http://hdl.handle.net/10526/89 2013-06-19T22:04:33Z http://hdl.handle.net/10526/193 Oral History Interview of Tarek Ali Hassan Hassan, Tarek Dr. Tarek Ali Hassana is medical professor at the Al-Azhar University, and honorary president of the ZenabKamel Hassan Foundation of Humanistic Development(ZKH) . ZKH was founded in 1993 in honor of ZenabKamel Hassan. A micro-credit development programme was started in Imbaba. The focus of the foundation is the development of women through literacy, health, and SME programs. . The interviews with Dr. Tarek Ali Hassan are rich in information in various topics, such as the sixties student's movements, closed inbreeding universities in Egypt, lack of scientific research, and the micro-credit project in the ZKH foundation, to mention a few. The second interview provides a broad base for understanding the roots of the idea of holistic development, and Dr. Hassan and ZenabKamel Hassan's work in Dingway. The interview covers work in the Dingway area, development in agriculture and social work, brief mention of Fouad University beginnings, pioneering spirit of 1920s, Holistic development work foundation in Dr. Tarek'schildhood , and Misdirection in international development work In the third interview, Dr. Hassan shares his views on the sixties movements, and his experiences during the time with respect to several issues; such as, Relationship between the East and West, and the importance of dialogue between them, Theater as a tool for social change, Anti-psychiatry movement, Theater productions performed, “Crisis” as a part of normal development, Instigating change at Al-Azhar and the challenges faced ,Religious movement causes deprivation of culture, Lack of curiosity, or a curiosity curbed by political, social, religious structure and Group dynamics and interactive communication between leader/follower or teacher/student The fourth interview is rich in information regarding a plethora of topics; for example, closed inbreeding universities, problems in scientific research in Egypt, reversal of roles of leaders/followers and faculty/administration, lack of recognition of the importance of scientific research, brief mention of Islamic renaissance movement, role of women in Egyptian history to modern times, role of mass media for facilitating social change, President J.F.K. brings hope to the world-poem by Dr. Ali Hassan, and The “Demise of the Matriarch” The fifth interview focus on the ZKH foundation for humanistic development and the work with micro-credit. Dr. Hassan provides details of the structure of the foundation in regards to the micro-credit program, results from the program, challenges facing NGO's in Egypt and issues of funding. 2010-02-28T13:32:46Z http://hdl.handle.net/10526/191 Oral History Interview of Samir Amin Amin, Samir When he arrived in Egypt in 1957, Amin was hired at the Mouassassa Iqtisadiya (Economic Organization), a public agency created in 1957 to manage the assets in which the government had a share. The public sector had indeed expanded in 1957, following the nationalization of the British and French economic interests. At the Mouassassa, which was directed by Sedki Soliman, Amin was attached to the research unit: his work consisted in studying the past history of the major sectors of the Egyptian economy, the problems they faced, and their outlook for future development. He was working under the supervision of his friend, Ismail Sabri Abdallah, who was in charge of orienting the economic decisions of the Organisation. Both Amin and Sabri Abdallah were also active members of the Egyptian Communist Party. According to Amin, there was no authentic economic planning in Egypt. The Free Officers did not have a clear vision of the economic policies to be followed nor did they have any solid understanding of economics. The Army officers and young technocrats which were appointed at the head of the newly created public sector also lacked the vision. And the regime did not turn to good account the knowledge and experience of communist and liberal economists. They were marginalized in different ways. Economic decisions were thus dispersed between numerous institutions (the ministry of Finance, the ministry of Planning, the Economic Organization, the Central Bank, and the ministry of Industry …), each one functioning according to its own logic, without any central coordination. These institutions, considered separately, also suffered, at various degrees, from lack of coordination and the absence of a comprehensive vision of economic development. The ministry of industry, for instance, was dominated by opposing clans, each one pushing its own project. And the ministry could implement its projects without any external supervision, since it had its own source of financing: the Industrial Bank The ministry of Planning which was supposed to propose a vision for the development of the public sector did not play its role properly. The experts working at the ministry relied essentially