THE WORLD BANK’S SUPPORT TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM IN EGYPT: EDUCATOR’S PERSPECTIVE ON ITS IMPACT FOR QUALITY AND EQUALITY

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By Merhan Rasmy

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# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPMAS</td>
<td>Central Agency for Public Mobilisation And Statistics</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>ECEEP</td>
<td>Early Child Enhancement Program</td>
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<td>EEP</td>
<td>Education Enhancement Program</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education For All</td>
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<td>ETEP</td>
<td>Engineering and Technical Education Project</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GOE</td>
<td>Government of Egypt</td>
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<td>HEEP</td>
<td>Higher Education Enhancement Project</td>
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<td>HEEPF</td>
<td>Higher Education Enhancement Program Fund</td>
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<td>HERS</td>
<td>Higher Education Reform Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>Implementation Completion Report</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa region</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIGA</td>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MoHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Project Appraisal Document</td>
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<td>PDO</td>
<td>Project Development Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCU</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEEP</td>
<td>Secondary Enhancement Education Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bank/WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>The United States Agency for International Development</td>
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**Researcher’s Background**

I developed a passion for teaching and more importantly, the desire to bring about change in the Egyptian educational system in 2008, when I started working as an English Instructor in a renowned private university in Egypt. As a pharmacy graduate from Cairo University, I felt that I had little knowledge and practice to achieve such aspirations. Therefore, I enrolled in the MA program of ICED in Spring 2015, where I chose international development and policy as my major to help me achieve my vision of change. It was during my second semester that I came across my topic of interest, while studying the course of International and Comparative Education, taught by Professor Nagwa Megahed. Ever since then, assignments in courses such as Social Foundations with Professor Malak Zaalouk and Globalisation, Development and Education Reform in the Arab World (with Professor Megahed) involved research and written analysis about international organisations, in particular the World Bank, with respect to some of the developing countries in the MENA region i.e. Egypt.
Abstract

The purpose of this qualitative study is to examine and explore why despite the implementation of many reforms in Egypt’s higher education system in the past decade, problems persist in quality and impact. This is despite the closure of the World Bank supported Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP) in 2008. Thus, the paper aims to provide an understanding, analyze, and to evaluate the Bank’s HEEP reform that was implemented in Egypt.

In the second section, I present the theoretical perspective which I believe may explain the true nature behind Egypt’s long-term relationship with international organisations, including the World Bank. This perspective is the International Education Development Framework, which covers several theories in accordance to the array of Western literature written by renowned scholars. This has led the author to question the Educators perspective in Egypt regarding the former HEEP project.

The methods used consisted of I) Document and Policy Analysis of official reports and documents pertaining to the HEEP project, to obtain the perspectives of both the World Bank and the Egyptian Government (or “Borrower”) and II) Individual Interviews, to obtain the perspective of the expert educators in Egypt. The Interviews were conducted with eleven Egyptian educator experts, who were selected using the purposeful sampling, in addition to snow ball sampling. Semi-structured interviews were used. Data was collected over a period of approximately two months.

The findings for the point of view of the World Bank regarding the outcome/impact of HEEP was rated as “moderately satisfactory”, while the “Borrower’s” (Egyptian Government) rated the project from their point of view, as “highly satisfactory”. It is worthy of noting that no group of stakeholders were held accountable or took any responsibility, for any hindrances of the project. In addition, several discrepancies were found as a result of the policy analysis, between the project cycle of the World Bank in relation to the actual cycle that was executed for the HEEP project.

The interviews were transcribed and analysis was done using the thematic approach. Findings of the field work suggest that most of the experts perceived the HEEP project to have had limited success in achieving quality. The experts blamed the Egyptian Government for the hindrance of the project. The policy recommendations that were offered by the experts for future World Bank supported projects, were various and diverse in nature.
Finally, this analysis has made the author question and request more extensive research to be conducted to explain why Egypt has maintained a long-term “partnership” with The World Bank.

**Keywords:** *International organisations; The World Bank; International Education Development, higher education reform; experts in education, Egypt.*
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The pressures of globalization in several countries have resulted in great changes in “relationships between the state, the market and higher education” (Becker, 2009, p.157). Thus, higher education has been connected to the development of nation states and has been perceived as vital for increased economic production (Fehnel, 2004; Williams, 2009). In the MENA region (as well as many other regions) where most of the nations have a developing economy, the chief source of knowledge and human capital necessary to compete in the global economy, is an outcome of higher education, where higher education is how “high-quality human capital” can be produced (Fehnel, 2004; UNESCO, 2013). Since a knowledge economy proposes that “‘greater human capital’ will be necessary to enhance worker creativity, to use information productively, to raise the efficiency of the service economy, to achieve economic competitiveness and thus to maintain employment” (Levidow, 2002, p. 3) to ensure the survival of these nation states in the global marketplace, the states are attempting to improve their higher education systems (Davies, 2009; Buckner, 2011) in a “global knowledge economy”, for their students to acquire “knowledge, skills, innovative ideas and scientific thinking” (UNESCO, 2013, p. 50).

However, during the 1990s, because of the high population growth rate that had exceeded the rate of expansion of the higher education systems, and the state’s lack of financial resources, (in North Africa, especially Egypt) the quality of these higher education institutions had declined. According to Said (2001), the higher education in Egypt has experienced “inadequate expansion”, probably leaving the system with “poor and limited facilities”, “complemented by overcrowding,” and thus “considerably affected the overloading of the system”, which possibly “led to the deterioration of the average quality of the graduate” (p.8).
This decline in higher education has encouraged governments in some parts of the MENA region (including Egypt) to seek and resort to the financial support of donor agencies. These donor agencies (or international financial organisations) fund and execute the necessary higher education reforms to: accommodate the growing number of students, to improve the quality of the education, as well as reaching equity in the provision of education and relevance (Tiongson, 2005; UNESCO, 2013). An example of an international organization that has recently become one of the main supporters of higher education reforms in many parts of the world (especially in developing countries), is The World Bank (Fehnel, 2004), where the Bank believes that “the very high unemployment rate of youth in the Arab World has been attributed to the poor link between education and employment market needs” (as cited in Klees, Samoff, J., Stromquist, 2012, p. 71). However, because of the intervention of donor agencies like The Bank in the reform of higher education systems in the Arab World, the increase in the “globalization of education policy,” according to Samoff, has threatened “the indigenous evolution of national education systems” (as cited in Williams, 2009, p. 77). Hence, the “needs” of these developing nations may be set aside, and ergo, “education becomes a preparation for international rather than national development” (Williams, 2009, p. 77). It is noteworthy that the World Bank has continued to provide and is still providing financial support to many countries in the MENA region for the implementation of higher educational reforms, including Egypt.

Overall, Egypt has the largest education system in the MENA region and it is also one of the largest in the world (World Bank Group, 2003) and even though the higher education system in Egypt may be regarded as the “oldest education system in the world” (Said, 2001, p.7), upon entering the new millennium, the Egyptian Government recognized the need to improve its system of higher education. According to Said (2009), the “Egyptian higher education system has been for long-suffering from many problems inherent in overcrowding, overly centralized governance and widespread inefficiencies, low quality of university education and poor quality and relevance of mid-level technical education” (p. 462). Thus, the government of Egypt reached out to the World Bank to evaluate the system at hand and to implement their recommendations, as well as to support the
funding of the educational reform (Acedo, 2002). This led to the launching of the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP), which had commenced in April 2002 and ended (after extending the project for an additional year) in December 2008 (World Bank, 2011).

**Statement of the Problem**

International agencies have been involved in all the stages of the Egyptian education system, especially higher education, as it has been, since the 2000s and increased recently in the context of youth led uprisings/revolution, viewed as a priority by the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) in Egypt, to ensure that graduates are highly skilled and qualified human capital in the labor market. Even though private universities recently emerged in the scene (as an alternative to state funded universities) to provide what the Ministry of Higher Education failed to offer, problems continue to appear in the quality of higher education, among other problems (Mostafa, 2016).

Now, with regards to the term “quality” in higher education, Tarawneh (2011) identifies quality as a negotiable matter between different parties concerned, regarding the anticipations and requirements, which coincides with the purposes, and they are usually “defined in terms of criteria related to academic standards, financial effectiveness, and social usefulness” (p. 1109). Thus, it is noteworthy that “different parties” may view quality from a “perspective of subjectivity”, where beliefs and desires (Tawarneh, 2011) may be present but may be viewed differently by the various parties that are involved in the process. Therefore, there is no general definition of what “good quality education” is, even though different definitions have been offered (UNESCO, 2013). Hence, different stakeholders will view the concept of quality and how to improve it in higher education, from different viewpoints. This difference may lead to a focus on different problematic areas in the higher education sector, that will possibly be viewed by different stakeholders as the means to improving quality (Brockerhoff, Huisman & Laufer, 2015) which may not be necessary to begin with. According to Nadia Badrwai, “the definition of quality, the system of quality assurance or accreditation as well as the methodology,
scope and function of the quality assurance bodies” (n.d, p.1) are different in Arab countries.

As stated by the official website of CAPMAS (2015), in the Egyptian sector of HE, the number of students that had graduated from public universities in 2008/2009 was 326.4

![Figure 1: Total number of higher education graduates in government universities (CAPMAS, 2015)](image)

hundred thousand students, while the number of students that had graduated in 2015/2016 was 324.2 hundred thousand (Figure 1). The number of students that had graduated from private universities in the 2008/2009 was 7.6 hundred thousand, which increased to 16.7 hundred thousand students in 20015/2016 (Figure 2). It is worthy to note that there are 24 public universities and 23 private universities in Egypt, in addition to the American University in Cairo (Radwan, 2016; SCU, p. 2) and 150 institutions. The American University is the first private foreign university to be established in 1919, thus it operates under a different umbrella of rules and regulations, in comparison to other private
It is also important to note that the system of higher education in Egyptian is highly centralized (El-Maghraby, 2012), however, Al-Azhar University is the only public institution (and religious) that enjoys a high level of autonomy.

The Secretary General of the SCU in Egypt, Dr. Mahmoud Ashraf Hatem, is currently aiming to have “skilled graduates competitive with the local and global labor market, in addition to applying international quality systems applications to achieve the Egyptian Universities autonomy with the emphasis on the quality of higher education” (SCU, 2015). Many higher education projects are currently in the process of being implemented, where Egypt announced a higher education plan that will occur in two phases from 2014 to 2022, including 61 initiatives at a cost of US$5.87 billion, which will be “aimed at producing more market-ready graduates and promoting a knowledge-based economy”, where five new universities per year will be created, in addition to the emergence of new

Figure 2: Total number of private universities graduates (CAPMAS, 2015)
partnerships (for both state funded and private universities) (SCU, 2015; africauniversities.org, 2016).

One of the partnerships that is being launched is with the United Kingdom, where the universities in the UK and Egypt “have signed 10 partnership agreements” where “building scientific research and increasing opportunities for student and staff exchanges” will be targeted (SCU, 2015). These projects and partnerships are viewed as perhaps necessary by the MoHE and SCU (which is governed by the MoHE), as “many jobs in Egypt go unfilled because employers are not satisfied with the preparations students receive,” where a better link needs to be established, between the theory being taught at Egyptian universities and the global marketplace (as cited in Mostafa, 2016).

So, despite the implementation of many reforms in higher education in the past decade, problems persist in terms of: quality, admissions, impact as well as outcome, even after the closure of the World Bank supported HEEP. The research or published literature discussing specifically and in detail, the World Bank’s HEEP that was implemented in Egypt seems to be limited or even nonexistent. It is noteworthy that the project itself was implemented upon the Bank’s recommendation and thus documented in detail solely by the Bank. There is thus a need for literature by scholars to explore and offer an understanding of the impact of this higher educational reform, as well as the extent to which HEEP has improved the higher education system and its outcomes in Egypt. Other literature by scholars with an evidence-based inquiry, discussing HEEP supported by the World Bank in Egypt is needed, rather than the reports that have been written by World Bank officials and staff and/or involved national officials and staff, or to other entities pertaining to the Bank (i.e. Independent Evaluation Group or IEG).

**Research Questions**

This study intends to address the following main question and its sub-questions:

**To what extent has the World Bank (WB) and its supported HEEP enabled or hindered the improvement in the quality of higher education in Egypt, based on the**
perceptions of the World Bank, the Egyptian Government and Egyptian Expert Educators?

Sub questions:

1. Why the WB support was needed in the first place?
2. What has been the WB interventions to reform higher education?
3. How do the educators perceive the WB supported HEEP impact on higher education in Egypt and what are the policy recommendations for improvement?

Purpose and significance of the Study

As it has been mentioned before, there is a lack of literature discussing HEEP, especially where the support of the World Bank is involved. Thus, the purpose of this study is to provide an understanding of, to analyze, and to evaluate the Bank’s HEEP that was implemented in Egypt. This will allow for inquiry-based recommendations for higher education policy reforms that will be solicited from renowned scholars and/or educators in Egypt as well the researcher's analysis. Feasible policy recommendations will be offered as an outcome of this paper from the perspective of said scholars and/or educators, to avoid making the same previous errors, which will ultimately benefit: policy makers, governments and practitioners as well as educators, regionally and globally.

In this chapter, I have introduced and articulated my interest in the implemented World Bank supported reform HEEP in Egypt. In the second chapter, I will offer a theoretical perspective for this paper, followed by a review of the literature discussing the World Bank projects and their philosophy, as well as the national context of the development of higher education in Egypt, followed by the Bank’s support to the higher educational reform implemented in Egypt. This will then be followed by the methodology, which will
consist of qualitative analysis leading to the viewpoint of the World Bank, the Egyptian Government and finally the viewpoint of the educators regarding the impact of HEEP and hence, their policy recommendations for the reform.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

In this first section of the literature review, I discuss briefly the role of international organisations in education and how they came to “play this role” in cooperation with nation states in the developing world, with a special focus on the World Bank and its principles. This is because as according to Gabriela (2013), “international organizations are important actors in the critical episodes of international politics, with power in mediation, dispute resolution, peace keeping, applying sanctions and others” (p. 309).

Brief Overview of International Organisations (IOs).

Under present conditions of globalization, Jason Beech (2009) states how “foreign influences have become more complex” (p. 342), where other actors besides the state have become involved in the process of “educational transfer” between settings, such as international agencies, universities, NGOs, etc. Hence, the field of “International Development Education” consists of key players that promote educational policies for development, mainly bilateral agencies i.e. USAID and multilateral organisations i.e. UNESCO, IMF, OECD and The Bank (Beech, 2009; Kendall, 2009). According to Hanrieder, these international agencies and/or organisations may be defined as “an institutional agreement between members of an international system” to “achieve objectives according to systemic conditions, reflecting attributes, aspirations and concerns of its members” (as cited in Gabriela, 2013, p. 309) and “what gives the basic rule of them is the sovereignty of the nation-state” (p. 309).

The current concepts of international development education “stem from the nineteenth century Enlightenment period,” which was developed in Europe and the U.S. during that period (Kendall, 2009, p. 418). The first international organizations created were the League of Nations, (Gabriela, 2013) and the International Labor Organisation, in which both were established in 1919. After the Second World War, multilateral agencies were formed to rebuild Europe, by the modern states, where their objective back then was to
assist in developing the world (Beech, 2009; Kendall, 2009). However, with time, these international organisations turned their charitable activities into a business, as according to Beech (2009). Now the “transfer” of education is the key role of these organisations, where “international organisations are regarded as catalysts fostering the exchange and transfer of policy ideas, solutions and problem perceptions between governments and beyond” (Jann and Wegrich, 2006, p. 51).

International Development funding, as according to Kendall (2009), can be in the form of bilateral aid, which is defined as the flow from “official (government) sources directly to official sources in the recipient country”, whereas multilateral aid is the “core contributions from official (government) sources to multilateral agencies where it is then used to fund the multilateral agencies’ own programmes” (OECD, 2016). Thus, multilateral agencies obtain their funding from several governments, while “bilateral organizations receive funding from the government in their home countries, and use the funding to aid developing countries” (Uniteforsight.org, 2015). It is important to note that there are two very distinct characteristics that differentiate international organizations from other types of organizations, which are “centralizations of power and decision-making autonomy” (Gabriela, 2013, p. 310).

**World Bank Principles**

Throughout the “post-Cold War decade of the 1990s, donors started to focus on a new set of issues, such as democratisation, good governance, human rights, the rule of law, and poverty alleviation” (Ali, Banks & Parsons, 2015, p. 122) where poverty alleviation was identified in an array of literature by the World Bank, as well as in their official website (WorldBank.org, 2017) as “poverty reduction,” and “attacking poverty” (World Bank, 2000). As cited in the work of Rodríguez-Gómez & Alcántara (2001), the Bank reports in the 1990s stated that it would “combat poverty” by

investing in people, particularly through the promotion of basic health and education; environmental protection; the fostering of private sector development; the strengthening of governments’ capacity to provide
quality services in a sufficient, transparent way; the promotion of reforms
to create a stable macroeconomic environment, and to direct investment
and long-term planning strategies (p. 509).

In the Bank’s (2000) attacking poverty report, it possibly states that poverty reduction can
be attained by “economic development” through the provision of “foreign aid”. However,
Alesina and Dollar (2000) concluded in their work that “bilateral aid has only a weak
association with poverty, democracy, and good policy” (p. 55), which may go against the
Bank’s statement of providing services in a “transparent” manner. As per Ali, Banks and
Parsons (2015), this may be attributed to the fact that many of the bilateral donors
followed their own agenda or “politicostategic, security, and commercial interests” while
providing aid, thus, issues such as “transparency, accountability, good governance,
democracy and human rights” in receiving countries were ignored (p. 123). Alesina and
Dollar (2000) themselves questioned in their work the intention of developed countries
behind the provision of foreign aid to the seemingly “less fortunate” developing
countries, by asking, “is the pattern of aid flows dictated by political and strategic
considerations which have little to do […] helping […] less corrupt regimes in
developing countries?” (p. 2). Ali, Banks and Parsons (2015) deduced in their paper that
the allocation of aid is driven more by the donor agencies own agenda “rather than
humanitarian considerations and developmental pursuits of aid recipients” (p. 116).
Alesina and Dollar (2000) further confirm this finding in their work, by stating that the
provision of aid is indeed “dictated by political and strategic considerations” (abstract,
before p. 1).

Alesina and Dollar (2000) also pointed that that the provision of foreign aid by developed
to developing countries is usually wasted, which may be because of “poor institutional
development, corruption, inefficiencies and bureaucratic failures” in those developing
countries (p. 2). It is noteworthy that foreign aid can be offered in the form of loans
and/or grants. According to Klein and Harford (2005), both a grant and a loan would
immediately be invested in a project. However, a loan is to paid back with interest, hence,
the returns to the recipient from the loan would be reduced (Klein & Harford, 2005). A
grant is a form of aid that is also provided by donor agencies, according to Klees, Samoff and Stromquist (2012) but it is granted to a recipient country in support of a development initiative, and thus is not to be paid back.

**Previous Critique of the World Bank in Literature**

An array of literature has been published examining as well as critiquing World Bank supported projects in education, that have been implemented in many developing countries in many regions, from 1990s to 2000, in Latin America i.e. Brazil, to Sub Saharan Africa as well as Northern Africa, i.e. Egypt, in all levels of their education system. The work of scholars like Steven Klees, Susan Robertson, Mark Ginsburg, Nagwa Megahed and many other renowned scholars have presented and demonstrated how the ideology of the World Bank (by examining their many published strategies and their supported educational reforms, particularly in higher education), has had an overall negative impact on the economy and the education system of developing countries.

For example, Henales and Edwards (2002) discussed in their work how the educational reform policies (or the politics behind these forms) adopted by Latin American administrations are “depressingly similar from country to country and among consecutive governments” (p. 126), as the result of the intervention of multilateral agencies as the WB and IMF. As per Andrés Bernasconi (2007), in the mid-1990s, this ‘Washington consensus’ of the multilateral agencies promoted measures in their policy documents (which were published by the Bank and IDB or Inter-American Development Bank) such as “greater reliance on private sources of funding, increased accountability, and a more effective management and governance structure for public universities in the region” as part of the reform agenda for the higher education in Latin America (p. 509). However, Bernasconi (2007) points out that countries in Latin America are not the same or even similar, despite “commonalities of language, dominant religion, and colonial history” thus, their tertiary education is not the same (p. 516). This seems to verify another
critique made by many scholars in literature, such as Klees et al (2012), that international
donor agencies have a “one size fits all” approach to implementing higher education
reforms (or educational reforms in general) in developing countries, which should not be
the case.

Torres and Schugurensky (2002) argue that Bank documents seem to justify their
intervention (through i.e. funding, offering technical assistance, etc.) by blaming
developing countries for their educational problems, which have occurred, per the Bank’s
analysis, as the result of “inadequate investments, poor planning, institutional
inefficiency and misallocation of resources” (p. 439). This may suggest that The Bank
has taken on those roles upon the implementation of their reforms in said developing
countries. However, Henales and Edwards (2002) argue that the policies recommended
by the Bank to remedy these educational problems may be in fact disguised as reforms,
where these so-called reforms are “obviously harmful to so many” (p. 127). Perhaps
because as per Bernasconi (2007), the Bank directed its policy recommendations on
approaches that could work in “improving access, quality and equity” with a slight or
even no increase in public expenditure and instead, for public institutions to increase their
revenue by for example, “charging tuition fees to students” (p. 514). Hence, Bernasconi
(2007) argues that the “introduction of tuition fees and the expansion of private tertiary
education”, remain at the top of the Bank’s agenda with regards to their solutions for
fixing certain aspects in higher education in developing countries, such as in Latin
America (p. 514).

However, it came to the attention of the author that there may be a lack in literature that
has discussed specifically and in detail the WB supported reform that was implemented
in Egypt, the Higher Education Enhancement Project in Egypt or HEEP, and how even
though many of the mentioned renowned scholars have critiqued the World Bank
supported education reforms, many developing countries insist on seeking out their aid,
thus enabling their participation in a “dependent relationship” with the Bank. This in turn
raised the question of how education experts in Egypt perceive these supported World
Bank projects, especially in Egypt.
With "an increasingly globalized world" (Davies, 2009), the role of international organizations in supporting education and development in developing countries has prevailed. There are more powerful actors at play in transferring educational policies from one context to another (Beech, 2009), especially from Western contexts to developing contexts (or countries). This in turn, has become more of a business in the field of education (Beech, 2009). This has prompted the debate of the impacts or consequences of the field of international development (education) (Kendall, 2009, p. 417) to be discussed in this part of the literature review. In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss the theme of globalisation (Spring, 2009) and education and the international development education (Kendall, 2009) to establish the theoretical framework of this study.

**Theoretical Perspectives**

Gabriela (2013) raised an important question, “But why states use international organizations as engines for cooperation?” (p. 310). In attempt to answer this question, I present the International Education Development Framework, to enable a better comprehension of the role of international organizations in supporting education development (including higher education reform) in developing countries. This perspective will discuss Globalization and Education first, under which three school of thoughts will be presented; the Hyperglobalists, the Transformationalists and the Skeptics. This will be followed by the International Education Development, which comprises of the theories; Postcolonialism and Privatisation. Then, in light of this theoretical perspective, I choose to discuss Alternative Approaches to Education. Finally, this section offers the debate that the study is based on, pertaining to the World Bank Supported HEEP. This brings the author to question the Educators perspective in Egypt concerning the HEEP project.
International Development Education Framework

I. Globalisation and Education

The concept of globalization is no new phenomenon and thus can be traced back to a much earlier time, however, the literature debating about such a phenomenon has become increasingly popular over the last twenty years (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011; Held & McGrew, 2003). Mark Bray views globalization as a term that does not seem to have an exact definition (Bray, 2005; Yang, 2003), where it can “mean different things to different people” (Bray, 2005, p. 35). Bray (2005) thus refers to the work of Held et al., to offer their perspective on what globalization might be, where it may be thought of as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (p. 35).

Williams (2009) offers from her perspective, what seems to be a definition suited for the argument of this paper, where “globalisation largely moves from center to the periphery, from more industrialised or developed nations to less industrialised or developing nations” (p.78) in the “new world of globalization” (Scott, 2000, p. 3). This viewpoint has been confirmed in Gabriela’s (2013) work where developing countries believe that the “system is tilted in favor of the rich and powerful countries” (p. 312). I am in full agreement with the definition provided by Williams, as this seems to be the case whether in terms of the movement of knowledge, goods or in terms of money. For example, when developed countries provide help in the form of foreign aid to developing countries, this aid may in fact, reflect the true power dynamic between rich and poor countries. Hence, he “poor countries” may have little say in the matter, as they may possibly be considered as the “less powerful” in this scenario.

Williams viewpoint seems to coincide with the economic aspect of the definition presented by Held & McGrew (2003), where “globalization has an undeniably material aspect in so far as it is possible to identify […] flows of trade, capital and people across the globe” (p. 3), as well as Yang’s perception regarding the effects of globalization in
the “trade and transfer of capital, labour, production, consumption, information, and technology” (2003, p. 271). Williams in her work thus examines the effect of globalisation on education, in which the focus is on developing countries as the “flows” appear to migrate from industrialized to developing countries instead of being “multidirectional,” where most of the “developing countries are outside of the networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (2009, p. 79). This concept has been confirmed by Held & McGrew (2003) in which globalization, with regards to “interregional flows,” “expands the reach of power relations across the world's major regions and continents” (p. 4).

Williams (2009) points out that globalisation in the existing literature is usually examined in the economic, political and cultural context rather than from the educational aspect, as globalization is usually market-driven (Yang, 2003). This realization has been asserted by Tickly (2001) in his work, where his focus was on the relationship between globalization and education in developing countries in a “post-colonial world”. However, the “globalization of education policy” is related to each field, in that education is always linked to the economy, politics and culture of any nation state, where the changes produced because of globalisation in these domains will influence the formation of education policy (Williams, 2009. p. 81). Thus, globalisation cannot be interpreted as an entirely novel phenomenon as well as its impact on contemporary education in developing countries, (Williams, 2009; Yang, 2003).

Mark Bray indicated in his work that, “interpretations of the precise nature of dynamics depend strongly on the perspectives of the observers” (2005, p. 35). Bray also referred to the work of Held et al, in which they differentiated between three theoretical viewpoints on globalization (p.36). It is noteworthy that these school of thoughts according to Held et al, as discussed by Bray (2005), do not focus solely on globalization and education, but it includes the role of the nation states in a globalized economy, possibly from a “power-relations” perspective.
A. The Hyperglobalists (globalist):

As per the hyperglobalist perspective, the role of the nation state is weakened by the presence of international (economic) organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Solakoglu, 2016). This is because modern globalisation is viewed as a new epoch in which countries all around the world are controlled by the regulations of the “global marketplace” (Bray, 2005, p. 36). In fact, these organisations (including the GATT organizations), have founded a new order dictated by the global economy, where nation states must abide by this “economic order” (Solakoglu, 2016). Thus, hyperglobalists view the role of the nation state as becoming restricted in the global age (Solakoglu, 2016). Hence, upon “entering a truly global age” (Tikly, 2001, p. 153), where economic forces are emphasised, hyperglobalists argue that “globalisation is bringing about ‘denationalisation’ of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of production, trade and finance” (Bray, 2005, p.36). However, per Ginsburg & Megahed (2011), one must acknowledge the fact that “nation-states differ with respect to political, economic, and military power […] these differences […] how any given country experiences globalisation” (p. 4).

Thus, the hyperglobalists recognize that there is a shift towards specifically new “forms of education policy formation,” (Williams, 2009, p. 81) in which these forms depend on the concepts of human capital and “neoliberal economic” theories. This shift in educational reform may have manifested in the form of “policy lending” and “borrowing”, where “global models of education reform” have been implemented in developing countries (Zaalouk, 2013, 201-202). Thus, the role of education in the society is diminished and “a very narrowly construed form of national development” is promoted from an economic approach (Williams, 2009, p. 81). Therefore, Williams argues that the globalist perspective may be used to study certain characteristics of the “globalised policy itself,” and the notion that because of the growing “worldwide interconnectedness” (as cited in Bray, 2005, p. 35) between industrialised nations, developing nations and multilateral organisations, and questions if “we are entering some sort of global age with respect to education policy (Williams, 2009, p. 81).
B. The Sceptics:

The sceptics disagree with the hyperglobalists, in that they believe that modern “levels of economic interdependence are not historically unprecedented” (Bray, 2005, p. 36). They recognise that nation states are influencing the “nature of world politics” (Solakoglu, 2016, p. 2). Many sceptics argue that the idea of globalization, is mostly an “ideological construction” or “a convenient myth” which, partially helps to rationalise the globalists’ “neoliberal global project” (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 5) or “neo-liberal policies created by the capitalist order” (Solakoglu, 2016, p. 2).

Sceptics (through the usage of the following terms) have a belief that “internationalization” or “partial internationalization of education”, “regionalization” in trade or “triadisation” is happening in the name of globalization (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 5; Tikly, 2001). Thus, the sceptics view the thesis of the hyperglobalist as flawed and “politically naive” since it undervalues the continuing strength of nation states to “regulate international economic activity” (Bray, 2005, p. 36) and hence argue that the national government is nevertheless a main actor in “world politics” (Solakoglu, 2016, p. 2). Sceptics for that reason refuse the notion of “global governance” (Held & McGrew, 2003) and assume that empirical evidence can establish the whole truth about the phenomenon of globalization (Held & McGrew, 2003; Tadic, 2006).

