human must find the particular way in which they can be 'saved' (Freud, 1930, p.4475-76, p.4482). Freud claims that after man discovers the immense danger of the immediate satisfaction of instinctual needs and after the fear and frustration of the external world leads him into a struggle with reality, he discovers that he would be safer amongst others who wish to renounce/repress their instinctual needs, and from there arose civilization (Freud, 1924, p.4128).

This aesthetic attitude to the goal of life offers little protection against the threat of suffering, but it can compensate for a great deal. The enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly intoxicating quality of feeling. Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it. (Freud, 1930, p.4481)

There is a particular type of happiness humans feel when beauty, in all its forms, is presented to their judgment. The artist's capacity to anticipate the beautiful and create it, and

the receiver's ability to recognize beauty upon seeing it with no previous reference is proof for Schopenhauer that humans, understood beyond their individual will, are the essence of the will. Investigating beauty and its appreciation was an elusive task for Freud but he concluded that it must be derived from the field of sexual feelings, he thought it was a perfect example of how an impulse could be inhibited in its aim/sublimated. Almost no one could write off beauty as a triviality despite it not serving any real use in the immediate survival of the human, it is one of the cornerstones of civilization (Freud, 1930, p.4481, 4491).

If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal reasons - becomes inorganic once again - then we shall be compelled to say that 'the aim of life is death' and, looking backwards, that 'inanimate things existed before living ones. (Freud, 1920, P.3740)

The difference between Freud's and Schopenhauer's routes to salvation has just been addressed. Freud didn't believe a turning away from life was either the solution to the problem of being, or the aim of the will. What Freud didn't take into account though was his concept of the destructive death instinct, the instinct which calls for a return to our earlier inorganic nature, meaning death, an instinct which he believed had the preservative instincts working at its service in order to follow the path to death on its own terms. Jacqueline explains existence according to Schopenhauer as "a constant process of dying and a momentary postponement of ongoing death" (Jacquette, 1999, p.294), which, to me, sounds a lot like Freud's formulation life as the mere dying on our own terms. Now although Young and Brook claimed that Schopenhauer never accounted for a death drive because for him the inevitability of death was bad enough without assuming humans sought death (1994). Grimwade also pointed out that there was no equivalent to the death instinct in Schopenhauer's work, claiming that Schopenhauer's will always wills itself, always wills life, and that even if Schopenhauer allowed for a few of its outward manifestations he certainly didn't account for the 'death instinct proper' (2011, p.153). In my opinion, Schopenhauer never had to account for a death drive because his universal will, just like the unconscious, in

which the Eros and the death instinct coexist, is to its core, all inclusive, chaotic, and capable of holding contradictions possibly beyond our conception. Just as the blind world-will, objectified in the subject, as phenomena, appears as will to life, the unconscious, individuated in the subject's psychic apparatus, appears as Eros. The will bears its destructive nature in internal and external conflicts alike, the will's fabric is as disturbed when man is subjugating man, nature, and animals for his pleasure and survival, as when man is conflicted between internal opposing desires and drives. It is exactly this destructive force of the will which is associated with art and draws us to the sublime raging forces in nature, to the ugly, painful and disturbing in art, and to tragedy and music (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 354).

Freud never wrote that the unconscious is the fabric of being, like Schopenhauer did with the will, partly because he was too concentrated on the experience of the individual, and partly because such a notion would have been unlikely to cross his mind. That doesn't mean he didn't speculate or note his amazement on the phenomena of one unconscious affecting another without any conscious awareness from both parties. In the creation of art especially, the artist communicates how, as a pure subject of knowledge, he reflects his, and the world's inner nature. Such knowledge is possible to communicate for Freud due to the unconscious intercourse possible between humans. For Schopenhauer it is because once the subject of aesthetic contemplation falls in a state of pure perception, the will becomes objectified in the artist and the receiver alike, it recognizes itself in them.

As we have seen in chapter four, the unconscious, despite not being able to communicate ideas because of repression, is still able to communicate affects. Now since Schopenhauer and Freud both agreed that the genuine work of art proceeds from an instinctive necessity/moment of inspiration which produces material that could seem foreign to the artist's own ego, and since the process of art entails a weakening of resistance, much like dreams. It's fair to say that a lot of the artist's unconscious affective content is able to

show itself. Therefore, art offers a platform where unconscious communication is possible. As a result, art is concerned with the inner importance of things, and it is of great value because it encompasses and exhibits the world as representation in extreme richness while aiming to show us things as they really are at their essence.