on technical models for economic development. But there was no political and social vision underlying these models. In addition, the ministry did not have the clout to obtain the implementation of the projects it was proposing. The ministry of Finance, on its side, was reluctant to finance the development of industry, and the Central Bank was mainly concerned with financial equilibrium. Amin argues that himself and Ismail Sabri Abdallah were conscious of these problems and attempted to correct them, through their work at the Mouassassa. But this proved impossible since it was the whole system that needed to be changed. As a result, the Five-Year Plan covering the period between 1960 and 1965 consisted merely in a series of projects, without any comprehensive design unifying them. According to Amin, one of the main reasons for this failure was the lack of democracy. Nasser liquidated the two political forces (the liberal bourgeoisie and the communists) who had real political weight in Egyptian political life, and each its own social and political project: this led to a political vacuum. Amin also argues that the Nasserite regime was, in its essence, a national bourgeois project and that the economic policies carried out by the regime never aimed at transforming Egypt into a socialist country. Therefore the transition from Nasser to Sadat did not constitute a real rupture, regarding the nature of the regime. It was simply a transition, in Amin’s words, from “Capitalism without capitalists to Capitalism with capitalists”. 2010-02-28T07:57:15Z http://hdl.handle.net/10526/159 Oral History Interview of Fawzy Mansour Mansour, Fawzy Fawzi Mansour is considered to be one of the most prominent Marxist economists of his generation. Although he did not play a direct role in the economic policies undertaken during the Nasserite era, his account enriches our knowledge of this period since he offers a critical view of this experience. Mansour graduated from university in 1945 and completed his PhD at Edinburg University (U.K) on The Development of Underdeveloped Countries within the Framework of an International Economy. In the early 1950s, Mansour taught economics at Cairo University; and was part of the campaign to defend the democracy and independence of the University, against the encroachments of the Free Officers regime. As a Marxist economist, he was also very critical of the new economic policies led by the new regime. According to him, the Free Officers, in their different tendencies (from right wing to left wing), did not have a clear vision of the economic policies to be followed nor did they have any solid understanding of economics. The experts, which were appointed in the new economic institutions (such as the Permanent Council for National Production), led policies encouraging foreign investments in the Egyptian economy. In response, Mansour held a series of lectures in 1954 attacking these new economic policies. He criticised them on the grounds that the economic development of Egypt could only come through a concrete industrialization policy. He also argued that historically foreign capital had never contributed to the development of Egyptian industries; and that on the contrary, it had largely contributed in turning Egypt, into what he called a “cotton farm” for the global textile industry of Europe. According to Mansour, this series of lectures was the main reason behind his exclusion from Cairo University in 1954. In the following years, Mansour refused to hold any position in the state apparatus, choosing instead to work as a lawyer. It is during this same period, that he tightened his links with the communist movement in Egypt. However during the period of 1955-1956 a series of events happed in Egypt – the construction of the high dam, the nationalization of the Suez Canal… – that led him to become friendlier towards the regime. Indeed, Mansour started writing articles supporting the nascent policies of economic planning, for the magazine Al Massaa, founded by Khaled Mohi el-Din. In 1958, at the request of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mansour was asked by the director of Bank Misr Ahmed Fou’ad, to head the research unit of the Bank. He declined the offer because he was asked to swear allegiance to Nasser. Fawzi Mansour was not present during the process of elaboration and implementation of the first Five-Year plan, as he was imprisoned, between 1959 and 1964, along with many other Egyptian communists. But in 1965, in the context of growing economic problems, he was asked, at the request of Nasser, to write a report on the economic situation in Egypt. Nasser was, in that period, moving towards the left. Although Mansour was favourable to economic planning, he was critical of states’ pattern of industrialization. According to him, the emphasis had been put, during the first five years plan, on consumption-goods industries, rather than on capital goods. He explains this general orientation by the