C. The Transformationalist:

Professor N. Megahed (peer debriefing, 2017), expressed how in fact globalization is transformative and cannot possibly be avoided. According to Tikly (2001), transformationalists doubt whether they are truly entering a “global age”. Scholars such as Mark Bray (2005) refer to the work of Held et al to argue that transformationalists believe globalisation to be a dominant driving force responsible for the fast “social, political and economic changes” that are restructuring societies. However, they are not
quite sure of the “direction in which trends are leading” and about the “kind of world order which it might prefigure” (Bray, 2005, p. 36).

Williams (2009) refers to the work of Leon Tickly in her account, where Tikly recognizes the transformationalist perspective to be applicable for analysing the “globalisation of education policy” as it permits one to examine the “greater fragmentation and stratification within and between countries (Tikly, 2001, p. 154) and how this “global stratification” (as cited in Bray, 2005, p. 36) is caused and aggravated (Williams, 2009) where states and societies are gradually becoming entangled in the “global order,” while others are gradually becoming accorded lesser importance (as cited in Bray, 2005) in which they are forced to be part of the “educational and economic underclass” by the “globalised education reform agenda” (Williams, 2009, p. 80). However, Tickly (2001) argues that advocates of the transformationalist approach “fail to acknowledge the continuing impact and relevance of prior forms of globalisation, especially those associated with European colonisation” (p. 155).

Thus, the “post-skeptic” (Solakoglu, 2016) or the transformationalist perspective as according to Williams claim, acknowledges globalization as a complex phenomenon and claims that one may look at what one may refer to as “inter and intra core-periphery relations” (2009, p. 80). Hence, Williams argues that this viewpoint may seem to provide an applicable “framework” with which to evaluate the possible effect of the “globalised policy agenda” on different nation states (2009, p. 81).

The debates about globalization, as per Ginsburg and Megahed (2011), have thus helped draw attention to the means in which “economic, political, and cultural” aspects of a certain society, as well as “educational reform,” can be comprehended as being greatly influenced by “global, national, and/or local processes” (p.4). Thus, globalization may be the result of “processes” that require “real [global organization] actors – economic and political – with real interests” (p. 4). This has led the author (and Professor N. Megahed, peer debriefing, 2017) to question; who exactly are the stakeholders involved? Who are the international actors or players, as well as the international agencies involved? Who
are the national or local actors? Is the World Bank a major player? I will shed light on these questions below in the second part of the theoretical perspective.

II. International Education Development (with respect to its global actors).

A. Post-Colonialism:

Postcolonial theory is a “literary theory or critical approach” that consists of literature produced in countries that were, or are now, colonized by other countries (Lye, 1998). Edward Said, a Palestinian-American scholar, presented a critique of “Western representations of the Eastern culture” (Zaalouk, Social Foundations of Education, lecture, 2016) in his book, Orientalism, which was published in 1978 (Kapoor, 2002), and is the “founding work” (Lye, 1998, p.1) for postcolonial studies. Kapoor (2002) defined the term Orientalism as the “systematic ‘body of theory and practice’ that constructs or represents the Orient” (p. 650). Thus, as stated by Kapoor (2002), postcolonial theory is premised on the notion of the “subaltern subversion of orientalist modes of representation” (p. 648), where the theory of postcolonialism “emerges out of literary studies, disclosing its arguments based primarily (although not exclusively) on literary sources” (p. 650).

As per Vanessa Andreotti’s (2007) work, she stated that “post-colonial theory is the name given to a set of debates about North-South relations arising from various disciplines and ‘movements’” (p. 3). Thus, it seems that finding a universal definition for post colonialism in the literature may be difficult, as “attempts at coming up with a single definition of postcolonial theory have proved controversial” and some scholars have even questioned the entirety of the concept in their work (Lye, 1998, p.1).

In the field of international development specifically, Kendall (2009), sheds light on the debates concerning the usage of the terminology in the field, which might in turn “(re)create underlying tensions concerning power and authority” (p. 417), for example, as
per Matthews (2002) many relations of trade between the West and the Third World, continue to be in the form of “asymmetrical power relations,” as they have been laid down through the past of “colonialism” (p. 15). Therefore, the political economy of Third World countries (or developing countries), seem to be heavily reliant or dependent on the rich and industrialised Western countries (or developed countries). Hence, the relationship of mutual dependence between two economies or more, and between these economies and “world trade”, may have manifested in the form of dependence, as the dominant countries can be self-sustaining by expanding, whereas other dependent countries can self-sustain only as a reflection of that expansion, which can influence their instant development positively or negatively (Santos, 1970).

Dependency thus possibly refers to, as Santos referred to it in his earlier work, “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” (as cited in Santos, 1970, p. 231). According to Kapoor (2002) “Dependency’s politics is premised on state and class control of capitalist development” (p. 648). The work of scholars such as Frank, Santos and Cardoso and Faletto (Kapoor, 2002) support the dependency theory and describe it as “patterns of global inequality and uneven development as a North-South phenomenon”, where “primarily the North American and European countries enjoy a privileged or upper-class position,” which is “at the expense of underprivileged countries” mainly located in the regions of Latin America and Africa (Kubow and Fossum, 2003, p. 41).

Dependency theory “adopts from the Marxist philosophy an historical methodology in building an explanation of unequal relations among nations” (Kubow and Fossum, 2003, p. 42). This theory may seem to be from an extremist point of view (Kubow and Fossum, 2003), nonetheless, Santos (1970) concludes in his work that to comprehend the “system of dependent reproduction,” where it must be “viewed as part of a system of world economic relations based on monopolistic control of large scale capital, on control of certain economic and financial centers over others, on a monopoly of a complex
technology that leads to unequal and combined development at a national and international level” (p. 235).

Thus, to serve the argument of this paper, “economic dependency” as a result of capitalism (Kapoor, 2002) in particular may be attributed to post-colonialism, as the term post-colonialism itself “represents an attempt at going beyond the historical definition of its primary object of study toward an extension of the historic and political notion of "colonizing" to other forms of human exploitation, normalization, repression and dependency” (University of Toronto Conference, 2002).

Nancy Kendall (2009) then goes on to argue that “international development” is known to involve “goodwill” endeavors by “richer,” “industrialised” or “modern” nations to enrich the quality of life of the people in “poorer,” “agrarian,” or “primitive” nations (p. 417). The attempt of rich countries to offer “goodwill efforts” has possibly led them to assume that the sole means of development for the “Third World” is for them to “model” the modern countries at their current level of development (Kendall, p. 417). This has probably resulted from the way the West perceive themselves as “the best”, which according to Andreotti (2007), is known as “cultural supremacy” (p. 5). As articulated by Gabriela (2013), this may involve an “isolationist approach” taken by most of the international organizations, as they tend to disregard the requests of member countries (p. 313). Perhaps that is why, according to Radwan (2016) that “higher education in Egypt has had an embedded spirit of internationalisation for hundreds of years” (p.19). It is noted in the work of Nancy Kendall (2009) and other scholars, like Klees et al (2012) and Tickly & Bond (2013), that the West perceive development as a uniform and linear path of progress, especially upon following a proposed Western model, to aid in the reform of any sector.

Kendall (2009) presents why some scholars would perceive this thought pertaining to “international development” as problematic, since “under- or undeveloped” countries are being simultaneously created through the building of developed states, while the focus of other critics, as per Kendall, is on the unequal power relations formed through “development discourses and practices” (p. 418). Hence, the usage of terms in the
literature such as “the South” to represent developing countries and the “the North” to represent the affluent and modern countries of the West (Andreotti, 2007). I am inclined to agree with Kendall’s presentation of the different critiques and foci pertaining to the aspect of development, as even though she is a scholar who is a transformative, her analysis was presented from the “lens of post colonialism” (Nagwa Megahed, peer debriefing, 2017), where Kendall seems to offer the true intentions or ideologies behind the usage of the terms in the field of international development. Thus, "post-colonialism" may, as according to the University of Toronto Conference (2002) “designate, and denounce, the new forms of economic and cultural oppression that have succeeded modern colonialism, sometimes called ‘neo-colonialism’”. Where according to Kelly and Altbach (as cited in Kubow and Fossum, 2003), neocolonialism is defined as the “deliberate policies of the industrialised nations to maintain their domination through foreign-aid programs, technical advisors, publishing firms or other means” where “neocolonial activities” are distinguished from “classical colonialism’s overt ‘nation-to-nation domination’”) (p. 43).

What the author finds inexplicable is that despite Kendall (2009) acknowledging the criticism in the assortment of literature surrounding the concept of “international development,” she states that efforts continue to promote the concept in the form of a universal global model. This model is to be followed perhaps by developing countries, to address issues such as quality, progress, etc.

As mentioned before, education has been linked to national development in much of the existing literature. So, for achieving development, developing countries have sought the help of multilateral agencies ever since the 1980s (Megahed, 2008), where the latter have recommended the former to resort to the practice of “policy borrowing and lending”. David Bridges (2014) in his work defines “policy borrowing” as a “variety of practices associated with the transfer of educational policy and practice from one national education system to another.” So, “policy borrowing” can also be known as “policy transfer” or “policy travelling”. It is probably safe to assume that in a “postcolonial world,” education is affected by economic and political forces at many levels, “including
the local, national, regional and global” (Tikly & Bond, 2013, p. 423), where according to Jason Beech (2009), different types of “actors” are involved in the business of offering “policy oriented advice” to governments of nation states, grounded on educational ideas or practices being transferred from one setting to another.

However, the practice of policy borrowing has raised two legitimate concerns for scholars like Bridges (2014) (with whom I agree with); an ethical concern and a political concern. First, the ethical issues would emerge because of disrespect to the native cultures and educational traditions of the “recipient” or “borrowing country”, where Zaalouk (2013) asserted this concern in her work by stating how such borrowed policies would be implemented regardless of the context of the developing country, and perhaps there was no focus on pedagogical strategy to begin with (Beech, 2009; Megahed, peer debriefing, 2017). This concern was also confirmed in the work of Burden-Leahy (2009), who stated that even though international donor agencies are a mediator of globalization “through its activities and funding priorities”, they have disregarded “context-based educational goals in favor of implementing predetermined policy goals”, which the borrower or recipient country must set out to attain (p. 537). It is notable that when formulating a policy, the understanding of the context is important, as the “education sector does not function in isolation but regularly interacts with other sectors in the country as well as regionally and internationally” (UNESCO, 2013, p. 9).

Secondly, Bridges (2014) discussed how the political issues would emerge due to the creation of dependency, where the borrowing country would be dependent on the “donor” or “lender”. Thus, the author agrees with Williams (2009) when she argues that “instead of sovereignty of educational decision-making passing into the hands of colonial masters it is now largely in the hands of multilateral agencies from which developing nations seek loans to finance educational developments” (p. 83), which seems to reinforce the new form of dependency between the West and the developing countries, in what seems to exist in a time of “post-colonialism”.

Alesina & Dollar (2000) argue that “colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid” (p.33), where the authors claim that the United States’
“pattern of aid giving is vastly influenced by that country’s interest in the Middle East” (p.34). As per Ibrahim (2010), Egypt is regarded as a “central country for maintaining stability in the Middle East,” thus the provision of foreign aid by the U.S. is viewed as a means to maintain (to a certain extent) the political and economic stability in the region (p. 505). What is quite thought-provoking is how the U.S. have directed approximately one-third of its entire aid to Egypt and Israel (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The fact that Egypt is this dependent on U.S. foreign aid and/or political and economic support from “western powers” (Alesina & Dollar, 2000) portrays what seems to be not only a dependent relationship between the two countries, but a form of oppression as well (Megahed, peer debriefing, 2017; Freire, 1970), as Egypt seems to rely heavily and constantly on international organisations. It is noteworthy that Egypt receives a remarkably huge support from many donors (and thus it is possibly the largest recipient of donor funding), i.e. Japan, France, Germany, Australia, and Austria (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Matthews (2002) therefore argues that the aid provision of any educational policy promoted by an international organization is suspected of fostering “a one-way colonial relationship of dependency”, where Shahjahan (2012) refers to the word “colonial” as “dominating” or “imposing”, thus hindering the development of the education system in partaking countries and giving rise to a class of elites, being based on the assumptions of the West regarding the education needs and interests (Matthews, 2012).

B. Privatization:

Goswami (2013) discussed how neoliberalism as a theory is not something new. In fact, for Henales and Edwards (2002), it was first introduced in 1944 by Friedrich Hayekin his book “The Road to Serfdom”. By the end of the 1980s, neoliberalism had developed on a global scale “with the worldwide expansion of the democratic electoral processes associated with capitalism,” and this led to the dramatic expansion of “neoliberal democratic capitalism” during the 1990s (Henales and Edwards, 2002, p. 122). Spring (2008) thus states that many scholars apply an analysis from the “postcolonial lens” to
argue that neoliberalism is a “belief” aimed at ensuring that nations and the class of elites in the society preserve their wealth, as well as their power in a globalized economy. As articulated by Shahjahan (2012), this “belief” has been prominent in the past thirty years, where policies and practices focused on cutbacks of government funding and thus “deregulation of public life” which spread a “crisis of fear that facilitated the neoliberal colonization” of several systems within the nation state, including the educational system, where recently the focus has been on higher education (p. 3).

It is worthy of noting that ever since the early 1980s, governments have put into effect privatization programs in more than 100 countries around the world (Banerjee & Rondinelli, 2003), which may have occurred due to Robertson’s (2009) argument that “privatization is an attractive solution to governments faced with declining resources and increasing demand” (p. 13). According to Henales and Edwards (2002), programs in the education sector, health sector, and “other social service policies were systematically and uniformly designed, administered, and evaluated” by international organisations, such as the Bank and/or IMF, thus, by this means, “political power” was shifted from the indebted nation states to the multilateral organisations (p. 124).

Williams (2009) argues that the changes in education policy that have resulted from the process of globalization may be the result of the “neoliberal economic principles”, informed by human capital theory, that characterize the global marketplace and are upheld by the multinational corporations and international that hold sway in the global economy” (p. 77-78), principles such as marketization, privatization and emphasis on human capital development (Shahjahan 2012). Hence, as per Banerjee and Rondinelli (2003), “economic globalization” seems to be the driving force behind privatization (p. 1527). This has resulted in a world dominated by unregulated markets, where “inequality and private power shape the social order” (Goswami, 2013, p. 32), in which “private” here may be perceived (per the previous and current literature), as the advancement and the empowerment of the individual rather than the nation or the state (Goswami, 2013; Rizvi, 2016; Shahjahan, 2012). Ergo, privatization seems to have promoted social stratification within the society of a nation.
In the work of scholars like Olmos and Torres (2009), they state that neoliberalism has been linked to structural adjustment programs (SAPs), where these SAPs are generally depicted as wide-ranging policies proposed by the World Bank, the IMF, and other international organizations, in which developing countries are obligated to implement a “neoliberal policy agenda” for the economic development of their nation states to meet the “conditions set by the World Bank and IMF for getting loans and aids” (Goswami, 2013, p. 32). For example, the IMF and the WB often make privatization a conditionality upon the provision of loans to developing countries (Banerjee & Rondinelli, 2003). According to Bohoslavsky (n.d.), Egypt in 1991 agreed to a solution proposed by the IMF, to rescue its economy at a time of crisis. Egypt had also turned to the World Bank, ADB and other international organisations for assistance, where it was stated by Bohoslavsky (n.d) that the rescue package was appraised at 562 million USD, and to access it Egypt had to implement (a universal) structural adjustment program, ERSAP, well known to many countries of the global south at the time. The most important of its components was the total liberalization of foreign trade and removing price controls, a floating currency exchange system, lowering the subsidies bill especially for energy, and cutting the remaining subsidies for pesticides and fertilizers by a half (p. 1).

Thus, these conditions may dictate and thus place governments under pressure, to reduce public spending on sectors such as education, specifically the higher education sector, leading to “decentralization” through perhaps “deregulation,” “privatization,” “marketisation” and thus the imposition of “user fees” (Goswami, 2013; Williams, 2009, p.80). The advocates of privatization i.e. the World Bank, rationalize the necessity of the implementation of such conditions either because governments are unable to finance the costs of the services required by the public i.e. higher education or because they are “ideologically committed to minimalist forms of government,” (Rizvi, 2016, p. 2) where both considerations apply in the case of provision of educational services (Williams, 2009). Thus, Levidow (2002) argues that reforms for higher education are in fact “neoliberal strategies” which usually have the following characteristics:
all constituencies are treated through business relationships; educational efficiency, accountability and quality are redefined in accountancy terms; courses are recast as instructional commodities; and student-teacher relations are mediated by the consumption and production of things, e.g. software products, performance criteria, etc. (p. 2).

Therefore, because of privatization and the logic behind it, human beings are being viewed as human capital (and consumers) and education (especially at the tertiary level) as a mere investment or a commodity that is up for sale (thus a tool for increasing economic productivity), rather than a public good or service (Goswami, 2013; Rizvi, 2016; Williams, 2009). It is noteworthy that economists such as Schultz (1963) introduced his idea of the human capital theory, which states that “people enhance their capabilities as producers and as consumers by investing in themselves and that schooling is the largest investment in capital” (p. x).

With regards to higher education, it has been argued in the existing literature that privatisation will restrict the goals of education to the economic development of the individual (as well as the national economy) (Williams, 2009; Shahjahan, 2012), “which in turn may foster the continued dependence of developing nations, as they constantly must rely on an external knowledge base” (Williams, 2009, p. 88), where it seems that “knowledge” is being produced in developing countries through education, only to be sold (Beech, 2009; Rizvi, 2016). Thus, according to Levidow (2002), by dividing people into “individual vendors and purchasers, neoliberalism imposes greater exploitation upon human and natural resources” (p.2). Hence, this “knowledge” that is being produced and sold through education, is helping in promote social stratification within developing societies.

After discussing the theories that dictate the educational system in developing countries, as well critiquing the concepts embedded within the concept of international development education, I would like to offer alternative methods or philosophies to policy formation, with regards to education. These alternative philosophies will be offered from a human rights perspective (Tickly & Bond (2013), as well as from the perspective of liberation education (Freire, 1970).
C. Alternative approaches to education:

(i). Human Rights-Based approach: As per Tickly & Bond (2013), a “human rights-based” approach is more characteristic of the approach towards education and educational research sponsored by UN agencies, international and local NGOs. The underlying rationale for research and research questions within this approach is provided by appeals to human rights, including children’s rights, or to associated entitlements or targets, for example, the MDGs and more recently, the SDGs (Rizvi, 2016). Since the beginning of the millennium, the EFA goals and the MDGs have motivated “national policies and development in many countries, and have been a basis for mobilizing resources for education,” where the MDGs tackle issues such as “poverty, education, health, equality, environment and partnership” (UNESCO, 2013, p. 10).

So, agencies such as UNESCO, believe that education offers more opportunities and freedom, and plays a key role in promoting peace, the creation of a democratic system and growth of the economy as well as improving health and reducing poverty (Rizvi, 2016). Even though UNESCO transfers “educational knowledge,” (or “educational transfer” like the World Bank), the environment that it creates is favorable for such transfer of knowledge (Beech, 2009). Thus, international agencies which follow this approach believe that “human beings should not be viewed as merely means of production and material prosperity” which coincides with UNESCO’s “humanist perspective” (Beech, 2009, p. 347).

However, international organisations follow approaches that promote western education or global culture through “global education discourse” (Beech, 2009; Megahed, peer debriefing, 2017) and thus indigenous or local culture is gradually diminished (Megahed, peer debriefing, 2017) regardless of whether these international organisations follow a human capital approach (pertaining to neoliberalism) or a “human rights” approach.
The discussion of the above method has therefore prompted me to refer to the work of Paulo Freire (1970), to present the next alternative approach “liberation education”.

(ii). Liberation education: Professor M. Zaalouk (EDUC 521/5202 - Social Foundations of Education, 2016), believes that a culture of schooling or “culture of pedagogy” must be promoted in education for liberation rather than domination, especially since education is the main tool for shaping a society and it can serve as an agent of change. Critical theorists introduced this ideology at the time of fascism or the authoritarian period, during the inter-war period and after World War 2, which emerged because of the oppression that took place during that time by dictators like Hitler. The concern for critical pedagogists’ and theorists, like Du Bois, Maxine Green and Paulo Freire, was for the inclusion of the marginalized groups such as ethnic groups, females and countries of the South. This philosophy and culture, or what was called a “critical pedagogy,” was advocated for and demonstrated in the famous work of Du Bois, “The Education of Black People: Ten critiques” (1906-1960) and in Freire’s work, “The Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970).

Critical theorists today like Carlos Alberto Torres still advocate for “liberation education” or globalization from below, as was explained by Professor N. Megahed, N. (EDUC 5203-01- Introduction to International & Comparative Education Course, 2015), through their work (where like Du Bois, Green and Freire, they believe that the power of their thinking and critiquing of the domination could change reality, by entering in a dialogue that would counteract hegemonic thinking and through education (and resistance), they could ultimately change reality. Therefore, liberation education would be the power and value of change of that reality. Thus, according to Freire (1970), dialogue is a word and a true word is praxis, in which reflection and action would result in change or the transformation of reality. As per Professor M. Zaalouk (EDUC 521/5202 - Social Foundations of Education, 2016), “once you understand that you are oppressed, you will not be oppressed anymore” where this realization is the first step in what Freire (1970) called in his book “conscientization” or critical thinking, reflection and action.
I will present in the next section the debate regarding the World Bank supported HEEP initiative. The history of the World Bank and its development will be offered first, followed by Egypt’s national context and its education development. This is to help understand how Egypt became involved with the World Bank, with regards to education specifically. I will then offer a brief overview of the HEEP project from literature as well as from the official documents pertaining to the Bank.

Debate:

The World Bank history and development strategy: The World Bank is the “largest single source of external financing for education in developing countries,” since its first loan for education in 1963 (Beech, 2009, p. 345). Founded as the “International Bank for Reconstruction” in 1944, the World Bank began with a certain objective in aiding countries in their struggles of rebuilding following the end of World War II (Beech, 2009; Rodríguez-Gómez & Alcántara, 2001). The Bank (along with other international organisations) supported the “The Washington Consensus”, which refers to a “set of broadly free market economic ideas” (Pettinger, 2013). According to the International Trade Administration, the World Bank Group today is a multilateral donor agency comprising of four “closely related institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (2017).

Since the 1960s, the World Bank’s responsibility has grown specifically with regards to developing underprivileged countries in regions like: Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, especially Sub Sharan Africa. The substantial debt obligation of the African countries in the post-colonial period resulted in the World Bank taking advantage of the opportunity to enforce its “structural adjustment” agenda on these countries. Thus, several African countries were kept under the policy power of the World Bank, where the
countries were forced to obey their economic policy regulations. This may indicate that nation states do in fact have little to say regarding the World Bank supported reforms, being implemented in any sector.

The focus on the educational priorities by the World Bank has varied throughout its years of operation (Rodríguez-Gómez & Alcántara, 2001), in which the Bank’s educational policy for developing countries changed drastically in the mid-1990s. They “positioned higher education as a luxury item”, hence the shift in funding from higher education to primary and secondary education, “to one that recognized and supported higher education as a key development priority”, due to the many years of under-funding experienced by the tertiary sector in developing countries (Robertson, 2009, p. 3). Thus in 1994, the Bank published a policy paper on higher education entitled, “Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience” (quotation marks added), to explain the extent of the crisis of higher education and the possible solutions and/or reforms that would help remedy this crisis (Robertson, 2009; World Bank, 2011). The Bank in its IEG review (2011) (report number 62651) stated that in their 1994 report, they had “identified a package of reform elements that came to be regarded as the Bank-advocated higher education reform model” (p.8), which was applied in different regions of the developing world. This was then followed by the 2002 release of the Bank’s report Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education, where the Bank’s “reform package” was refined (World Bank, 2011). This report highlighted the “role of higher education in the construction of knowledge economies and in institution building for democratic societies” (Bernasconi, 2007, p. 514). In 2008, the Bank published another report entitled “The Road Not Traveled” where it offered a “careful regional analysis of the relationship between education, the labor market, and economic growth during the late 20th and early 21st Centuries” (World Bank, 2011).

Till today, the Bank proposes its strategies and education policies to be the leading forces for global education (Klees et al, 2012), where it currently dominates the global policy discourse and authority in education, and thus this multilateral agency is one of the main actors in the facilitation of transferring educational knowledge to developing countries.
According to the official website of the World Bank (2017), “with 189-member countries, the World Bank Group is a unique global partnership fighting poverty worldwide through sustainable solutions”, in which the “World Bank has heavy connections to the U.S.” (Hozayin, 2018).

The World Bank’s educational policy agenda in reviving higher education follows the neoliberal approach, and is serving quite often the prosperous nations and multinational establishments (Klees et al, 2012). Thus, the WB has become a “highly effective means to promote the economic policy positions of the advanced capitalist countries” (Rodríguez-Gómez & Alcántara, 2001, p. 508). The “Group of 7”: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA denote 45% of the Bank’s capital and the USA another 17% (Rodríguez-Gómez & Alcántara, 2001). The mode of operation of the WB can indeed be compared to a “credit card system” but with countries (Megahed, 2017), in which the concept seems to be reinforced by the terms “credit agreement” which can be found on the official website of the World Bank (2017).

Western Scholars’ perspective on the World Bank discourse in education: The World Bank’s Education Strategy for 2020, has been discussed and critiqued in the book “The World Bank and Education Critiques and Alternatives” by Klees et al (2012) which can also be applied to the Bank’s previous strategies, as they all seem to follow a neoliberal approach. This approach supports the view of holding people or countries responsible for their own failure or success.

In addition, the overlooking of evidence and the World Bank’s policy recommendations are the result of both their neoliberal ideology, and their utilitarian or market-driven approach. Therefore, it is not a “knowledge bank” as they claimed to be, after reinventing itself in 1994 (Robertson, 2009) but a biased “opinion bank,” with “monopoly power” (Klees et al, 2012, p. 209). This is probably because “it is a bank, and banks survive on investment” (Davies, 2009, p. 17), where its “self-described role as a knowledge bank, combined with the expensive impact evaluations which, in some countries, cost more
than the actual “intervention” whose effectiveness they are supposed to measure, epitomizes the “what works approach.” (Klees et al, 2012, p. 5).

**Egypt’s national context and education development:** Education has been significant to the evolution of modern Egypt, persistently influencing its religious, social and political nature and it has been a field in which Egypt has endeavored to “develop a coherent sense of identity” (Cook, 1999, p.16). Al-Azhar University was the first institution of higher education to be established in 975 AD by the Fatimids, (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011; Radwan, 2016). Then in the early 19th century, Muhammad Ali Pasha implemented a secular and modern system of education like that of the Europeans, where the first secular, and private, National University of Egypt was established in Cairo in 1908, now known as Cairo University (Hartmann, 2008; Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011; Radwan, 2016). In 1919, American citizens established The American University in Cairo; the first private, non-profit university (Radwan, 2016) till his day. However, Ali’s “dual system” of education (Cook, 1999) gave rise to an educated Egyptian middle class, as the lower classes relied on Al-Azhar and the traditional Qur’an schools (known as “katateeb” or “kuttab”) (Hartmann, 2008).

When Gamal Abd El Nasser came to power in 1956 (following the 1952 revolution that was led by Nasser and the Free Officers Movement), free universal education was then introduced (Ghanem, 2014; Radwan, 2016). These reforms led to the nationwide access to higher education (Holmes, 2008) as well as equality in education (Hartmann, 2008). Nasser also established more universities throughout the entire country (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011), to give rise to skilled and educated Egyptians that would be able to run their own economy without external aid or foreign influences (Manning, 2012). This however, resulted in the deterioration of the quality of higher education in Egypt (Holmes, 2008), due to the inability of the state to fund these universities (Hartmann, 2008) because of the large influx of students (Cook, 1999). Nasser also implemented Westernised like reforms in Al-Azhar universities, which only strengthened the
“religious-political” split of the education system and the social divide in the society of Egypt (Ibrahim, 2010).

During Sadat’s era, the economic liberalisation policies diminished the role of education in promoting social equality (Ibrahim, 2010). The “dual system” of education was again promoted, as the poor had to rely on the inadequate public system, while the rich could rely on private schools. The support of international organisations such as USAID, The World Bank and the IMF was believed to be a solution to the government deficit and thus led to the implementation of neoliberal reforms in education (Ibrahim, 2010). In 1981, Mubarak enabled further privatization of the education system (Hartmann, 2008) allowing international organisations to integrate “global discourses” into Egyptian education (Ibrahim, 2010).

The education system in Egypt today is composed of the following; kindergarten (two years), primary and preparatory (which are both mandatory), secondary and tertiary education (Hartmann, 2008). The Ministry of Education is responsible for preschool, primary and secondary, while the Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for tertiary education (EP-NUFFIC, 2015). For students to enroll in higher education (and after spending 12 years of formal school education), they must pass a National General final examination (Thanawya Aama) or its equivalent (Radwan, 2016). To ensure that graduates are highly skilled and qualified human capital in the labor market, international agencies have thus been involved in all stages of the Egyptian education system (Ibrahim, 2010).