Just as it is necessary for the artist to be able to communicate unconscious material and to be able to reach the pure knowledge of things, the receiver of the work of art has to engage with the work of art on a deep enough level for the resistances to abate. Such a process requires a certain intellectual capacity and willingness on the side of the receiver, the understanding of art demands a change in the receiver in order for the essence to reach consciousness, this change is the act of will/ego denial.

As we have understood, Schopenhauer believed that there were two layers of aesthetic contemplation. The first layer is pure will-less knowing where the pull of beauty itself causes one to avoid the unpleasant or worrying thoughts of everyday life and fall in a state of calm contemplation; from that first layer arises the feeling of delight associated with art. One could speculate that Freud's oceanic feeling has a similar effect on the ego causing it to unwind, and to seek the pleasure of momentarily forgetting about its struggles. Once the aesthetic contemplation takes over, the subject indulges in the pleasure of losing the ego/self-boundaries and forgetting about its fear and suffering; here the whole pleasure of the contemplation resides in such loosening of the ego boundaries. The second layer is the knowledge of the essence/Idea of the will/unconscious, which in a genuine work of art makes itself visible as representation. This second layer brings with it perceptions of chaos, and unsettling feelings regarding the fundamental struggle and discord of the will/unconscious. Beauty seduces the ego/individual will and pulls them towards it causing them to flow out into the perceived object, blurring the lines between subject and object. It also causes the ego/individual will to exert less energy on resistance and therefore allows for the second layer

of contemplation, the emergence of the universal will/unconscious material, to take place. This second layer of contemplation is where the possibility of denying the will, of salvation, occurs.

All suffering resides in our individual will, and in certain types of art the first layer of contemplation, the turning away from the will, and withdrawal of the subjective side of consciousness itself constitutes the entire pleasure. In the lowest grade of the will's objectivity amongst the arts, architecture already exhibits the will's fundamental discord. Such discord in architecture according to Schopenhauer is what makes it beautiful. Psychoanalytically considered, when viewed as shelter, it is the practicality and importance of architecture to the ego preservation which first draws the person to it, once the ego is pulled, the aesthetic side can then make its way through resistance and into the unconscious affective life.

The plastic and pictorial arts differ from architecture in that they are at a higher level of the will's objectivity; therefore, whilst offering the same pleasure of losing the ego boundaries, feeling at one with the universe and forgetting about all fears and worries, they also help in the understanding and comprehension of the essence of the self and the world. As we move through the different arts and the different grades of the will's objectivity we find that for Schopenhauer the idea of mankind represents the highest grade of the will's objectivity, and that the arts that exhibit human image like painting, human form like sculpture, or an intense human emotional range like tragic poetry, are considered at a higher grade of the will's objectivity than the rest of the arts. Psychoanalytically this could be attributed to the fact that it is easier for humans, in this case for artists, to project their transferences and unconscious life onto a human ideal, we often see that even in dreams however distorted or nonsensical they might be, the ones that leave a strong after effect always contain a human element. It seems that the higher the grade of objectification of the

will, the weaker the resistance. Music, on the other hand, for Schopenhauer is unlike the other arts since it speaks directly from the essences of things, it stems directly from the unconscious, and psychoanalytically that could be attributed to the fact that music, being beyond the faculty of reason, is viewed as unthreatening by the ego and therefore doesn't face resistances or repressive attempts, giving it an advantage over all the other arts. Music like tragedy offers us a clear representation of the suffering of our conflicted instincts, and of the chaos contained in the will; they also manage to still be pleasurable and that is because through them we learn to view suffering without its relation to our ego/individual will; they are rather grasped by the id/idea before anything else. It could be argued that such a clear visibility of the will/unconscious doesn't need to lure the ego/individual will in with beauty, it rather presents such a stark reflection of the unconscious that the id/idea, now lured in by its own reflection, compels the individual to engage with the work of art. This could explain why the ugly, gruesome, and tragic in art still offers an aesthetic satisfaction.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Connecting Freud's thought with Schopenhauer's and attempting to showcase Schopenhauer's influence on Freud is not a new topic. Many have attempted it and many more probably will. The advantage this thesis has in this regard is that it focuses and attempts to portray philosophy and psychoanalysis with equal clarity and weight. Most of those who did write on the relationship of the two thinkers seem to have been either inclined towards philosophy, choosing to compare their ethical and aesthetic theories, therefore missing important psychoanalytic distinctions, or they seem to have been psychoanalytically inclined, attempt to isolate the psychological aspects of Schopenhauer's work, therefore missing the chance to get an impartial picture of both their works combined. One of the things the reader should come out with from this thesis is that the line between the psychological and the philosophical in Freud's and Schopenhauer's doctrines is far from clear.