background of the ruling elite, which came from the middle and petty bourgeoisie and thus aspired to consumerism. One notable example is that of transportation: rather than developing a comprehensive public-transportation system, the public sector started producing private cars, which was economically speaking an irrational choice. Priority should have been given to basic needs industries producing for the masses. Moreover, the implementation of the first Five-Year plan was affected by the fact that the plan was implemented by the same personnel that was running the enterprises before their nationalizations. Indeed, many of the owners and associates of the nationalized enterprises, who once had resisted the nationalization policies, were now running their old businesses as public-sector directors and employees. Fawzi Mansour opens his second interview by analyzing the reasons behind his opposition to the regime in the late 1950s, which led to his arrest in 1959. Mansour was opposed to Egypt’s unity with Syria, which he viewed as a way to reinforce the baathists in Syria against the strong communist movement. On a more national level, he was against the regime’s attempt to rely on the bourgeoisie to implement the objectives it had fixed in terms of industrialisation, during the early phases of economic planning. The government tried to cooperate with capitalists in most issues relating to the national economy. Mansour considered that this attempt was destined for failure given the nature of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, which tended to take on projects which realized quick benefits, without taking many risks. Mansour spent five years in jail (1959-1964) along with many other Egyptian communists. During this period, they were kept informed of the political developments outside, through the press and the radio. When, in 1961 and 1962, the nationalization policies were launched, a number of communists in jail started supporting the regime, considering these policies as a step towards the socialist transformation they aspired for. Although he supported nationalization policies, Mansour did not become a full supporter of the regime. He believed that without democracy and free speech any step forward was doomed to failure. He points to the fact that even though Nasser repressed communists for years, he was, to a certain extent influenced by their ideas and thought. He read their writing and followed their debates. Mansour believes that the launching of nationalization policies in the early 1960s was partly due to this ascendancy. When he was released in 1964, he joined the Tanzim Tali’i, a secret organisation inside the Socialist Union (al-Ittiahad Ishtiraki). In this specific context, he was asked in 1965, on the request of Gamal Abdel Nasser, to write a report on the economic situation of Egypt just after the first Five-Year plan. In the report, entitled Akhtar al- Wad’ el-Iqtissadi al-Rahin wa Kaif Yuajah (The dangers of the present economic situation and how to handle them), Mansour underlined the problems facing the Egyptian economy and made recommendations for the second Five-Year plan, which was to be launched that same year. Discussing the report, Mansour points out that the goal fixed by the government, which was to double the national income in a period of ten year, was not in itself unrealistic. On a theoretical level, it was possible for an underdeveloped country to achieve this goal. But in the specific case of Egypt, this was impossible because of the lack of democracy. The elaboration and the implementation of the plan required a certain degree of conviction and participation from workers and employees. In practice, they were not given the chance to participate at any level in the decision making processes. Moreover, the economic decisions were not guided by the interests of the working classes. In this respect, Mansour draws an interesting comparison between Mohamed Ali’s experiment in modernization and Nasser’s political project. Mohamed Ali began his rule by liquidating the nascent bourgeoisie, which could have shared and supported his project, relying instead on the state bureaucracy. Similarly, Nasser refused to allow any share of power to the classes that could have supported his project: the working class and the peasantry. This factor explains the rapid collapse of the two regimes. Analysing the consequences of the 1967 defeat, he argues that Nasser feared that the bourgeoisie had taken advantage of the destabilization of the regime to turn against him. He thus chose to make concessions to this class by shifting the economic policies. He, for instance, appointed in the government, right wing politicians, such as Abdel Aziz Higazi. Mansour finally speaks about his experience at the Institute for Socialist Studies (Ma’had al dirasat al-Ishtirakiya), where he taught economic s for several years. 