**Egypt’s education development and the World Bank:** According to the official website of the World Bank:

the current portfolio of the World Bank in Egypt includes 26 projects for a total commitment of US$5.92 billion. The World Bank finances projects for faster delivery of benefits to the people of Egypt in key sectors including energy, transport, water and sanitation, agriculture and irrigation, housing, social protection, as well as health and education.
First, the implemented WB projects were related to agriculture, water, etc. Then privatization of the economic system in Egypt occurred known as the SAPs in the 1980s, by the IMF as well as the WB. Thus, Egypt has been a major beneficiary of foreign aid ever since the era of Sadat. This was soon followed by the privatization of education, the first WB supported project implemented in Egypt being the Education Project in 1977 (Worldbank.org, 2017). Hence, as per the “Project Appraisal Document” of the Bank (2002), “Egypt has had nine World Bank-supported projects since 1997 addressing issues in general education and manpower development” (p. 19). It is noteworthy to mention that as per the ITA (2017), Egypt is currently labelled as a “middle income” country and is no “longer eligible for loans from the World Bank's 'soft' financing arm, the IDA, but it is still eligible for World Bank IBRD loans […] Egypt is one of the largest users of IFC funds in the world.”

Other projects in education that were implemented in Egypt were: ETEP from 1992 – 1998 (Said, 2001, p. 37), Education Enhancement Program or EEP, which was one of the major initial reforms that was implemented in Egypt in 1996 upon the recommendations of the World Bank. Allocation of resources was prioritized for the primary and secondary education on the expense of higher education (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011).

Additional projects associated with education, that have come to an end include: Basic Education Improvement Project (World Bank.org, 2017), Secondary education enhancement program or SEEP, where the EEP and SEEP “Programs' objectives directly support the Government's 20-year Education Sector Strategic Framework (1999-2019)” as per the Bank’s “Project Appraisal Document” (2002, p. 2). Furthermore, HEEP, which is the second project in the sector of higher education, as per the Bank’s PAD (2002) and Early Childhood Education Enhancement Program or ECEEP.

It is worthy of note that in the World Bank’s (2009) “Implementation Completion and Results Report,” it was stated that in February 2000, a National Conference on Higher Education was held where the Government of Egypt (GOE) prepared a Higher Education Reform Strategy (HERS), which was discussed during the conference. As stated by Mohsen Elmahdy Said (2009), the conference was held in Cairo with over “1200
stakeholders of higher education participating and coming to consensus on a declaration recommending legislative, financial and structural reform of higher education” (p. 41). “The conference declaration, which identified 25 reform initiatives, was endorsed by the President and the Prime Minister” (World Bank, 2009, p. xii), and they were to be implemented over a time period of fifteen years. The issues that were addressed in the conference as per the “Project Appraisal Document” (2009) were: “overly centralized governance and widespread inefficiencies, low quality of university education and poor quality and relevance of mid-level technical education” (p 3-5). It was stated in the “Implementation Completion and Results Report, that the initiatives to be aided by the IBRD under the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP) were chosen based on the urgency given to improve: “(i) system governance and efficiency; and (ii) quality and relevance of higher education” (World Bank, 2009, p. xii).

Overview of the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP): The need for HEEP was initially justified in the Bank’s (2002) “Project Appraisal Document,” and reasserted in other Bank reports on HEEP such as the “Implementation Completion and Results Report,” (2009) as the project “specifically aims to help the Government restructure and change the higher education system so it produces the type of graduates needed to underpin a private sector-led, export-driven economy, competitive in a global market” (p. 2-3). For Said (2009)

twelve of the 25 projects were identified and bundled into six integrated sub-projects and given priority in the first phase of the HERS (2002 – 2007), namely:

• FOEP Faculties of Education Project
• ETCP Egyptian Technical Colleges Project
• FLDP Faculty-Leadership Development Project
• ICTP Information & Communication Technology Project
• QAAP Quality Assurance and Accreditation Project
• HEEPF Higher Education Enhancement Project Fund (p. 463).
Objectives: As per the Bank’s (2009) “Implementation Completion and Results Report,” the “original project development objectives” or (PDO) of HEEP was formulated and planned to “create the conditions fundamental to improving the quality and efficiency of the higher education system in Egypt through legislative reform, institutional restructuring, and establishment of independent quality assurance mechanisms and monitoring systems” (p. 2). It was stated in the Bank’s Loan Agreement Document (2002) that the “Bank has received a letter dated February 11, 2002, from the Borrower describing the objectives, policies and actions and financing plan designed to develop and promote the efficiency, relevance and quality of higher education and the Bank has responded thereto by a letter dated February 17, 2002” (p 2-3), which suggests that the Egyptian government had planned everything, and requested the assistance and or intervention of the World Bank, through mainly funding, as well as other means of intervention i.e. facilitating bureaucratic procedures.

Perhaps one of the reasons for needing HEEP, specifically the component of institutional restructuring, (Component 1 in HEEP, which will be mentioned in the next subsection), that coincides with the categorization of reforms made by Tiongson (2005), one of which being “management and institutional reforms,” may have been based on the belief that “centralized systems” (which are usually in charge of the educational sector, as well as other sectors in Egypt) are not often able to “respond efficiently and adequately to local needs” where instead, decentralized systems may in the end improve quality (p. 265).

Thus, the reforms suggested by the World Bank (2011) were to improve higher education to suit the economic and social needs of each country in a globalized world, with no mention of improving the means of provision of education by higher education institutes i.e. pedagogy (Klees et al, 2012; Megahed; World Bank PAD, 2002), even though “instructional practices” was mentioned in the Bank’s PAD (2009) as the reason behind the low quality of education in Egyptian HE as well as the “stress rote learning and memorization of facts” undergone by the students and the “heavy reliance on the lecture system” (p. 5). Whether teachers in a school or lecturers in a university, as cited by Mark
Ginsburg, the “quality of their teaching are now widely recognized as the most critical of many important factors that combine to create overall quality of education” (Klees et al, 2012, p. 83), thus, teachers and/or instructors and/or lecturers are vital as they are the “main driving force in education” (UNESCO, 2013, p. 31).

**Original components:** As approved by the World Bank in the Implementation Completion and Results Report (2009), “Component 1: Improve efficiency through the reform of governance and management. Component 2: Improve the quality and relevance of university education. Component 3: Improve quality and relevance of mid-level technical education,” where Component 1 for example, would be responsible for five initiatives, one of which being 1 (iii) “Establishing a National Quality Assurance Council (NQAC)” (World Bank, PAD, 2009, p. 8). This council, as per the Bank, would be responsible for the accreditation of higher education institutions in Egypt (World Bank, PAD, 2009) as well as ensuring quality of the higher education programs, and is to be maintained by “the Borrower” as stated in the Bank’s “Loan Agreement” report (2009).

**Loan and conditionality:** The project cost a total of 60 million U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2011), where per the Bank’s “Project Appraisal Document” (2002), “an IBRD loan of US $50 million will cover eleven sub-projects of the Government's reform strategy”, (of the 25 initiatives) “and the GOE is contributing approximately US$10 million to support the first phase of the HERS” (p. 3). The amount to be borrowed by Egyptian Government from the Bank was again confirmed in the “Loan Agreement Report” of the World Bank (2002) to be 50 million U.S. dollars. It is of great significance to mention that the loan is provided by the World Bank upon the agreement of the “borrower” (World Bank, 2011) to adopt the suggested policy reforms by the Bank (Klees et al, 2012).

In the Bank’s “Loan Agreement” (2002) report, it is stated under Article II, Section 2.04, that Egypt’s Ministry of Finance or “The Borrower” as referred to by the Bank, will pay “a front-end fee in an amount equal to one percent (1%) of the amount of the Loan” to the Bank, as well as a “commitment charge at the rate of three-fourths of one percent (3/4 of 1%) per annum on the principal amount of the Loan not withdrawn from time to time” under section 2.05 (p.3). An “interest on the principal amount of the Loan withdrawn and
outstanding from time to time, at a rate for each Interest Period equal to LIBOR Base Rate plus LIBOR Total Spread” is also to be paid, mentioned under section 2.06, where LIBOR stands for the “London interbank offered rate” (p.3). It is also noteworthy that the Bank states under section 2.08 that the principal amount of the Loan is to be repaid by the Ministry of Finance “in accordance with the amortization schedule set forth in Schedule 3 to this Agreement” (p.3). The loan will be repaid in 17 years, with interest, where a 5-year grace period has been provided, as stated in the Bank’s Loan Agreement document (2002) “Beginning August 15, 2007 up to August 15, 2018, 2,085,000” USD (United States Dollars) and on “February 15, 2019, 2,045,000 USD” (p. 10), where “interest and other charges shall be payable semiannually on February 15 and August 15 in each year” (p. 1).

Competitive Funds: With regards to Egypt, the Higher Education Enhancement Program Fund (HEEPF) is a “competitive fund” that was established as the program demanded “responsive funds” to improving research and teaching (Fehnel, 2004), which is one of the initiatives pertaining to Component 1 or 1(v), in the Bank’s PAD (2002). It is to “support competitive proposals designed to support improvements in teaching and learning in academic departments and program and course innovation” in public higher education institutions (World Bank PAD, 2009, p. 6). This fund is to be “thereafter maintained by the Borrower’s MOHE” as mentioned in the Bank’s (2002) “Loan Agreement” for HEEP, in which the World Bank views the MoHE as the “champion of reform” (World Bank PAD, 2009).

Evaluation of the project outcomes: In the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results Report,” (2009), “key indicators” (after approval) were provided under the POD section to monitor and assess the project, one of which was “Key legislative reforms enacted for the universities to become effective self-governing institutions” (p. 2), which again seems to pertain to the legislative or bureaucratic aspects of the project rather than the level of education that is to be provided by HE in Egypt through i.e. pedagogical training (World Bank PAD, 2009) of faculty and staff, as it may “reinforce a business-like approach to education” (Klees et al, 2012, p. 69). It is important to note that these
“key indicators” were not revised, as per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results Report,” (2009).

The “ratings” of the World Bank report used terms like “satisfactory” and “moderate satisfactory”, for the performance of Egypt as well as the performance of the World Bank (World Bank, 2011), which are terms that seem to be vague. These terms seem to coincide with quantitative analysis, which are numerical in form and thus it may be easy to lie with statistics (Klees et al, 2012; Zaalouk, 2016). Adequate and sufficient qualitative analysis needs to be provided to depict a more accurate picture with regards to the results of the higher education project in Egypt, especially since the Bank believes that “what matters is measurable outcomes” (as cited in Klees et al, 2012, p. 73).

Institutional and Implementation Arrangements: As per the Bank’s PAD report (2002) the chief institutions in charge of the HEEP were: “(i) the Ministry of Higher Education; (ii) the Supreme Council of Universities (SCU); (iii) the participating universities; and (iv) the Project Management Unit (PMU)” (p. 12). Other entities were meant to be established such as the “(i) the Supreme Council of Technical Colleges (SCTC); (ii) the Higher Education Enhancement Project Fund (HEEPF); and (iii) the National Quality Assurance Council (NQAC)” (p.12). This need to establish new entities was rationalized by the Bank as follows, to “harmonize the national higher education framework” (p.12).

Educators perspective in Egypt about HEEP: the perspective will be obtained through field work, in which I will discuss in the research methods section.
Chapter 3: Methodology

This study follows a qualitative design, in which field work was conducted to obtain the perspective of expert educators in Egypt through individual interviews. In addition, documents were used to analyse the policy of the World Bank-supported HEEP project and to critique it. The design of the research itself involved answering the research questions of this study (that were presented earlier) to help explore and comprehend the research problem at hand.

Research Design:

This study employs a qualitative research methodology, where according to Creswell (2012) “exploring a problem and developing a detailed understanding of a central phenomenon” (p. 26) is necessary, which is appropriate to the purpose of this study. As according to Klees et al (2012), “since the World Bank intends its education policies and strategies to be prime movers for global education, it is essential to subject them to systematic, grounded, and critical scrutiny” (p. xv), this can be achieved through inquiry and examination that reveal stakeholders' perceptions, which aligns with the characteristics of qualitative research employed in this study. The book of Klees et al (2012) “broadly critiques” (p. xv) the World Bank, and since it was written by several renowned authors, including Mark Ginsburg, Gita Steiner-Khamsi, and many more, where the book presents the general perspective of the Western scholars and educators, regarding the World Bank policies in developing countries.

Document and Policy analysis was conducted, where the author analyzed data obtained through second hand research of; official public records, international reports and international documents regarding the WB supported HEEP policy (which can be downloaded and saved, as they are available to the public on the Bank’s official website). This is the same methodology that was used by Ginsburg & Megahed (2011), where both
scholars made use of the documentary sources or “extensive documentary analysis” (p. 1). The analysis of the official documents and reports of the HEEP project was supplemented by the usage of scholarly articles and/or publications¹. Among these scholarly publications, the book by Klees et al (2012) entitled “The World Bank and Education. Critique and Alternatives” facilitated the comprehension of the World Bank’s approach to implementing education reforms and thus assisted the researcher in her analysis and critique. The author resorted (and relied heavily throughout the paper) to the insight of Klees et al (2012) as it “brings together for the first time a group of some of the most widely known observers of the World Bank’s education policy” (p. xvi) as well other work by renowned scholars, in which the critiques offered in this collection also have implications far beyond the World Bank as they are responses to the neoliberal global education policy recommendations that have dominated for several decades in developed and developing countries alike. We believe that this collective response is more important than ever given the ever stronger dominance of neoliberal policies in general, and, in particular, the World Bank’s ascending role as an undisputed influential actor in education, often more so than UNESCO. (p. xvi)

This is because Klees et al (2012) justify strongly and rationally their perspective and critique about the World Bank by stating that the organisation periodically produces a new education sector document […] policy […] strategy or review […] intended to shape education policy and practice […] Such documents are extremely influential as they reach policy and decision makers […] large audience of educational practitioners and other lending institutions that work closely with the World Bank […] free distributions and through the World Bank’s website […] the World Bank’s education sector policies are used as a key referent in negotiations and decisions by lending countries (p. xv)

¹i.e. journals obtained online and/or acquired in the MA program of ICED by renowned scholars to support any argument made by the author or to refute said argument.
Policy analysis of the World Bank HEEP project was carried out by examining the World Bank’s “project cycle”, which was obtained from a brief published on the World Bank Group website (2017) with reference to several Bank official documents that had discussed the HEEP project. This was done by the author to identify any discrepancies or contradictions between the general project cycle and the Bank’s documents pertaining to the HEEP project, with the help of Haddad & Demsky’s (1995) book entitled “Education Policy-Planning Process: An Applied Framework.” In addition, the “project cycle” of the Bank was critiqued as per certain elements of the model proposed by the UNESCO (2013) in the UNESCO Handbook on Education Policy Analysis and Programming, as the handbook,

proposes a systematic and structured method that facilitates analysis of education policy and programmes across the areas of [...] quality [...] of education and across the major cross-cutting issues, for all levels and types of education within the national context [...] useful [...] when commenting on policy documents provided by governments and donors (p. iv).

In this study, I have also offered the educators’ perspective in Egypt about HEEP, which was obtained through field work (and will be discussed in the findings section). So, what is the Eastern/Egyptian perspective? This was answered through interviews conducted with educators and/or experts in the field. The design of this study revolves around answering the research questions stated previously, which has resulted in offering a better understanding of the World Bank HEEP project.

**Sampling**

The purposive (purposeful) sampling technique was used in this study, where the selection of “representative individuals” was done to reveal the perspectives of these “individuals to a population” (Creswell, 2012, p. 206). First, I intentionally asked via email the permission of certain faculty members in a specific department pertaining to a
renowned private university, if they would like to participate in my research. My name as well as my affiliation to the AUC were provided, as well as the reason for my research and how information can be obtained (via interview or email), upon the initial consent of the Professors. The rest of the sample were chosen at random, where emails were sent to Professors affiliated with and/or are currently working at said private university with the aid of its website, via the i.e. staff directory, to ask if they could participate in my research. I then searched via google the email addresses of Professors who were directly involved in HEEP, and who were (and still are) affiliated with other universities besides said private university, to ask for their permission as well.

I also resorted to snowball sampling (Creswell, 2012), which is when the “researcher asks participants to recommend other individuals to be sampled” (p. 209), (as I was unable to find enough professors who were willing to participate in my research within that private university). I asked Professors I had already interviewed or was in the process of interviewing, if they knew of any educational experts who may be able to assist me working in and/or outside of said private university. Some Professors outside of the university were also contacted by phone, where I asked if they would be willing to participate in my research. All Professors were told that the researcher will not disclose their name unless they would like otherwise and any information shared by them will be used for the sole purpose of this research.

The sample was intended to be around a minimum of 15 expert educators, (however, the researcher was only able to obtain 11, as it is further explained in the process of data collection) where the former sample number would have helped the author gain a deeper understanding (Creswell, 2012) of the World Bank supported HEEP that was implemented in Egypt. The sample consisted of 9 male Professors and 2 female Professors, all pertaining to the Egyptian nationality. The professors who were involved directly or indirectly in the WB supported HEEP project were 9, of which 8 are male and 1 is female. Professor 9 however was not involved in the HEEP project, but was involved in another project funded by another donor agency. Whereas 8 professors were a director of a certain component or stage within the project during or after the WB support (where
the project was then funded by the Egyptian government). Professor 5 was not involved in the decision-making process of the initiative, but was part of the strategic planning team for this project. Professor 1 was involved in the project but on an institutional level. This professor was asked to carry out certain practices associated with the quality component of HEEP that was implemented, at a renowned public university, in the department of Psychology. Only two Professors out of the total sample asked to remain anonymous. Further description of the sample regarding their age, type of involvement in HEEP, their affiliation with public or private institutions, etc. will be offered in the table below.

**Table 1: Sample Description**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professor (coded using numbers)</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Area of Specialisation (Humanities or Sciences)</th>
<th>Academic Rank</th>
<th>Institution (Private or Public)</th>
<th>Type of Involvement (Leadership position at the time of HEEP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>+70</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Director of Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>+70</td>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>Emeritus Professor</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>executive director &amp; chairman of the board of the PMU at MOHE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>+70</td>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>Professor (previously Dean)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Director of the ICTP component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Assistant manager for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My intention was to gain an insight on the perspective of educational experts who live in Egypt and/or Egyptian educators regarding the mentioned research problem. The expert educators offered general and/or specific feasible policy recommendations, regarding means of improvement to offer lessons to be learned from this experience.

*Interview Protocol*

Interviews were conducted, which were in the form of one-on-one interviews, “the most time-consuming” as per Creswell (2012, p. 218) as well as the most commonly used in educational research (Partington, 2001). Questions were formulated as a result of; the
array of literature (written by renowned scholars) read by the author (which discussed and critiqued the World Bank), analysis by the author of the official HEEP documents published by the Bank, and, as a result of the class discussions that were held during the author’s MA courses of both Professor Nagwa Megahed (2015) and Professor Malak Zaalouk (2016). A total of 16 questions were formulated, where 6 of them were closed-ended, while the other 10 questions asked were open-ended. The structure of the qualitative interviews was semi-structured. As per Partington (2001), in a semi structured interview, the researcher can “control of the process of obtaining information from the interviewee, but is free to follow new leads as they arise” (p. 33). The questions in a semi-structured interview are prepared in advance but other questions may arise spontaneously because of new leads that may need to be followed, which may require further exploration and understanding. Hence, this type of interview enables the interviewee to dig deeper to understand the central phenomenon at hand. This was the case here, since some ideas that were mentioned by the interviewees needed further clarification and/or elaboration. In addition, the interviews were recorded to ensure accuracy and to enable the author to take brief notes whenever possible. An interview protocol was also used upon the recommendations of Creswell (2012).

**Data Procedure**

**Data collection**

The author obtained throughout the academic semester of Spring 2017 (which commenced in January), public records as international reports and international documents that were available on the World Bank website, and additional documents continued throughout the writing process of this study ². The interviews were conducted

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² It is important to acknowledge the fact that numerous sources have been recommended by the author’s thesis supervisor Professor Nagwa Megahed, as well as Professor Russanne Hozayin and professors (expert educators) who were interviewed by the author as well.
per the time and availability of the educational experts, (as well as their readiness to participate in the study) as they were busy i.e. teaching, meetings, travelling, attending conferences, etc. The researcher started collecting data in the fall semester of Fall 2018, (as during the summer of 2017, Professors were on holiday and CAPMAS approval had not been received yet) in which the process was time consuming. As per Creswell (2012), “collecting qualitative data and analyzing it takes considerable time, and the addition of each individual […] only lengthens that time” (p. 209).

The author had begun to send emails on Thursday 14\textsuperscript{th} September 2017, to ask Professors in and outside of that said private university, which was done once the researcher got her IRB approval and CAPMAS approval, in which the latter took approximately 40 days to receive. The author had targeted and hence sent approximately 30 to 40 emails (or more) to Professors for initial consent within and outside said private university, as well as approximately 10 messages via cell phone for the same purpose. Only a minority within said private university agreed to meet up with the author or send answers via email (due to their busy schedule and conflict between my availability as well as theirs), as the majority declined. However, professors outside of said private university agreed, and on Thursday 22\textsuperscript{nd} September, the first interview was conducted. Initial consent was confirmed by the potential participants or interviewees, through email for both one on one interviews and for interviews via email. This enabled the researcher to then send a copy of the interview questions, prior to the scheduled interview, by email.

The one-on-one interviews were recorded upon the agreement of the interviewee and a consent form was signed (in English or Arabic, according to the preference of the interviewee) before the researcher commenced the interview. Upon inquiry of certain interviewees, the researcher offered a confirmation of the purpose of the research and why the perspective of the educational experts was needed in this research. Face to face interviews lasted between 22 minutes and 32 seconds to approximately 61 minutes and 24 seconds. Most of the interviews were conducted in English and a few were conducted in Arabic, which was again according to the preference of the interviewee.
The author went to several public and/or private universities to interview the Professors, the place of work of some of the interviewees and public settings that were not academic in nature or work-related. This was because the place of work of some of the professors was in another governorate. The researcher was very fortunate to meet the Professors as most of them were directly involved with/in the HEEP project at the time of its implementation. The final interview was conducted on Thursday 26th October 2017. The author had anticipated to receive at least four additional responses via email (in addition to the 11 face-to-face interviews), as it was not possible to meet them in person, due to a conflict in schedules between the author and participants. However, a few professors declined after initial consent via email due to lack of thorough knowledge regarding the topic and a few other experts had not sent their response as agreed, due to perhaps their inability to find time to answer the questions, may be as a result of their hectic work schedule.

The researcher also asked for help from a personal contact, to assist in finding and providing emails and/or phone numbers of educational experts. This person was not part of the sample, as they served primarily as a mediator and because they are not affiliated with the academic field.

Data Analysis

First, the one on one interviews were “recorded” (Partington, 2001, p. 33) via a cell phone, where the audio files were then transferred from a private cell phone (that was only used and/or accessed by the author) to the computer. The files were then saved and kept safe on the researcher’s password protected personal computer, which no one had access to them but the author herself. The one on one interviews were then “transcribed” (Partington, 2001, p. 33), where transcription is when the researcher “types the data into a computer file for analysis” (Creswell, 2001, p. 217), which is the “process of converting audiotape recordings or fieldnotes into text data” (p. 239). The transcribed data was read several times by the researcher, where an analysis was conducted during each time (Creswell, 2012), to develop a more profound understanding of the information and to
identify any emerging themes that were common, within the data. As this data was transcribed, they became “documents” as per Owen (2013), where one can use these documents for analysis to help develop a further understanding of the phenomenon being studied.

All interviews were conducted in English except for 2, where the Professors chose to have the interview conducted in Arabic. The 2 Arabic interviews were first transcribed and then translated into English, where the author’s native language is Arabic and thus, she has a good command of the English language. The thematic approach was used in analysis, where the responses of the participants were coded, grouped into themes to align and provide answers to the research questions. The research questions hence guided the development of the interview protocol. Interviewees were coded by numbers (1 - 11). Emerging themes could have been examined by interviewing the participants via a second interview, to ensure validity (accuracy) and reliability (consistency), as per Brink (1993), to ensure the least possible amount of error (Creswell, 2012). However, this proved to be more than difficult, due to the busy work schedule of both the author and the interviewees. Nonetheless, these emerging themes will require further research in the future.

Scope of the Study and Limitations

First, the availability of professors pertaining to the renowned private university was a challenge, as some of them had prior engagements and/or were busy during the time of data collection. Second, as the researcher conducting this qualitative study, a limitation that has arisen is that I may be “over reliant on accessible and elite” (Brink, 1993, p. 37) professors in the department within the private university and/or outside of it (especially since the sample obtained consisted of 11 experts). This may mean that due to the nature of this study, a limitation regarding the results obtained may not be generalizable to all the education experts in Egypt. Another limitation faced by the researcher was the inability to interview the faculty members’ multiple times. A second interview would
have been helpful to further clarify emerging themes. However, due to the lack of time that occurred from both the researcher’s end, as well as the participants, a second interview proved to be problematic.

That is why the researcher included the perspective of the WB regarding the outcomes of HEEP and assessed those impacts, the perspective of the Borrower’s from their report, in addition to the educators’ perspectives. This is what Creswell (2012) refers to as the “triangulation of data” and to which Sargeant (2012) confirms as “data triangulation,” which is the usage of “multiple data sources to produce a more comprehensive view of the phenomenon being studied” (p. 2-3). This is because as per Creswell & Miller (2000), “qualitative inquirers need to demonstrate that their studies are credible” (p. 124).

Now, the fact that 9 Professors were involved in the WB supported HEEP, may have led to their hesitation in fully disclosing their sincere opinion of the impacts of the project as well as any kind of criticism in relation to the impacts of the involvement of the Bank and/or their philosophy. This however, is only a mere impression of the author herself and thus, cannot be confirmed or denied.

**Ethical Considerations**

Per Creswell (2012), “all educational researchers need to be aware of and anticipate ethical issues in their research” (p. 22). Thus, before the data was collected, even though the author had completed the IRB training, an IRB approval was required. CAPMAS was also necessary to be obtained. Once the research proposal was approved, (and after obtaining IRB and CAPMAS approval) the researcher commenced in collecting data.

The author ensured that the educational experts (who were asked for initial consent via email and were then interviewed) knew “the purpose and aims of the study, how the results will be used, and the likely social consequences the study will have on their lives” (Creswell, 2012, p. 23), as they are professors who teach at a well-known and reputable private university as well as other public and/or private universities. Each of them were
asked to sign a consent form prior to the face-to-face interview. Thus, the participation of the Egyptian educational experts was of course voluntary, as they were asked if they wish to be a part of the author’s research. Following several research studies that have been published, the educators’ whom were interviewed by the author were assigned different names to protect their anonymity and/or were not mentioned at all. This is because only 2 interviewees chose to remain anonymous and thus, their confidentiality has been protected. The experts in education will receive a copy of the study upon its completion and approval (Pajares, 2007, p. 8), upon their request.
Chapter 4: Findings

The findings of this study are organized in the manner below to answer the research questions of this study. Owen (2013) in his article (that discussed his PhD research and dissertation), used “interviews and document analysis” to “collect appropriate data” to support the addressing of his theoretical perspective and thus research question (p. 6).

Firstly, the findings pertaining to the World Bank’s documented viewpoint/s of the outcomes of HEEP will be presented, followed by the perspective of the “Borrower’s” in their report as well as document and policy analysis of the World Bank’s HEEP project. These two perspectives are meant to answer sub questions; 1 and 2, pertaining to the main research question of this study.

Then, the educator’s perspective will be presented. The perspective of the educational experts alone in the research would not have been suffice, as it would not have been representative of all the experts in Egypt. So, all three viewpoints are offered collectively to, as mentioned in the previous section, reveal the perceptions of the stakeholders of the HEEP project. The findings for the third sub research question will be presented as feasible policy recommendations that were suggested by the educational experts.

According to Bardach, “in policy research, almost all likely sources of information, data, and ideas fall into two general types: documents and people” (as cited in Owen, 2013, p. 9). Therefore, as previously mentioned, this “triangulation” of data is a “validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 126). Hence, a better understanding of the outcomes of the WB supported HEEP initiative may be reached.

The perspective of the World Bank regarding the HEEP project was obtained from several official and public documents that were published online via the Bank’s official website, where the author will focus on the Bank’s assessment of the outcomes of HEEP discussed in those reports. The WB’s assessment of their own performance and the
performance of the “Borrower’s” (as referred to by the Bank) in the implementation of the initiative will also be offered. In addition, this section will highlight the results of an impact assessment study that was conducted by the “Borrower” (Egyptian Government), which was published by the Bank.

Figure 3: Impact of HEEP: World bank, “Borrower” and Educators perspective.