So it comes about that psycho-analysis derives nothing but disadvantages from its middle position between medicine and philosophy. Doctors regard it as a speculative system and refuse to believe that, like every other natural science, it is based on a patient and tireless elaboration of facts from the world of perception; philosophers, measuring it by the standard of their own artificially constructed systems, find that it starts from impossible premisses and reproach it because its most general concepts (which are only now in process of evolution) lack clarity and precision. (Freud, 1925, p. 4125)

In being functional and having an aim such as the removal of mental disturbances, psychoanalysis already disengages from philosophy and art. It also cannot be classified under the culturally important but useless. At the time when Freud gave life to psychoanalysis, he knew he was standing in opposition to psychiatry/science; that being said, he still saw himself as a man of science. Earlier we touched upon some of the reasons Freud might have been drawn to avoid association with philosophy. According to Berthold-Bond, Freud wasn't satisfied with philosophy (metaphysics specifically) and felt that the philosophical tradition was unable to conquer its resistances in order to 'look into itself', in order to reach health. Philosophers, according to Freud, used illusory metaphysical explanations of the world as a

defense against having to actually face the unconscious and its repressed material. Freud's seeming aggressiveness against philosophy and unwillingness to acknowledge the clear influence of philosophers like Schopenhauer on him probably sprung from his dissatisfaction with philosophy (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.275). Freud's dissatisfaction with philosophy wasn't a passive one. In a letter he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess in 1896, he said that he aimed to create an objective philosophy. Berthold-Bond speculated that Freud aimed to achieve such an objective philosophy by transforming metaphysics, the comfort of illusions, into the science of metapsychology, the psychological reality of everyday life. Psychoanalysis would then be the sublimation of philosophy since it is willing to face the unconscious and come out with scientific knowledge regarding the nature of the world (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.275-277). Freud was torn between his meta-psychological theories and between defending himself against the claims of being unscientific.

Schopenhauer claims that both philosophy and poetry seek knowledge of the inner being of humans, but that they reach it in different ways; they both start from the particular, but while philosophy seeks a general all-inclusive understanding of the inner nature of things, poetry speaks from particular and important individual experience. After what has been said throughout the thesis on philosophy, poetry/art, and psychoanalysis so far, one could argue that psychoanalysis holds a middle ground between the two, because while it focuses on individual experience, it also considers itself a science which could have wider application and explain concepts universally. Now we can ask ourselves, what does it mean for Psychoanalysis to be situated somewhere between philosophy and art, and between philosophy and science? Like philosophy and art, it seeks knowledge of the inner nature of things and an understanding of things in their universality and particularity; but while art and philosophy start from the point of intuitive knowledge, psychoanalysis claims to start from scientific functional knowledge. Freud considers his feat, a feat of scientific reason against

the “wish-projections” of the philosophers. Through translating the abstract/spiritual language of the philosophers into scientific language Freud believed he achieved his task. (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.276, p.279)

Schopenhauer believes that humans have the capacity to view their experiences poetically hence with artistic eyes, which gets us wondering what it would mean for psychoanalysis to consider such a notion. Freud often spoke of psychoanalysis as the art of interpretation, and if we hold him to it and treat the psychoanalyst as the artist and the therapy process as the work of art in the Schopenhauerian sense it would give us interesting results to say the least. The analyst like the artist is interested in the inner significance of things, she looks at the same thing as everyone else but while others deem it as trivial she sees something different in it, pointing out to the patient personal content, which, has been there all along, but, which was nevertheless foreign to the patient's own ego. Freud describes the patient's state of mind during analysis as such:

He may himself notice that a very remarkable psychological problem begins to appear in this situation - of a thought of his own being kept secret from his own self. It looks as though his own self were no longer the unity which he had always considered it to be, as though there were something else as well in him that could confront that self. He may become obscurely aware of a contrast between a self and a mental life in the wider sense. (Freud, 1926, p.4331)

The therapy process is similar to the experience of art in that the analytic session should first and foremost put the patient in a relaxed state (laying on the couch), for the ego defenses to be lowered, much like we explored how beauty attracts the ego and lures it into lowering its defenses. The patient is encouraged to free associate, much like how the ego flows out in the contemplation of art. During free association affects are released through language just as they are through actions (Freud, 1895, p.11). It's worth mentioning that Schopenhauer himself believed in the power of association when it came to recalling or conjuring up unconscious material; he said that we have only to look for the “thread on which it hangs through the association of ideas” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.133). The analyst also tries

to avoid being perceived in the usual relational mode humans usually adopt. She, like the Schopenhauerian genius artist, is supposed to be a mirror to the other, in this case the patient. Psychoanalysts realize how hard, sometimes impossible, it is to not be perceived in such a relational mode, but they nevertheless attempt to do their best to avoid such relativity. The analyst sits behind the patient for example, so her facial expressions and posture doesn't affect the patient's self-reflection, she avoids going into any details regarding her personal life for the same reason. Also, as was pointed out in the last paragraph of chapter four, in psychoanalysis there is a distinction between the knowledge of the analyst and that of the patient, the analyst avoids giving advice and opinions and doesn't make interpretations until the patient is about to make the interpretation himself. In Schopenhauerian terms that could be because knowledge of Ideas is more valuable than the knowledge reached through concepts. Once the analyst detaches herself enough to explain to the patient information regarding their inner selves, she stops being a mirror and they are now both in the realm of concepts/the ego, where Freud pointed out they would definitely be met with the ego's resistances, and not Ideas/the id, where the knowledge has conscious access to and influence over the unconscious. We can already assume that if we wish to correlate the therapeutic session/process, with a form of art in Schopenhauer's philosophy, we would most likely correlate it with poetry. The first and most obvious reason being that they both employ language and concepts in order to appeal to the imagination of the patient/receiver. Although psychoanalysis relies immensely on language and speech, Freud sees in psychoanalysis a different way of perceiving them. The concept/language when employed in therapy and poetry is not given as an ends in itself, the psychoanalyst doesn't wish to spoon feed certain concepts which she believes to be correct, she rather translates the unconscious's alien language into one which is familiar to the ego/individual will and harmoniously combines the translated concepts, so when the time is right, she can lead the patient to use their imagination

in order to conceive an individual suitable perceived truth out of the abstract concepts. Freud compared ordinary language to scattered ruins of a temple; some people would settle for such scattered ruins and derive meaning out of them, while psychoanalysis aims at a language which not only uncovers the temple but also translates its encryptions and reaches 'undreamt of information' (Freud, 1896, p.408). When those scattered ruins are put together in psychoanalytic language they, "are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance" (Freud, 1900, p.751). The second reason psychoanalytic session could be correlated with poetry is that in both the more subjective the artist/analyst is, the more she thinks she knows what is right or what is helpful and attempts to make us see it through her eyes, and through subjective induced sympathy she gets us to inhabit her state of mind, the less efficient the art-work/therapy becomes. The more objective the artist/analyst is on the other hand the more she allows us to view the will in its true essence.

Finally, if this thesis has achieved what it set out to do, it will leave the reader with a solid grasp, on one of Schopenhauer's main concepts i.e. the will, on his view on the importance of the arts, and on his classification of the arts according to their levels of the objectification of the will. The reader should also come out with a decent grasp on the main Freudian concepts and their relevance to Schopenhauer's theories, as well as a general grasp on the development of Schopenhauer's thought through psychoanalysis. Most importantly it should encourage future interdisciplinary research on psychoanalysis, philosophy, and aesthetics. Psychoanalytic research would be better off if it did not shy away from its philosophical roots, if it rather used them for its advancement. Philosophical research would also benefit from applying a more nuanced understanding of psychoanalysis. A psychoanalytic take on Schopenhauerian philosophy might give it a new bearing in the sphere of current philosophical thought. Finally, art would gain a reflective conscious understanding of its processes through philosophy and psychoanalysis.

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