2010-02-22T13:39:06Z http://hdl.handle.net/10526/136 Oral History Interview of Ibrahim El-Issawy El-Issawy, Ibrahim In this interview, Issawi attempted to retrace the history of the NPI. Founded in 1960, its role was to assist the Ministry of Planning by conducting research work in different areas of the economy. Issawi mentions, indeed, that the Institute elaborated the first input-output tables for the Egyptian economy. It acquired early in the 1960s the first computer to be introduced in the civil sector in Egypt (IBM 1620). The Institute also aimed at training government officials and young graduates in economic planning, since Egypt was lacking specialists in that specific area. The Institute gathered Egyptian economists from different tendencies, (from right to left wing) like Nazih Deif, Mohamed Mahmoud el-Imam, Salah Hamed and Ismail Sabri Abdallah who was appointed as the head of the Institute in 1969. It also benefited from the knowledge and experience of foreign experts who were sent to Egypt during the implementation of the first Five-Year plan (like Bent Hansen and Jan Tinbergen). Assessing the economic policies followed in the 1960s, Issawi argues that there was no comprehensive planning, in the true sense of the word: in fact there was neither price planning, nor consumption planning, social planning, or regional planning. The organism established for price planning – Jihaz Takhtit Al-Ass’ar – stopped its activities shortly after its creation, with the launching of the Infitah policies. As for regional planning, it was never really put into practice. In the early 1970s, Egypt was divided into 7 regions (different from the governorates), as a basis for regional planning. But in fact, this was not followed by practical steps for the elaboration of development policies adapted to each region. According to Issawi, the absence of such planning accounts for the deep economic distress found in Upper Egypt. According to Issawi, the 1967 war brought a shift in the economic policies followed by the regime, as all resources were mobilized for the war effort. Besides, the regime adopted a more conciliatory stance towards the private sector. Issawi argues that this policy benefited a fringe of the bourgeoisie which had started to make its fortune in the 1960s in sectors like wholesale trade and the construction sector. This group managed to accumulate wealth as early as the 1960s through the partnership between the public sector and private enterprises, through legal and illegal means. However, the radical shift occurred with Sadat’s era. Following the October 1973 war and the oil-boom, Egypt’s labor force massively migrated to Gulf countries. On the international level, Egypt broke its alliance with the Soviet Union and was getting closer to the United States. The economic reforms undertaken during that era put and end to the domination of the public sector on Egypt’s economy and encouraged domestic and foreign investment in the private sector. Sadat’s closer associates (among whom, for instance, Abdel Aziz Hegazi) were indeed arguing that Egypt had to encourage foreign investments in the economy to compensate for the lack of savings. According to them, Egypt had to take advantage of the economic boom occurring in the Gulf countries and change its economic policies accordingly. According to Issawi, with the growth of the private sector and, more generally, the shift in economic policies during Sadat’s era, the Ministry of Planning stopped playing any central role in orienting the Egyptian economy. Its role became limited to investment planning in the public sector and government administrations. Five-year plans were elaborated, but they were not implemented. Besides, the relation between the NPI and the Ministry became much looser. In 1982, an economic Congress was organized at the initiative of the newly elected president Hosni Mubarak. Kamal El-Ganzouri was at that time Minister of Planning. Economists from various political tendencies attended that meeting, among whom Ibrahim Helmy Abdelrahmane, and Issawi. According to him, the Congress was marked by a wish to break with Sadat’s economic policies, and to return to planning as a way of managing the Egyptian economy. Indeed the NPI was asked to collaborate in the elaboration of the following Five-year plan. But the ministry made little use of the research work done by the Institute; the discourse about the return to planning proved illusory and remained a slogan. Starting from the 1980s, the State started progressively to decrease its investments in the public sector. The main justification for such a policy, which was encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank, was that the financial resources were limited and that the priority had thus to be given to the private sector. Starting from the 1990s the government started officially to express its intention to proceed with privatizations. In that context, the role of the Ministry of Planning became confined to allocating state funds to the different sectors (health, education, police, etc.) 2010-02-11T15:27:01Z