I. Findings of Document and Policy Analysis:

I. a. World Bank’s Perspective
The World Bank (2002) in the Project Appraisal Document or PAD stated (Report No: 23332-EGYPT) under section A.1. “Project Development Objective” or PDO, the following objectives “the Project will create the conditions fundamental to improving the quality and efficiency of the higher education system in Egypt through legislative reform, institutional restructuring, and establishment of independent quality assurance mechanisms and monitoring systems” (p. 2). In the IEG ICR Review (2011) (Report Number: ICRR13224), it indicated that in both the PAD and the Loan Agreement, the
objectives of the project were articulated in the same manner. As per the PAD (2002), under section A.2. “Key Performance Indicators” were specified to be used in monitoring and in assessing the “progress made towards project objectives” which were

- Key legislative reforms enacted for the universities to become effective self-governing institutions;
- Legislative reform enacted to establish independent quality assurance mechanisms;
- Legislative framework in place for the Technical Colleges to become self-governing institutions with linkages to the private sector;
- Consolidation of 47 Middle Technical Institutes into 8 Technical Colleges accomplished;
- Management Information System developed and operational for the post-secondary sector (p. 2)

The project consisted of 3 components. As per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” (2009) (Report No: ICR00001154), the original components (as approved) were: “Component 1: Improve efficiency through the reform of governance and management” which was to reinforce “five groups of activities aimed at improving system governance management and efficiency” (p. 2), “Component 2: Improve the quality and relevance of university education” which supported “efforts to improve the quality and relevance of university education through facilitating the use of new learning technologies and human resource development” and “included two activities” (p. 3) and “Component 3: Improve quality and relevance of mid-level technical education” where the aim of this component was to “support the restructuring of mid-level technical education for improved quality and relevance” (p. 3). These components, according to several Bank reports were not “formally revised”. However, there were important changes done to the original components, than that mentioned in the PAD.

In the “Implementation Completion and Results” (2009) (Report No: ICR00001154), the overall outcome of the project was given a “satisfactory”. While in the IEG comparative review or the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR, 2011) (Report No.:}
the outcome of the project was given an overall rating of “moderately satisfactory” (p. 30). This rating was based on: “relevance ratings” that are “substantial for objectives and modest for design”; “efficacy ratings” of “modest for improving efficiency and substantial for improving quality” and an “efficiency rating” of “substantial” (p. 45). It is noteworthy that when the Bank was unable to provide sufficient information for IEG to have reached a “clear rating”, IEG had downgraded the “relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006”, as per the IEG review (2011, p. 6).

It is noteworthy that the Bank’s HEEP-Aide Memoire (October 12th-17th, 2008) for Egypt (Higher Education Enhancement Project Supervision (IBRD Loan No. 4658-EGT) acknowledged that one of the most significant accomplishments of the project is its “contribution to creating an environment which is more receptive to change and participation in reform efforts” (p.3). It was mentioned in a previous aide memoire (May 15-24, 2007) how the World Bank’s “supervision mission” was fixated on 2 themes, which were “external efficiency” and “quality assurance mechanisms” (p. 2). The report also declared how the HEEP initiative at the time, continued to be a “showcase project” in the MENA region, in relation to education, as it had developed a “quality assurance process”, “faculty training”, and the “HEEPF” had set in motion “innovations” that were considered “favorably throughout MENA” (p. 4).

As per the aide-memoire (October 12th-17th, 2008), the most important achievements of the project were grouped and categorized into two areas; the project had become a significant “change agent for modernizing the management culture” for institutions of higher education. It had also played a role in the “improvement of the infrastructure of the HE sector” (p.3). The Bank then questioned “how deep” were these “changes?” Where these changes were to be identified at the time by conducting an impact study and, “how permanent” were these “changes?” The question of the changes being “permanent”, as per the Bank, had referred to the creation of sustainable mechanisms, in which some areas, the “sustainability” was not “hundred percent assured” (p. 4).
It is worthy of noting that the closing date of the project was scheduled for the 31st of December 2007, but was extended till the 31st of December 2008. The Bank assessed the outcomes of the project in several of their reports as follows:

I. a. 1. Relevance

The Project Management Unit (PMU) was responsible for implementing this project, as stated in several reports pertaining to the WB. As per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” (2009) (Report No: ICR00001154), the general “relevance of project objectives” was “high” upon the “preparation” of the project and upon its “completion” (p. 9). However, it was stated in the IEG ICR review (2011) (Report Number: ICRR13224) (p. 2) and the IEG comparative review (2011) that the general “relevance” of the objectives of the project was “substantial.”

Relevance of Objectives was “substantial”: According to the IEG ICR review (2011), the objectives of the HEEP initiative were placed in compliance with the social and economic needs expressed in the Country Assessment Strategy (CAS) for Egypt, published by the WB in 2001. As per the Bank’s CAS report (2001), for Egypt to “remain competitive in the increasingly globalized economy”, it will “require a sophisticated education system that can generate graduates with problem-solving and technological skills for the fast-changing, information-oriented environment” (p. 11). As per the IEG ICR review (2011), the objectives were linked to the reform agenda that was proposed in the National Conference on Higher Education in 2000, where 11 out of the 25 reform initiatives were addressed by HEEP.

Relevance of Design was “modest”: It was stated in the PPAR (2011) (Report No.: 62651) that the design of the project utilized by the “implementers”, with its “5 sub projects”, was not the same as the original design (and its “3 components”) proposed in the Bank’s project documents. Thus, this lead to a bit of “confusion” as to how the success of the project success was going to be “determined” (p. 35).
I. a. 2. Achievement of Project Development Objectives (Efficacy)

The Bank’s PPAR (2011) revealed that the “evidence for efficacy for the two main objectives of the project” were to, “a) create conditions for improving efficiency”, and “b) create conditions for improving quality” (p. 36). As per the IEG ICR review (2011), “Objective (a)” was given a rating of “Modest” and “Objective (b)” was given a rating of “substantial” (p. 2).

With regards to “Objective (a)”, the “Implementation Completion and Results” (2009) indicated that the way HEEP contributed to set up the conditions “conducive” (where it was indicated that the word “conducive” was used instead of the word “fundamental,” as was originally stated in the PAD) for “improved efficiency” was “rather limited” (p. 11). The rationale offered by the former report (p. 11), the PPAR (2011, p. 36) as well as the IEG ICR review (2011, p. 2) was according to the following output, the “new legislative framework to award more autonomy to universities faced some resistance in Parliament and has not been adopted yet.” In addition, with respect to another output identified as “rationalized funding” in the IEG ICR review (2011), the MOHE worked on a “funding formula” and also developed a “model to estimate and analyze student unit costs,” but it was not used (p. 2). As per the “Implementation Completion and Results” (2009), The MIS (management information system) was established and adopted but was “not yet operational” (p. 11). The Bank stated in the PPAR (2011), that the Supreme Council of Universities and the Supreme Council of Technical Colleges were established in 2008. However, it was uncertain to “what extent they have power or will to make substantial changes” (p. 37), and the “efficiency” of the technical colleges is in danger as a result of the heavily centralized system (“Implementation Completion and Results”, 2009). The outcomes pertaining to this objective were; an increase in the “cost per student,” which was of “diminished efficiency” as the student-to-staff ratio had remained unchanged (IEG ICR review, 2011, p. 2) and the “graduation rates” for public universities, which were below average for public universities such as Cairo University and Alexandria University and below international standards (PPAR, 2011). Thus, as per the WB, “HEEP did support an efficiency improving agenda” (PPAR, 2011, p. 37).
As for “Objective (b) create conditions for improving quality,” was rated “substantial” where according to the outputs of universities, “deep changes in the university system took place” as per the PPAR (2011, p. 43). This included the formation of the National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NAQAAE), as per the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009). According to the PPAR (2011), certain characteristics attributed to the improvement in quality strengthened one another by several means, such as “ICT connectivity provides new e-channels for staff development”; increased quality standards under quality assurance and accreditation […] use of new instructional media; innovative, entrepreneurial programs under HEEP […] and new research brings the university into contact with community needs” (p. 43). However, it was confirmed in the PPAR (2011), that there was no “hard evidence” to confirm these effects on quality were as a result of changes that were brought about by HEEP.

With reference to the outputs of technical colleges discussed in the IEG ICR review (2011), there was a decrease in student-staff ratio as an outcome, from “305:1 to 98:1 in the service subjects”, as a result of hiring a larger number of qualified staff (p. 3). However, as per the IEG ICR review (2011), a decrease in the graduate unemployment rate could not be determined as an outcome. This was in spite of the fact that the restructuring of the mid-level technical education had taken place to suit the “industrial and commercial world” as stated in the PPAR (2011, p. 44), and the number of students who had enrolled in technical colleges had increased, but the “entrants into new workplace connected programs had not yet graduated” (IEG ICR review, 2011, p. 4).

I. a. 3. Efficiency

The efficiency of the project was rated as “substantial” as the “Economic rate of Return (ERR)” and the “Financial Rate of Return (FRR)” were not brought up to date for the “Implementation Completion and Results” report, as they were not “estimated during appraisal” (2011, p. 11). The IEG ICR review (2011) stated that the ICR had not conducted an efficiency analysis (p. 4). In the beginning, the process of implementation during the first 2 years of the project was negligible and “disbursement of funds” were
minimal, as per the PPAR (2011, p. 44). As per the IEG ICR review (2011), after adjustments to the budget were made, “disbursement followed the expected curve,” and towards the end it had accelerated, so that “loan funds were fully disbursed within a one year extension” (p. 4). Following the project completion, all components from HEEP were continued in HEEP2 (which was fully financed by the Egyptian government), except for the HEEPF component, as per the PPAR (2011, p. 44). The funding of these components was much higher than during the Bank supported HEEP loan for more or less the same activities, “suggesting good value for money under HEEP” (p. 44).

Figure 4: Impact of HEEP: World Bank Perspective

I. a. 4. Other Outcomes and Impacts:

(i) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

As per the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2011), the major social problem related to the project links its “possible impact on equity to access higher education” (p. 12). The two most prominent features that may have had an “impact on
equity”: “(i) a cap on secondary school students access to university” and “(ii) an increase in students’ financial contribution to the cost of higher education” which were not specifically tackled by the project (p. 12).

(ii) Institutional Change/Strengthening

HEEP had a “substantial institutional impact” at the “system, MOHE and university levels” (“Implementation Completion and Results,” 2009, p. 12). For example, the establishment of NAQAAE at the system level, “building the capacity of the Strategic Planning Unit” in the MOHE and at the university level; the development and the operation of management information systems, the establishment of Quality Assurance Centers and one of the most important accomplishments, the “restructuring of the technical education sub-sector” (p. 12).

(iii) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

As per the “Implementations Completion and Results” report (2011)

- The “accreditation and quality assurance agency (NAQAA)” was created, but this framework had some limitations.
- “The Development Engagement process introduced by QAAP”.
- The launch of the “National Centre for Faculty and Leadership Development (NCFLD) with an international accreditation”.
- The founding of the “consortium of Egyptian university libraries” (p.12), which was also mentioned as an outcome under “(b) institutional change/strengthening” in the same report.

I. a. 5. Impact Assessment Study:

As per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the MOHE decided to carry out an “Impact Assessment Study” and manage a “Stakeholders
workshop.” This was because the project had proven to be multifaceted due to the difficulty in assessing the project outcomes. The aim of this study was to evaluate the viewpoint of the beneficiaries regarding the HEEP outcomes. The initial part of the impact assessment concentrated on the effect of QAAP, ICTP and FDLP, and was carried out in three universities: Cairo, Mansoura and Assiut, to represent at the time Urban, Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt governorates, and were chosen according to the degree of their involvement in the Project. In each university, four faculties: Engineering, Medicine, Commerce and Art, represented both “hard and soft sciences were surveyed” (“Implementation Completion and Results”, 2009, p. 13). However, as per the Bank in the PPAR (2011), there were limitations to the study such as the lack of availability of “baseline data” and the size of the sample was too small (p. 44). The methodology of the study was also flawed as the sample was biased and there was no control group, as was stated in the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009). The sample, according to the above report, had consisted of “3371 students”, “351 Teaching Assistants” and “522 faculty staff members” (p. 13). The results of the study showed:

(i) a globally good knowledge and perception by faculty members, especially for QAAP and ICTP; (ii) a significantly lower level of knowledge and perception of project benefits from students; and (iii) higher expectations from faculty for project longer term impact (p. 13-14).

I. a. 6. Assessment of the World Bank Performance in the HEEP Project: The performance of the Bank was rated (by the Bank) “Moderately unsatisfactory,” where its performance during preparation and the Bank’s Supervision were both given a rating of “moderately unsatisfactory” (IEG ICR review, 2011). While the performance of the Bank in the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009) was rated as “moderately satisfactory. It is worthy of noting that the Bank did not hold itself accountable for any hinderances that occurred during or after the completion of the project. The Bank willingly admitted to only a few minor mishaps in this section of their reports.
(i). **Quality at entry**: The Bank was involved in a long procedure of discussions with the Government of Egypt before planning and assisted the MOHE in the reform preparation (PPAR, 2011). As per the IEG ICR review (2011), the Bank used lesson learnt from previous projects as well as earlier “operations in the sector” (p. 4). However, according to the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), there were some “shortcomings” regarding project design such as “poorly designed indicators,” (p. 16) as well as inadequate technical support, amongst other drawbacks (PPAR, 2011).

(ii). **Quality of supervision**: The Bank worked with the Project Management Unit (PMU) and supervised the implementation of the project (IEG ICR review, 2011). However, there were inadequacies regarding the supervision of the project itself i.e. the Bank failed early on to take actions to resolve the discrepancies that arose between the 2 accounts of the project design of that of the Bank and the PMU, as per the PPAR (2011). Other issues had arisen, as the Bank was not vigilant to issues such as “procurement issues.” This was due to a flawed tracking of the progress of the project by the Bank itself (PPAR, 2011).

**I. a. 7. Assessment of Borrower Performance**: The performance of the Borrower was rated as “moderately satisfactory” (IEG ICR review, 2011), even though in the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the performance was given a rating of “satisfactory”. It is important to note that the Bank mainly held the Egyptian Government (or the “Borrower”) accountable for hinderances that had occurred during or upon the completion of the project.

(i) **Government performance**: Despite the Government’s “full ownership” of the project from the start, it was “overly optimistic” about its “ability to push legislative reforms on university governance and financing through the Parliament” and was unable to reach a compromise during HEEP (PPAR, 2011, p. 47).

(ii). **Implementing agency performance**: Given the lack of details regarding the design of the project, the PMU faced obstacles in project implementation (PPAR, 2011). Choosing directors for the 5 sub projects enabled the strengthening of its structure (IEG ICR
review, 2011). However, the PMU performance was to a certain extent “mitigated by shortcomings in monitoring and evaluation, and in fiduciary compliance” (Implementations Completion and Results, 2009, p. 17). The PPAR (2011) had described the “fiduciary compliance” using the words “minor problems” (p. 48) and the IEG ICR review had described them using the words “some problems” (p. 5).

I. b. Borrower’s Perspective

The perspective of Egypt regarding the outcomes of the HEEP project were obtained from the “Borrower’s Report”, the “Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR)” (2009) (IBRD LOAN No. 4658-EGY), written by the PMU, Ministry of Higher Education. In addition, a summary of the Borrower’s perspective was presented in the World Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” (2009). The author will highlight the findings of each report, which were very similar.

The assessment of the outcomes of the HEEP initiative as was discussed in the Borrower’s Report (2009) was based on the project developmental objectives (PDO) categorised under the three components. The three components were originally presented in the Bank’s 2002 “Project Appraisal Document” (PAD).

I. b. 1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

According to both the Borrower’s Report (2009) and the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the Egyptian Government’s HERS supported by the National Conference in 2000, consisted of 25 sub components which were to tackle the different areas of reform to “support efficiency and quality enhancement initiatives and improve the quality and relevance of higher education” (p. 46) and (p. 71) respectively. This was to enable graduates to have both the “knowledge and skills
demanded by Egypt’s developing and globalizing economy” (p. 46) and (p. 71). The HEEP project was designed in a manner that had focused on a “top-down approach” for several reasons, one of them being that “universities were not ready to accept or deal with change”, as per the Borrower’s Report (2009, p. 47).

The Borrower’s Report (2209) stated that the connection between the PDO’s and the key performance indicators was “generally good.” However, “Extensive Awareness” was obligatory at all levels of the projects to appeal to faculty to take part (p. 47).

I. b. 2. Achievements of Project Development Objectives

The overall rating as indicated in the Borrower’s report (2009) was “Highly Satisfactory”. This part of the report took each of the three PDOs and examined the changes in the key performance indicators and the accomplishments of the anticipated outputs that were related to each objective, as per the report.

I.b.2. (i) Achievements of the First Development Objective: As per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the objective was to “improve efficiency through the reform of governance and management of the higher education system” (p. 72). The three key performance indicators related to this objective “show a positive trend”, which were “(i) reform legislation governing higher education and rationalizing funding allocation mechanisms; (ii) establish a National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NQAAAE); and (iii) establish a Higher Education Enhancement Project Fund (HEEPF)” (Borrower’s report, 2009, p. 47).

With regards to KPI “(i) reform legislation governing higher education and rationalizing funding allocation mechanisms”, the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education had decided to follow the implementation of many of the features of their new draft of the “unified legislative framework” for their HE system in an “ad-hoc manner”, until an agreement
was made to agree to such changes in the higher education system ("Implementation Completion and Results" report, 2009, p. 72). However, the definitive version of this law was at the time, still awaiting the support of the “education committees of both the Shoura Council and the Peoples’ Assembly (the Parliament),” despite many of its features had been already “implemented successfully” or was in the process (“Borrower’s” Report, 2009, p. 48). However, identifying the percentage of achievement at the time was problematic, as per the “Borrower’s” report (2009). In addition, the work on the “student cost component” of the model (that was developed to help achieve the first PDO, which was comprised of three parts) had already revealed that “on average only 35% of the higher education resources” were “allocated to support student learning while the other 65%” went to “overhead” (“Implementation Completion and Results” report, 2009, p. 72). As per the Borrower’s report (2009), this was primarily because of the “duplication of functions and administrative staff overstaffing” (p. 48). Nonetheless, the SCTC (Supreme Council for Technical colleges was established in November 2003 due to the issuing at the time a “ministerial decree #2089/2003,” which was an expected output that was achieved by 100% (Borrower’s report, 2009, p. 79).

As per the Borrower’s report (2009), the KPI “(ii) establish a National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NAQAAE),” the NAQAAE was founded by a “Presidential Decree #82 in June 2006 and bylaws prepared” and authorized by “Shura Council and People’s Assembly in December 2006” (p. 48). It had been created because of the Quality Assurance and Accreditation Project (QAAP).

According to the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the KPI “(iii) establish a Higher Education Enhancement Project Fund (HEEPF),” the most important goal of the HEEPF component was to “enhance quality, relevance, and efficiency of the higher education” which was achieved through creating a “sustainable competitive mechanism among Egyptian universities and Technical Colleges” (p. 73). At the time, 17 public universities and 5 technical colleges had benefitted from this “competitive fund grant” (“Borrower’s” report, 2009, p. 49). Table 2 below sums up the achievements of the HEEPF Grant projects, as per the “Borrower’s” report (2009).
Table 2 ("Borrower’s” Report, 2009, p. 49) (RFP: request for proposals).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEEPF Grant Projects</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Funded Projects</td>
<td>159 projects out of 563 submitted proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of RFP cycles</td>
<td>4 cycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average project size</td>
<td>US $ 87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Project Duration</td>
<td>20 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of projects by size</td>
<td>Small projects (Less than US$ 50,000): 26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium Projects (US$ 50,000-US $ 100,000): 42%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large projects (over US$ 1000,000): 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Projects</td>
<td>Academic Programs:22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity Building: 25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curriculum Development: 22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Development: 22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge Resources: 9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality assurance: 6.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of public universities participating</td>
<td>90 faculties in 17 universities and 5 Technical Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of direct beneficiaries from the funded projects</td>
<td>121,722 undergraduate students and 100,915 from other categories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Borrower’s report (2009), even though the target achieved was over 100 %, only four cycles out of the originally planned five cycles were carried out because of limitations in funding. This occurred in spite the increase of the HEEPF budget to 13.3 million U.S.D (Borrower’s report, 2009).

It is noteworthy that there were additional outputs accomplished in Component 1 i.e. “establishing the QA infrastructure in the Egyptian Universities” but such indicators were not included in the Bank’s Project Appraisal Document (PAD), as there was “no clear vision on how this project” was to be implemented (“Borrower’s” report, 2009, p. 82). These indicators were incorporated after the “implementation methodology was developed” and supported for by all the stakeholders (p. 82).
I.b.2. (ii) Achievements of the Second Development Objective: According to the Borrower’s report (2009), the second development objective was to “improve the quality and relevance of university education” (p. 52). The two key performance indicators related to this second objective demonstrate a positive trend, as per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009). These were: “(i) establish an integrated information and Communication technologies infrastructure”; and “(ii) provide training for faculty and staff” (p.77).

Regarding key performance indicator “(i) establish an integrated information and Communication technologies infrastructure,” the Information and Communications Technology Project or ICTP was comprised of 5 sub components at a “wide level” and at the university level, as per the Borrower’s report (2009, p. 53). These sub components were: “Network Infrastructure, Management Information System (MIS), e-learning, Digital Libraries, and ICT training” (p. 53), and were meant to tackle issues related to quality and efficiency, where the ICT training was in full coordination with the FLDP project (“Implementation Completion and Results” report, 2009). The general target of this component was for it to be the “global revolution in knowledge creation and sharing into the teaching and learning process in the Egyptian universities,” as per the Borrower’s report (2009, p. 53).

The anticipated outputs i.e. the introduction of e-learning as a new teaching method, was achieved by 100 %, as per the Borrower’s report (2009). However, one indicator in particular “two-thirds of all publicly university students” using internet facilities by 2007, was “difficult to quantify” with regards to percentage of success, as a definite percentage of students using the internet was hard to “monitor collectively” (p. 86). Nonetheless, it was assumed, due to the “computer infrastructure” that was “enabled in Egyptian public universities”, 80 % of the “target indicator” was accomplished (p. 86). The concept of making IT access available to all faculty and students in public universities was 100 % success, as per the Borrower’s report (2009).
As for the indicator “(ii) provide training for faculty and staff,” this component was to support “capacity of academics and administrative staff” with regards to professional development (“Implementation Completion and Results”, 2009, p. 80). An additional output or indicator resulted from this, which was not primarily planned for in the Bank’s PAD, which was “Capacity Building and Management Training” (Borrower’s report, 2009, p. 87).

I.b.2. (iii) Achievements of the Third Development Objective: The last project development objective was to “improve the quality and relevance of mid-level technical education” as per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009, p. 81). The key indicators connected to this objective had also shown a “positive trend,” as per the report. The eight KPIs linked to this third objective show a positive trend, which were:

(i) reform of the ETC’s governance framework; (ii) refurbishing of the ETC’s physical facilities; (iii) upgrading of the ETC’s laboratories and workshops; (iv) capacity building of ETC faculty and support staff; (v) development of the ETC’s educational programs, curricula and learning resources; (vi) development of ETC information and communication technology network; (vii) development of effective links to the productive sectors and labor markets; and (viii) development of quality assurance and accreditation for the ETC’s. (p. 81).

The outputs that were expected in relation to the third component were for example, pertaining to key indicator (i) “reform of the ETC’s governance framework” was the “restructuring of 45 MTIs” (Middle Technical Institutes) into “8 autonomous TCs” (Technical Colleges) “linked to the industry completed by 2007” which was 100 % achieved, as was stated in the Borrower’s report (2009, p. 88). While other indicators such as (ii) “refurbishing of the ETC’s physical facilities” were identified in the report as “additional outputs”. The completion of this indicator was to be financed by the “local fund” (p. 90).
I. b. 3. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

The project (as mentioned previously), was given a rating of “Highly Satisfactory”, as per the perspective of the PM and MoHE in the “Borrower’s” report (2009, p. 61). This was according to several reasons that were discussed in the report, in which some will be highlighted by the author as follows:

- First, the project “succeeded, focused and achieved” more than the specified PDO, despite them being “ambitious” in addition to the “challenges” that were faced by the project (p. 61).
- Regardless of all the “challenges”, the HEEP initiative contributed to the implementation of the “Higher Education Reform Agenda 100-2007”, which had helped in issuing many “Ministerial decrees governing the Egyptian Higher Education system” i.e. “the Act #528/2003 governing the management of the technical colleges” (p. 61).
- Through its endorsement for Higher Education Reform Agenda, HEEP had assisted in establishing a more “robust higher education sector” and had aided in the “adoption of the higher education policies” that required “strategic planning for the Egyptian Higher Education” by creating a “Strategic Planning Unit (SPU)” (p. 61).
- The project had made “substantial achievement in institutional strengthening and capacity building of academics and administrative staff at universities” (p. 61).
- The HEEP initiative advocated for the implementation of the “quality assurance systems in the Egyptian universities though the QAAP project under Component one”. HEEP2 or the second phase of the Higher Education Enhancement Project will promote the “Continuous Improvement and Qualifying for Accreditation (CIAQP) for the Egyptian Academic Institutions” (p. 61-62).
- The project endorsed under component one, the competitive grant funds or HEEPF.
- The ETCP project will carry on in the HEEP2 project.
• HEEP has aided the Ministry of Higher Education to outline its “future reform program” in HE (p. 62).
• The “Impact Assessment study” of HEEP showed that the members of staff and the students had both concurred that HEEP initiative led to a “significant improvement for the learning environment in the Egyptian universities” (p. 62).

I. b. 4. Assessment of Bank Performance (according to the “Borrower”)

Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry (“performance through lending phase”)

The Bank was given a rating of “satisfactory”, as per the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009). “Monitoring and evaluation” was developed into the project based on Key Performance Indicators or KPIs “Borrower’s report”, 2009, p. 63). Despite this, there were “no records for the initial baseline measurements” (p. 63). In addition, the “evolution of the project KPIs” had not been considered in the Bank’s “mission aide memories” (p. 63).

Quality of Supervision

Supervision by the WB was done frequently and on time as well as “technically sound”, as per the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009, p. 86). There were, however, several regular changes in the members of the supervision team of the Bank throughout the duration of the project (Borrower’s report, 2009). These changes were time consuming as the new members had to get reacquainted to the design and progress of the project, as per the Borrower’s report.

Bank Reporting of items such as the performance, progress and development objectives of HEEP were “comprehensive” (Borrower’s report, 2009, p. 63). However, slight interest was paid to utilize the reports issued by the PMU, such as “quarterly performance
reports,” to evaluate the effect of the “quality of project performance” (“Implementation Completion and Results” report, 2009, p. 86).

Procurement, the task of ensuring that the PMU had accurately achieved “competitive biddings centrally” was done “satisfactorily for 261 bidding packages” with a total of 26.2 million U.S. dollars, as per the Borrower’s report (2009, p. 63).

I. b. 5 Assessment of Borrower Performance

The rating overall for the performance of the Borrower was given a “satisfactory” for the reasons that will be stated below, as per the “Borrower’s” report (2009). In addition, “all project results and outputs” were accomplished and the PMU was to be responsible for executing HEEP2. It is important to note that The PMU blamed in their report, but did not hold the Bank accountable, for many of the delays that occurred during the project.

Government Performance

The performance of the government was rated “satisfactory” (Borrower’s report, 2009). The PMU had monitored closely certain aspects of the project i.e. inputs, outputs as well as outcomes. The MoHE had supported the sustainable mechanisms that were to result from HEEP by issuing ministerial decrees that were responsible for establishing i.e. NAQAAE. However, as per the “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the last version of the “new unified law” for the higher education system in Egypt had still, at the time, awaited approval by the Parliament. It was at the time, difficult, from the “Borrower’s” viewpoint, as to when such “comprehensive framework for reform” would be supported, since passing this law through Parliament was highly political (Borrower’s report, 2009, p. 64). In addition, delays in the accessibility of the “counterpart local funds” were resolved by “establishing a unit for local fund” in the PMU (p. 64).
Implementing Agency (Agencies Performance)

A rating of “satisfactory” was awarded to the performance of the agencies, as according to the “Borrower’s” report (2009). This rating was given despite the obstacles or “difficulties” faced that were specifically mentioned within the report (where the Bank was indirectly blamed) and which caused delays in the plan of the PMU regarding the implementation of the project. The MOHE (Ministry of Higher Education) through its established PMU (Projects Management Unit) oversaw the HEEP initiative (“Implementations Completion and Results”, 2009). The internal dialogue and organization between the two entities was “strong”, with the personal involvement of the appointed minister at that time (“Borrower’s” report, 2009). Hence, “all difficulties” had been resolved throughout the duration of the project.

After presenting both the viewpoints of the Bank and the “Borrower” through their written reports, I will examine the Bank’s project cycle in comparison to the actual cycle carried out for the HEEP project that was discussed in the WB documents. In addition,
Haddad & Demsky’s (1995) book and the UNESCO handbook, volume 1 (2013) will be used, along with other documents, to establish a comprehensive critique regarding the HEEP project cycle.

I. c. World Bank Policy Analysis

Educational reforms are usually implemented to develop the “system, administration, content and methodology” of the existing educational systems with regards to “access, equity, quality, relevance, efficiency and cost/finance” (Kitamura, 2009, p. 3). This is true especially for developing countries. The intervention by the World Bank in higher education, regarding the formulation of their educational reforms or “projects” in developing countries, seem to follow a “one-size fits all” sort of approach. According to Collins & Rhoads (2009), the WB does indeed follow a “one-size-fits-all economic ideology” (p. 203) upon the formulation of their educational policies. Shahjahan (2012) further confirms this observation, by citing in their work the following:

Overall, the World Bank conducts the following seven types of higher education activities, mainly to: (1) produce policy reports, (2) provide financial support (e.g., loans, funding initiatives), (3) collect and analyze data, (4) offer policy advice, (5) sponsor international/regional conferences and networks (e.g., South-South networks), (6) supply technical support, and (7) provide analytical assistance (to help governments decide on possible reforms in higher education) p. 374.

As stated in the World Bank Group’s website (2017), the World Bank offers “financing and services” to “low and middle-income countries” to promote “development and change”. Hence, the intervention of the WB seems to be mainly in the form of funding and other types of minor interventions i.e. technical assistance. The Bank (2017) further states that “development projects” are put into effect by “borrowing” countries (developing countries) abiding by particular “rules and procedures” to ensure that the “money reaches its intended target.” Evidence suggests that the Bank’s role had mainly
involved “supervision” regarding the allocation and disbursement of its loan by the Egyptian Government. This seems to be apparent in the Bank’s Loan Agreement document (2002) where it is stated under “Section 3.01. (a)” that

The Borrower declares its commitment to the objectives of the Project, and, to this end, shall carry out the Project, through MOHE, with due diligence and efficiency and in conformity with appropriate education, communication, coordination, management and governance practices, and shall provide, promptly as needed, the funds, facilities, services and other resources required for the Project. (p. 5)

As per the UNESCO handbook, Volume 1 (2013), documents such as “policies”, “strategies” and “plans” are presented (in that order) in the “education policy development” process (p. 6). The education policy on a national level, according to UNESCO, comprises of the objectives and “priorities” sought after by the government in issues regarding education, such as access, quality, etc. As in the case of the HEEP project, funding and assistance was to be offered by the WB upon the Egyptian government providing a strategic plan, as per the educational experts that were interviewed. This was the Egyptian Government’s reform strategy, as per the “Project Appraisal Document” for the HEEP project, where the Bank (via the IBRD) chose to finance 11 out of the 25 reform initiatives and chose not to fund those related to i.e. “expanding access” and “funding the private sector” (World Bank, 2001, p. 6-7).

The World Bank Group’s brief (2017) defines the concept behind their project cycle as follows: “the project cycle is the framework used to design, prepare, implement, and supervise projects.” It is important to note that as per the UNESCO handbook (2013), “policy-making should be preceded by research, evidence-collection and debates on the identified issue or need, as well as on the proposed vision, options and means to address such issues or needs” (p. 7).

The project usually implemented by the World bank is temporary, which is to be sustained by the developing country upon its completion. However, this sustainability was not applicable to some components of the HEEP initiative i.e. HEEPF, which was a successful component in the eyes of the educational experts. As per the “Implementation
Completion and Results” report of the Bank (2009), “without reforming the resource allocation system, a competitive funding mechanism cannot be sustained” (p. 11). It is important to note, as per the World Bank Group (2016), the “World Bank Group has never had an explicit strategy for higher education.”

The concept of the Bank’s “project cycle” seems to coincide with the Project Management Institute’s definition of a “project” as a “temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service” (European Commission, 2017, p. 2). The word “temporary” in the definition refers to every project having a specific “end,” and the word “unique” denotes that the “product” or “service” is not the same and is distinguishable from all the similar “products” or “services” (European Commission, 2017, p. 2). According to the World Bank (2017), the length of the project cycle by “commercial standards,” is long, where it can last for more than four years, from the time the project is “identified” till the time of its completion. Nonetheless, the WB education reform project is temporary and is to be continued and updated when necessary, by the “borrower” (a term used by the Bank), referring to Egypt.
A World Bank project cycle, as per Figure 6 above, consists of six stages (World Bank Group, 2017):

1. Identification
2. Preparation
3. Appraisal
4. Negotiation/Approval
5. Implementation/Support

It is important to note that according to Haddad & Demsky (1995), the framework for educational policy making consists of seven stages: “(i) Analysis of the existing situation, (ii) The generation of policy options, (iii) Evaluation of policy options, (iv) Making the policy decision, (v) Planning of policy implementation, (vi) Policy impact assessment, (vii) Subsequent policy cycles” (p. 24). It is noteworthy to mention that the implementation of a policy cycle is an iterative process which is to be repeated and
modified upon identifying any faults, but this does not seem to apply to the World Bank’s concept of the project cycle. As per the UNESCO handbook (2013), an educational policy cycle consists of: 1. Analysis, 2. Planning, 3. Implementation and 4. Evaluation. So, the models of both Haddad & Demsky (1995) (pertaining to the International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO) and UNESCO (2013), have been formulated specifically for education.

I will now discuss each phase of the Bank’s project cycle and compare it specifically to the different Bank documents detailing the HEEP project, for any discrepancies and/or contradictions.

1. **Identification**

After the Bank, along with the IFC (International Finance Corporation) and MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) and the “borrowing country’s government” (as well as other stakeholders) have met up to determine the “design” of the “financial assistance” to be offered, the WB then conducts its analysis (World Bank Group, 2017). The analysis is the first step specifically in the educational policy analysis, as per the UNESCO handbook, volume 1 (2013) in which a “vision” (step 0) is formed before the start of the policy cycle (p. 8). While the identified projects for the project cycle, as according to the World Bank Group (2017) can “range across the economic and social spectrum from infrastructure, to education, to health,” to government fiscal management.

Hence, it seems that the Bank’s project cycle is applicable to different problematic areas that may pertain to enhancing primarily economic development of a developing country, followed by social development, as per the Bank’s priorities. Unlike both the frameworks suggested by Haddad & Demsky (1995) first and recently the UNESCO (2013) educational policy cycle, the Bank does not have a “project cycle” specific for education. Nonetheless, the crucial issues and problems within the Egyptian higher education sector
were identified by the Bank and confirmed in an array of official Bank documents, regarding quality, governance, efficiency and relevance.

It is worthy of noting that according to the quarterly newsletter published by the World Bank Group (2002) entitled “Towards a Poverty Reduction Strategy,” the levels of poverty in Egypt had decreased with the improvement of education, and a “solid analytical base” was being prepared at the time, for an “Egyptian-owned poverty reduction strategy” (p. 1). Thus, it seemed rational at the time to implement HEEP, as per the Government of Egypt’s (with the help of the World Bank’s technical assistance) 1996 “comprehensive education strategy”, where reform in primary followed by secondary education had already been completed (p. 3). It is even more important to note that according to the “Borrower’s” report (2009), the project was designed by the Bank and the MOHE based on six studies that were conducted in the areas of i.e. “labor market analysis,” “governance,” “accountability,” “developing policy framework,” “private sector role,” “relevance” and “quality assurance” (p. 40).

As stated in the World Bank Group brief (2017), “alternative scenarios” are to be outlined in a “Project Concept Note,” along with “proposed objectives,” a timeline for the approval of the project process and “imminent risks.” At this point, the term “alternative scenarios” is unclear to the author whether it represents the term “generation” or “formulation” of “policy options” as per either the Haddad & Demsky (1995) or the UNESCO model (2013). The author was unable to find a “Project Concept Note” for the HEEP project, to confirm or deny this speculation.

A “Project Information Document,” or PID is issued in this phase of the Bank’s project cycle, where the PID (Report No. PID9033) for the HEEP project was prepared on May 3rd, 2000. The document provided an outline of the HEEP project in five pages i.e. project description of the project, project objectives, sustainability, and so forth, including a “country and sector background” (obtained via the Bank’s analysis) and the rationale behind the Bank’s involvement. In the Bank’s PID (2000), there was no mention of any “imminent risks” regarding the HEEP project. Only “environmental aspects” or “issues” were mentioned, in which none were “foreseen” (p. 5).
However, no analysis pertaining to understanding the context and other influential factors (as per the UNESCO handbook, 2013), were presented in the PID (2000) under the “country and sector background.” For example, no analysis was conducted towards how this project would relate to EFA goals or MDGs. Instead, quantitative data was presented in the Bank’s PID (2000) i.e. “Approximately 20% of the 18-22 age group (1.5 million students, of which 40% are female) were enrolled at that level in 1998/99” (p.1).

In the “Towards a Poverty Reduction Strategy” (2002), only a poverty assessment study was conducted by the Bank and the Ministry of Planning and discussed in the report, with regards to education i.e. the HEEP project, being the means in reducing poverty in Egypt. According to the “Project Appraisal Document” (2002), the Bank conducted an economic analysis for the HEEP project, financial summaries, as well as other analytical plans were presented from an “economic perspective” only. These analytical studies were continued from what was first mentioned in the “Project Information Document” (2000), “The team's dialogue with the Government on the fiscal implications of various enrollment and cost recovery scenarios will be continued, and a summary analysis presented as part of the project economic analysis” regarding the point of “sustainability” (p. 4).

The analysis from a multifaceted viewpoint, (which seems to be lacking from Bank reports regarding Egypt and its HEEP project) is important, as per the UNESCO handbook (2013) reforms in the sector of education can influence other sectors. According to Haddad & Demsky (1995), the analysis of an educational policy must take into account several aspects of the “social context, including political, economic, demographic, cultural, and social issues” which may possibly influence the “decision making” and similarly the processes of implementation of the education sector (p. 24). This principle was also confirmed by the UNESCO handbook (2013).
2. Project Preparation

The “borrower government,” the Egyptian MOHE, the SCU, partaking universities and the PMU, were responsible for this phase of the HEEP project, as stated in the Bank’s PID (2002). The MOHE as per the PID (2002), had acquired “considerable experience” in management of projects during the implementation of the prior and disclosed Engineering and Technical Education Project (ETEP) project (p. 22). The PMU at the time had more than “nine years of experience in administering and implementing a Bank-financed project” (p. 22). However, as per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2011) it was assumed (so the project was carried out based on a mere assumption, regarding a project of such magnitude) that the “experience” gained by the PMU from the ETEP would have equipped them to “smoothly implement” the HEEP project (p. 10).

Hence, even though the Bank acknowledged in the “Implementation Completion and Results” (2011) report that the “size, scope and complexity” of the HEEP project was much greater than the ETEP (p. 10), the PMU had in fact faced legitimate “challenges” in executing such a “complex and sector wide project” due to the insufficient details that were provided regarding the project design (p. 17). So, the Bank implicitly held the Egyptian government accountable for the delays that they faced, during the implementation phase of the project.

This however, only led to the strengthening of the PMU “through the appointment of five sub-project directors” (p. 10), while the “Borrower’s” “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009) mentioned that six directors were appointed and not five.

According to Haddad & Demsky (1995) the “the broader the scope of a policy is, the more problematic it becomes” (p. 18), in which the problems concerning HEEP may not have been efficiently foreseen and analysed, thus, it seems that “strategic decisions” were not made, which deal with “large-scale policies and broad resource allocation (p. 18).

However, according to the “Borrower’s report” (2009), changes were made by the Bank, from the original design of project and there were issues with funding. The “Borrower”
also acknowledged in their report (2009), that a project of this nature had needed at least a “six-month startup period” to develop i.e. action plans and guidelines, before any “disbursement” took place (p. 41). Again, both the Bank and/or the Egyptian Government were not held responsible for this hastiness in the approval of a project of such a great scale and size.

As per the UNESCO handbook, volume 1 (2013), “Education ministry staff may be overburdened in trying to co-ordinate and manage all these inputs,” (p. 8) as different stakeholders with experience in policy planning, making, etc. other than the government, may not have been involved nor asked to participate in the project, to begin with. Only other donors were involved in financing the project, as per the “Borrower’s Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009) i.e. Prince Talal, The Ford Foundation.

According to the World Bank group’s brief (2017), several years can be spent on conducting “feasibility studies.” However, with regards to feasibility studies for the HEEP project, the author was unable to find detailed reports discussing such studies specifically for Egypt, via the Bank’s websites. However, the author assumes that such studies were presented from a financial perspective in the Bank’s PAD (2002), in the form of economic analysis, financial analysis, social impacts of the project and so forth. In addition, Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) reports were issued in 2001 and 2006 for Egypt, by the World Bank. So, it seems that the concept of “feasibility” may have been examined mainly from a monetary perspective, which contradicts the UNESCO’s (2013) model, as other aspects such as i.e. “political feasibility” needed to be taken into consideration.

In addition, beneficiaries and stakeholders during this phase, are met with, to confirm that the project meets their needs. In the Bank’s PAD (2002), beneficiaries were identified, i.e. “higher education students,” “private” and “public-sector employers” and “faculty” and “instructors,” as well as benefits of the project (p. 12). Yet, there was no mention in the report of having met said beneficiaries before or during project preparation, to ensure that the project indeed met their needs or not.
As per the World Bank Group (2018), it does in fact “assess the relevant capacity” of the agencies responsible for implementation at this stage, for the Bank to reach an understanding with the borrower, regarding the overall management of the project i.e. “systems required for procurement.” It was stated in the Bank’s PAD (2002) that the “procurement capacity in the HEEP PMU has been assessed and found to be adequate for the implementation of HEEP […] documents have been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory quality” (p. 22). No environmental issues were foreseen, as per the Bank’s PID (2000), and therefore were not applicable, as confirmed in the Bank’s “Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet” (2001, Report No. 23343) which is to be determined in this stage, if necessary or applicable.

3. Project Appraisal

According to the World Bank Group’s brief (2017), the “appraisal” phase gives an opportunity to the stakeholders to review the project design thoroughly and resolve any emerging issues or questions. The work that was done during the project “identification” and “preparation” phases is revised by both the government and the World Bank to “confirm the expected project outcomes, intended beneficiaries and evaluation tools for monitoring progress” (The World Bank Group, 2017). It is important to note that in the Bank’s “Project Performance Assessment Report” (2011) or PPAR, it was acknowledged that “higher education reform was a relatively new undertaking […] in the World Bank” (p. xiii) which meant that even upon reviewing the project design, certain issues may have been missed or overlooked. This may be attributed to the Bank’s and the MOHE’s lack of expertise in implementing such a large-scale and complex reform, without, as per UNESCO (2013), knowledgeable partners, which may have led to, as per the PPAR i.e. “shortcomings the results framework and laying out a solid monitoring and evaluation agenda” (p. xiii).

According to the PAD (2002), it was stated that the “Country Assistance Strategy” report (released in 2001) recognized that ‘Egypt's capacity to build human resources will be
central to its long-term economic and social development” (p. 2). The objectives of the HEEP project were formulated on this notion. However, as per the “Implementation Completion and Results” report pertaining to the Bank (2009) and the “Borrower” (2009), both reports confirmed that the project development objectives had not been revised (with no mention of who was to be held accountable for this “oversight”). In addition, the “Project Information Document” that was issued by the Bank in 2000 may not have been updated and therefore was not released (as the author was unable to find an updated version of the document), despite the World Bank Group (2017) claiming that this document would be updated and released upon approval for project funding.

The World Bank Group in their brief (2017) also claimed that the final stages within this phase are the “assessment of the project's readiness for implementation and agreement on conditions for effectiveness” which were “agreed upon actions prior to implementation.” However, as per the Borrower’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), it was claimed that there was no “clear vision on how this project will be implemented,” with reference to the HEEP project.

It is worthy of noting that in the Bank’s PAD (2002), under “Sustainability and Risks,” the “critical risks” foreseen by the Bank (which were numerous), were concerning the performance or commitment of certain stakeholders within the Egyptian Government’s i.e. SCU, as well as institutions not accepting certain changes that were to be introduced as part of the HEEP project, as well as the continuity of the HEEPF funds, amongst many other risks. Another risk amongst the list offered, the “parliament does not approve draft legislation,” was foreseen by the Bank in the PID (2002, p. 26). However, the Bank’s remedy to that potential risk or “risk mitigation measure” was that “involving members of the parliament in the process of drafting the legislation would ensure safe passage through Parliament” (p. 26), in which reality had in fact acted against that very precautionary measure. Despite a list of “critical risks” mentioned in the Bank’s PID (2002), the overall rating given to these potential risks was “satisfactory.” The “risk to development outcomes” were given a rating of “moderate” in the Bank’s ICR (2009), and
a “low to negligible” in both the Bank’s ICR review (2011) and the Bank’s PPAR (2011, Annex A, p. 27).

4. Project Approval

A document for “investment project financing” was formulated and issued once all the details of the project were negotiated and agreed upon by both the government and the World Bank (World Bank Group, 2017). This document is the Bank’s “Project Appraisal Document” or PAD, which was issued in March 7th, 2002, for the HEEP project. In this phase, the project appraisal document is to be submitted to the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors for deliberation and thus, approval. Implementation of a project begins once approval for funding has been granted, “conditions for effectiveness are met,” and the acceptance and signing of the official legal documents is complete (World Bank Group, 2017).

It was acknowledged in the Bank’s PAD (2002) that critical issues “affecting governance and efficiency” at the time, had remained to be dealt with, together with the “political exigencies,” introducing a “formula-driven system” for the financing of higher education that had already been developed, in addition to other issues which had gone “much beyond the education sector” (p. 6). It was not mentioned in the report how such issues were to be handled.

However, as per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009) the disagreement to “legislative reforms for more autonomy and criteria-based resource allocation was underestimated” (p. 6) and as per the “Borrower’s” report (2009), it was still pending the approval of the Parliament, at the time. Such an issue was meant to have been anticipated at one point during the initial stages of planning the project, and thus dealt with. As per UNESCO (2013), understanding the political context is important as “policy is about politics” (p. 15), which may have not been done so by the World Bank, hence, the “opposition” of the Egyptian Parliament regarding certain components of the
HEEP project, was “underestimated”. In addition, according to the “Borrower’s” report (2009), the community itself had resisted the introduction of such changes, with regards to the “comprehensive legislative framework,” (p. 76), which may mean that the Bank and/or PMU had not met up with all the stakeholders involved prior to the HEEP implementation, to make sure that the project had in fact met their needs.

5. Project Implementation

The project was implemented by the PMU, with the help of the World Bank funds as well as the Bank’s technical assistance and support (World Bank group, 2017). The implementing agency of the borrower is supposed to prepare the “specifications for the project” and carry out all “procurement of goods, works and services” that are to be needed.

However, as per the “Borrower’s” “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), the arrangement and provision of the “planned disbursement” was deemed unrealistic, as the “procurement of goods and services” have proven to be “lengthy procedures” that are time-consuming “until delivery of goods, and/or completion of services before issuing payment” (p. 41). Further serious problems resulted due to the “tying – up disbursement for loan proceeds to local funds under the civil works and goods categories,” which threatened and put at risk the credibility of the PMU with the suppliers and contractors (p. 41). If the implementation process was indeed planned carefully, as per the UNESCO model (2013), such problems may not have occurred to begin with. It may also mean that “adequate fiduciary controls” on the utilization of project funds were not in place by the specialists on the project team of the Bank, as claimed by the World Bank Group in this phase (2017). No specific group of stakeholders were held accountable in the reports for this mishap.

At this phase, all components are supposed to be ready, but “project delays and unexpected events can sometimes prompt the restructuring of project objectives” (World
According to the “Borrower’s” report (2009), the original project development objectives were not revised throughout the duration of the project and were not restructured, despite delays in certain phases of implementation. If the PMU and MOHE had presented regular reports on the project activities, as per the World Bank Group (2017), why was this not dealt with by the Bank and/or in cooperation with the PMU? As per the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), it was acknowledged that a “restructuring of the project could have been considered” to “correct the deficiencies” of the project, but it was not rationalized as to how it could have been done or why it was not done. As per the “Borrower’s” report, “corrective actions” were taken but the nature of these actions was not specified.

According to the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2011) the project had undergone “substantial delays” in its early phases of implementation (p. 6), where part of the delay was attributed to the “lack of clarity and complexity in project design” and to “insufficient implementation arrangements” (p. 6). In addition, according to the “Borrower’s” report (2009), the universities were not prepared to handle the concept of change that was accompanied with the implementation of the HEEP project. “Issuing payments” due to the bureaucracies the PMU faced in “negotiating funds” with the Ministry of Planning, was also a problem, as well as “obtaining construction permits” for “new buildings” (“Borrower’s” report, 2009, p. 41-42). As per the Bank’s “Implementations Completion and Results” report (2009), another delay that occurred was because of the “time taken by the Government to appoint” project directors (p. 6), in addition to the change of component directors (“Borrower’s” report, 2009).

According to the Bank’s “Towards a Poverty Reduction Strategy”, the HEEP project was “declared effective […] only 95 days from approval, compared to the usual delay of over a year” (p. 3), which meant at the time that the Egyptian Government could commence in the implementation of the HEEP project. According to Haddad & Demsky (1995) “Misjudging ease of implementation is, perhaps, the most frequent error in policy planning” (p. 36). “Policy making” is the initial step in any “planning cycle” and “planners must appreciate the dynamics of policy formulation before they can design
implementation and evaluation procedures effectively” (Haddad & Demsky, 1995, p. 18) in which the making of the policy may have not been carried out efficiently as in the case of HEEP, due to it’s quick “declared effectiveness.” Nonetheless, as per the “Borrower’s” report (2009), the delays that had occurred were controlled and thus enabled the achievement of the planned project “deliverables” and objectives.

However, according to the “Borrower”, the restrictions in the funding of the HEEP prevented the implementation of the fifth cycle of the HEEPF (“Borrower’s” report, 2009). This may mean that with regards to planning, as per the UNESCO model (2013), the design of the “implementation strategy” may have been flawed, as the “activities” of the HEEP project that were “specified” and “budgeted” at that stage, suffered during the phase of implementation. The implementation of the “planned” and “budgeted” activities were not done according to the “agreed timeline” (UNESCO, 2013, p. 9). Hence, a delay in the time schedule of the overall project had occurred, as per the “Borrower’s” report (2009) despite their ability to contain the situation in the end.

It is noteworthy to mention that in the Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009), since original components of the HEEP project were not reviewed (as mentioned previously), and thus, the “project was not restructured,” the components of the project and “activities” were “significantly changed” from what was initially specified in the PAD (p. 4). Hence, according to the “Borrower’s” report (2009), this may have led to the Bank “changing its strategy during implementation,” which was an “unforeseen change” in the eyes of the “Borrower” (p. 41).

“The project's progress, outcomes and impact” on the beneficiaries are “monitored by the government and the Bank” during the phase of implementation. This is to “obtain data” for evaluation to measure the “effectiveness” of the project operation with regards to results (World Bank Group, 2017). As per the “Borrower’s” report (2009), an “impact assessment study” was conducted in 2008, per the “Borrower’s” request (which was claimed by the WB in their reports), where beneficiaries and stakeholders were asked about the impact of the project, after its disclosure. This study, as per the PMU and the MOHE, was also part of the “requirements” for completing the “Borrower’s”
“Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009, p. 45). In addition, the “impact assessment study” was conducted by the PMU and the MOHE, due to the unexpected changes in the implementation strategy of the Bank in the implementation phase, which led to the lack of availability of baseline data to compare it with the output or outcomes from the activities of the project (“Borrower’s” report, 2009, p. 41).

6. (i). Project Completion

As per the World Bank Group (2017), a World Bank “operations team” gathers information i.e. outcomes accomplished; the problems faced; the “lessons learned,” etc. and data, in an Implementation Completion and Results Report. The information and data are documented by the Bank and the “borrower” (in this case, the PMU and the MOHE) once the project is closed and completed at the end of the “loan disbursement period” (which can take around 1-10 years). The Bank’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report was issued on June 5th, 2009. As per the Borrower’s report (2009), their “Implementation Completion and Results” report was prepared by the PMU “within the four month grace period” given to finish all “pending payments,” “activities” and “services rendered” prior to the date of closure of the project in accordance with the “regulations” and “guidelines” of the Bank (p. 45).

Both “Implementation Completion and Results” reports pertaining to the Bank (2009) and the MOHE and PMU (2009) described and evaluated the outcomes of the HEEP project (World Bank Group, 2017). The Bank’s ICR (2009) offered a “results framework analysis,” (p. vi) where qualitative information was presented in tabular form, in which the project development objectives, the “output indicators” of the objectives, the “baseline data” for the indicators and the target and actual achieved, were compared and discussed. The “Borrower’s” report (2009) measured in tabular form, which was similar to that of the Bank’s but was expressed in more detail, the “original target values” in comparison to the “actual value target achieved at completion,” in correspondence to baseline data, with regards to several indicators. The data and information may have been
presented in this way to make clear the knowledge that was gained from the “results measurement process”, to help “benefit similar projects in the future” (World Bank Group, 2017).

It is noteworthy to mention that both the Bank’s report (2009) and the PMU/MOHE’s “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009) discussed the means in which the project could be sustained in Egypt upon project completion and closure, entitled the “post-completion operation” or the “next phase,” known as HEEP 2.

6. (ii). Evaluation

The evaluation of the project performance is conducted by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group or IEG, where the outcomes are compared to the original objectives (World Bank Group, 2017), as was done so in the Bank’s “Performance Project Assessment Report” (2011) or PPAR, but for Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. According to the UNESCO handbook (2013) the evaluation phase, expressed as the “monitoring and evaluation” or “M&E”, is the “integral part of the policy cycle (p. 38), where the project activities are frequently “monitored” and “reviewed” and modifications are made if and when needed (p. 9).

As per the PMU and MOHE in their “Borrower’s report” (2009), in March 2006, the PMU had hired a “monitoring and evaluation consultant” to be in charge of “coordinating monitoring reports from HEEP directors” on the progress of the project’s performance indicators (p. 44). This led to a “template” being designed for quarterly reports which were endorsed by the WB supervision teams and enabled their preparation by the PMU, which also discussed the main accomplishments of the project and progress, as well as “future plans” for the next time period (p. 44).

However, according to the Bank’s IEG ICR review (2011) with regards to M & E implementation, there was a “lack of robust M & E output” (p. 5). As per the PPAR report (2011) pertaining to the Bank, the HEEP project had adopted a design that was
“heavily input oriented,” which had given rise to questions as to whether the reform had led to “desired outcomes” (p. 12). This was also the case of two other countries that implemented WB supported higher education projects, Jordan and Yemen. This may have been attributed to a flaw in the design of the M & E, as the “output indicators” classified in the PAD were often unclear and “lacking baseline and /or target values” (IEG ICR review, 2011, p. 5). In addition, failure to bring together the PAD (report that was issued in 2002 by the Bank) and the government of Egypt’s “project structure” meant some uncertainty in the application of the project indicators (p. 5).

Nonetheless, the IEG ICR review (2011) stated in their report regarding the M & E implementation (which seemed to contradict certain aspects mentioned in the PMU’s report) from “project mid-term” to near the time of project completion, the PMU was constantly “reminded” to prepare and implement a “system” to “track and report” the progress made in reaching the developmental objectives, and the setbacks of implementation, in addition to appointing an “M&E specialist”, yet was not “actively taken up” (p. 5).

As per the UNESCO handbook (2013), several features such as “relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability,” are assessed, where the results of the assessment then offer “inputs” for the means in which future policies can be improved (p. 9). This format was followed by the Bank in its “Implementation Completion and Results” report (2009) (which was presented in the first section of the findings) and its PPAR (2011). As per the “Borrower’s report” (2009), these exact terms were not used in their evaluation (which was discussed in the findings section as well).

However, the PMU and MOHE stated in their report (2009) that the KPI focused mainly on “outputs” rather than actual “short or long-term outcomes or impacts” and the Bank had changed its strategy during the implementation phase, to a “results based evaluation”, plus “project impact” (p. 41). In addition, an “Impact Evaluation System” was established by the PMU that was used as a pilot study at a public university in Egypt, to test before the implementation on a wide-scale, the “study tools” and “design,” as was stated in the “Borrower’s” report (2009, p. 45). Despite all this, as per the PPAR (2011) the “project
indicators were conceived of inputs, processes or outputs,” hence, it was not possible to answer, “whether the HEEP project made any substantial difference in higher education relevance, quality or efficiency” (p. xiii).

After analyzing the WB’s project cycle with respect to the HEEP project, as per the UNESCO handbook 1 (2013), the HEEP project or policy seems to have been formulated entirely from an economic perspective and/or analysis. According to Haddad & Demsky (1995) “analytic techniques carried on in ignorance of political, social and bureaucratic realities do not go very far” (p. 22). Hence, as per Kitamura (2009), policies must be formulated from; an economic as well as a social and more importantly, a human rights perspective.

It is important to note that as per Ginsburg & Megahed (2011) that a similar reform project was implemented but not coordinated with the HEEP project component named the “Faculties of Education” or the “Faculty of Education Enhancement Project.” This was the “Faculty of Education Reform Project”, which was “part of the Education Reform Project funded by the United States Agency for International Development” or USAID (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011, p. 3). This “issue” was not highlighted or mentioned in any of the Bank’s reports or the report pertaining to the PMU. This “limited impact” in the HEEP component may have resulted due to the fact that it was implemented separately to that of the USAID project (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011), which was unknown as to why it was done so.

Nonetheless, this may have meant that resources were wasted as well as funding, as there was no synchronization or coordination between the two projects. As per UNESCO (2013), with regards to “donor coordination”, it may be safe to assume that “donors may have different agendas, priorities, management styles and administrative requirements, which can make working together difficult” (p. 18), and as cited in the work of Ginsburg & Megahed (2011), donor agencies may “advance their own strategic interests against those of the country in question” (p. 19).

The perspective of the educators will be discussed in the next section. The perspective as mentioned earlier, was obtained through conducting face to face interviews.
II. Findings of Field Work: Educator’s Perspective

The expert educators were assigned numbers according to when the interviews were conducted, so, as per the chronological order of the interviews.

Firstly, most of the Professors working at the renowned private university declined when the author asked for their initial consent via email. For example, one professor stated in their email the following response, “I am sorry but the subject matter is not within my research and thus I cannot be of help to you.” This response came even though I had addressed Professors, the majority of whom are teaching at the faculty knowledgeable of global affairs and public policy at the renowned private university first, followed by other faculties i.e. Business. What seems to the author as hesitation by the professors and perhaps their unwillingness to participate, is an interesting finding (which will be discussed in the analysis and discussion section).

As this is a qualitative research, findings below were presented as themes to align with sub research questions 1 and 2, to answer them, in addition to identifying the similarities and differences within the themes (Owen, 2013). Then HE policy recommendations offered by the experts were presented to answer sub question 3. This is to ultimately help in answering the main research question “To what extent has the World Bank (WB) and its supported HEEP enabled or hindered the improvement in the quality of higher education in Egypt based on the perceptions of the World Bank, Egypt and Expert Educators?”

II.A. Sub question 1: “Why the WB support was needed in the first place?”

Necessity for IOs assistance: There was a consensus among 9 professors that Egypt in fact needs assistance from international organisations to reform the system of its HE and hence they agreed that the project itself was necessary. Only 6 Professors confirmed that
this reform was part of the Higher Education Reform Strategy (HERS) that was proposed in 2000, in the Higher Education Reform Conference. This is what led Egypt to seek out the WB for advice and assistance to help implement this reform agenda, as per the experts. According to 4 experts, other international organisations such as the OECD were asked to assist in the reform agenda i.e AHELO or Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes.

Professor 11 however, who was not involved in the HEEP project expressed a different viewpoint, where she believes that “international organisations can be supportive of HE reform” and Egypt “can get a lot of support from international organisations”. However, towards the end of the interview, the professor felt that “in a sense, I don’t think it was necessary” referring to the WB supported HEEP project. Professor 4, who was not only involved but was a director of a certain component within HEEP, declared that “I do not want to depend on the WB or any other organization.” Not only that is that the opinion of said professor, but this professor also believes that “we need to implement our own projects” with reference to the Egypt.

The necessity of the need of international organisations help was categorised into the following subthemes:

- **Problems in education:** Professor 3 who was involved in the project stated that the “HE system in Egypt was in need of development”, especially the “graduate studies” and hence the “university system”. Professor 2 asserted that the WB at the time had already many “interventions in many countries around the world”, where most of them are “developing countries” and they were “suffering with problems in their education”, as was the case in Egypt. In addition, as per Professor 5, Egypt at the time was “lagging behind” with regards to trends in education, where the WB had set certain trends. Hence, Egypt needed to “follow those trends” by taking advantage of their collaboration with the WB. According to several experts, the reform of the Egyptian HE was recognized as a national priority.
• **Funding:** Seven of the educational experts, of whom 6 participated in the project, specified that Egypt had needed funding from the WB to implement the reform. Professor 1 explained how the “economy of Egypt was suffering” and so Egypt required help from external agencies. Professor 3 expressed his opinion on how the “government was not able to cater for the reform of the higher education” in Egypt and thus, “to fulfill the reform agenda” Egypt required a “huge amount of funds”. This viewpoint was further confirmed by 4 Professors, where at the time of implementation of the project: Professor 5 affirmed that “funding was the big issue as we are still a developing country”, Professor 6 replied “financial support” was needed to implement the reform, Professor 7 mentioned that “there was not enough funding” as the Egyptian government has usually had problems in financing projects, and Professor 9 claimed that the project was “needed for funding”. According to Professor 8, Egypt needed help in the form of monetary aid because “we do not allocate enough financial resources for education.” The rationale offered by the expert was that Egypt throughout its life has had its resources “provided by foreign entities” as there is no “real budget for education”. Professor 10 claimed that the cooperation was necessary to encourage the Egyptian government to do more, through the pressure of the WB. This is because the government is always reluctant to endorse in education.

• **Technical assistance:** Professor 9 reassured that Egypt sought out the help of the WB for “funding” rather than “technical assistance”. While Professor 6 said that “technical support” was necessary to implement some of the objectives of the reform.

• **Experience and Expertise:** Professor 2 commented on the fact that the “World Bank a big international organization” which has a “very long experience with educational reform”, hence, their “expertise was needed”. While Professor 9 reinforced his claim by stating again that the Egyptian government did not seek out the WB, at that time, because of their “lack of experience” but rather, because of “lack of funding”. Nonetheless, he asserted that Egypt needed the international experience. Professor 10 explained that the project was necessary because “we did
not have enough experience” to implement the reform agenda. He specified that the WB had the expertise as well as the “knowledge” or “know-how” to promote the process, implement and thus achieve change to the system. Egypt needed “some international standard for making implementation plan with indicators with specific objectives to be measured”. The HE system needed to abide by the “international norms”, and this could only be attained through “cooperating with an experienced international organization such as the WB”.

II.B Sub question 2: “What has been the WB interventions to reform higher education?”

One professor stated that the intervention of the WB with HEEP and contribution began with “drafting of the “aide-memoire.” This, according to the expert, is the “basic concept of the project.” This intervention was then continued in the form of “technical support and funding”. Then, “basic indicators” were developed to “assess the reform that took place” by “going through or towards the objectives.”

- **Funding:** Three professors felt that the Bank’s intervention through mainly funding of HEEP was not necessary, especially through the provision of a loan. Two professors believed that the project could have been financed through alternative means of funding, by the provision of i.e. “grants”. For example, Professor 5 stated that “from my point of view, the loan was not the right choice” as the expert felt that there were many options to opt for at the time, rather than a loan. Professor 4 shared a different opinion all together, by saying that “I do not think that money is the means for educational development.” While Professor 9 at the time of the project was not a member of the Ministry of Higher Education, and thus, could not offer a rational as to why the Egyptian government chose to finance the project by borrowing money from the WB, stating “I do not know why they did this”.

Professor 2, who was the director within a specific unit within the Ministry of Higher Education, felt that Egypt was in a partnership with the WB, rather than Egypt receiving a “loan”. As in the viewpoint of said expert, the “loan represented a 60% of the overall funding” where the government of Egypt “supplied the 40 % remaining.” So, as per the Professor, it was “co-financed by the Egyptian government” hence, it was a form of “partnership.” Nonetheless, the Professor believes that “Fifty million US dollars in the field of education is a little amount of money”. This money however, was “meant to introduce the change into the sector”. So, the expert believes that, “it was necessary to get the loan that would have the expertise, technical support and the new management structure brought along with it”.

Several other professors: Professor 7, 8 and 10, agreed with Professor 2 in the idea that “50 million US dollars was nothing in the field of education, especially during the time of the implementation of the project. Both Professor 7 and 10 confirmed that HEEP 2 (the second stage of HEEP) was completely financed (and executed solely) by the Egyptian government, hence 50 million dollars was not a lot of money. Professor 8 claimed that the WB themselves “had warned us that the loan received was not enough”. He believes however, that the loan should not have been the only source of funding for implementing the reform.

Professor 3, who was a director of the Project Management Unit at the time of the implementation of HEEP, felt that Egypt needed those “kinds of loan agreement.” The expert went on to add that “we had finished the engineering and technical education project in the beginning and upon the success of completion” of this project, the “World Bank showed intention” in that they were “prepared to fund the whole higher education reform agenda.” This was to be done by the WB as per the Professor, “provided we had a strategic plan.”

- **Terms and conditions of the Loan:**
Necessity of the terms and conditions: Only 4 professors knew there were terms and conditions associated with the loans provided by the WB to fund the HEEP initiative, to begin with.

Professor 2 explained that the “terms and conditions” basically had to do with the “funding scale”. The WB was concerned at the time that the “funding would go as planned” and that the “transfer that would follow would be according to the actual funding.” She mentioned how the WB did not “require any restrictions that had to do with the higher education sector” but rather, it was to “guarantee more success to the projects.”

Professor 3 explained that the WB provided the loans under conditions that were quite convenient. Professor 3 further clarified that the presence of conditions is necessary for any organization, like the concept of the presence of a “constitution”. As per the expert, international organisations provide “international funds that are governed by international laws” and they are “acceptable to everybody.” Professor 6 expressed how “we may differ in points of view about the necessity of some of the terms and conditions.” However, he asserted that if one signs an agreement, “you have to abide by the rules.”

Professor 7 (who was not aware of what exactly were the terms and conditions) shared a similar point of view to Professor 3, where he asserted that the WB provided the loan under good conditions.

Transparency of the terms and conditions: Professor 2 mentioned how the terms and conditions of the loans were not in fact “meant to interfere with the Egyptian affairs.” Professor 3 confirmed by stating how “people have misconceptions about World Bank”. The professor assured that the WB experts were there to “fulfill our agenda” and it was “our say” as their assistance (through provision of funds) was sought out at the request of the Egyptian government. Hence, there was “no corruption” and only “transparency.” Then he further justified his opinion by saying that the WB do not have a hidden agenda, as people always hear. As per the professor, they only have their rules, which are well organized and “declared
to every country beforehand.” Therefore, the expert confirmed that any country knows exactly what their “commitments are” and that the WB is an organization that is “very keen about implementation transparency”.

This was confirmed by Professor 6 who stated, “according to the rules of the WB, transparency is very important point in all processes.” The expert further clarified by saying “so we did not have any problem about somebody taking advantage of whatever rules”. Professor 7 (who was a director in one of the components of HEEP 2) stated that HEEP was not “dictated by an external agency or someone”, but rather, it was an “Egyptian need based on an Egyptian analysis.” He went on to further explain that if the WB had requested “us to place conditions, we would have said no”. So as per the expert, “it was our initiative, it was our need and we just used their money to implement the project” where “their” referred to the WB.

Despite Professor 5 being unaware of the terms and conditions associated with the WB loan, he speculated that the conditions placed were not intended for “political interference.” He believes these conditions were probably documentative in nature in the form of “follow up and quarterly reports” and so forth. He explained his opinion further by stating that everything had to be documented to probably ensure that the money was spent efficiently.

Professor 9 (who did not participate in the drafting of the concept of the loan with the WB) confirmed, according to his knowledge, that there was no agenda on this project. When asked (as a follow up question) if in general, these terms and conditions would benefit a certain group of stakeholders, he expressed dismay by stating, “What do you mean again conditions?! I told you there are no conditions!” He later explained that at the time, he did not accept any of these obligations, even if the fund was not granted. It is worthy of note that he was not involved in the negotiation process of the loan with the WB.

Professor 10, who was involved in the drafting of the project from the very beginning, stated that the WB “did not dictate any conditions.” However, the Professor then supposed “pushing towards some financial or political issues, it
was not such remarkable things in that area”. This particular statement should have been further examined by the author, through inquiry (asking questions) to the interviewee.

- **Technical support:** One Professor asserted that “we did not need computers or equipment” which had come at the expense of more critical issues. Professor 11 confirmed this opinion. While Professor 2 explained that “technical support” was provided after the basic concept of the project was drafted. Professor 11 confirmed that the WB had managed to “equip the universities with hardware” where computer labs were brought in as well as internet access, and that was in the eyes of the expert “useful.”

- **Bureaucratic procedures:** Professor 1 believed that HEEP caused more paperwork in his faculty department and thus, “more bureaucratic procedures” had resulted from the project.

As per the opinion shared by Professor 2, the terms and conditions of the project supported the Egyptian government. She elaborated further her viewpoint by stating that these terms were “required by the government to revise their own laws and bylaws that would get rid of the rigid type of laws that hinder change, and that would allow more flexible change to take place”. Professor 8 believed that the WB “spared us the process of enduring the complex bureaucratic procedures of the Egyptian system.” As per the expert, the laws that were to be abided were that of the “WB themselves and not the complex laws of the Egyptian system.” Professor 10 asserted that the WB facilitated the procedures by offering “more flexibility” as a result of the rigidity of the government’s bureaucracy.

- **External evaluation:** Professor 3 stated that an evaluation was carried out by an “internal body, the OECD together with the World Bank” where they had conducted an “external evaluation” for the entire “HEEP as a project.” Professor 9 confirmed that this “impact study” was necessary and thus was requested by the Egyptian government, as the WB only cared for the “disbursement, how much, how much you have used of the money.” The expert clarified his point of view by saying “because it's a bank, and I judge your performance by how much how
much money you spent.” The Professor affirmed that he did not agree with their perspective, and stated “we said now we are dealing with education, we are dealing with very important aspects for the reform and we need to have what we called impact assessment.”

II.C. Sub question 3: “How the educators perceive the WB supported HEEP impact on higher education in Egypt and what are the policy recommendations for improvement?”

II.C.3. (i) Perceived Success:

Professor 7 believes that the HEEP initiative was a “cornerstone” and thus accomplished a tremendous change in the environment of the HE.

- Quality: Professor 2 stated how the “quality assurance is really a big shift,” as an “overall quality should be imposed on higher education institutions.” The expert further clarified by stating that higher education institutions “should be evaluated regularly and periodically”, and they must be “peer reviewed.” In addition, she expressed that “external examiners and examinations should take place,” so HEEP had “really injected quality indicators into the system.” Professor 11 believed that the “most important impact” of HEEP was the “quality assurance and broadening the quality assurance culture in HE”. She also confirmed how the project was “instrumental in supporting quality assurance for Higher Education” and “possibly that was the area where they were most successful, in bringing in a culture of quality assurance”. This was the point of view of all 10 professors interviewed.

Professor 3 expressed how HEEP brought about “sustainable mechanisms” in for example, quality. Professor 10 expressed how the project “spread the idea of quality within the HE system” through the establishment of NAQAAE. Thus, in the eyes of the expert, the project had helped a lot, “comparing with the baseline what we established from”. Professor 7 stated that “NAQAAE should do and they are, I know they are doing, they are revising their standards and they are trying to simplify the procedures of accreditation” which from his viewpoint is a “good
thing.” Professor 9 mentioned how the project produced a “change of culture” especially in the aspect of quality. For example, he explained how an “accredited center for the Middle East in Egypt” was established with the cooperation of the “international one in in Amsterdam”.

- **ICTP**: Professor 2 articulated that a “serious change” in the higher education sector was brought about through the “provision of learning resources” via the ICT project. This change was “guided through the online courses and digital technology resources” as Egypt must be “heading towards the knowledge economy and knowledge society.” She explained her point of view further by stating that “knowledge needs to be accessible to everybody and if it's accessible to everybody it should be accessible to universities and learners.”

As for Professor 3, he believed that “this was a huge project”, in terms of “internet infrastructure” as well as the establishment of the Egyptian Knowledge Bank (EKB). He specified the impact of this particular component by explaining how the PMU had “gone through the process of identifying the needs of every discipline in the universities like medicine, engineering, pharmacy, agriculture.” According to this expert, (who was a director and was in charge of the PMU) an agreement was made with the publishers for “I think I signed over a million dollars or 2 million dollars” in the contract agreement, to provide all the documents “free of charge for all the researches in the universities.”

Both Professor 5 and Professor 8 concurred that there was a change in the internet infrastructure and the EKB was one of the important outcomes of this component. Professor 8, who at one point during that time, was responsible for the ICT project, explained how this component “was provided with 10 million dollars” and “additional funding was offered through contributions by universities”. As a result, a “national center for e-learning and 19 other centers were formed in universities” in addition to the EKB. As per the expert, training like the ICDL (International Computer Driving License) courses was offered for around 60,000 trainees.
Professor 7 explained how after this component was implemented, “there were users of the internet, there were graduates of faculties of information technology and all this helped” in establishing companies and creating IT technology. The expert confirmed that as a result, “we are exporting this to the world”. Professor 9 concurred that the project was a “good achievement” in which he believes it is “continuing till today”. While Professor 11 believed that “engineering benefitted” most from this component, as they are “technologically oriented”.

- **HEEPF**: 5 professors confirmed how this was a very successful component of the HEEP initiative.

  Professor 2 explained how the HEEP project “provided new initiatives” that were not there to begin with, the “most important of which was the higher education enhancement project fund”, which “introduced the idea of competitiveness to the higher education sector.” Professor 5 stated how “giving funds upon competition was a new practice for public universities.” Professor 7, as per his own personal opinion, stated that this was the most successful component of the HEEP initiative. He clarified his viewpoint by explaining how the HEEPF component was “based on initiatives from the staff members” as it was “their ideas,” and once they had won the competition, their ideas were funded. According to the expert, now there is “collaboration” with the “Germans through DAAD” and “Europe through TEMPUS before and now ERASMUS.” The Professor believes how this is an accomplishment as the project established the “principle of competitiveness,” where if “you need a fund, you have to compete for it”.

  Even though Professor 9 was not involved directly in the WB supported HEEP, he was involved in the WB components as previous member of the HEEPF board. The aim of the board was to synchronise the TEMPUS and HEEP projects, where he confirmed that this was a good project. This was also asserted by Professor 10.

- **Students:**

  **Learning** Professor 3 considers that the learning of students is “highly dependent on the IT infrastructure,” where “active learning is the way to go.” As per the
educational expert, he deems that this is a “slow process in development” as it is dependent on making information available, in the “proper format.”

**Evaluation of Faculty and Staff** Professor 4 stipulated how the only beneficial impact of the WB supported HEEP was that the “evaluation of faculty and staff had become a reality that could not be denied.” Professor 5 concurred by stating that the students, for the first time, could evaluate their teachers and or their lecture. However, he is doubtful with regards to the “honesty or the accuracy,” in terms of “to what extent the evaluation is accurate”, especially since the “practice of accreditation after 2006 was not ideal”. Professor 7 however believed that students could indeed evaluate their own professors and their own courses.

- **Faculty and Staff (FLDP):**
  There were 2 viewpoints regarding this particular component.
  First, Professor 2 stated how the “hiring and recruitment policies of the faculty members at universities,” was carried out through the component "faculty and leadership development project." She explained how instead of “hiring leaderships because of their age or their seniority”, the component changed this concept as it had “required leaderships to acquire basic competencies and skills to qualify for a leadership position.” She further mentioned how this project enabled the revision of the “laws of recruitment,” thus, the senior professor is not necessarily the most efficient. However, the expert stated how universities were not really interested in the Faculty and Leadership Development Project, in comparison to other components, i.e. the ICTP.

In addition, Professor 3 mentioned how there are now “training centers” in every university, “to cater for the capacity building of human resources”. Professor 5 clarified how this component “opened a new window” for capable people from the staff to “switch inside the system from the teaching positions to leadership positions.” He however believes that the main sector who benefitted from the “trainings and the capacity building was the management and the leadership”.

Professor 6, who was a director of a later stage in the project, acknowledged that this “idea was not known” in Egypt and “we had to convince the staff members of
public universities of the importance of introducing this type of reform.” He continued to explain his viewpoint by revealing how staff members, “as far as teachers, they are amateurs,” where even though they are professional in earning a degree in a certain specialization, “as far as teaching they are amateurs” and the “students usually pay the price”. So as per the expert, it was “essential to introduce the concept of staff development.” Professor 8 believed that as a result of this component, “the faculty and staff had changed to the better” and the expert thinks that if they changed to the worse, it was because they were receiving poor salaries.

While Professor 4 expressed otherwise by stating “I do not think that it succeeded. I do not think that there was any benefit to anyone either.” The expert believes that because faculty and staff members were “forced to take these courses or training,” they went along with the idea anyway, “only for the sake of getting promoted.” This viewpoint was more or less asserted by Professor 10. Professor 9 expressed how this component “has declined now”.

- **Governance**: Professor 9 pointed out how for the governance, “we enhanced a little bit the structure”, as well as the environment of higher education. He also mentioned that “if you look at our laws and bylaws, they are more or less good”.

- **HEEP 2**: There seems to be differing opinions amongst the educational experts, regarding the aspect of a second phase for HEEP, which was according to experts, was fully funded by the Egyptian government. Professor 2 explained how this was an “unfortunate time for the HEEP”, where “it was meant to be HEEP 1” and the expert was “expecting a HEEP 2, which is a continuation that has never happened.” The Professor even mentioned how by the end of the HEEP project and after its finalization, how there was a discussion in a “number of rounds with the World Bank, the HEEP 2 components” and how they could “compliment what has taken place, but this never happened as well”.

Professor 10 confirmed this opinion by stating “we tried with the government to promote the 2nd phase, but actually, we didn't succeed in getting the financial support or the investment needed for the 2nd phase.”
This viewpoint was however not shared by other experts. For example, Professor 6 expressed how “we were able at that time to convince the Egyptian government to continue financing this project and up until now this project is running and financed by the Egyptian government,” referring to the second phase of HEEP. This was confirmed by Professor 7 (who was involved in the second phase of the project), “the second phase was completely financed by the Egyptian government”. Professor 9 also added, “we didn't take any money from the WB, although the WB was ready to give Egypt another loan,” to finance HEEP2.

II.C.3. (ii). Policy formulation changes:
Professor 2 stated that HEEP was a main change with regards to formulation of HE policies. Professor 3 expressed that “sustainable mechanisms” such as “quality assurance, FLDP centers, quality assurance offices or centers in every university and even on the level of faculties” had taken place as a result of HEEP. Professor 5 mentioned that the “establishment of the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation” or NAQAA was a major change in the policies of higher education. This was asserted by Professor 6 and Professor 7, where professor 7 articulated how NAQAAE was a “direct product or outcome of the project.” Professor 10 stated how the ministry of higher education was able to “place a strategic plan not just for higher education, but for the entire educational system, as problems were apparent in all the sectors”.

II.C.3. (iii). Perceived Hindrance:
The general consensus of the educators regarding their viewpoint on the hinderance of certain components are discussed below. It is noteworthy that Professor 2, who was involved in the project, expressed how the “intervention by HEEP” in the Egyptian system of higher education was “not that massive.”
• **Implementation:** Professor 4 explained how the “rate of decision making” and hence the “implementation of those projects” was “slow,” which was from his viewpoint, one of the biggest problems, as the pace at which the projects were being implemented was slow. He clarified by saying “what was done in 5 years for the supported WB project should have been done in only one year,” so as a result, higher education in Egypt is developing at a much slower pace in comparison to what is happening in the rest of the world.” Thus, as per the expert, “the gap is getting bigger”. He therefore believes that “we are not very good when it comes to implementation”.

Professor 5 thinks that “maybe the implementation was not sufficient to meet the objectives and expectations.” Professor 2 stated that there was a delay in funding, so the project commenced in 2004. In addition, she explained how there was a concern from her end regarding the “response rate of the Egyptian partners,” as the project was ambitiously designed, where “we thought that tangible deliverables would be achieved within a certain time frame.” However, in her opinion, because of the “relaxed routine of the Egyptian universities and the lack of competences within faculty members” there were delays and extensions and so forth.

Professor 9 expressed more or less a similar viewpoint, where the project “theoretically speaking was from 2002 to 2007”, but had commenced in 2003, because of the “delay of approval and the processing of fund.” The expert also revealed how in the second phase of HEEP, “we had to upgrade and update some components” because sometime had elapsed between “time of implementation and the time of design of the concept of the paper, and thus things had changed. According to the expert, the “implementation of reform is not going as quick as the changes going on in higher education,” and thus the “implementation is the challenge.”

• **Uprising/revolution:** Professor 2 revealed how the HEEP project was “very unlucky” due to the occurrence of the 25th January Revolution in Egypt. She further explained by stating there was a “gap of a second system, where faculty
members and students were not going to universities,” and a lot of people left their leadership positions and other people took their place. This per the expert caused a “change into the higher education system, where a big bulk of the HEEP procedures and objectives” were as a result, “lost.” Professor 9 believed that after the revolution in 2011, “everything collapsed”. Professor 10 confirmed that because of the revolution in 2011, many changes did not take place or were put to a halt i.e. improving the standards of professors. So, the expert believes that Egypt is worse off now than it was in 2000.

**Resistance:** Professor 1 mentioned how there were “two kinds of resistance”, the “dean and the administration.” According to the expert, “people who controlled the faculty of arts were not really interested and they did not welcome change.” He believes that this is because of lack of trust and lack of ethics. Professor 2 confirmed there was resistance, but in the form of “tension and struggle between the institutions and the project that was managed by the ministry and the World Bank.” The expert explained that the “number of missions came from the World Bank experts to evaluate the and monitor the progress of the project and they could highlight those obstacles and risks, to the project.” Professor 3 pointed out that one of the “key problems” was the “culture of quality and resistance to change by the faculty members.” However, the expert said that those “challenges” were “confronted” and now “everybody is satisfied.” One of those challenges, as per the Professor was how university professors were used to a certain way or “mode of delivery,” which according to him, is “not an easy thing to change.” In addition, with regards to the ICTP component, “course files were developed, which took about 10 years of implementation” as the concept was highly resisted, but as per the expert, it is “now becoming a well-established mechanism”.

Professor 4 believes that the obstacle in the face of reform is that “no one is committed to attending the university or doing their job.” Professor 8 expressed that 60,000 faculty members did show resistance during their training in the ICTP component, where “this resistance persists till today”. However, from the expert’s
viewpoint, “the level of resistance was not great during the period of training,” since there were specific conditions placed, “for example, if any faculty member wanted to get a promotion, they had to take 6 courses.” Professor 10 stated that the “majority of professors are not up to standard” and he believes that the “continuity of the process was not supported” sufficiently, “either within the university itself or from the government and the ministry of higher education.”

- **Government:** Professor 1 believes that government intervention spoilt the entire HEEP project. Professor 2 stated that “by now, the government of Egypt is very reluctant to get loans” which is why the HEEP project from her viewpoint, is “phasing out.” In addition, Professor 3 feels that the “government is very slow,” i.e. the ministry of higher education, the development team and the Supreme Council of Universities, their mechanisms and so forth. This is despite how the government, as per the expert is “looking into diversifying the HE and giving more opportunities for private education to get into the higher education system.” Professor 9 was confident that HEEP was an “enthusiastic plan of reform” but “unfortunately, we were not able to implement this reform completely.” The expert attributes this to “lack of funding” as the “government or the party at that time,” did not want the project to “continue in this direction,” since he believes that, there were unfortunately “other priorities rather than higher education.”

- **How the loan was used:** One professor assured how the WB did indeed “donate”. However, the professor believes that “how we use this donation or this aid is very important,” where he thinks that this “may be more important than the aid itself” and in order to “make use out of this donation, we have to follow very scientific and academic, sincere steps”. Professor 5 stated that “there is no wisdom” regarding the “way of spending” a loan, when it is provided by a foreign entity.

- **Faculties of education (FOE):** Professor 2 stated that the Faculties of Education component helped change the “bylaws and the regulations” as well as the “program description of the faculties of education.” As per the expert, “now all the faculties of education implemented the credit hour system” that would permit
“more electives to students” which would give students the options to “withdraw from a course and join another course.” However, she believes that the component did not help in the “teaching skills and field activities and hands on training into the sector.” Professor 9 believes that the FOE benefitted moderately from the HEEP project, but would not rationalize as to why he believed so. Both Professor 4 and professor 10 confirmed that there was not much of an improvement in the Faculties of Education.

It is important to note that Professor 10 explained how there was a similar project at the time for reforming FOE by USAID, “confusing this program of the USAID with our program with the WB”. He further clarified by stating how the “strategic objectives of both projects were not compatible,” even though according to the expert, “we wanted at that time to enforce the USAID to change this,” to make their “project to be compatible with ours” or “synchronized” but “we could not achieve this”. The expert explained that the USAID project was “choosing individuals to give them a chance to see new development,” so it was “mainly concerned with improving the staff members through visits to USAID.”

As per Professor 11, the faculties of education “did not benefit” at all from HEEP. The expert justified her answer by explaining how even though the WB contributed to the faculties of education by providing them with internet infrastructure, there was nothing at all that contributed to improving “pedagogy or changing syllabi or changing programs or content.” She then reaffirmed her answer by stating, “no, none of that”.

- **ICTP**: Professor 3 had criticized the Egypt Knowledge Bank, where “instead of paying 64 million dollars per annum,” it could have been done in “phases.” This was because according to the expert, “neither the people are ready,” referring to the 90 million Egyptians, as he was talking about providing “access to all the 90 million people”, nor the “IT infrastructure in the country can cater for it.” Professor 8 thus believes that with reference to the EKB, “we should have provided for only 8 % of the 90 million.” Professor 10 believed that this component did not bring about a lot of change, “only basic changes”. 
• **Quality:**
Professor 2 laughed and then stated that there was “not much” change or improvement, with regards to quality. She explained further by stating “although HEEP could have achieved a lot of changes” but these changes were “not as deep as the teaching and learning process in universities”. Professor 4 asserted that there is “no change in the quality of education.” Professor 5 pointed out that the “teaching or the learning process was not the main benefit”. Professor 8 mentioned that the idea of “quality was only a theoretical concept” as it was only “discussed on paper.” This was confirmed by Professor 11, as she stated how “this is the reputation that everyone is talking about.” She also saw that the HEEP project did not achieve much with regards to quality of teaching and learning.

**Teaching:** Professor 2 believes that the quality of teaching, with regards to the quality assurance system, that “people are very good at providing the documentation and papers that proves they are teaching”, but not “necessarily reflecting it, reflecting real teaching quality.” The expert thinks that this is because the “majority of faculty members have not yet received training, the proper training that was planned” and most of them in the eyes of the expert are “aging,” so, they are not into “e-learning and online things and digital resources”, so, the “traditional way of teaching is still in place.” Professor 4 confirms this opinion by stating that “some instructors and/or professors insist on teaching the old-fashioned way”, but the expert attributes this to how instructors and/or professors force the students to “memorise the information provided solely in the lecture by the lecturer, which is not the way to go about teaching students”.

**Learning:** Professor 2 stated how the “learning component is still focusing on knowledge” and this is what the “exams are measuring.” So, as per the expert, if one is “assessing only knowledge then the program would not target anything except knowledge.” There is no focus on the “skills and competencies and values and attitudes of learners.” Professor 8 believes that students are learning, despite the “undesirable outcomes” of the project. For example, the expert stated how
students are being shown exactly how to work out and solve a problem in the
lecture by their professor, and may even cheat, as a result of their “Egyptian
nature” regardless of the project itself. Nonetheless, the “students had learned,” as
according to the expert, what he cared about is that the students learned the
questions and the answers to those questions.

Institutions
Professor 10 revealed that some faculties were “specialized in renewable energy,”
which was in the governorate of Aswan. According to the expert, he explained
how “through this very conservative interpretation of quality,” they “transformed
themselves to a normal faculty of engineering”. Professor 10 expressed in a very
frustrated manner how he believes that “this is against the process of
development.” The expert even questioned the action in a surprised manner, “how
you have this faculty as faculty for renewal energy and improve it in that sense?”

Accreditation:
Professor 2’s opinion is even though “they structured the system of quality” but it
was not to the extent of achieving the required “quality output and outcomes.”
She further clarifies her position by stating “I hear people here and there
commenting on the quality assurance process that it is more paper based” and it is
not authentic nor real. The expert believes that even though the “quality change
into the sector is this massive reporting system”, she still thinks that “they are
missing the essence of the indicators of quality, rather than the dull reporting
system.” So, the expert believes that the system is there, but not “necessarily
affecting the real quality of the system.”
Professor 3 speculates that now, “on the ground,” whether the “process of
accreditation and re-accreditation of institutions,” is “happening or not, I would
say that it is a slow process,” which is “highly dependent on the individuals that
lead the organisations.” Professor 5 believes that the system is “stuck at the first
early indicators,” where “everything is documented”, but it does not go beyond that. Hence, as per the expert, the “accreditation mechanism is not measuring real quality,” as it is “stuck in the level of documentation”. Professor 9 suggests that the “one who measures the standards should not be the provider,” where he believes that this is “something that the world is working on.”

- **Relevancy:**
  
  **Universities**

  Regarding the relevancy of universities to the labor market, Professor 1 believes that “HEEP did not achieve anything at all and there were no changes” in that area. Professor 2 explained how even though the “WB was always concerned with this particular objective,” there is a “gap” and “until today, the universities are producing faculty graduates that are not really compatible” with the requirements of the “Egyptian labour market.” Professor 5 feels that there was a “positive contribution in this field” but only with the “faculties of engineering and agriculture.”

  However, Professor 6 stated that “I do not think that this was one of the important issues in the HEEP project.” The expert believes that there was “no project dedicated for matching between the needs of the labor market with the output from the higher education system”. While Professor 7 expressed his certainty by stating “of course there was a reduction in the gap, especially in the soft skills and the hard skills”. Professor 8 however was uncertain yet, he stated that he believes relevancy between universities and the labor markets was not established, despite knowing the needs of the labor market, “thanks to us coming up with solutions that addressed some problems.” Finally, Professor 11 questioned “what is the labor market for faculties of education?” The expert asserted that “these are schools and what were they able to do for that?” It was “not clear” in the eyes of the professor.
**Technical education:** Professor 2 explained how HEEP was able to contribute in the “sector of technical and vocational higher education,” where “technology clusters” were created, which were “relevant” to the needs of labour market. So as per the expert, “some of the institutions within the technical colleges were changed in mandate to suit the labour market needs” and more partnerships were formed. According to the professor, “boards” were “created for those organisations to recruit […] 40% of employers and business men into the world of management of those technology clusters” and this was from her viewpoint, a “mechanism to create relevance between the technical higher education and labour market.”

Professor 4 believes that there was a “lack of projects for the technological institutes,” as attention was paid to the “labs at the expense of the staff and/or instructors,” which in the eyes of the expert, was “one of the flaws in technical education.” The professor stated how the “people who teach are not professors” but “they are in fact engineers and thus, they are not qualified to teach.” Professor 7 also concurred by stating that the “technical and vocational education should have been much better.” Professor 9 believed that technical colleges benefitted moderately, but would not state why. However, he mentioned how the “labor markets need more technical and technological skills rather than other skills,” but the “HEEP projects were not successful” as it did “not match the market needs.” Professor 10 expressed his point of view as an engineer, where he believed “only 10% success was achieved”, especially with regards to the technical colleges, “even though it was anticipated to achieve a relevancy of more than 50 %. “ The expert explained how there was an attempt to “have a model with the stakeholders,” which meant the establishment of a “board of trustees for each of those faculties involved,” which were “headed by one of the business or business community,” in addition to “some experts from community and academy.” The Professor clarified that this model was meant to “promote” by giving the “owner of those faculties” and “push it towards improvement and more contact with the business community.” However, the expert asserts that this could not be achieved
because of the “regulations within the system.” The Professor stated that the “ministry of higher education was involved in the beginning” to implement the initial steps in the implementation process for those faculties, and therefore, as per the expert, “the admin, staff within the higher education and the ministry of higher education could not accept clearly the new situation.” Therefore, according to the expert, there were “some struggles” and “some difficulties” to make this successful. The expert attributes this lack of success because “not only of the system itself within these faculties,” the directors of the faculties did not “have any powerful tools to implement change.” The expert confirmed that even if the directors follow the “normal bureaucratic regulations,” they would not be able to achieve anything.

Nonetheless, with regards to relevance, as per the expert, “you can see it in in faculty of medicine and faculty of engineering and faculty of applied arts, for example.”

- **Monetary gain:** Professor 4 believes that “one of the flaws of the supported World Bank projects” was that the Bank itself continued “paying monetary incentives to professors and anyone who had started drawing up a proposal for a new program,” or “improved at that time a current program.” The professor felt that way because in his eyes, “this work should have been done for free,” but instead, “people only worked for monetary gain,”

II.C.3. (iv). a. Policy Recommendations:

Professor 7 expressed how the government “must revise” the means for improving HE in Egypt, where he feels that now, they must set out, as was done in National Conference in 2000 to “revise what was done.” The expert also mentioned that the government needs to question “what are our real needs?” and to have a “strategic plan, a solid strategic plan” that all stakeholders can agree on, as well as to attempt to “seek funds for it, may be from the government” and the expert thinks that this “should be possible because education should be a first priority.”
• **Public universities:** Professor 6 criticized how “public universities still implement the semester system” and in his eyes, it is a “rigid system.” The expert believes that the public universities have to “find a way to adopt a system” that is compatible with “international recognised systems”.

• **FOE:** Professor 4 suggested launching a “new kind of development,” where he believes if “we improve faculties of education and train leaders as well as faculty and staff, based on what they have learnt in the faculties of education, we will see the difference.” The expert added that to make this happened, “Egypt will need help from external sources.” He stated that “yes of course, we need help,” as per the expert, the external sources will be needed to “train a group of people from the faculties of education” and “another group” will also be needed, to “train leaders.”

• **Faculty members:** Professor 2 suggests that “faculty members should not be hired,” but rather, “contracted”, as they are “too safe to move and to change.” The expert believes that if they are “contracted according to certain terms for a certain period of time,” then they would surely “do their best to keep their positions.” So, as per the educational expert, this is a “radical change that should happen in the higher education sector.” Professor 4 believes that “professors have to dedicate their time to the university and the students.”

• **Funding formula:** Professor 2 feels that a “funding formula” must be placed, where the expert thinks that the government can allocate fund to universities, “based on the number of students per specialization,” instead of the current “type of funding that has always been there for ages and ages.” So, as per the professor, she believes that the “funding mechanism as well should change” and with the “funding, they would have the student as their core beneficiary” and hence, “they would try to attract students” and establish relevance to the labour market.” The expert goes on to explain that by this means, the universities will “maintain their status” and if they fail, then they will “lose their funding.” Hence, according to the Professor, the “funding mechanism is another factor that is important to change as well.”
- **Exit exams:** Professor 2 feels that “universities should have exit exams,” where all students graduating from a university must “sit in an exam” that would see how students “have been prepared and what type of competencies and skills they own, regardless of their field of specialization.” This is because as per the expert, there are “basic requirements, common requirements that all graduates” must have or acquire.

- **Labor market:** Professor 4 strongly believes that any project needs to be matched to the “needs of the labor market,” and thus as per the expert, “we need to be aware of what are the exact needs of the labor market.” He feels that “education in Egypt must change towards the development of skills” to ensure relevancy with the labor market.

- **Quality:**
  - **NAQAAE:** Professor 4 is certain that “NAQAAE is still in the initial stage” and thus “needs to further improve itself”. Professor 10 confirms this idea by stating that NAQAAE needs to “improve their standards and change their philosophy in order to improve.” Professor 11 believes that NAQAAE “badly needs to expand its partnerships.” The expert also believes that they are “moving too slowly and they are not allowing […] other organisations to work with them and to support them.”

  - **Accreditation:** Professor 11 strongly feels that NAQAAE “needs to have a flexible national qualification framework, that will allow equivalences between formal, non-formal, and informal learning.” As per the expert, Egypt “would be better off being informed by the British system of "OFSTED" instead of the American model of accreditation,” where “OFSTED” stands for “Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills.” The expert also believes that NAQAAE “should be an inspectorate for quality, as opposed to an open accreditation system, where people pay to be accredited as in the US.”

- **Government:** Professor 1 suggests that the project should be “supervised by international organisations from A to Z,” rather than the government. Professor 10 feels that if more pressure is placed on the government, for example, the project
must not be financed unless the government has “10 times this amount and not only 10 %.” Professor 11 suggests that the current quality assurance mechanism needs a decentralized system.

- **Donors:** Professor 10 recommends that any donor agency must not “contribute to any reform programs” unless they are entirely sure that it is “one of the main strategic concepts,” because the expert believes that the program eventually fades or phases out in the end.

- **Change:** Professor 4 confirms that the entire “project did not go beyond the theory,” as it was merely written up in the form of reports. The expert believes that the “issue needs a change of the current school of thought.” Professor 9 feels that “we need people to create and design innovative programs” as well as a new school of thought that “involves creativity,” in order to “manage the implementation of the change.” Professor 11 asserts that “we need to get internal commitment to wanting to change.” The expert went on to add that it is ‘mostly we should be able to create our own forum for a discussion” and “to come up with a proper situation analysis of what are the issues.”

- **Research:** Professor 5 believes that there must be a focus on “quantitative research rather than qualitative,” where as per the expert, the quantitative evaluation for example of any reform must focus on the outputs in the “form of clear numerical objectives and indicators.” He also suggests that “impact assessments, research and studies should be or must be supported, like the experience of action research in education.” The expert further added that if action research is conducted to measure the impact of these projects funded by the World Bank, “I think it will give good literature for this kind of research.” While Professor 11 recommends that students at the university level must be engaged in “proper research and what are research protocols and research methods and academic integrity.”

- **Internationalisation:** Professor 6 thinks that “internationalization is becoming more and more the norm in relation between different universities.” This from his viewpoint, means that “we have to facilitate the mobility of students, the transfer
of credits, the mutual recognition, the dual degrees, the joined degrees,” and so forth. The expert believes that there are “lots of reforms that we have to introduce in Egypt, in order to match whatever reform is being done in different countries all over the world.”

- **Governance:** Professor 9 believes that Egypt needs a “ministry of higher education, but as a body” to act as a regulator. The expert recommends that with regards to governance, “the governance system should have a regulator, and this regulator should be the ministry of higher council.” So, as per the Professor, instead of having a ministry for higher education and a ministry for education, Egypt must have “one ministry of education and research and to have a vice minister”, which in the eyes of the expert, will be dependent on “how the political context is” that is “leading the government.”

- **Alternative philosophies:** Professor 1 feels that “academic freedom, ethics and conscientiousness” is necessary. Professor 11 believes that “internal dialogue, reflective practices and a shift in the paradigm of relating the higher education to the labor market,” is in order. The expert explains her opinion by stating that “the job of universities is not a one on one relationship between learning, training and the labor market.” Rather, as per the expert, higher education is “one component of wellbeing and being a well-rounded citizen.” The professor asserts that obviously one must have a job, but “universities are there to enhance creativity, to enhance sustainable development, to enhance global citizenship and human rights,” as well as “different perspectives of how we develop our societies and how we engage in research and how we engage in intellectual dialogues on a national level.”
II.C.3 (iv) b. Problems that persist post HEEP:

In addition to problems that still exist post HEEP such as the quality of teaching and learning, accreditation and so forth that were mentioned by the experts (some expressed in the form of a policy recommendation), additional problems from their viewpoint persists in the higher education sector.

- **Private institutions:** Professor 3 pointed out that the “progress” in the Egyptian private institutions is being “challenged because of the unavailability of enough faculty members that are adequately trained.”

- **Salary structure:** Professor 3 feels that this is a “problem that we are facing of this remuneration, poor remuneration of salary structure.” This thought was confirmed by Professor 8.

- **Equality:** Professor 10 strongly believes that there is “no equality in the system of higher education amongst the different regions of the country.” The expert offers examples to clarify his point of view. For example, “governorates as Minya” only have 1 or 2 types of higher education systems, where in Cairo, they may have 20 types or 20 institutions. The professor adds “in some remote areas, you will find only 1 faculty or 2 faculties or just higher education institutions.” However, the expert expresses how one may not be able to “find, for example, technical institutions.” This in the eyes of the expert, will negatively affect the Egyptian economy and the development of Egypt at large.

- **Student-Faculty relationship:** Professor 11 discussed briefly how there are “huge problems with student-faculty relationship, because there are no real protocols as to rights and duties,” of the students, and how the relationship between the student and their professor should be.

Thus, the consensus amongst the expert educators indicates that the HEEP project did not achieve its full potential. Findings suggest that the perceived hinderances seem to outweigh the perceived impacts of the project. Most of the educators however mainly
held the Egyptian Government accountable for these perceived hinderances. This is despite the acknowledgement of some experts (explicitly and/or implicitly) of the kind of role played by the World Bank and the philosophy guiding its interventions in educational reforms. Finally, the policy recommendations offered by the experts were very different, and no two experts stated similar recommendations. Each expert had their own opinion of what Egypt needs, to avoid the mistakes made in future World Bank supported reforms.
Chapter 5: Discussion and Analysis

In this chapter, I will critique the World Bank philosophy, with regards to mainly the HEEP project and justify my critique using primarily the book written by Klees et al (2012). Next, I will discuss the perspective of the interviewed educational experts, in terms of their philosophy regarding the World Bank supported HEEP project. Finally, I will highlight the problems that persist in higher education post HEEP project, to confirm its impact or lack thereof, on the quality of the Egyptian higher education system.

Critique of the World Bank Philosophy and its Policies

According to the work of Collins & Rhoads (2009), the Bank’s philosophy or “ideology” is significant in evaluating its policies. As articulated in the Bank’s “Peril and Promise” report (2000) “the quality of knowledge” produced within the institutions of higher education, and its “availability to the wider economy,” is turning out to be “increasingly critical to national competitiveness” (p. 9). Hence quality, has been given a great deal of attention by the World Bank, as per Klees et al (2012), especially with regards to higher education in attempts to reduce poverty in developing countries.

As stated in the Bank’s CAS for Egypt that was published in 2001, it was stated that for Egypt to overcome challenges such as high rates of unemployment (especially amongst youth) and a “successful integration into the global economy,” it will require “an expanded role for the private sector” which is perceived as the “motor of growth and raising competitiveness” (Annex 1, p 1). Hence, as per the work of Collins & Rhoads (2009), the issues of “bad governance and limited markets” were indirectly identified by the Bank as the “source of poverty” where the solution devised by the Bank was “decentralization, privatization, and market liberalization” (p.184). Levidow (2002) confirms this argument, where for many years now, the World Bank has been supporting a 'reform agenda' to improve the quality of higher education and promoting it to
developing countries, where the main components of such reforms are usually “privatization, deregulation and marketization” (p. 5). This solution seems to have been attributed to the neoliberal school of thought, where “more market and less state is the recipe for economic growth” (Sayed, 2006, p. 53).

It is important to note that the “Bank’s ideological stance” regarding higher education has been its “tendency to push for strengthening the private sector,” related with the “dismantling of the public sector” (Collins & Rhoads, 2009, p. 190). This notion was confirmed by Klees et al (2012) as well as in the Bank’s CAS for Egypt (2001), which stipulated that “Private Sector Development (PSD)” is vital for bettering “living standards and sustainable job creation” in addition to “promoting Egypt’s successful integration into the global economy” (Annex 1, p. 1).

It seems that there is a subtle hint in the Bank’s CAS for Egypt (2001), in which the high rate of unemployment amongst the Egyptian youth was due to the failure of public education systems and its inability to cater and thus provide quality education for all its enrollees. Hence, the inability of the system to “produce” knowledgeable and skilled higher education graduates or “manpower” (Sayed, 2006, p. 53) to develop the economy. Nonetheless, as per Collins & Rhoads (2009), the Bank has recently changed the formulation of its policies in higher education “beyond the individual benefits measured by narrow rate-of-return analyzes,” where it now focuses on the economic and social benefits of higher education on the society and the nation (p. 201). This is as mentioned before in the literature review, and as confirmed by Sayed, seems to be the focus of the “Western model of development” with regards to the “role of human capacity”, primarily through industrial development then via the “market economy” and the “information society” (p. 53).

The problem however, seems to be that the World Bank seldom examines the outcomes of privatization, even though several scholars have discussed the catastrophic aftermath of developing countries who have pushed for the growth of their private sector (Klees et al, 2012) i.e. “indebtedness” of countries as per Sayed (2006). Ergo, as per Klees et al
(2012), this privatization has led to promoting “inequality by guaranteeing unequal access and uneven quality of education” (p. 39).

Even the Bank’s principle of relating the higher education sector with the labor market and hence economic development, seems to coincide with its neoliberal ideology, even though, as per an educational expert, higher education is not meant for that purpose alone. According to Nordtveit, (as cited Kless et al, 2012), confirms that the references made by the Bank in their “Learning for All:WBES 2020 Strategy,” (which was released in 2011) regarding “knowledge in a global economy” and “skills” are also indicating the need of better “linkages between education systems and labor markets” (p. 23). So, the Bank’s neoliberal philosophy seems to be apparent in all its reports and hence reform strategies, not just the Bank-supported HEEP project, where “human capital” has become a main ingredient in the “sophisticated equation of globalization” (Sayed, 2000. p. 54).

As per the Bank’s PPAR report (2011), the implementation of the “Bank-Promoted Higher Education Reform Model” in Egypt, as well as countries such as Jordan and Yemen, consisted of features such as “transparent financing formula,” “increased use of ICT,” “diversified financing” amongst other features, which seems evident that the Bank formulates its higher education reforms to better suit the labour market, from an economic perspective (p. 13-15). However, the concept of education as a “human right” (Klees et al. 2012) was not expressed as a concern or placed as an objective in any of the HEEP project reports.

The formulation of the HEEP initiative from an economic viewpoint may also portray as was discussed before, that the HE policies of the Bank are tailored in a “one-size fits all” fashion across different countries in the i.e. MENA region, even though each country has its own unique social, economic and political context. Perhaps, as per Klees et al (2012), the World Bank had perceived the countries in the region as being similar, hence, from their view, “policy transfer would ideally occur” (p. 5) throughout the regions, with a few adaptations here and there to the policy, “regardless of country context” (p. 10).

Some features of the Bank’s reform model were unsuccessful upon implementation of, specifically the HEEP project i.e. the “university autonomy” feature, as this change was
resisted mainly from a political aspect as well as socially, and was still pending the approval of the Egyptian Parliament at the time of the completion of the project (PPAR, 2011, p. 11). The Egyptian government, because of this “pending approval,” had implemented this feature in an “ad-hoc manner” (Borrower’s report, 2009). This ultimately defies the concept of “sustainability” of certain components of the HEEP project that was discussed in the different reports published by the Bank and the Egyptian Government (known as the “Borrower” to the Bank).

This probably means that inadequate analytical research was conducted on the Bank’s part not only for Egypt, but for other countries such as Yemen, especially since the “university autonomy” feature of the reform model was also unsuccessful in its Bank-supported “Higher Education Project” (p. 11). Or maybe it was because the reform was implemented using a “top-down approach” (Borrower’s report, 209, p. 47), in which it may have been assumed that upon using this mode of implementation, the stakeholders involved i.e. universities “would listen and respond” (Haddad & Demsky, 1995, p. 70), even though the system in Egypt at the time was highly centralized (and remains so). Perhaps because not all stakeholders were not benefit from such a reform (Collins & Rhoads, 2009). The Bank in the end did make the mistake of assuming that because MENA countries were experiencing similar challenges with regards to their higher education sector, that they operate within “particular social and historical contexts that shape the extent to (and ways in) which they can apply widely accepted higher education reform models” (PPAR report, 2011, p.vii).

Nonetheless, Egypt (as well as Yemen) may have taken the research presented by the Bank for granted. This is because the World Bank throughout all its reports and policy papers for Egypt, as well as other countries, as per Klees et al (2012) is constantly attempting to persuade the “reader” i.e. the governments of the developing countries, that its “policies are well founded” (p. 24), even though it was acknowledged by the Bank that it had no specific strategy for higher education and that it was a “new undertaking” for the Bank. As per Klees et al (2012), the World Bank “prides itself on being evidence- and research-based, but it is not” (p. 49). This claim was also confirmed in the work of
Collins & Rhoads (2009), in which a Bank official the authors had interviewed stated that:

research at a public institution, including most government research, or World Bank research, is strategic in its orientation. An institution does not engage in research for research sake; it engages in research because it has a strategic interest in the outcome. And very often we already know the outcome and what we do is use this research to generate what we want. So, it is not true that research results lead to better operations or management…In order to lend in areas where we currently do not, we generate the kind of research that will justify doing what we want to do (p. 190).

Thus, as per Klees et al (2012), it is probably not a good idea to have the same organisation “analyse” the country’s education sector, “identify a reform package”, provide a loan for “implementing the reform package,” and evaluate its i.e. “relevance,” “efficiency” and “efficacy” (p. 10), as was the case of the HEEP project. Hence, it is “ill conceived” to have the World Bank itself analyze the problems in education of the developing country through numerous reports and strategies and lend it money for its solution (p. 10). This is probably why the World Bank may have failed to foresee, analyse and/or remedy any potential risks before and during the implementation of the project. In addition, no group of stakeholders were held responsible for any delays and obstacles faced. Only blame was subtly hinted in the reports pertaining to the World Bank towards the Egyptian Government and vice-versa.

In addition, the Bank-supported HEEP project seems to “focus on processes rather than on pedagogy” (Klees et al, 2012, p. 29) as well as structural changes, related to institutions and/or governance. For example, in the Bank’s PPAR report (2011), it was stated how HEEP (as well as other higher education reforms that were implemented in Yemen and Jordan) “the projects were most successful at creating inputs or immediate conditions […] for improved quality”, via the usage of information technology (IT) infrastructure (achieved through the ICTP component) and its “use in teaching, learning and research” (p. 18).
However, there was no mention in the reports with regards to objectives and/or results, that actual quality with regards to i.e. teaching and learning, was achieved, however minimal, especially with regards to the Faculties of Education Project. In the Bank’s PPAR report (2011), “improved quality” was discussed for universities and technical colleges, which was rated “substantial” (p. 29). The Bank’s view on quality was with regards to “institutional changes,” the establishment of a quality assurance agency, ensuring ICT connectivity, etc. for universities in general. Perhaps because the focus or interest was on i.e. ICT rather than improving pedagogical methods, in attempting to tailor these types of faculties or universities in general, as well as technical colleges, to better suit the labor market. It was even acknowledged that the Bank, through the HEEP project, assisted in creating “credible – even if not all essential – conditions for improvements in the quality” (Annex A, p. 29), however, authentic quality regarding changing curricula, improving pedagogical methods as well as learning, were not discussed nor achieved.

As per Klees et al (2012), the World Bank has spent several years “trying to position itself as the “Knowledge Bank” (p. 55), as well as a “generator of new knowledge and a synthesizer of existing knowledge.” The Bank asserted the notion of its position as a “Knowledge Bank” in its PPAR report (2011) where it claimed that Egypt had considered it necessary at the time to “quickly build capacity to fully participate in new knowledge-based enterprises […] to produce higher level higher education graduates with skills needed for an increasingly privatized labor market” (Annex A, p. 28). As cited in the work of Collins & Rhoads (2009), this movement or concept that the Bank is attempting to promote across the globe may be defined as “academic capitalism,” or “academic capitalist knowledge regime” (p. 193).

Hence, according to the authors Collins & Rhoads (2009), the “university knowledge production” of many affluent countries has become “market-oriented” and thus inclined toward “fields that have revenue-generating potential” (p.193). Thus, as per the authors, “academic capitalism” may be recognized as “knowledge privatization” and “profit taking” wherein “institutions, inventor faculty, and corporations have claims that come
before those of the public” (p. 193). Ergo, it may be evident that built on this notion, the World Bank has prompted the Egyptian state to adopt “elements of the neo-liberal approach in its educational reforms,” (Sayed, 2006, p. 44) such as the HEEP project (as well as the projects that had preceded it).

It is worthy of noting that many of the expert educators who were interviewed, were not aware of whether there were conditions or not placed upon the provision of the HEEP loan by the Bank, while others were unable (or perhaps did not want to) specify those said terms. In addition, some experts verified there were conditions (or terms), but the nature of such conditions was not clearly identified, or was a mere speculation on their part.

As per Collins & Rhoads (2009), the “emphasis on the private sector” is usually attained through the “enforcement of conditions placed on loans to developing countries” or “prior actions” as referred to by the authors (p. 190). Loans that were provided through i.e. Structural Adjustment Programs or SAPs that were implemented in developing countries such as Egypt in the 1980s, during the Sadat era, were given on the condition that the Egyptian government “substantially decrease funding to all public-sector services,” (hyphen added by the author) with a focus on the tertiary sector (Collins & Rhoads, 2009, p. 190).

The disastrous results of the SAPs because of these loans have been discussed by renowned scholars in the literature review and in addition by Sayed (2006), in which these “soft loans” have pushed the “Third World countries” such as Egypt from “low economy” or “middle economy” countries (as per the nomenclature used by the Bank) into “indebtedness” (p. 84). While the question of whether “conditions” are still accompanied upon the provision of loans or not may have given rise to controversy, as per comments from Bank officials that were interviewed by authors Collins & Rhoads (2009), imply that the “practice of using conditions,” irrespective of what they are labeled, “exists in some form as a method for the Bank to achieve certain goals” (p.190).

This has prompted the author to question as to why the HEEP funding or loan was needed by Egypt to begin with? The 50 million dollars that was provided by the Bank to finance
the HEEP project (with an additional 10 million dollars that was provided by the
Egyptian Government) was nothing in the viewpoint of some experts in the education
sector. It was even confirmed by some of the experts interviewed that the amount of
money that went into HEEP2, known as the “Accreditation phase” (Radwan, 2016),
amounted to 100 thousand million Egyptian pounds, which was fully financed by the
Egyptian government. So, why was the Bank fund needed? It seems that Egypt was
somewhat more dependent on the World Bank’s expertise and guidance to implement the
HEEP reform project, rather than the funding itself. This dependency can be
characterized through, according to Klees et al (2012), the concept of the “transfer of best
practices” in education, which can be substituted with a term that represents the
“economics of policy borrowing” and the “power asymmetry between recipient and
donor” as “programmatic conditionality” (Klees et al, 2012, p. 10). Hence, the term
“Borrower” may have been used constantly by the Bank in all their documents for that
reason, as Egypt seemed to have been heavily reliant on the World Bank. The problem
here is that even the Egyptian Government seemed to have accepted and hence assumed
the role of the Borrower, otherwise they would not have released a report entitled “The
Borrower’s report” (2009).

It is important to note that in the case of the HEEP project, even if it was the Egyptian
government who had developed this “well-articulated reform strategy” (“Borrower’s”
report, 2009, p. 35), it was them who had requested the financial and technical assistance
and advice of the World Bank, so it seemed that the Bank had the “upper hand” after all.
For example, it was the WB who had changed the strategy of implementation during the
project implementation phase, without informing the Egyptian government. The Bank
also caused some unnecessary issues with regards to i.e. a flawed “disbursement plan,”
“tying-up of disbursement funds for loan proceeds to local funds,” and lack of funds for
the implementation of the fifth cycle of HEEPF (Borrower’s report, 2009, p 41-42) which
seemed to be beyond the control of and hence out of the hands of the MOHE.

Hence, it may be safe to assume that Egypt was to a certain extent dependent on the
World Bank with regards to mainly financing and perhaps management, as well the
“know-how” of the HEEP project. This may possibly mean that this dependency is fostered through the provision of aid or a loan in the form of a “one-way colonial relationship” between the World Bank and Egypt, where the scale seems to be tipping towards the Bank’s side with regards to power (decision making) and wealth. Nonetheless, the World Bank has chosen “the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP), as one of its most successful projects implemented worldwide” (Said, n.d. p.461). It is being argued by scholars that a “large portion of foreign aid flowing from developed to developing countries” for the funding of such higher education reforms by international organisations is being “wasted and only increases unproductive public consumption” (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p.34).

Therefore, the neoliberal philosophy, as per Collins & Rhoads (2009) persists to “undergird funding” in the Third World, even in the support for higher education, which implies that the “policies and practices contributing to asymmetrical relations” between developed and developing countries, “continue to exist” (p. 203). This seems to be applicable in the case of the World Bank supported HEEP project. Perhaps the ambitious reform project could have been more successful, if Egypt’s educational system at large was not “lacking a clear philosophy” and “suffering from an ideological vacuum” (Sayed, 2006, p. 81), which may have forced the MOHE to adopt a neoliberal like approach to the project in the first place.

In the next section of this chapter, I would like to discuss the viewpoint of the Egyptian expert educators that were interviewed, and whether they too share the ideology of the Bank or a different philosophy all together. This is will be done with reference to the World Bank-supported HEEP project.

**Educators perspective**

The findings of the responses provided by the educators were deemed overall negative, regarding the impact of the HEEP project. In this section, the analysis of the perspective of the Egyptian experts in education with regards to the World Bank-supported HEEP
project is thus important, since their viewpoints have not been shed light on in previous literature. This analysis will hopefully enable the author to comprehend their philosophy regarding Egypt’s higher education system, and if in fact from their point of view, Egypt needs the assistance and involvement of international organisations in improving and developing its higher education sector, whether through financial aid (through loans) or by other means.

I will first offer a possible justification as to why gathering a minimum sample of 15 expert educators was difficult, where the author managed to gather and interview only 11 educators. This of course will be a mere speculation on the author’s part. Then I will examine and attempt to identify which school of thought or philosophy the expert educators belong to, with regards to globalization and education. This will be done with reference to their spoken viewpoints regarding certain aspects of the HEEP project, as well as their opinion regarding its overall impact on the quality of the Egyptian higher education.

**Difficulty in Finding Participants**

It is important to note that the justification that will be discussed in this section, is nothing more than a personal opinion pertaining to that of the author only. This opinion or impression is with regards to attempting to offer a rationale as to why it was challenging for the author to find a sample for this study.

The author believes that it was not easy to find participants, firstly because some may have not had the necessary expertise to offer an objective or unbiased, or even a well-informed opinion concerning the World Bank, specifically with regards to the HEEP project. This was expressed in several of the emails sent by the different professors to the author declining to participate in the study.

Secondly, the educational experts may have been concerned that what would be revealed by them during the interviews, would not only be misconstrued but also misused by the
interviewer (which was not going to be the case had they chosen to participate). In addition, during the Mubarak era, “civil society was always controlled” (El-Sherif, 2014, p. 6), in which citizens were unable to freely express any discontent towards the system and their activities. Even after the 25th January revolution in 2011, and the 30th of June “second revolution” (Radwan, 2016, p. 14) or “military coup” (as referred to by some media publications) in 2013, the citizens, especially in the educational field, may have still felt that it was unwise to speak as the state was and is the “predominant political and social actor in the country” (El-Sherif, 2014, p. 6). Perhaps the experts’ past encounters with the system influenced their decision, especially since the previous regime of the country restricted “political activity” and “freedom of expression” (Radwan, 2016, p. 13). Or, they may have been cautious in talking, so as not to jeopardize any future World Bank projects that are still to occur in Egypt, upon criticizing or even discussing their views about the Bank. An unknown conflict of interest may also have been a reason for the experts not wanting to participate in this study. Unfortunately, this rationale is based on an assumption made by the author, and nothing else, hence the author cannot prove or deny this assumption due to lack of availability of evidence. Finally, even though a few experts had agreed to participate in the study, they were in fact in the midst of a very busy schedule, and thus did not get around to participating in the study via email.

In the next part, I would like to offer possible philosophies which I believe may pertain to some of the educators who were interviewed. Some of these philosophies were discussed in the literature review in great detail.

**Possible Philosophies of the Expert Educators:**

This discussion is again merely from the author’s viewpoint. It is worthy of noting that most or all the expert educators interviewed, were highly critical of the government (whether at that time or now) in one aspect or another i.e. for their mindset; acting slow or in acting to begin with; for being reluctant in seeing projects all the way through; or in providing funding for the HEEP and HEEP2 project; and/or simply not caring and hence, not prioritizing education over other sectors. The experts also recognize that education is
a national priority in Egypt, which is stated in the Egyptian constitution, but may not have been acted upon. In addition, some experts were hesitant to fully disclose their opinion about certain components of the HEEP project, whether they were directly involved in the reform or not. Nonetheless, the author was able to identify three possible and apparent school of thoughts, amongst the interviewees. Some of the philosophies do overlap to a certain extent as per some scholars, but have been discussed separately to facilitate the process of understanding.

A. Hyperglobalists

A professor (Professor 1) deemed the entire project from a negative perspective, again due to the involvement of the government. He encouraged that “ethics”, “conscientiousness” and “trust”, as well as using “scientific methods”, be employed upon implementing such educational reforms. He thus encouraged forming partnership with the World Bank and other agencies, but was highly critical of the Egyptian government’s conduct during the implementation of the project “The government. The people who pay, the people who receive this money, because they use the money on themselves, a big part of it and the people know that and they don’t talk about it.”

The expert deemed how the project was implemented at the institutional level as well, where he stated that

the university now, the administration offices, like accounting, deans, and vice deans, these are all administrative entities, who are taking over the scientific and the academic rules. These departments and those entities are supposed to serve the academic side, but what has happened now is that the academic side is serving the administration, which has destroyed the university.

This viewpoint however, may mean becoming even more dependent on foreign agencies upon executing educational reforms and relinquishing any power from the nation state in
such affairs. This point of view coincides with what was discussed in the work of Collins and Roads (2009), where they had interviewed a high-ranking official in the Ugandan Ministry of Education, who stated that the “World Bank is perpetuating colonialism. If you make somebody dependent, the person will never be free, because when I’m dependent on you I must agree with you at all times” (p. 196).

Another expert (Professor 3) had expressed during the interview, with reference to Poland as an example, how privatizing almost 90 percent of their once public higher education system vastly improved it. Hence, he seemed to encourage the act of privatization of the higher education system in Egypt, as the government is unable to provide the funds for a high quality higher education. Education according to the expert is a “national priority, it really is, and the government is the prime responsible of this, the sole responsible for the education of its people, so there has to be solutions for that and those solutions cannot be postponed.”

He also seems to perceive higher education as an “investment”, rather than a “commodity” or a “service”. Terms such as “return on investment” and “investing in people” were used by the expert. This terminology, according to the literature review and the work of several scholars i.e. Williams (2009), seems to align with the hyperglobalist school of thought, where they depend on concepts of human capital and “neoliberal economic” theories, as new forms in the formulation of educational policies. However, the “ill-intent” of the neoliberal or World Bank philosophy, was not apparent anywhere in the words of the expert.

While Professor 8 blamed the mindset of the government as well as the society, and even acknowledged that “management is weak and we allow the less educated to take control of the affairs of our country”. This led to the expert advocating for Egyptian officials to follow the ideology of the World Bank, in which he stated that “we need to be authentic and implement the school of thought that we learnt from the World Bank, without being pretentious”.

Both Professors’ (3 and 8) outlook on the overall impact of the HEEP project was generally positive.
B. Sceptic

Professor 4 criticized the Egyptian government, in addition to the World Bank. He thought there was nothing to gain from the project except the ability to produce good documentation. He believes that without the help of external forces, Egypt can help reform its Faculties of Education in order to improve the quality of higher education graduates, and thus help them acquire skills to better suit the labor market. That is why the author speculates that the expert’s school of thought pertains to the Sceptics, as discussed in the literature review by Solakoglu (2016) and Held and Mcgrew (2003).

The professor’s view seems to still encourage a “neoliberal element” towards the role of higher education, despite the fact that the expert wants Egypt to improve itself by itself and despite the expert heavily criticizing the World Bank’s approach. This is because the expert then suggested that “external” assistance may be needed in training enrollees and/or graduates of the “reformed” graduates of faculties of education.

C. Transformationalists

The transformationalist stance or as referred to in literature, the “liberal” perspective,” is a moderate perspective with regards to globalization, in comparison to hyperglobalists and skeptics. “The transformationalist stance shows a realistic approach to globalization” (PARJANADZE, 2009, p. 84). This school of thought does not attempt to “oppose the existence of global trends, but rather tries to face the dilemmas it poses” (p. 84). This approach seemed to apply to a certain extent to the experts who were interviewed, which seems to coincide with the work of scholars presented in the literature review, pertaining to Williams (2009) and Bray (2005).
One educational expert (Professor 7) revealed in the interview how optimistic he is with regards to international cooperation with other agencies, including the World Bank. He evaluated the project as putting Egypt on the right track towards improvement, hence, he had several positive things to say about the HEEP project. He asserted how the HEEP project was a government designed project and an Egyptian based reform, which was not influenced by external forces. Hence, it was Egypt’s project, but it was implemented with the help of the World Bank.

Another educational expert (Professor 6) acknowledged the occurrence of the process of globalization. He asserted that as Egyptians, “we are not living on an isolated island and we need to keep up with the world, with regards to international standards.” With regards to the policy recommendations of the expert, an advocacy for internationalization, for the “mobility of students” and “mutual recognition” as well as “dual” and “joined degrees.” His overall take on the project was good. However, there may be “neoliberal elements” pertaining to the expert’s opinion, as he had voiced the following thought about the Egyptian workforce

Egypt is a country that exports certain services and we have about 8 million Egyptians working in the Gulf areas and they bring us about 18 billion dollars a year of revenue. And I don't think there is any other…Egyptian product that can come even near that quantity.

Hence, the expert views Egyptian graduates as a product, an “exportable product” and the acquisition of skills by that “product” is vital. This is to ensure that the product is “exportable” overseas, (not just in the Egyptian market), to generate a great income or revenue for Egypt. Ergo, the expert regards education as an “investment.”

Other experts seemed to pertain to the transformational school of thought, but with less of a neoliberal approach and more of a critical eye towards the project. For example, Professor 2 recognized the potential of the HEEP project and even called it “ambitious,” but admitted that the project’s impact was not great, especially with regards to the quality, “it was the seed of quality but not the fruit.” Hence, the overall impact of the project from the expert’s perspective, was negative. The government was highly
criticized by the expert for the setback of the possible success that could have been achieved by the HEEP project.

Another expert (Professor 9) acknowledged that were components that were not as successful, i.e. faculties of education and the technical colleges component, as the latter project did not match the needs of the labor markets. The expert also recognizes the World Bank is a bank, and may serve mainly its best interest, hence, the expert did not always see eye to eye with their decisions. Nonetheless, the professor deemed the overall project as good.

An educational expert (Professor 10) also confirmed the notion of the World Bank as a Bank, but was extremely critical of the way the government carried out itself during the project, especially with regards to is “rigid bureaucracies.” The cooperation with the Bank enabled the overcoming of the “hurdle” of such bureaucracies. So, the Bank was not criticized by the expert, even though the expert seemed to be fully aware and acknowledge some of their “intentions” attributed to their mindset. However, it seemed as if the Egyptian government was blamed for not “caring” at the time of the implementation of the reform or even now. Furthermore, with the recent turn of political events and the constant change in political figures/government officials, things kept coming to a halt with regards to the HEEP project. Hence, the major setbacks that had resulted were the fault of the government, from the expert’s point of view. The expert deemed the project to be less of a success than was anticipated.

It is important to note, as per Ginsburg & Megahed (2011), that the process of “policy borrowing” through this reform was requested by the Egyptian Government from the World Bank, but the Egyptian government officials and educators were not a “pawn” in the process. This was confirmed one way or another by some of the Egyptian education experts during the interviews, and the majority were “politically astute” in expressing their points of view.

A third category of philosophies was identified by the author, pertaining to one expert interviewed. This will be discussed as follows:
D. Alternative Philosophies

Only one expert (Professor 11) had a different philosophy all together, which seems to pertain to the philosophy of “Liberation education.” This is because as per the expert, the philosophy of the World Bank hopes to see all of the higher education sector and/or education in alignment with the needs of the labor market. However, the expert deems this philosophy and does not believe that this is the purpose of higher education, where she expressed that

higher education is a much broader learning experience which allows you to grow as a citizen, as an individual and universities are actually hubs for large societal changes, they are hubs for research, for experimentation […] labor market which is not at all the paradigm I would like to abide by.

The expert’s view on the philosophy of the world Bank seems to coincide with what was discussed in the work Freire (1970) and other well-known scholars, including that of Sayed (2006), he articulated how “these concepts dehumanize people and place them in the same category as raw materials such as minerals” (as cited in Sayed, 2006, p. 57).

Hence, as per the expert, “critical pedagogy” is what is more important than seeking aid from international organisations, through “internal dialogue” and “internal clarity” of the Egyptian government officials, with regards to what is truly needed in not just the higher education sector, but education as a whole. The view of this expert towards the outcome of the project was evidently negative. The expert also pointed out that there was mention and thus no acknowledgement of formal and non-formal education, with regards to quality, especially since some rural areas have no choice, depending on the availability of schools or institutions within a certain governorate or district. Hence, “different forms of learning” within communities need to be considered, from a human rights perspective.

After shedding light on the possible philosophies of the interviewed Egyptian educational experts, I would like to briefly discuss the problems that currently exist in the higher
education system of Egypt. These problems will be highlighted with the help of the responses offered by the educational experts.

**Problems that persist in the HE system (post World Bank-supported HEEP)**

As per Radwan (2016), Egypt as well as its higher education system, is at a “crossroad.” This may be due to the recent political turbulence that the country has experienced, which has ultimately led to certain components, as was confirmed by the educational experts, or sustainable mechanisms of the HEEP project to involuntarily perform “less successfully” than had been anticipated or even “collapse.” The HEEP phase that was supported by the World Bank, which was referred to as the “Quality phase” (from 2002-2007) by Radwan, (2016) did not only suffer. This may also have been applicable to certain projects pertaining to the HEEP2 or “Accreditation phase,” as named by Radwan (2016) in his work, which was implemented from 2007-2012.

As per Ahmed (2015), due to the “limited institutional capacity” and the “design” of the “governance structures”, Egyptian higher education institutions are not “well positioned to deliver high quality instruction” (p. 134). So, the quality of higher education in Egypt and governance of their higher education institutions (confirmed by experts that it is still highly centralized in nature) continue to suffer, despite the implementation of the World Bank-supported HEEP project. As confirmed by the educational experts, due to the “bureaucratic regulations” of the system, universities do not enjoy autonomy. Hence, as per Ahmed (2015), “lack of academic freedom” persists as a result of such a system, as well as “lack of accountability and transparency” (p. 134). The latter point seems to coincide with the problem identified by one of the educational experts, regarding student-faculty relationships.

In addition, one of the educational experts (Professor 10) had confirmed that problems with regards to equity within the system remain to persist, with respect to different governorates and such problems have not been addressed by the government.
Furthermore, the government failing to take into account the different types of education within the current quality assurance is another problem, that was identified by another expert (Professor 11). Within the reports of the World Bank concerning the HEEP project, no mention of “life-long learning” was discussed. Not only that, but methods of teaching and learning are still attributed to the concept of “rote-learning,” which was mentioned by several educational experts. Hence, the overall quality with regards to teaching and learning persists. So, unfortunately, quite a number of problems persist post-HEEP project, in which all have been confirmed in the work of Ahmed (2015). The final stage of the Egyptian financed HEEP or the “Excellence and Internationalisation phase” as per Radwan (2016), which was to be implemented during the time-period of 2012 till 2017. Whether any of the persisting problems will be addressed and hence improved, is still a question that awaits an answer, as per Ahmed (2015).
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations

The purpose of this qualitative research was to examine and explore the impact of the World Bank supported Higher Education Enhancement Project. Problems continue with regards to quality as well as impact despite the implementation of many reforms in Egypt’s higher education system in the past. This was still evident even after the disclosure of the World Bank supported HEEP project. Thus, this study explored the impact of the HEEP initiative on the quality of Egypt’s tertiary sector, from the viewpoint of Egyptian educational experts, in addition to the viewpoint of the World Bank and the Egyptian government.

The theoretical perspective presented in this paper offers a possible explanation from the author’s point of view, as to why Egypt has maintained a long-term relationship with international organisations, including if not mainly the World Bank. The perspective entitled the International Education Development Framework, covered and incorporated several theories in accordance with the perspectives (and critique) of many renowned Western scholars such as Beech, Kendall and Williams, towards the activities and philosophies of international organisations. This prompted the author to question what is the viewpoint of the renowned Egyptian educators regarding the former HEEP project.

The methods used were Document and Policy Analysis, of both official Bank reports and the Egyptian official report as well as WB documents, that had discussed the HEEP project. This was to present the viewpoints of both the World Bank and the Egyptian Government (the Ministry of Higher Education). Individual Interviews were also conducted to give a chance to the expert educators in Egypt to express their voice on the impact of the HEEP project. Data was collected over a period of approximately two months. Interviews were conducted with eleven Egyptian educators, and these experts were selected using the purposeful sampling in addition to the snowball sampling. Semi-structured interviews were used.
The findings from the document and policy analysis suggest that the World Bank’s viewpoint regarding the HEEP project was “moderately satisfactory”, while the “Borrower’s” (Egypt’s) point of view was given a rating “highly satisfactory”. It is noteworthy to mention that the official reports did not hold anyone accountable, nor did any group of stakeholders take official responsibility, for any hindrances that occurred before, during or even after the project came to a closure. In addition, several inconsistencies were found as a result of the policy analysis of the HEEP project.

Findings of the field work suggest that most of the experts perceived the HEEP project to have had only some degree of success in achieving quality, in comparison to what was expected by some of the experts. This finding nonetheless went against the expectations of the author and the viewpoint of many Western scholars, such as Beech and Kendall, regarding the role and critique of international organisations. The information from the experts was obtained by transcription of the interviews and its analysis, using the thematic approach. The experts held the Egyptian Government responsible for the HEEP project not achieving quality. However, hardly any critique was expressed towards the Bank itself. It is unknown to the author was to why that was the case. Perhaps the past involvement of the Professors in the HEEP project was a factor? However, the experts did not express whether they did benefit personally from the project or not. Nonetheless, the policy recommendations that were offered by the experts for future World Bank supported projects, were numerous yet different, which may be attributed to the experts having different philosophies.

The author also questions where exactly was and is the Egyptian voice (Hozayin, 2018) as their voice and opinion seemed to have been “faint” in comparison to Western scholars and the WB, and why have the experts not been given a chance before to express their thoughts regarding the impacts of the HEEP project before? This study may have given the educators an opportunity to voice their expert opinion, and for the author (as well as policy makers, other educators and practitioners regionally and globally) to benefit from their expertise and knowledge.
It is important to note that as the author was finalizing her thesis, it came to her knowledge that a new World Bank project called the “Supporting Egypt Education Reform Project,” Report No: PIDISDSC23072, is to be launched in Egypt in September 2018 (and was approved in November 2017), (World Bank PID/ISDS, 2017). This project in fact seems to be very similar to the concept of the Education Enhancement Project that was supported by the Bank and implemented in Egypt, in 1996. The cost that will be financed by the Bank’s IBRD for the project will be 500 million US dollars, as specified in the PID/ISDS (2017) of the World Bank. This project was drafted even though the Egyptian Government is still to pay the remaining amount of the HEEP loan in August 2019, which may place a burden on Egypt’s financial resources, especially since the loans are paid back with interest.

The author is in turn intrigued as to how the 500 million dollars will be distributed (upon the implementation of the project), and why this large amount of money is needed to implement this new WB supported project? The components of the project (and the estimated cost) as stated in the Bank’s PID/ISDS (2017) are as follows: “Component One: Early Childhood Education and Foundational Learning (US$ 60 Million estimated cost)” (p. 11), “Component Two: Effective Teachers and Education Leaders (US$ 70 Million estimated cost)” (p. 12), “Component Three: Comprehensive Assessment Reform for Improved Student Learning (US$ 120 Million estimated cost)” (p. 12), “Component Four: Enhancing Service Delivery through Connected Education Systems in Education (US$ 200 million estimated cost)” (p. 12) and “Component Five: Project Management (US$ 35 – 50 million estimated cost)” (p. 13).

This is especially since Professor R. Hozayin (personal communication, 2018) stated the following concern regarding the new WB supported project that will be launched in Egypt

The main issue is that the external agencies have their own agendas (it also must be remembered that the WB has heavy connections to the US). The recipient country does not always have expertise equal to representing

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3 This document was sent by email to the author, by her thesis supervisor, Professor Nagwa Megahed
4 The personal communication was via email between the author and Professor Russanne Hozayin
their nation's views on an equal footing with the experts from the donor. So, the agenda of the donor (most often) "wins", with little "voice" from the recipient nation. When this dominance occurs at the same time as policy dominance from international organizations (as in the case of education) and the national policy is highly centralized and top-down (as has long been the case in Egypt), implementation and sustainability will continue to be both problematic and of questionable value.

Hence, this led Professor Russanne Hozayin (2018) through personal communication with the author, to speculate the following, “what is the risk of these loans?” The WB did not regularly conduct risk analysis during the time of the HEEP project. Now the Bank has started to conduct such analysis pertaining to risks, and they have “projected that the recent pre-university loan to Egypt is ‘high risk’”. So, this has led the Professor R. Hoazyin (personal communication, May 12, 2018), and in turn the author, to question “what is the implication of this risk for the success of any WB educational project (including the sustainability of its programs)?” In addition, will anyone be held accountable, on the Bank’s side and/or the Egyptian side, if things do not go according to plan? This may not be known, until after the closure of the project on the 1st of September 2023 (World Bank PAD, 2018).

Finally, this analysis has made the author question and request more research to be conducted to examine the perceived impact of the new WB project, that is yet to be implemented. This has further compelled the author to question why Egypt has maintained and still maintains a long-term “dependent relationship” with The World Bank (a “post-colonial master” perhaps)? This is especially with the persistence of the Bank through its many reports, that better education will eventually reduce poverty, even though the reality so far has been contrary to that belief. The “optimistic” viewpoint of the Bank seems to be contradictory to Sayed’s (2000) opinion, as “years of development assistance in its various forms have not managed to eradicate poverty from the world” (Sayed, 2000, p. 83).
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Guide

Interview questions

1. Age
   30 - 40
   41 - 50
   51 - 60
   61-70

2. Area of specialization
   Humanities
   Sciences

3. Institution
   Private
   Public

4. Academic Rank
   Assistant
   Associate
   Professor
   Other (Please specify)
5. Leadership position
   
   Director of initiative
   
   Unit or center
   
   Chair of department
   
   Vice dean
   
   Dean
   
   Other (Please specify)

6. Do you believe that Egypt needs help from international organisations, such as the World Bank, in the reform of their higher education? Why? Please explain your answer.

7. What do you know about the WB supported HEEP?

8. Do you think the implementation of HEEP was necessary? Why?

9. Do you think Egypt needs loans from WB to implement such reforms? Why or why not?

10. Are you aware of the terms and conditionality of the loans provided by the WB? If so, could you tell me your opinion regarding such terms and conditions? Why do you think such terms are necessary/unnecessary? Who do you think they benefit and/or serve?

11. Have you participated in the project activity? If so, how? For how long were you a part of the project? At any point, did you have any concerns regarding the project?

12. If Yes/No, what do you think is/are the most direct impact or obvious change(s) that resulted from the HEEP initiatives? From your perspective, what would you consider as main changes in HE policies and/or practices resulted from the implementation of HEEP in Egypt? Please give examples.
13. To what extent was the implementation of HEEP in helping to improve the relevance of HE to the needs of the labor market?

14. To what extent did HEEP help improve the quality of (teaching, learning, management and leadership) for faculty, students, and staff in HE institutions in Egypt? Please give examples.

15. To what extent did HEEP help improve in the quality assurance and accreditation of higher education institutions in Egypt? Please give examples.

16. What would you like to add/mention as additional/other positive or negative impact of the World Bank-HEEP on higher education in Egypt?

17. What are your recommendations for improving HE in Egypt and its potential/future World Bank-supported reforms?
Appendix 2: IRB Approval

To: Merhan Rasmy  
Cc: Dena Riad & Sulma Serry  
From: Atta Gebril, Chair of the IRB  
Date: August 8, 2017  
Re: Approval of study

This is to inform you that I reviewed your revised research proposal entitled “The World Bank’s Support to Higher Education Reform in Egypt: Educators’ Perspective on its Impact for Quality and Equality” and determined that it required consultation with the IRB under the “expedited” heading. As you are aware, the members of the IRB suggested certain revisions to the original proposal, but your new version addresses these concerns successfully. The revised proposal used appropriate procedures to minimize risks to human subjects and that adequate provision was made for confidentiality and data anonymity of participants in any published record. I believe you will also make adequate provision for obtaining informed consent of the participants.

This approval letter was issued under the assumption that you have not started data collection for your research project. Any data collected before receiving this letter could not be used since this is a violation of the IRB policy.

Please note that IRB approval does not automatically ensure approval by CAPMAS, an Egyptian government agency responsible for approving some types of off-campus research. CAPMAS issues are handled at AUC by the office of the University Counsellor, Dr. Amr Salama. The IRB is not in a position to offer any opinion on CAPMAS issues, and takes no responsibility for obtaining CAPMAS approval.

This approval is valid for only one year. In case you have not finished data collection within a year, you need to apply for an extension.

Thank you and good luck.

Dr. Atta Gebril  
IRB chair, The American University in Cairo  
2046 HUSS Building  
T: 02-26151919  
Email: agebril@aucegypt.edu

Institutional Review Board  
The American University in Cairo  
AUC Avenue, P.O. Box 74  
New Cairo 11835, Egypt.  
tel 20.2.2615.1000  
fax 20.2.27957565  
Email: auirb@aucegypt.edu
Appendix 3: CAPMAS APPROVAL
Appendix 4: Informed Consent Forms (English and Arabic)

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
Institutional Review Board

Documentation of Informed Consent for Participation in Research Study

Project Title: The World Bank’s Support to Higher Education Reform in Egypt: Educators’ Perspective on its Impact for Quality and Equality

Principal Investigator: Merhan Rasmy, email: merhanr@aucegypt.edu

*You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the research is to provide an understanding of, to analyze, and to evaluate the Bank’s HEEP that was implemented in Egypt, and the findings may be published, presented, or both. The expected duration of your participation is 30 minutes or more i.e. an hour, depending on the interview.

The procedures of the research will be as follows interviews will be conducted with educational experts depending on their time and availability, where the questions asked will be open-ended and the structure of the qualitative interviews will probably be semi-structured.

*There may be benefits to you from this research.

Feasible policy recommendations will be offered as an outcome of this paper from the perspective of said scholars and/or educators, to avoid making the same previous errors, which will ultimately benefit: policy makers, governments and practitioners as well as educators, regionally and globally.

*The information you provide for purposes of this research is confidential.
*Questions about the research, my rights should be directed to Merhan Rasmy at 01009648739.

*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Signature
________________________________________

Printed Name
________________________________________

Date
________________________________________
استمارة موافقة مسبقة للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية

عنوان البحث: دعم البنك الدولي لاصلاح التعليم في مصر: وجهة نظر خبراء التعليم العالي بشأن تأثيره على الجودة والمساواة

الباحث الرئيسي: ميرهان رسمي
 البريد الالكتروني: merhanr@aucegypt.edu
 الهاتف: 01009648739

ائت مدعو للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية عن دعم البنك الدولي لاصلاح التعليم في مصر: وجهة نظر خبراء التعليم العالي بشأن تأثيره على الجودة والمساواة

هدف الدراسة هو تقييم وتحليل مشروع HEEP المقدم من البنك الدولي والذي تم تنفيذته في مصر.

نتائج البحث ستنشر في دوريه متخصص أو مؤتمر علمي أو ربما كليهما.

المدة المتوقعة للمشاركة في هذا البحث 30-60 دقيقة.
إجراءات الدراسة تشتمل على جمع البيانات عن طريق إجراء المقابلات المفتوحة مع خبراء التعليم العالي بناءً على مدى توافرهم.

الاستفادة المتوقعة من المشاركة في البحث: الخروج من البحث بتصديقات مجدية لتفادي الوقوع في الأخطاء السابقة والتي بدورها ستعود بالنفع على متخذي القرار وأعضاء هيئة التدريس على الصعيد الإقليمي والدولي.

السرية واحترام الخصوصية: المعلومات التي ستدلى بها في هذا البحث سوف تكون سرية.

أي أسئلة متعلقة بهذه الدراسة أو حقوق المشاركين فيها يجب أن توجه إلى ميرهان رسمي ورقم هاتفه: 01009648739.

إن المشاركة في هذه الدراسة ماهي إلا عمل تطوعي، حيث أن الامتناع عن المشاركة لا يتضمن أي عقوبات أو فقدان أي مزايا تحق لك. ويمكنك أيضا التوقف عن المشاركة في أي وقت من دون عقوبة أو فقدان لهذه المزايا.

الامضاء: ...................................................

اسم المشارك: ...................................................

التاريخ: ...................................................